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ABSTRACT 
 
This dissertation adopts an analytic concept of settler colonial pacification to examine shifts in 
the policing of Indigenous peoples’ protests in Ontario from the mid-1990s to 2013. Following 
the high-profile conflicts at Oka / Kanesatake, Gustafsen Lake / Ts'Peten and Ipperwash / 
Aazhoodena, the Ontario Provincial Police and RCMP introduced several reforms, which were 
promoted as guarding against the escalation of violence during protests: relationship-building 
with Indigenous communities, negotiation-based protest policing, measured response, and 
intelligence-led policing. These have been adopted in the context of an intensified national 
security environment based on the protection of critical infrastructure. My project situates these 
reforms in the context of the Canadian state’s ongoing project of settler colonialism. For a 
critical understanding of policing, colonial relations must be foundational to the analysis and the 
police institution must be situated in the context of ongoing colonialism because of its historical 
foundations in constituting settler colonial order.  
Through open source texts, records obtained through access to information requests, 
and interviews with law enforcement and government personnel, this dissertation (un)maps 
institutional policies, practices, tensions and disjunctures in the implementation of reforms. I 
trace the practices and interconnections of three institutional clusters of policing: front line police 
forces, the intelligence and national security nexus, and Indian Affairs and the emergency 
management apparatus. These processes are organized through and reinforce the symbiotic 
depoliticising logics of (1) liberal legalistic discourses of rights, and (2) security discourses of 
prevention and management. I argue that these contemporary practices can be understood as 
settler colonial pacification strategies that simultaneously work to suppress Indigenous 
nationhood and (re)produce the Canadian nation-state. Deployed in governing Indigenous 
peoples, these practices reveal the persistent settler state concern with asserting sovereign 
authority. As settler colonialism is an ongoing process, there are historical continuities and 
discontinuities in pacification practices. Shifts and disjunctures in policing practices reflect the 
inherent instability and anxieties of settler colonialism and the paradox of liberal democratic 
policing vis-à-vis Indigenous self-determination struggles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
In the summer and fall of 2013, Mi’kmaq and Acadian protesters engaged in a blockade of 
fracking operations in Elsipogtog, New Brunswick. On October 17, the Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP) carried out a pre-dawn raid after RCMP negotiators had assured protesters the 
day before that there would be no surprise operations. Images and videos of camouflaged 
snipers, snarling police dogs, police lines, an armoured personnel carrier, and burning police 
cars flooded social and mainstream media. Solidarity actions occurred across (what is now 
known as) Canada. Occurring eighteen years after Dudley George was shot and killed by the 
Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) during a reclamation action at Ipperwash Provincial Park and 
six years after the release of the Ipperwash Inquiry’s final reports, the events at Elsipogtog 
evoked comparisons to Ipperwash, as well as to the show of state violence at the armed 
standoffs at Oka (Kanesatake) in 1990 and Gustafsen Lake (Ts’Peten) in 1995. In both cases, 
the Canadian military were deployed in support of police; at Oka, they took over command from 
the Sûreté du Québec. Elsipogtog seemed to be a stark contrast to how police responded to the 
wave of Idle No More protests across Canada in the winter of 2012-2013. Despite hundreds of 
protest actions, including numerous blockades, there was minimal conflict involving police and 
only one person was charged. The policing of Idle No More was seen as reflecting major shifts 
in police practices.  
After the experiences of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash, the RCMP and OPP 
have emphasized the adoption of measures aimed at improving their relations with Indigenous 
communities, and of a “peacekeeping” approach to protests. While the events at Elsipogtog 
seemed to run counter to the “new” policing approach that had been a “success” with Idle No 
More, neither case is an exception to “normal” practices. Direct actions and protests are highly 
visible manifestations of Indigenous peoples’ resistance in a settler colonial state. Rather than 
“exceptional” moments, they are important lenses through which to concretely examine the 
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broader relationships of policing to state formation, state sovereignty, colonialism, imperialism, 
and capitalist economic production.  
This dissertation examines the policing of Indigenous peoples’ protests in Ontario from 
the mid-1990s to 2013 and situates them in these broader relations, processes, and structures 
of settler colonialism. The reforms introduced by the OPP and RCMP since 1995 include the 
prioritisation of community relationship-building, and the adoption of negotiation-based protest 
policing, intelligence-led policing, and incident command structures. Reflecting wider trends in 
liberal democratic policing, these reforms have been promoted by police forces as guarding 
against the escalation of violence during protest and respecting the right to protest. At the same 
time, these measures have been adopted in the context of a broader intensification of national 
security structures and practices, which have manifested within police forces through 
enhancements to “militaristic” tactical units, access to a greater range of weapons and 
equipment, and participation in national security intelligence-sharing forums. On the surface, 
these shifts might appear to be contradictory—a “softening” of public order policing along with a 
“hardening” through militarisation and securitisation. This “contradiction” has been taken up in 
police studies and social movement studies, but the failure to address the specificity of how 
these practices are implemented in the context of Indigenous resistance is a significant 
substantive and conceptual limitation. 
For a critical understanding of policing, the police institution must be situated in the 
context of ongoing colonialism, regardless of whether the immediate subject of inquiry relates to 
Indigenous peoples. The police institution is historically grounded in the emergence of nation-
states and capitalism, integral to the production of order. In this dissertation, I adopt an analytic 
concept of settler colonial pacification through which to understand how contemporary policing 
(re)produces settler colonial order through practices that are simultaneously repressive and 
constitutive in containing “threats” to the settler state’s assertion of sovereignty. This assertion 
of sovereignty that underlies the settler state formation is entwined with securing conditions 
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amenable to accumulation, starting with access to land and resources. Through an analytic 
framework of (un)mapping, my project traces concrete institutional practices to make visible how 
pacification strategies “work” as part of the ongoing and inherently insecure project of settler 
colonialism. 
 
SITUATING THE PROJECT  
Context 
After the events of Ipperwash, the Ontario government refused demands for a public inquiry into 
the death of Dudley George. In 2003, a newly elected Liberal government established the 
Ipperwash Inquiry with two mandates of inquiring into the specific events surrounding George’s 
death, and a broader policy-based inquiry to develop recommendations aimed at preventing 
similar tragedies in the future. The inquiry was a significant moment as an exposition of the 
“problem” of Indigenous protests in the context of state-Indigenous relations. Although the 
Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) began to implement reforms soon after Ipperwash, the inquiry 
validated and legitimated these as consistent with ideals of liberal democratic policing. One of 
the Inquiry recommendations was that there should be an independent, third-party evaluation of 
the OPP’s Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents, its central post-
Ipperwash policy reform. As of July 2014, the OPP have not yet had an independent evaluation. 
In December 2013, the organisation released an “annual report” about its use of the 
Framework—the first formal piece of documentation offered for external accountability since 
Ipperwash.  
This “new” policing approach has been implemented in many protests since Ipperwash, 
including the 2006 Six Nations reclamation at Caledonia, the 2007 National Day of Action, and 
Idle No More protests. In many cases, both the OPP and RCMP have emphasized their use of a 
negotiation-based approach rather than aggressive enforcement. This has been met with high 
profile, public criticisms of police and government by politicians, members of the judiciary, media 
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commentators, and non-Indigenous people for what is perceived as a “failure” by  police to 
enforce the “rule of law” against disruptive Indigenous protests. The OPP and RCMP have 
responded to these criticisms, often referencing the Ipperwash recommendations, by arguing 
that their actions, and restraint, are evidence of the “success” of their reforms for maintaining 
“peace”. 
While critical analyses of official discourses and representations of police activities are 
important because they tell us about dominant discourses and narratives, such analyses are 
also limited for understanding policing practices because they rely on the perspectives of police 
organisations and their claims to institutional expertise. This claim to expertise and authority is 
reinforced by the hidden nature of bureaucratic processes, as well as the secrecy that cloaks 
internal police activities and decisions as matter of security. In addition to official police 
accounts, documentation and analysis of the policing of these events has largely been through 
mainstream media reporting, or books written by journalists (such as the very comprehensive 
examination of Ipperwash by Peter Edwards (2003)) as well as reports by non-governmental 
organisations. Accounts have also been produced by the people who experience policing 
firsthand as participants in protests, which are often documented in media reports or non-
governmental organisation reports.  
 
Research on Policing Indigenous Protests 
Despite the continuity of Indigenous resistance in the history of the settler state (integral in the 
formation of the state itself), the contemporary policing of Indigenous peoples’ direct action 
resistance in Canada has been relatively limited in academic work. In rare cases scholarly 
analyses might be part of legal or quasi-legal processes such as inquiries. For example, 
academics were engaged in the Ipperwash Inquiry process to produce background papers on a 
wide range of topics. There have recently been scholarly books published by Laura DeVries 
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(2011) about the conflict at Six Nations, and by Edward Hedican (2013) about Ipperwash and 
the inquiry, but neither takes policing as a focal point.  
In the existing academic literature on protest policing, which is concentrated in the fields 
of police studies and social movement studies, Indigenous protests are largely invisible. On one 
hand, studies of the policing of Indigenous peoples tend to be historical, or do not take up the 
policing of Indigenous resistance in a contemporary context of colonialism. On the other hand, 
the literature on public order policing in Canada has not addressed the unique dimensions of 
Indigenous protests.  
Colonialism, Policing (and) Indigenous Peoples 
The role of police in colonial relations between Indigenous peoples and the Canadian settler-
state has been taken up in an historical context in several important works (e.g. Anderson and 
Killingray 1991; Greer 1992; Marquis 1997; K. Smith 2009; Nettelbeck and Smandych 2010). 
These works situate the emergence of police in Canada in the early nineteenth century as 
directly intertwined with controlling indigenous resistance to settler colonialism. Based on 
historical records, these studies have documented techniques and strategies of colonial control 
conducted by police forces such as surveillance practices and the enforcement of the Indian Act 
(Marquis 1997; K. Smith 2009). Historians (e.g. Marquis 1997; Styles 1987) and scholars of 
policing such as Brogden (1987a, 1987b), Sigler and King (1992), and Deflem (1994) document 
how the police institution (re)produced not just a class-based order, but a colonial one. Studies 
of colonial policing in the everyday lives of Indigenous peoples in the contemporary context are 
important contributions, reflecting pacification on a localised, normalised scale through over and 
under-enforcement contributing to high incarceration rates of Indigenous men and women (e.g. 
Razack 2002; Samuelson and Monture 2008; Comack 2012). It is important to situate protests 
and direct actions on a continuum with everyday encounters. 
The literature on Indigenous protests in the contemporary Canadian context has not 
focused on policing as a form of power. Much of this research has documented specific 
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struggles (e.g. Richardson 1989; Hodgins, Lischke and McNab 2003; DeVries 2011), examined 
the trajectory of Indigenous activism over time (e.g. Hall 1991; Long 1992; Wilkes 2004; Ramos 
2006, 2008), and analysed dominant representations of Indigenous struggles (e.g. Wilkes 2004; 
Knopf 2007; Hedican 2008; Adese 2009; Wilkes, Corrigall-Brown and Ricard 2010; Wilkes, 
Corrigall-Brown and Myer 2010). This body of work is important in documenting and making 
protests visible while contributing to understanding the colonial relationship. Indigenous 
resistance more broadly has been taken up in the work of Indigenous scholars and activists with 
a focus on the impact of past struggles on ongoing resistance, and on articulating dimensions 
and projects of Indigenous self-determination (e.g. Manuel and Posluns 1974; Horn 1991; 
Monture-Angus 1999; Alfred 1999, 2005; Turner 2006; Coulthard 2007; Corntassel 2008; L. 
Simpson 2008).   
Public Order Policing  
The substantive literature on public order policing and the criminalisation of dissent has largely 
excluded consideration of Indigenous peoples’ resistance in Canada. This is significant in light 
of the number, frequency, and duration of direct actions undertaken by Indigenous peoples and 
communities, but also because of the broader political significance of indigenous struggles vis-
à-vis the settler state. Most of the existing research has focused on the policing of labour conflict 
and transnational “mega-events” such as economic summits and Olympics protests; this 
empirical context has informed theorising related to public order policing. The other limitation in 
the wider literature is that there is a tendency to frame police practices or tactics in binary terms. 
In general, there has been a relative lack of research on public order policing in Canada. 
In a 1997 article Mike King (1997) argues that this lack of attention has been symptomatic of the 
liberal ideology of the Canadian nation-state being a “peaceable kingdom”, particularly in 
distinction from the US (citing Torrance 1991). Part of this “peaceable kingdom” narrative is the 
sacrosanctity of the police institution in the mythology of the Canadian nation-state. Since 1997, 
the body of literature has grown, spurred largely by transnational global justice protests since 
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Seattle in 1997 and the various summits that have taken place in Canada (e.g. Ericson and 
Doyle 1999; Pue 2000; Esmonde 2002, 2003; de Lint and Hall 2002, 2003; Sheptycki 2005; 
Kennelly 2009; Rafail 2010; Monaghan and Walby 2012a; 2012b). Willem de Lint and Alan 
Hall’s (2009) book, Intelligent Control, was the first comprehensive, historically-grounded study 
of public order policing in Canada and an important critical contribution. Yet through grounding 
their analysis in class struggles and labour relations, the colonial dimensions of contemporary 
policing are minimised. In their detailed study of the relationship between intelligence-led 
policing and negotiated management, de Lint and Hall (2009) provide a descriptive discussion 
of reclamations and blockades in which they note that the unique politicised context of land 
claims has an influence on police practices. However, they do not offer a substantial analysis, 
basing their arguments and conception of “intelligent control” largely on the trajectory of policing 
labour unrest and transnational “mega-events”. 
 Beyond the Canadian context, many policing and social movements scholars have 
described the “new” public order policing approach using the analogy of the “velvet glove” to 
describe negotiated management and liaison policing as working in tandem with the “iron fist” of 
“paramilitary” tactical response (see e.g. Kraska 1997; Marx 1998; Soule and Davenport 2009; 
Earl 2011). Other scholars such as Soule and Davenport (2009) suggest variations in protest 
policing such as “even hand”. This analogy of the “iron first” and “velvet glove” refers to what are 
described as two separate processes or trends in policing: a “softening” reflected in liaisons and 
communication-based approaches, and a “hardening” visible in “militarisation” or 
“paramilitarisation” (e.g. Kraska 1997). Some scholars have associated the proliferation of 
police intelligence operations with “paramilitarisation”, while others have described it as being 
the “velvet glove” (de Lint and Hall 2009). I argue that these practices and dynamics are not 
“new” but rather are continuities of modern police power. While these functions are carried out 
by separate police units (which are sometimes in conflict with each other) it is more appropriate 
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to see these strategies as a whole—the glove cannot be separated from the “fist”. The inherent 
potential violence of the police institution is always present and is what enables “soft” strategies. 
A significant limitation of being caught up with describing “models” of policing is the risk 
of abstracting or generalising practices and ignoring or dismissing “exceptional” cases as 
anomalous. The complexities, contingencies and tensions of actual practices of power and 
resistance can be obscured. Studies of protest policing in Anglo-American and European states 
have consistently found that police responses, in terms of the tactics they use to manage 
protests, are shaped in large part by the social locations of protesters. There is a greater 
tendency for police to use coercion or force (“the iron fist”)—and thus, to criminalise—younger, 
racialised and economically marginalised people (e.g. Waddington 2007; Soule and Davenport 
2009). The specific power relations at work in the policing of protests and direct actions by 
Indigenous peoples have not been adequately addressed. These actions are distinct from 
others that occur in Canada (and in other settler states) because they are ultimately challenges 
to the settler-state’s assertion of sovereignty through its control of territory and exercise of 
authority—a process in which the police institution is directly implicated. Direct actions such as 
reclamations and blockades are often responses to the systemic failure of governments to 
address grievances and land claims (Maaka and Fleras 2005), bringing Indigenous peoples into 
a space of colonial encounter with the police—an institution historically implicated in their 
displacement, dispossession, and repression (Williams and Murray 2007; Samuelson and 
Monture 2008; Gordon 2006, 2010).  
The lack of empirically-grounded research and theorising of policing in the specificity of 
the colonial context can be attributed in part to limited “backstage research” and the limitations 
of relying on official representations or evaluations of policing. A significant obstacle contributing 
to this gap are methodological barriers to conducting scholarly research of police institutions. I 
argue for the importance of “shifting the gaze” onto institutions in a way that goes beyond official 
narratives. 
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RESEARCH APPROACH and OBJECTIVES 
The focus of my research is on the “backstage” of policing activities. By “backstage”, I am 
referring to the institutional practices and processes that are not usually visible outside of 
organisations. These are the logics, structures, and practices that underlie or animate the 
concrete, visible policing activities experienced by Indigenous people, either directly in protest 
situations, or indirectly. My approach is therefore intended as a counterpoint to official 
institutional narratives, and as a complement to documentation, research, and analyses 
produced by Indigenous communities, supporters, or observers based on the lived experiences 
of those involved in these conflicts. This dissertation is not intended as a review or an evaluation 
of post-Ipperwash OPP and RCMP reforms in the conventional sense of assessing 
“effectiveness” or “success” and should not be read as such. My argument is that the police 
institution must be situated in the context of settler colonialism, and that policing practices 
should be understood in terms of how they (re)produce dominant relations. Protests and direct 
actions are highly visible colonial encounters between Indigenous self-determination and the 
settler state’s assertion of sovereignty, embodied by police as law enforcers with the capacity to 
use coercive force to make “peace”.  
This research seeks to make colonialism “foundational” (Lawrence and Dua 2005) by 
centring it substantively and analytically. Settler colonialism is not just about Indigenous peoples 
on the one hand, and “the government” and police on the other. Through our presence on this 
land, settlers are unavoidably part of the structures and relations of settler colonialism and 
therefore implicated in sustaining (or challenging) existing conditions. Non-indigenous academic 
researchers have been complicit directly through exploitive research practices and knowledge 
production, and less directly (but no less significantly) through the failure to address colonialism 
in our work and thus perpetuating its naturalisation. This dissertation is informed by my 
engagement with critiques made by Bonita Lawrence and Enakshi Dua (2005), Linda Tuhiwai 
Smith (1999), Andrea Smith (2010) and other Indigenous scholars, of the failure of anti-racist 
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scholars and activists to connect our work to colonialism, and of settlers in general to recognise 
and interrogate our complicity in settler colonialism. As a social formation, settler colonialism 
shapes social, political and economic relations and structures. For academics, this occurs by 
reproducing and legitimating dominant discourses as well as through our silences. 
Decolonisation requires that settlers take initiative in challenging the colonial structures in which 
we are complicit (L. Smith 1999; A. Smith 2014). Academics have benefited from the 
exploitation of Indigenous peoples as subjects and objects of research, as well as by living and 
working on stolen land. Settler academics must interrogate how our research practices and 
knowledge production contribute to and legitimate ongoing colonial violence (L. Smith 1999; A. 
Smith 2014). In shifting the research “gaze” onto the “backstages” of dominant institutions—as 
the problem to be known and intervened upon—my approach aims to make colonialism central 
and not engage in colonising practices.  
The concept of settler colonial pacification makes colonialism foundational to the 
analysis of the police institution and police practices, which includes attention to the spatial 
dimension of order production, and emphasizes agency and resistance within and outside of 
institutions. My analytic framework of (un)mapping aims to make visible the “backstage” 
practices of pacification as micro-physics of power—how pacification works—which de-
naturalises the project of settler colonialism (and state sovereignty) as an ongoing and 
inherently insecure formation. There are three inter-connected objectives guiding this research: 
 To examine the “backstage” of how the “new” public order policing approach of 
negotiated management and militarisation (including intelligence-led policing) are 
implemented in relation to Indigenous peoples’ protests.  
 To examine how policing, as pacification, extends beyond the front-line police institution 
by concretely identifying (a) the formal and informal relationships and networks among 
police, security, government and other entities (e.g. corporations and private interests) 
and (b) how these institutions are involved in managing protests.   
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 To understand how the specific practices and networks of contemporary policing 
(re)produce the settler state through different frameworks and logics of liberal rights, 
reconciliation, and (national) security, and to identify continuities and discontinuities with 
historical practices.  
 
While current practices may be reasonably successful in limiting the escalation of conflict 
due to aggressive police tactics, my analysis makes visible how these practices constrain the 
parameters of “legitimate” protest while intensifying governance and having punitive implications 
for those who transgress. These processes are organised through and reinforce the symbiotic 
logics of (1) liberal legalistic discourses of rights, and (2) security discourses of prevention and 
management. I argue that these processes are part of settler colonial pacification that 
simultaneously work to problematise and suppress Indigenous nationhood and (re)produce the 
Canadian nation-state. The tensions and disjunctures of policing practices made visible in my 
research reveal ruptures in these governing logics, and thus, in legal, judicial, police, and 
administrative institutions. In examining how police and government policies are being 
implemented in practice, my dissertation moves beyond evaluating the “success” or “failure” of 
these reforms to show how they are rooted in the colonial relations between the Canadian state 
and Indigenous peoples. This project also seeks to make visible the contingencies and 
complexities in these practices, which characterise the (re)production of settler colonialism. 
 
OUTLINE OF THE DISSERTATION  
I begin in chapter 1 by outlining my analytical concept of settler-colonial pacification, which 
draws on (1) the contributions of Michel Foucault and political economy scholarship on police 
power and pacification, and (2) settler-colonial studies literature. Theorising of police power and 
the police institution has been limited by a lack of attention to ongoing colonialism. In 
Foucauldian work, this is reflected in the minimisation of enduring juridical and disciplinary 
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exercises of power. As postcolonial and colonial governmentality scholars have emphasized, 
these forms of power are regularly experienced by racialised and Indigenous peoples. While the 
political economy approach has addressed the enduring violence of police power, it has been 
limited in addressing the role of this violence in constituting settler colonial formations, which 
underlie capitalism and class struggles. One of the implications of this is that the space of the 
settler state is naturalised. Drawing on settler colonial theory, an analytic of settler colonial 
pacification for studying policing makes ongoing settler colonialism foundational, addresses the 
spatial dimensions of order production, and centres the dialectic relationship of power and 
resistance. These components are reflected in my methodological framework of (un)mapping, 
which draws on the work of Dorothy Smith and Sherene Razack. Starting with concrete 
moments of resistance as entry-points, (un)mapping makes visible the practices of settler 
colonial institutions to show how these practices work to (re)produce order. This approach 
disrupts dominant discourses or organising logics that naturalise social, political, economic and 
territorial order of the settler state.  
In chapter 2 I apply the concept of settler colonial pacification to the specific context of 
Canadian nation-state formation. I focus on the origins of the police institution, its relationship 
with the Indian Affairs bureaucracy, and the role of these institutions in asserting sovereignty in 
(re)producing the settler state. Adopting Comaroff’s (2001) concept of “lawfare”, I discuss how 
liberal legalism and rights discourse have become dominant logics of contemporary 
mechanisms of pacification. Since the 1960s, in the context of the emergence of the rights 
regime, there has been an increase in Indigenous militancy, which reflects the dialectic 
relationship of pacification and resistance and makes visible the instabilities of settler 
colonialism. I discuss the events of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash as significant 
“ruptures” that have shaped contemporary policing practices.  
 In chapter 3, I argue that the Ipperwash Inquiry and the series of official reforms made 
by the OPP and RCMP since the mid-1990s are consistent with a politics of reconciliation that 
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work to (re)legitimate the settler state and organisational authority disrupted through the 
encounters of Oka, Gustafsen Lake and Ipperwash. I situate these reforms in the context of 
broader logics and structures of national security. In the period that reforms were being 
implemented, the federal government introduced the Anti-Terrorism Act and National Security 
Policy, and I show how the problematisation of Indigenous protests as an object of policing is 
normalised within new security logics as an object of national security. The contemporary 
colonial police-security apparatus is not static, and is dialectically shaped by ongoing 
encounters. The 2006 reclamation by members from Six Nations of the Grand River, the 2007 
National Day of Action, blockades at Tyendinaga, and Idle No More protests have been 
significant in shaping this apparatus.  
In each of chapters 4, 5 and 6, I examine specific clusters or constellations of policies, 
practices and relationships that are part of the police-security apparatus. I (un)map how reforms 
have been implemented or activated in practice, including the complexities, contingencies, 
tensions and disjunctures that emerge within and among institutional actors and organisations. 
These complexities emerge because of the constant shifting of pacification strategies, which are 
not always aligned within and between institutions. The constant shifting of strategies, and the 
disjunctures that arise, reflect an underlying paradox of liberal democratic policing vis-à-vis 
Indigenous self-determination. 
 Chapter 4 focuses on the implementation of “negotiation”-based public order policing 
and relationship building initiatives as the hallmarks of post-Ipperwash policing reforms. These 
strategies are driven by rights discourses and responsibilisation as techniques of governance. 
Disrupting the binary of consent/coercion, I show how the ever-present “coercive” components 
of the police repertoire facilitate the front-line strategies that are steeped in the language of 
“consent”. At the same time, front line “negotiation” provides legitimation for potential police use 
of force through deflection of responsibility to protesters. In the context of Indigenous resistance, 
these policing practices work to constitute “subjects of empire” (Coulthard 2007) through 
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institutionalisation/assimilation and criminalisation. As strategies articulated and deployed by 
police, I argue that governing through liberal rights is a juridical-disciplinary mode of power 
rooted in the settler state assertion of sovereign authority.  
In chapter 5, I extend my argument about the mutually constitutive dynamic of 
coercion/consent strategies by examining the way that front-line policing based on “trust” and 
relationships is entwined with surveillance and intelligence operations—the less visible 
operations of police organisations. I trace the nexus between front-line policing with/in the 
broader national security apparatus and show how CSIS, the Canadian Forces, government 
departments, and Indian Affairs participate in collaborative intelligence/knowledge production 
about Indigenous “threats” to critical infrastructure, which has emerged as a central object of the 
police-national security apparatus. The rationalisation and “scientization” of intelligence 
contributes to legitimating knowledge as “truth” and surveillance practices as necessary 
prevention measures.  
Chapter 6 continues this mapping of the wider national security apparatus to show how 
front line policing is inextricable from the political activities of government departments within a 
security paradigm of emergency management. I focus specifically on Indian Affairs and how the 
department’s historical practices of surveillance are formalised and normalised in this paradigm. 
In addition to surveillance, I show how Indian Affairs deploys legal-administrative mechanisms 
as strategies of pacifying “militant” protest. I argue that the contemporary “emergency 
management” paradigm of national security is a contemporary manifestation of the colonial 
emergency that reflects the settler colonial state preoccupation with Indigenous peoples as 
political-economic risks. The prevention oriented emergency management discourse 
depoliticises the exercise of “exceptional” power governing Indigenous communities.  
I conclude by synthesising the settler colonial pacification mechanisms discussed in the 
preceding four chapters to identify historical continuities and discontinuities reflecting the 
inherent instability and anxieties of settler colonialism, and the paradox of liberal democratic 
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policing vis-à-vis Indigenous self-determination struggles. I reflect on implications of these 
formations and spaces for future inquiry.  
 
A NOTE ON TERMINOLOGY  
The naming and categorising of people and spaces have been integral to colonial domination, 
and we need to be conscious of the potential of reproducing dominant discourses by using 
contested terms uncritically.   
In my dissertation, I use the term “Indigenous” to refer to the original peoples and 
nations whose presence on this land pre-exists European settlement. Unlike the term 
“Aboriginal”, which is a category imposed by the settler state, the term “Indigenous” transcends 
state borders. It identifies local struggles with/in a common struggle by Indigenous peoples 
around the world for autonomous survival and homelands, which have been and continue to be 
taken, destroyed, and threatened by colonisers and settlers (see Alfred and Corntassel 2005). 
The term “Aboriginal” is used in Canadian as an umbrella category referring to First Nations, 
Inuit, and Métis peoples. It is a contested term, as a social-legal category of the settler colonial 
government that forms the foundation of its policies and practices for governing Indigenous 
peoples (see Alfred and Corntassel 2005). I use the term “Aboriginal” only in reference to 
specific police programs (e.g. Aboriginal policing) and government-defined policy, such as 
Aboriginal and treaty rights or Aboriginal title. I occasionally use the term “Indian” in its historical 
context as used by settlers and the Government. “Indian” remains the legal category of an 
Indigenous person (who is not Métis or Inuit) registered as having status under the Indian Act. 
“First Nations” has replaced “Indian” as the contemporary term for Indigenous peoples who are 
not Métis or Inuit, as well as in referring to bands, communities, and nations.  
My use of the term “sovereignty” is specific to the context of nation-state formation and 
imperialism, which I discuss in chapter 1. I also use “sovereign power” in drawing on Michel 
Foucault’s work, referring to a modality of juridical power or governance by domination and 
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prerogative. In Indigenous politics, the use of the concept of “sovereignty” has been 
problematised because it is seen as casting assertions of autonomy in a Eurocentric model. In 
referring to Indigenous struggles for autonomy and decolonisation, I use the term “self-
determination” (see e.g. Monture-Angus 1999; Alfred 2005a; J. Barker 2005; Corntassel 2008).  
I use the term “reclamation” rather than “occupation” as each of these terms conveys 
different meanings in terms of relationship to, in these cases, land. To “reclaim” implies a prior 
and existing relationship with the land whereas to “occupy” implies an encroachment or 
infringement. Reclamations and blockades are “direct actions”, a form of protest action to 
achieve political objectives outside of institutionalised channels. Protests are expressions of 
dissent, which can take a range of forms.  
Finally, the official name for the federal bureaucracy established for the purpose of 
making and administering colonial “Indian policy” has changed many times since 1867. The 
Indian Department was first a part of the Secretary of State, but was then incorporated as a 
branch of the new Department of the Interior in 1873. In 1880, Indian Affairs became a 
department within the Ministry of the Interior. In 1936, the Department of Indian Affairs was 
moved and reduced to a branch within the Department of Mines and Resources. The branch 
moved again in 1950 to the Department of Citizenship and Immigration. In 1966, Indian Affairs 
merged with administration of the North and Territories, forming one ministry of Indian and 
Northern Affairs Canada (INAC). In June 2011, INAC changed its name to Aboriginal Affairs and 
Northern Development Canada. In the specific period of inquiry for this project, the bureaucracy 
was known as INAC. As most of the department’s documents that I have used in my research 
precede the name change, and for the sake of continuity, I use Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC) when referring specifically to the federal ministry. When discussing the federal 
and provincial bureaucracies as an institutional apparatus, I use “Indian Affairs”.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
Un)mapping Settler Colonial Pacification: Conceptual and Methodological Framework 
 
The study of protest policing has predominantly been taken up in criminology in the field of 
police studies, and in political sociology in social movements studies. The focus in these fields 
tends to be on identifying and describing distinct changes in police strategies and technologies 
and the implications for different social movements. In the wake of the 1999 anti-World Trade 
Organization protests in Seattle, studies of public order policing have focused on anti-
globalisation/ global justice movements and mobilisations at international summit events. Critical 
studies have attempted to situate these policing practices in the context of contemporary 
configurations of neoliberalism and globalisation. As discussed in the Introduction, the existing 
literature on protest policing is limited in two key dimensions: First, there is a tendency to treat 
contemporary policing practices or strategies as “new” without situating the police institution and 
practices in the historical exercise of police power and its continuities. Second, Indigenous 
protests have been comparatively ignored, or otherwise referenced as a type of protest, without 
interrogation of the historical specificity of colonialism—this ignores the distinctiveness of 
Indigenous protests as an object of policing. The literature on police power—both Foucauldian 
and political economy—is also limited in that it has not adequately addressed ongoing 
colonialism in a contemporary context. While imperialism and colonialism are acknowledged in 
accounting for the historical development of capitalism and liberalism, they have not been the 
starting points for analysis. This is a significant gap in critical theorising of police power and the 
police institution.  
This chapter is organised in two parts. In part one I outline my theoretical-conceptual 
framework through engagement with the extant literature to identify gaps and limitations in 
understanding the specificity of policing in settler colonial contexts. I articulate an analytic 
concept of settler colonial pacification that brings together two relatively recent analytic 
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directions for critical scholarship: political economy studies of police and pacification, and settler 
colonial studies. This conceptual framework is reflected in my methodological approach of 
(un)mapping, which I explain in the first half of part two. (Un)mapping draws on the approaches 
of Dorothy Smith and Sherene Razack, as well as insights from critical geography. (Un)mapping 
reflects a Foucauldian analytic of micro-physics of power in mapping concrete policing 
practices, but is grounded in a historical materialist framework informed by critical race, 
Indigenous thought, and settler colonial studies. Police practices, and the institution, are 
situated as pacification strategies in the ongoing project of settler colonial state formation. In this 
framework, multiple modalities of power work simultaneously to suppress enduring Indigenous 
self-determination and to constitute, or (re)produce, settler colonial sovereignty. In the second 
half of part two, I discuss my use of open source texts, access to information requests, and 
semi-structured interviews to (un)map policing practices and identify considerations about the 
research process. As a mode of inquiry, (un)mapping is inextricably bound up with the power 
relations being researched. I conclude the chapter with a brief note on “studying up”. 
 
PART I: THEORETICAL-CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK  
POLICING AS PACIFICATION  
I begin with establishing the concept of police, drawing on Foucault’s significant contribution 
through his genealogies of power and the state. I identify some of the limitations of Foucault’s 
treatment of police, which are addressed in the political economy literature by situating the 
police concept in the context of the symbiosis of modern states and capitalism. The concept of 
pacification has emerged in recent political economy theorising of police power and security. 
Pacification is a useful analytic concept that captures the continuities of military-police power, of 
war and “peace”, and the enduring significance of sovereign power in contemporary liberal 
democratic societies. The attention to enduring sovereign-juridical power as connected with 
state formations addresses a key limitation of Foucault from a political economy perspective, 
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which is the de-emphasis of the enduring significance of “the state” and his lack of attention to 
juridical and disciplinary modes of power in neoliberalism. The theorising of pacification as a 
critical analytic concept is relatively new, and there are important gaps in the current body of 
literature which are evident when applying the pacification concept to the specificity of settler 
colonial formations. By addressing these gaps, the analytical contribution of the pacification 
concept can be strengthened overall, and specifically as a way of understanding the 
dis/continuties of police power in settler colonial societies.  
 
Police, Policing, and the Police 
My analysis draws on the contributions of Foucault, Pasquino, and contemporary political 
economy scholars in understanding police as a modality of power specific to the historical 
emergence of modern states and capitalism. For Foucault, police power extends beyond a 
specific institution or function—i.e. the police institution. The specific institution of the police is 
one manifestation, or source, of police power that is distinct because of its capacity to exercise 
legitimated violence. For political economy scholars, an analysis of police is an inquiry of the 
interconnected processes of state formation, accumulation and security. 
The concept of police appeared in political discourse most prominently in seventeenth 
century Europe referring to a project of legislative and administrative regulation of public life in 
the interests of the general welfare of the population and ensuring “good order”—in short, the 
management of population(s) by the state (Neocleous 2000; Foucault 2007).1 Foucault (2007) 
emphasizes that police had historically-specific forms in each state, with the most extensive 
articulation of police occurring in Germany in the form of polizeiwissenschaft, or “police 
science”. The influence of the Enlightenment and classical liberal philosophy are evident in this 
police science, reflected in its reliance on statistics and in organising governance strategies 
                                               
1
 “Police” was used in Germany, Italy, and France, whereas the terms “policy” or “commonwealth” were more 
commonly used in Britain (Neocleous 2000).  
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through primarily administrative rather than juridical-legal mechanisms.2 The objective of police 
was to increase or maximise the “public happiness”—i.e. prosperity and wealth—through 
management of the population, regulation of the necessities of life, health, prevention of 
idleness, and the circulation of goods and workers. Between the seventeenth and nineteenth 
centuries the concept of police gradually narrowed to refer to a specific institution (the police) 
and activity (policing) associated with enforcing “law and order” (Neocleous 2000; Foucault 
2007). However, the police institution continued to engage in these other areas of order 
production. The police project was indispensable to the raison d’état of state expansion by 
fostering conditions for commerce through maximisation of the population, minimising wages 
and costs, as well as acquiring gold (Foucault 2007).3 The prosperity of the nascent modern 
state—its competitiveness in the global context—depended on “the strength and productivity of 
all and each” (Gordon 1991:10).  
One of the major critiques of Foucault’s work on police, and studies of police based on 
Foucault’s work, is that in focusing on the dispersal of power beyond the state, ongoing forms of 
coercion and domination are minimised. As Neocleous (2000) writes, “the Foucauldian texts are 
stripped of any sense that police has anything to do with violence and thus state power” (p. x). 
In particular, there is a minimisation of the police institution—and of police officers as agents—
and of the relationship of police and military power. Although the police institution is just one 
source of police power, it is a significant one because it is the institution that enacts sovereign 
power through its potential to use coercion to effect order. In one of the Society Must be 
Defended lectures, Foucault (2003:250) describes police as both disciplinary and 
regulatory/administrative. In later lectures, the disciplinary dimension seems to be dropped as 
                                               
2
 Polizei, polizeiwissenschaft, and cameralism were forms of police science. Cameralism was a discipline of 
mercantilist administration, which was closely linked with police. The concept of police appeared in the work of 
classical political economists including William Petty and Adam Smith (see Rigakos et al. 2009; Williams 2003). 
Foucault ([1973]2000:69) describes Patrick Colquhoun as the “creator of the police in England”.  
3
 Raison d’état can be understood as the moment when “the state”—or “the idea of the state” (Abrams 1977[1988])—
emerges as a convergence of an “art of governing” (governmentality) and political sovereignty (Walters 2012:25).  
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he pursues analysis of police as a political-administrative apparatus of biopolitics—normalising 
and “optimising” the life of the population. Foucault (1991:102) emphasized that juridical and 
disciplinary modes of power were not replaced by (biopolitical) government but rather co-exist 
as “a triangle”; however, the enduring significance of juridical and disciplinary dimensions of 
police is overshadowed. The multiplicity and complexity of the power effects of police, including 
the coercive aspects, fade into the background.  
The political economy literature addresses the perceived detachment of violence in 
Foucault’s conception of police. By engaging in historically-grounded inquiry and theorising of 
“policing as a grand intellectual project linked to state formation, prosperity and security in 
Enlightenment thought” (Rigakos, McMullan, Johnson and Ozcan 2009:1-2), a political economy 
of police situates the contemporary police institution in this historical context of state formation. 
As McMullan (1998) argues, raison d’état and the police state did not completely give way to 
liberal governmentality. As elaborated by McMullan (1998), Neocleous (2000) and Rigakos et al. 
(2009), police produced a social order conducive to the emergence of capitalism through the 
object(ive) of maximising the population (as labour and wealth), which is integral to state 
sovereignty. An analysis of police provides insights on the symbiosis of capitalism and state 
formation. This work identifies the integral role of the police as an institution invested with a 
legitimated monopoly of violence in establishing and maintaining conditions amenable to 
capitalist accumulation in both the domestic and colonial contexts. Neocleous (2000), Gordon 
(2006, 2010), and Rigakos et al. (2009) among others have examined how the police institution 
has been integral to the production of the working class by compelling participation in waged 
labour through enforcing vagrancy laws and criminalisation of other means of subsistence.  
A second major critique that stems from Foucault’s analytical displacement of juridical 
and disciplinary power is that it diverts attention from the enduring and significant presence of 
state violence in the lives of subjugated groups (see e.g. Stenson 1999; Dean 1999, 2002a, 
2002b; Mbembe 2001, 2003; Hindess 2001; Singer and Weir 2008). As Stoler (1995:55) points 
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out, although Foucault shows how biopower was a basis for “inscrib[ing] modern racism in the 
mechanisms of the normalizing state,” he explicitly states that modern racism is not his focus. 
The violence of colonial and settler state sovereignty is experienced in material ways by 
racialised and Indigenous peoples in everyday life (see e.g. Razack 2002; Samuelson and 
Monture 2008; Comack 2012; in US context, see e.g. Cashmore and McLaughlin 1991; 
Chambliss 1994). As Dutton (2009) argues, drawing on Prakash (1999), while techniques of 
governance may appear similar, “race makes them operate in a profoundly different way” to 
produce domination (p.309). Colonial governmentality—a phrase introduced by David Scott 
(1995)—and postcolonial scholars applying Foucauldian analytics, have produced analyses of 
the micro-physics of power in colonial contexts that account for the multiplicity and contingency 
of power in historically specific settings (e.g. Scott 1995; Stoler 1995, 2009; Stoler and Cooper 
1997; Mbembe 2001, 2003; Moore 2005; Mawani 2009). One of the key emphases in the 
colonial governmentality literature is the enduring significance of sovereign-juridical power, 
‘race’ and racism (i.e. racial superiority/inferiority as legitimation for colonialism), and the 
anxieties of colonial rule that extended to the metropole.  
The “founding violence” of nation-state formation in establishing and maintaining 
territorial boundaries, and in producing order within those boundaries, has not disappeared. 
Sovereignty must be constantly reinforced, and overt forms of state violence are evident when 
sovereignty is challenged.4 This is especially evident in settler colonial contexts, as I will discuss 
below. The effect of a framework that focuses on “liberal governance” is that it produces 
“sanitised accounts of governance in which elements of domination, exploitation and violence 
(figuratively and literally) become largely invisible” (Merlingen 2003:191 in Walters 2012:72; also 
Hindess 2001). The rendering invisible of these ‘non-liberal’ forms of governance that sustain 
                                               
4
 In Policing the Crisis (1978), Stuart Hall and colleagues draw on Gramsci in arguing that coercive and repressive 
(state) control emerges when hegemony (consent-based “soft” control) is inadequate in securing the legitimacy of 
ruling relations. This binary of coercion-consent needs to be problematised to consider how the securing of 
sovereignty is ongoing, especially vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples. 
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relations of domination contributes to reproducing dominant narratives of state sovereignty 
(such as by relegating colonialism to the past).  
 
Police, Liberalism and Security—Sovereignty and State Formation 
With a de-emphasis on juridical and disciplinary modes of power, the relationship between 
police and military power conveys a “break” or separation of these two apparatus. As Foucault 
(2007) argues, the administrative apparatus of police emerged at the same time as the military-
diplomatic apparatus in the context of the formation of the modern state system with the treaties 
of Westphalia. Foucault (2007) describes these two formations as apparatuses of security, 
entwined by the task of enabling commerce and monetary circulation—what Marxist political 
economy would describe as fostering capitalism and the accumulation of wealth. Through 
producing and maintaining internal and intra-state peace, the security apparatuses of police and 
military-diplomacy enabled state growth, which was necessary to enhancing the 
competitiveness of the state in the global context (Gordon 1991; Foucault 2007). The state 
becomes defined by internal order based on the legitimacy of state authority, and by external 
order based on mutual recognition of sovereignty among states.5  
The defining of “modern” states that emerged in international law in the late sixteenth 
century reflected the concept of ownership. In this period, sovereignty was defined in secular 
legal terms as the claim to exclusive authority asserted over defined territory and its contents, 
including people. At the foundation of sovereignty is territorialisation—the process of asserting 
(creating and maintaining) boundaries of authority (ownership). As Elden (2007:578) writes, 
“territory is more than merely land,” it is the constitution of a political space. Cartography was a 
key political practice of asserting ownership by inscribing the boundaries of, and naming, 
territory. As Neocleous (2003:98) writes, the assertion of sovereignty “requires the permanent 
                                               
5
 I use the concept of sovereignty here in terms of territorial authority asserted by nation-states.   
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policing of territorial boundaries” by military and police power. The police and military institutions 
(apparatuses) are inextricable from state formation as products and producers of state 
sovereignty assertions. The consolidation of state sovereignty depended in large part on the 
monopolisation of legitimate violence and distinguishing it from illegitimate acts carried out by 
entities not recognised as sovereign states (Neocleous 2000, 2008). The military and police 
institutions were vested with this monopolisation of “legitimate” violence.  
The legitimation of policing, including the use of coercion, derives from the idea/ideology 
of “the state” as guarantor of the “common good” (Abrams [1977]1988). Foucault (2007:98) 
argues that the “common good” is “ultimately nothing other than submission to [the] law” of the 
sovereign. This submission (obedience) to law is enabled by the production of an ideological 
shared interest among people within the territory, which shapes subjectivities and citizenship in 
relation to a national identity.6 Abrams ([1977]1988:75) argues that the idea of “the state” as a 
natural, legitimate monolithic entity “has been a cardinal feature of the process of subjugation” 
by mystifying those processes of political and economic domination. The “common good”, 
understood as the “security and happiness of all and of each” liberal subject is, as Pasquino 
(1991:113) emphasizes, the “security and happiness of the state”. 
This concept of security is historically-specific to the development of capitalism, and 
organises society through the politics of liberalism and its technologies of individualism and 
responsibilisation. As Marx ([1843]1978:43) put it, “security is the supreme social concept of 
bourgeois society, the concept of police.” As a political philosophy, liberalism is defined by the 
ideals of individual liberty (autonomy), private property, and equality. These ideals privilege (the 
individual rights of) accumulation, consumption, and private ownership, which are inherently 
                                               
6
 The idea of a “national identity” has been variously conceptualised as national consciousness, or racism/race war 
(Foucault 2003), “one national class interest” (Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels.1848. Manifesto of the Communist 
Party), and “imagined community” (Benedict Anderson. 1983. Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and 
Spread of Nationalism. London: Verso).  
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insecure because they are based on and produce individual (and thus, competing) self-interest, 
conflict, poverty, and the “free markets”.7  
The logics of security are concerned with the freedom of circulation, which is counter-
posed to (territorial and corporeal) restrictive logics of sovereign-juridical and disciplinary forms 
of power (Foucault 2007; see also Bigo 2008). Yet with the concept and exercise of police 
power we see how conditions (bodies, behaviours, activities) are contained through 
administration and enforcement to enable liberal “freedom”. The concept of police captures the 
inter-relationship of liberalism and security. Locally, as a “technique of liberal security”, the 
object of policing is to produce security by managing the inherent insecurity of liberalism 
(Neocleous 2000:43). Policing is legitimised by the necessity or demand for liberty (Neocleous 
2000, 2008) as well as securing natural phenomena of population and economy (Foucault 
2007). One of liberalism’s “myths”, as Neocleous (2010) puts it, is that peace is the objective of 
civil society and that states exist to ensure this peace. The universalisation of the “common 
good” of security legitimates political authority of government and state institutions, and makes 
the exercise of state sovereignty self-justifying.8 In the global context, international law works to 
maintain the peace of states, policed by the constant possibility of diplomatic-economic 
sanctions and war. As Neocleous (2010) argues, in liberal thought this binary of war/peace 
makes it conceptually paradoxical to think of structural and other forms of violence as producing 
(liberal democratic) peace. This binary of war and peace masks enduring violence that 
constitutes “peace” as a specific social order. The implication is that the role of police power is 
dichotomised with war(fare).  
                                               
7
 Liberalism legitimates inequalities, as attributed to individual actions (e.g. work ethic) and “natural” competition.  
8
 The ideological separation of the political and economic realms, and state and civil society, creates the perception 
that the state is totally separate or independent from the production of wealth (Neocleous 2000). This is a key 
mechanism that legitimises capitalist accumulation and the social hierarchy and inequality as a “natural” outcome of 
individual self-interest and a free market. At the same time, the state and its policing apparatuses, which are integral 
to this accumulation process, are also legitimised as being solely about an objective “law and order” in everyone’s 
interest. By de-coupling the interrelationship of the state and economic system, policing is legitimised. State-based 
policing is seen as a common public good while policing carried out by corporations (and non-governmental 
organisations) is linked to the protection of private interests (rights). 
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The pervasiveness of these dichotomisations has implications for scholarship. These 
binaries underlie critiques of the contemporary “blurring” between public police and ‘security’ 
functions associated with national security and the military. This critique assumes that at some 
point in time there was actually a clear separation between policing and security functions—
what Brodeur (1983, 2007) distinguishes as “high and “low” policing. “High” policing refers to 
centralised, political policing with the objective of securing the government and the state. “Low” 
policing refers to the “everyday” consent-based policing concerned with public order and law 
enforcement. The former is associated with national police forces, security intelligence agencies 
and the military, which are responsible to the executive branch of government, while the latter 
describes urban-based police organisations responsible to law.  
Intersecting with these two “models” are a set of binaries with respect to primary policing 
strategies (“hard”/coercive versus “soft”/consent-based) and circumstances (‘exceptional’ versus 
‘normal’). These binaries are constitutive of liberal-security logics (Neocleous and Rigakos 
2011). The “norm” for liberal democratic societies is consent-based low policing, whereas the 
use of high policing and coercion to police citizens would be illiberal—unless it occurs in 
exceptional circumstances in the interest of the “common good”. These binaries further 
dichotomise the institutions of police and military and their association with peace and war, 
respectively. As I discuss in chapter 2, these binaries have historically been fundamental to the 
legitimation of the public police as well as of forms of “high” policing deployed in colonial 
spaces. 
The incorporation of these binaries within scholarship shapes how we define 
phenomena as phenomena, and how we problematise them. The tendency in police studies and 
social movement studies to describe tactics associated with a “militarisation of police” is based 
on the assumption that police and military institutions are or have been engaged in distinct 
activities in separate spaces. This elides the common origins of these institutions as parts of 
entwined security apparatuses. The implications are that the objects of theorising and empirical 
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inquiry “are ultimately liberal concerns” (Neocleous 2013:9). This includes framing analyses of 
police and security in terms of whether they conform to or violate “rule of law” and liberal 
democratic norms (Neocleous and Rigakos 2011). Consequently, “militarisation of policing” is 
cast as a “bad”, illiberal development that runs counter to “normal” liberal democratic policing. 
By implication this idealised norm of “low” policing is legitimated, despite its continuous 
deployment of violence to produce order, as experienced by those who are “out of order”. 
Within theoretically-informed and critical literature (much of which is influenced by 
Foucault or governmentality studies), there has been a significant body of work concerned with 
the ubiquity of “security” discourse and formations in contemporary societies. This includes 
scholarship on concepts such as “securitisation”, the perceived “(para)militarisation” of police 
forces (Kraska and Kappeler 1997; Kraska 2001, 2007; Murphy 2007; de Lint and Hall 2009), 
the risk society (Beck 1992; Ericson and Haggerty 1997), actuarial governance (Feeley and 
Simon 1992; Feeley 1994), “net-widening”, and “states of exception” (Agamben 1998, 2005). 
Yet, as Bigo (2008) notes, much of the Foucauldian-inspired work on security has primarily 
been concerned with liberal governmentality and risk (through diffusion beyond the state) rather 
than “the police state” and violence (p.103).9 Valverde (2010) has critiqued much of this 
“security” literature as (re)producing a generalised abstract concept of security/securitisation 
that lacks empirically-grounded research of the specificity of how “security” works. From a 
political economy perspective, this lack of empirical inquiry misses the continuities of security 
practices. As Rigakos et al. (2009) argue, this work does not account for the long historically-
rooted trajectory of these processes as features of police power in state formation. In doing so, 
the “novelty” of security discourse is overstated. While acknowledging an intensification of 
security discourse and formations since 2001 and changes in techniques, Neocleous (2008) 
                                               
9
 Bigo (2008) argues that research needs to address the question of violence and struggle in relation to security; if 
security is norm(alised) and violence/struggle are conceived as “exceptional”, we (re)produce a “symbolic inversion of 
violence as a force for peace and protection” (p.103). Indeed, this is the project undertaken by political economy of 
police and pacification.  
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challenges the perception that this is a novel or substantially different project from what was 
happening before. I argue that this is all the more evident when we ground the analysis in 
contemporary colonialism.  
 
Police as Pacification 
To further disrupt the binary of police power and war, Neocleous (2010, 2011a) has argued for 
the “re-appropriation” of pacification from the field of international relations as a concept for 
radical political and social theory in furthering critical study of police as part of an emergent 
“anti-security” framework (Neocleous and Rigakos 2009, 2013). Theorising of police as 
pacification problematises the liberal-security binary logic that has structured scholarly inquiries 
on policing and security through dichotomisations of police–military power, public-private, state-
civil society, coercion-consent, war-peace, and exception-normality. Rather than structuring 
critical inquiry, these concepts become objects of analysis. Rejecting binary thinking can 
produce more complex but nuanced understandings of how power works. Importantly, it also 
resonates with the work of Indigenous scholars and activists in understanding colonialism as 
war.  
Historical Foundations of Pacification  
Like the concept of police, theorising of pacification has an historical-materialist basis grounded 
in the emergence of modern nation-states, international law, and imperialism as a project of 
state expansion through empire-building. Etymologically, pacification refers to a process of 
bringing or making (imposing) “peace” amidst conflict or disorder. Pacification emerged as a 
concept within the same historical period as police, appearing in political discourse in the 
sixteenth century as scholars sought to legitimate the conquest of Indigenous peoples as a non-
state entity, in the context of the nascent modern-state system and international law.   
One of the foundations for the emergence of sovereignty doctrine and international law 
came from the contributions of Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria to intellectual-legal 
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debates concerning the status of “Indians” in relation to the Spanish. If Indians were “human”, 
then conquest would be illegitimate as a violation of their sovereign authority. Against church 
doctrine, De Vitoria argued that Indians were human and therefore had “ownership” of the land. 
This meant that they were bound by the universal natural law principle of reason (jus gentium). 
Under this principle, Spain (like all sovereign nations) had the right to travel and to engage in 
trade. Preventing the exercise of this sovereign right would be considered an act of “barbarism” 
in violation of this natural law (Anghie 1996; Russell 2005; Neocleous 2010), amounting to an 
“act of war” (de Vitoria in Anghie 1996:326). Spanish invasion and colonisation were thusly 
rationalised as a “just war” (jus in bello) in defending their right under natural law in response to 
Indigenous resistance to their incursions (Anghie 1996). For de Vitoria, the purpose of (“just”) 
war was “to establish peace and security” (in Neocleous 2010:12; emphasis added). The 
description of conquest as bringing or making of “peace” was a rhetorical move that masked the 
violence of conquest (Neocleous 2010), while reinforcing the racial superiority of Europeans and 
legitimating the assertion of imperial sovereignty.  
As discussed above, Foucault (2007) locates the emergence of military-diplomatic and 
police apparatuses with the formation of the European concept of nation-state sovereignty 
emerging with the Peace of Westphalia. The diplomatic-military apparatus maintained a 
universal peace, or “equilibrium” among European nation-states through the ever-present 
potential of war (as enforcement), (liberal) diplomacy, and the creation of standing armies. From 
de Vitoria’s theorising to seventeenth century Westphalian equilibrium, the making of peace was 
based on the sovereign exercise of power to create colonial and metropolitan social order while 
enhancing the political and military dominance of the sovereign through imperial expansion.  
As a process, pacification refers to the creation and enforcement of a specific “peace” 
through military dominance and legal mechanisms, but also through “civilising” liberal political 
strategies of capturing the “hearts and minds” of a population, i.e. securing order through culture 
and liberal ideology (Neocleous 2010). In producing “peace”, pacification works to destroy and 
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remove existing forms of political and social organisation in order to construct a “new” society—
a “brighter and nicer new life” (Neocleous 2011b:198, referencing a phrase used in the US 
pacification strategy in Vietnam). Destruction is part of the production of social order that 
provides “a secure foundation for accumulation” (Neocleous 2013:8). In contemporary usage, 
pacification has been associated primarily with imperial-military operations. During the US-
Vietnam War, the term “pacification” replaced “counter-insurgency” in US military strategy 
(Neocleous 2011a, 2011b). Neocleous (2011b) notes that in more recent military discourse, 
both “counter-insurgency” and “pacification” have been replaced by terms such as “low-intensity 
conflict” and “operations other than war”. The shifting terminology increasingly obscures these 
practices as warfare and imperial domination.   
On one level, the re-appropriation of pacification from international relations and military 
studies is a move that resists the mystification of contemporary imperial and colonial military 
projects through the discourse of liberalism and security. Analytically, the concept of pacification 
joins police and military power and thus, the connection between “public order” and imperialism 
(Neocleous 2010, 2011a, 2011b). While Foucault traces the emergence of the military-
diplomacy apparatus and police apparatus concurrently, these are treated as separate in his 
analysis (in part because of his micro-physics approach). Understanding police as “a process of 
pacification” (Neocleous 2013:18) brings “war”, processes and effects of domination (or 
sovereign-juridical power) and discipline ‘back” into the analytical picture alongside liberal 
governance. “War”—coercion, structural violence, domination—produces liberal peace 
(Neocleous 2010), which is a condition of ongoing struggles. The concept of pacification 
focuses on political, administrative and coercive institutions that derive from and (re)produce 
legitimation of “the state”. While pacification occurs on localised scales, the production of order 
is entwined with global processes of capitalist accumulation.  
Pacification thus refers to both the practices, and their legitimating discourses, that 
facilitate territorial expansion and the exploitation of Indigenous and settler labour power 
31 
 
necessary to the accumulation of capital (see Alfred 2005b; Neocleous 2010, 2011b). This is an 
ongoing process as the displacement of people from means of sustenance and production— 
original (or ‘primitive’) accumulation—is necessary to sustain capitalist production (Neocleous 
2013). As a process of making “peace”, the concept of pacification implies that there is ongoing 
resistance (to capitalism and colonialism), which pose threats to order. Without resistance, 
pacification would not be necessary. There is a dialectical relationship between resistance and 
pacification, reflected in shifting forms of pacification strategies. As an analytic category, 
pacification assumes that social relations are characterised by ongoing conflicts, which blurs the 
distinction between “criminal”, or public order issues, and war. Taking pacification as a critical 
category identifies continuities (and discontinuities) of order production without being 
constrained by ideological binaries which are themselves mechanisms of order production. 
The strength of the pacification concept is in its grounding in historical context of 
imperialism and colonial practices. The police institution, as an apparatus of security, is also 
grounded in imperialism through its role in producing social order conducive to state formation 
and expansion.  
 
Addressing Gaps in Political Economy of Police and Theorising of Pacification  
In contributing to the emergent theorising of policing as pacification, my approach addresses 
three core inter-related gaps in the current body of literature. Despite the historical foundations 
of pacification, there has been limited engagement with (1) ongoing colonialism (rather than 
imperialism), (2) spatial order and territorialisation, and (3) agency and resistance. I discuss 
each of these areas of limitation below. Although these dimensions are articulated as core 
components of a critical analytic of pacification in existing research, they have not been 
substantially elaborated/developed through empirical inquiry. These three areas are made 
evident in the specificity of the settler colonial context of the practices I examine in this 
dissertation. In identifying and addressing these gaps, I draw on the work of settler colonial 
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studies and of Indigenous scholars. Taiaiake Alfred has written extensively on colonialism as an 
ongoing war being carried by the state through physical violence and liberal politics of “minds 
and hearts” (Alfred 2005:180), and explicitly describes the reconciliation discourse of the 
Canadian state as a “pacifying” strategy (Alfred 2011:9). Glen Coulthard (2007) has similarly 
critiqued the politics of recognition and of reconciliation politics, which I discuss further in 
chapter 2. 
Settler colonial studies is an emergent transdisciplinary field that that seeks to articulate 
theory and conceptual frameworks through interrogation of the specific formations of different 
“modes of empire” (Veracini 2010:2, emphasis in original). Predominantly an intellectual project 
of settler academics, one of the objectives of settler colonial studies since the mid-1990s is to 
counter the naturalisation and invisibility of settlers and settler colonialism which has been 
perpetuated by scholarly research about Indigenous peoples (Veracini 2010; Macoun and 
Stakosch 2013). The theorising of settler colonialism has itself been shaped by the effects of 
Indigenous mobilisation as a catalyst for shifting understandings of white settler colonialism 
(Veracini 2013).10 There is a growing literature specific to settler colonialism in the Canadian 
context (see e.g. A. Barker 2009; Morgensen 2011; Crosby and Monaghan 2012; Monaghan 
2013). In addition to disrupting the colonising power of settler colonial academic privilege, 
Macoun and Stakosch (2013) emphasize that settler colonial theory resists the relegation of 
colonialism to the past, which occurs in both conservative and progressive scholarship as well 
as in dominant political discourses. Settler colonialism is understood to be an ongoing process 
                                               
10
 While settler colonialism has been used descriptively in the past, it has not been theorized as a unique formation 
until the mid-1990s and spurred by Wolfe’s 1998 book. According to Veracini (2013) in the early 1900s, settler 
formations were treated as distinct from colonialism, based on the “pioneer” and frontier. This differentiation remained 
into the comparative studies of the 1950s and interest in what Foucault (2007) referred to as the “boomerang effect” 
between colonies and metropole. The presence of Indigenous peoples and their subjugation by settler-colonists was 
largely invisible in scholarship until the 1960s and 1970s in the context of anticolonial uprising and decolonisation. 
However, these analyses tended not to include white settler states where these mobilisations were not as overt. 
Where the concept of settler colonialism was applied to white settler states, the analytic focus was on the 
dependency relationship between the settler state and the metropole rather than on the subjugation of indigenous 
peoples (Veracini 2013). Veracini (2013) locates the emergence of settler colonial studies with increased visible 
(disruptive) mobilisation by Indigenous peoples in white settler states through the 1980s and 1990s.   
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characterised by the presence and resistance of Indigenous peoples. I draw on settler colonial 
studies to identify three gaps in pacification literature.    
Imperialism, Colonialism, and Settler Colonialism 
Like Foucault’s work, most of the recent political economy theorising of police is predominantly 
situated in urban contexts of Europe and North America, with the latter focusing on questions of 
capital and class struggle. Although pacification is conceptually grounded in the historical 
context of imperialism, colonialism, and warfare, contemporary debates have largely focused on 
Europe and North American metropoles, and have not—with some exceptions (e.g. Valverde 
2006; Gordon 2006, 2010; A. Smith 2013)—substantially addressed the interconnectedness of 
imperialism, colonialism, and racism in pacification strategies. Imperialism and colonialism are 
entwined but distinct formations. Loomba (2005) distinguishes imperialism as the project of 
empire-building emanating from the metropole, while colonialism refers to the mechanisms of 
domination implemented within the colonized territory (including processes of territorialisation). 
As a distinct formation, settler colonialism is characterised by the assertion of sovereignty by 
settlers who become the majority within a territory through elimination of Indigenous peoples 
(Veracini 2010). Wolfe (1998) also distinguishes settler colonialism from colonialism because 
the primary objective of settlers is to secure land and resources rather than the exploitation of 
Indigenous peoples as a labour force. In settler colonialism, Indigenous peoples are not as 
“indispensable” to the new political economic order as in colonial formations (p.8). 
 The existing pacification literature tends to deal with imperialism rather than specific 
mechanisms of colonial governance. When focusing on “internal pacification” (Neocleous 
2011b:2000), the literature identifies connections between, for example, contemporary US 
imperialism and social control technologies “at home” but does not address the distinct context 
of local or “domestic” colonialism (e.g. Neocleous 2011a; Wall 2013; Rigakos and Ergul 2013). 
Settler colonialism as an ongoing process is not taken up. Furthermore, there is a privileging of 
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(global) capitalism emerging from the lack of analytical attention to specificities of racism and 
colonialism as distinct formations interlocking with capitalism (see A. Smith 2010).11  
The systemic invisibility of colonialism perpetuates the myth that colonialism is a relic of 
the past. This is endemic to studies of policing, whether “mainstream” or critical. In the late 
1980s, Mike Brogden (1987a) argued that studies of policing must be situated in colonial 
history, but this has not been widely taken up outside of historical studies (e.g. Brogden 1987a, 
1987b; Anderson and Killingray 1991; Styles 1987; Sigler and King 1992; Deflem 1994; 
Smandych and Nettlebeck 2010). While these studies make important contributions towards 
developing critical theorising of police, there are two major limitations. First, being relegated to 
historical literature, colonial policing—and by implication, colonialism—is construed as 
phenomena of the past, reinforcing dominant narratives that colonialism no longer exists. 
Second, while there may now be more contemporary studies of policing Indigenous peoples 
(e.g. Cunneen 2001; Churchill and Vander Wall 2001; Perry 2009; Comack 2012), my 
argument, echoing Brogden, is more fundamental in terms of situating the police institution 
within colonial relations whether or not the immediate object/subject of inquiry are Indigenous 
peoples. Colonial policing, and broader forms of governance in settler colonial and post-colonial 
contexts, is not just about Indigenous peoples; it is also about the settlers/colonisers doing the 
policing, and the effects of it in shaping power relations. The political economy of police and 
pacification literature asserts the importance of historical materialist inquiries yet imperialism 
and colonialism have been marginal dimensions in these analyses. The trajectory of capitalism 
must be situated in relation to the specificities of imperialism, colonialism, and settler 
colonialism. An analytic of pacification needs to address how police technologies work 
in/through race and colonialisms in (re)producing specific order.  
 
                                               
11
 In the US context, Andrea Smith (2010) conceptualizes white supremacy as constituted by three pillars of 
slavery/capitalism, genocide/colonialism, and Orientalism/war. 
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Space and Territoriality  
An important dimension in the production of colonial order is the regulation or ordering of space, 
which is integral to settler colonial formations starting with the theft of land through violence and 
legal mechanisms such as the doctrine of terra nullius and forced surrender or treaties (see e.g. 
Alfred 2005; Borrows 2005; A. Smith 2010). There are two interconnected dimensions of settler 
colonial spatial ordering: territorialisation and governance mechanisms. As discussed above, 
state sovereignty is asserted through the (re)production of inscribed boundaries of legal, 
political, and military authority; through these processes land is constituted as a political space 
(Elden 2007), which requires constant policing (Neocleous 2003). Territorialisation is an ongoing 
process allowing for the constituting of “new” settler political orders through territorial (and 
population) expansion and capitalist accumulation, which are dependent on securing access to 
land and resources.  
Settler colonialism is defined by “a logic of elimination” (Wolfe 1998, 2006), which 
shapes the production of social-political order by eliminating existing indigenous social-political 
formations so as “to establish a better polity” (Veracini 2010:4). In addition to the theft of land, 
elimination processes of dispossession, displacement, racialisation, law, criminalisation, 
incarceration, administration and assimilation all have spatial dimensions and occur through 
coercive violence and “liberal” governance. As I discuss in chapter 2, the Canadian settler state 
has deployed a range of spatial governance mechanisms such as reserves, the policing of 
geographic and social boundaries, destruction of spiritual spaces and burial sites, forced 
removal of children to residential schools (and state “welfare” systems), and exploitation, 
privatization and regulation of the natural environment (Razack 2002; Harris 2002, 2004; 
Blomley 2003; Gordon 2010). This constituting of colonial spatial order is foundational to the 
process of territorialisation. Resistance therefore also manifests spatially as challenges to the 
settler colonial ordering of spaces—as struggles to reclaim stolen land, to assert fishing and 
hunting rights, to defend against or prevent encroachments and environmental damage, and 
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through everyday practices. Contemporary direct actions such as blockades and reclamations 
are spaces in which the policing of sovereignty’s boundaries are especially explicit. Localised 
policing that (re)produces and maintains spatial order must be situated in the broader project of 
constituting settler state sovereignty.  
Colonial governmentality and postcolonial scholars have pointed out that in Foucault’s 
shifts in analysis away from sovereign-juridical governance, the significance of territory as a 
terrain of politics is subsumed by the primacy of population as the object of biopower (Rose-
Redwood 2006; Elden 2007; Rifkin 2009; A. Simpson 2011). As discussed, the governance of 
Indigenous peoples as a population vis-à-vis settlers reflects a spatialised ordering of territory. 
Through continuing land theft, exploitation, domination, and assimilation, this space can be 
understood as a space of warfare.  
The concept of pacification can be enhanced by incorporating a geopolitical analysis 
(Rifkin 2009) of the war-police-accumulation nexus. This has been limited in the current body of 
work theorising and applying the pacification concept. For example, while the contributions of 
Neocleous (2011a), Wall (2013), and Rigakos and Ergul (2013) identify the interconnectedness 
of police strategies between metropole and colonies, taking the contemporary US as an imperial 
centre, these analyses do not address the question of the US (or Canada) as colonial spaces. 
The settler colonial context is a space in which the colony–metropole exists simultaneously in 
ongoing struggle. The relationship between the settler state and Indigenous peoples as an 
ongoing conflict is not taken up and by implication, settler state territory is naturalised. This is a 
crucial limitation where the insights of Indigenous scholars, critical race and settler colonial 
theory can contribute to, and strengthen the explanatory contribution of pacification.  
Agency, Resistance, and Anxieties 
The third gap in current theorising of pacification relates to the question of resistance and 
agency. Although resistance is conceptually theorised as the condition or raison d’être of 
pacification, the specificity of this dynamic has not been taken up through empirical inquiry. 
37 
 
Resistance is assumed but not empirically examined in concrete ways in theorising the 
relationship with domination and state systems. Critical race, feminist and postcolonial scholars 
have sought to address agency and resistance through the perspectives (or standpoints) of “the 
subjugated”, revealing the ways in which people engage in everyday forms of resistance, 
subversion and survival. Within this literature and in research by “mainstream” scholars, Abu-
Lughod (1990) identifies a tendency to romanticise resistance while neglecting how power 
works. She argues that “resistance should be used as a diagnostic of power” as micro-
processes of resistance tell us about “forms of power and how people are caught up in them” 
(p.42). As I discuss in the next section, Abu-Lughod’s argument resonates with Foucault’s 
suggestion, following his conception that “where there is power, there is resistance” (1978:95), 
that it is acts of resistance that make the exercise of power visible ([1982]2000). 
Attention to the micro-physics of resistance is important if settler colonialism is 
understood as an ongoing structuring (or ordering) project rather than an event (Wolfe 2006). As 
Macoun and Stakosch (2013) caution, this understanding of settler colonialism as ongoing and 
continuous does not mean that it is structurally inevitable. Indeed, Wolfe and Veracini both 
emphasize the shifting, dynamic nature of settler colonialism and that it is not a monolithic, 
unified, or coherent structure. By definition, settler colonialism is incomplete and therefore 
cannot be assumed as total or “finished”. Making this concrete, settler colonial state institutions 
are not monolithic entities, but spaces of conflict, tension, resistance, and disjuncture that arise 
from the contingencies of everyday activities. Agency is exercised within and outside of 
institutions. 
The conceptualisations of pacification and settler colonialism both have this 
“incompleteness” in common—if either process was “complete” or “successful” the context or 
social formation would cease to be one of pacification or settler colonialism. The enduring 
presence of the Indigenous Other means that the settler can never be fully indigenised to 
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territory (Veracini 2010:23).12 This ongoing resistance to complete elimination means that the 
possibility of transformation or decolonisation is also ongoing. Taiaiake Alfred and Jeff 
Corntassel (2005) have described settler colonialism as “shape-shifting” as strategies of 
elimination change in form and permutations. This is because Indigenous resistance is 
ongoing—merely existing as Indigenous peoples on the land is a challenge to settler colonial 
sovereignty. As Leanne Simpson (2008:13) states, “Indigenous Peoples whose lands are 
occupied by the Canadian state are currently engaged in the longest running resistance 
movement in Canadian history,” predating the state itself. This shifting limits the coherence of 
pacification projects, producing fissures, disjunctures and tensions within state institutions. The 
assertion of jurisdictional authority by the settler colonial state is insecure. Shifting strategies of 
pacification emerge because of: (1) the enduring survival/presence of Indigenous peoples, (2) 
overt resistance (reclamation, protests, disruption, legal challenges), (3) contingencies and 
disjunctures in implementation of practices (i.e. tensions in and between institutions), and (4) 
the expansionist impulses of capitalism (linked into global context). All of these are 
interconnected and create anxieties of settler colonialism. 
Addressing the three limitations that I have identified in existing police and pacification 
literatures by drawing on settler colonial studies, I adopt a concept of settler colonial pacification 
as an analysis of the specificity of policing Indigenous struggles in Canada. Settler colonialism is 
a specific colonial formation characterised by the assertion of settler sovereignty through 
ongoing territorialisation. Pacification is understood as the processes of order production that 
are at once destructive and constitutive of social order. As a concept, pacification emphasizes 
continuities of police power and ‘war’ in constituting nation-states and conditions amenable to 
                                               
12
 Veracini (2010) argues that settler colonialism is characterized by a triangular relational dynamic between settler-
colonials, Indigenous Others and exogenous Others. Exogenous Others are racialized immigrants/migrants who are 
not part of the dominant white-European settler group. In this dynamic, the settler colonial subject is dialectically 
constructed as both exogenous and indigenous in relation to territory, relative to the indigenous Other and exogenous 
Other respectively. Like settler-colonial subjects, exogenous Others may benefit from the dispossession of 
Indigenous peoples. However, they are perpetual “foreigners” who may be selectively included / assimilated into the 
“settler body politic” (p. 18). 
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accumulation. The analytic concept of settler colonial pacification interrogates how settler state 
sovereignty is being asserted and legitimated. 
Through an analytic framework of (un)mapping, the objective is to make visible specific 
practices of pacification—how pacification works—which de-naturalises settler colonialism as a 
territorial and ideological formation and showing how it is an ongoing project. One way of getting 
at this is by starting with moments of challenge (or change) in the micro-physics of settler 
colonial strategies—the spaces of encounter. In turn, the (un)mapping of current strategies 
should be guided by questions of (a) how they work to (re)produce settler colonial state 
systems, (b) how they are emergent because of resistance, and (c) where they are vulnerable to 
disruption and potential transformation. 
 
PART II: METHODOLOGICAL FRAMEWORK AND METHODS  
My methodological framework of (un)mapping is bound up with my theoretical-conceptual 
framework and the substantive area of inquiry by: (a) analytically centring ongoing colonialism 
and (b), seeking to resist the colonising legacies of social research by turning the academic 
gaze onto the practices of state institutions that (re)produce settler colonialism. The aim is to 
provide an empirically grounded inquiry of specific manifestations of pacification by making 
visible state-based policing of Indigenous resistance and how these practices work as strategies 
of settler colonial governance. I begin by explaining the methodological framework and then 
discuss my methods of textual analysis and interviews in this project. I end with reflections on 
the research process and considerations for (un)mapping as “studying up”.  
 
(UN)MAPPING  
My methodological approach of (un)mapping draws specifically on the work of Dorothy Smith 
and Sherene Razack, both of whom ground their modes of inquiry in historical materialist 
frameworks which begin with localised human activities and embodied experiences. These 
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practices provide insight into the broader social, cultural, political and economic formations of 
society.  
Dorothy Smith (2005) describes mapping as part of institutional ethnography, a concrete 
empirical inquiry which situates people’s “actual” activities and experiences vis-à-vis the 
ideological, which aims to make visible the contradictions between them. Mapping makes visible 
how textually-mediated “ruling relations” organise and coordinate people’s consciousness and 
everyday social relations and activities. Ruling relations refers to the textually mediated 
“complex of administrative, managerial, professional and discursive organisation that regulates, 
organizes, governs and otherwise controls our societies” (D. Smith 1999:49). I adopt Smith’s 
(2005) definition of institutions as the observable, material elements of ruling relations. For 
Smith, institutions are made partially visible from the standpoints of “people who in one way or 
another are involved in them”. Inquiry therefore may more likely lead to “intersections or 
interconnections” among multiple institutions rather than arbitrarily isolating one institution (or 
organisation) for description. (p. 68). These are governing institutions that derive legitimacy from 
their association with “the (idea of the) state” (Abrams [1977]1988). Mapping concrete work 
processes and sequences of activities can make visible how domination and resistance happen 
without being reduced to instrumentalist explanations. It also points to spaces of resistance 
within institutions and potential sites for intervention. 
While Dorothy Smith locates her approach with a Marxist historical materialism from the 
standpoint of women, Sherene Razack’s (2002) approach of unmapping is informed by critical 
race and postcolonial thought and draws on critical geography in articulating a methodological 
process of making visible the dialectical production of space and identities as social processes.  
Razack states that “to unmap means to historicize” understanding social formations as 
constituted by human (social) processes (p.128). In the context of imperialist expansion, the 
production of maps and maps themselves are means of asserting claim to, and control over, a 
delineated space (Razack 2002; Blomley 2003; Neocleous 2003). Unmapping therefore rejects 
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and disrupts the naturalisation of spatial relations, and seeks to historicise practices of power 
that construct spaces and bodies within those spaces as natural. This process of de-naturalising 
and historicising spatial relations “undermines [the] world views that rest upon it” (Phillips 
1997:143) by making ideologies and practices of domination visible. Razack’s (2002:15) 
application of unmapping “interrogates” the construction of bodies and spaces revealing the 
interlocking of patriarchal, class-based, racialised and colonial systems of domination.  
This is an important point of divergence between Razack’s and Smith’s approaches as 
Smith (2005) emphasizes that institutional ethnography is undertaken without any “prior 
interpretive commitment” (p.36). She argues that explanations of social relations in terms of 
“domination” or “resistance” are imposed by researchers disconnected from “the life worlds of 
people” (p.38). Yet Razack’s “interpretive commitment”, or analytical direction, to making visible 
the construction of race, gender, and class in white settler society is grounded in material and 
symbolic experiences of everyday life. Thus, while both approaches produce ways of knowing 
that are grounded in the lived experiences of those whose subjectivities are constituted or 
imposed by ruling relations / systems of domination, Razack’s involves an explicit undoing of 
systems of domination through the production of counter-narratives.  
Bringing together Smith and Razack, my approach of (un)mapping is concerned with 
making visible how power operates while disrupting the ideological “world views”—or, 
organising logics—that naturalise and render those processes invisible. (Un)mapping is a 
process of inquiry that simultaneously maps micro-processes of power while unmapping 
governing logics. More specifically, the ways in which institutions work to produce settler 
colonial order are mapped while historicising and thus disrupting the naturalisation of that order. 
If the role of mapping in colonisation has been characterised by a unidirectional relationship 
between the map-producer (the “knower”) and that which is mapped (the “known” bodies and 
spaces) (Kirby 1996:48), then (un)mapping endeavors to disrupt that directionality, producing 
knowledge about the institutions that organise our social relations in ways that (facilitate or) are 
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amenable to the accumulation of wealth in a capitalist mode of production in settler colonial 
society. The micro-processes of “work” explored by Smith must be situated in the context of the 
material and symbolic space(s) constituted by imperialism and colonialism.   
The “mapping” in this project produces a material, textual interpretation of the relations 
of the complex of institutions of the Canadian settler state as they operate in relation to 
Indigenous peoples’ resistance. There is “indexicality” in its reference to “the real world” (D. 
Smith 2005) of actual organisations, departments, practices, policies and events. However, this 
map should not be read as “complete”—maps will always be unfinished and incomplete 
because institutional processes and practices are not static and history is continuously in flux; 
nor is this map a “contained” field that is fully exhaustive of all the entities and processes at 
work. Maps produced through social inquiry are always partial—Smith (2005) usefully describes 
maps as assemblages of partial perspectives that can be overlaid with each other in building 
more nuanced, complex understanding of social relations.   
 
Entry-points  
(Un)mapping requires a concrete starting point(s) for inquiry. The policing of Indigenous 
peoples’ protests is currently one of the most highly visible and explicit encounters between the 
settler colonial state’s assertion of sovereignty and Indigenous self-determination. While 
reclamations and blockades might be viewed as “exceptional” events and unrepresentative of 
the “normal” relations between the state and Indigenous peoples, I draw on Pilsworth and 
Ruddock (1982), Marx (1972), Sjorberg and Miller (1973:139), and Hall et al. (1978) in 
understanding these events as “critical incidents” that are “‘ruptures’ of the social order”. These 
ruptures are characterised by (1) potential breaks or disruptions in the routines of institutions or 
social systems, and (2) the intensified production of texts. These conditions make visible 
“moments of truth” (Pilsworth and Ruddock 1982) in ruling relations. Methodologically, Foucault 
([1982]2000) suggests an analytics of power should start with acts of resistance as the points at 
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which power is made visible. The visibility of disjunctures in these moments provides insights 
into the work of the organisations that make up institutional complexes. Sjoberg and Miller 
(1973) argue that ruptures provide opportunities to gain access to institutions that are usually 
closed to outsiders as institutions work to repair or re-establish order. Ruptures are significant 
moments, but also have effects that extend temporally and spatially; they can therefore be entry 
points for (un)mapping broader shifts in institutional activities as well as internal disjunctures. 
My focus in this dissertation is on policing practices in Ontario after the 1995 Ipperwash 
reclamation. The shooting death of Dudley George by an Ontario Provincial Police sniper during 
the reclamation was the first time that an Indigenous person had been killed during a protest 
since the nineteenth century. The events of Ipperwash and the ensuing inquiry have had a 
direct impact on the OPP’s adoption of major reforms, and an indirect impact on the RCMP. 
Since Ipperwash, there have been a number of significant, high-profile protests in Ontario during 
which the “new” approach of the OPP could be implemented: the 2006 Six Nations reclamation 
at Caledonia, the 2007 National Day of Action, blockades at Tyendinaga in 2007 and 2008, and 
the emergence of the Idle No More movement in 2012. Again, rather than end-points of inquiry, 
these are entry-points for “getting into” everyday institutional processes by identifying the 
organisations within/through which these activities occur.  
 
METHODS  
Following Dorothy Smith (1999), texts are integral in the organisation of ruling relations. As the 
primary media of communication, texts organise bureaucratic practices and processes (both 
within and between entities); texts also (re)produce institutional discourses in interpersonal 
relations by shaping the activities of people engaged with/in these institutions. Reflecting the 
textually-mediated processes of contemporary organisations, I use textual analysis and semi-
structured interviews concurrently. Information derived through textual analysis informed the 
interview process by identifying prospective participants to be approached for interviews, as well 
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as by informing the development of interview schedules and the analysis of interview 
transcripts. Similarly, information gleaned from interviews led to other documents. Interviews 
enriched the textual analyses by filling in the “gaps” and providing insight into how people 
produce and “activate” (or animate) texts in actual policing practices. Concrete events provide 
anchors in interviews to discuss practices and for locating relevant texts guided by four core 
research questions:  
 How did Ipperwash and the Ipperwash Inquiry affect the policing of Indigenous protests 
and police organisations more broadly? 
 What strategies are used to police Indigenous protests, and how do they work in 
practice? Are there conflicts in the use of multiple strategies at the same time? 
 How are police, intelligence, government, and other institutions connected—formally and 
informally—in the policing of Indigenous protests? 
 What implications do contemporary policing practices have for the settler state’s colonial 
relationship with Indigenous peoples? 
 
Texts—the Living Colonial Archive 
As the “primary mode of action and decision in the superstructures of business, government, the 
professions” (D. Smith 1999:50), texts connect localised realities and the ruling relations that 
transcend the individual and local. Texts coordinate the actions of people and standardise “what 
is known” (knowledge), which becomes a basis for how others organise their activities (D. Smith 
2002:36; Devault and McCoy 2001:765). While texts do not determine people’s activities, they 
are means of standardisation and regulation producing a specific (settler colonial) order. Texts 
are the products of material activities and have material effects.  
In this project, I conceptualise texts produced in, by, and for state institutions as a living 
colonial archive. Here, I draw on Stoler’s (2009) conceptualisation of historical colonial archives 
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as “both transparencies on which power relations were inscribed and intricate technologies of 
rule in themselves” (p. 20). In the context of contemporary institutional activities, Larsen and 
Walby (2012) use the term “live archive” in emphasizing the dynamic and shifting character of 
texts and repositories. This resonates with Stoler’s (2009) emphasis that colonial archives 
reveal the “epistemological and political anxiety” of colonial states (p.20). While institutional 
records deploy and (re)produce authority in governance, they also “[register] other 
reverberations, crosscurrent frictions, attractions, and aversions that worked within and against 
those assertions of imperial rights to property, persons, and profits that colonial regimes claimed 
as their own” (Stoler 2009:22). The living colonial archive captures practices of governance as 
well as the enduring anxieties of settler colonialism. As noted above, during “ruptures” in order, 
there are periods of intensified institutional activity, which means increased textual production. 
“Critical incidents” are therefore an important starting point for picking up textual trails. 
Accessing the living colonial archive of the Canadian state allows us to (1) make visible 
activities of institutions, (2) trace the interconnections among institutions, and (3) denaturalise 
ruling discourses, (re)produced in the content and format of texts, as social-historical constructs.   
Accessing Texts 
I obtained publicly accessible documents such as media releases, annual reports, performance 
and priorities reports, and some policy documents, in digital format from the websites of 
organisations, in hard copy from the departments themselves, and through media reporting.13 
An important body of publicly accessible material is the archive of documents produced for and 
by the Ipperwash Inquiry, which are maintained online by the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney 
General. This archive includes transcripts, exhibits, and submissions by the Ontario Provincial 
Police including policy guidelines and comparative reports on their practices. 
                                               
13
 I used the Internet Archive to obtain some digital materials that are no longer available on organisation websites 
due to updating. The Internet Archive (www.archive.org) is an online digital library/archive of internet websites and 
digital cultural artifacts (e.g. images, films, texts).  
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 A second type of textual material are the records of government departments and police 
and security organisations that are produced internally for the bureaucratic operations of the 
organisation and do not (normally) circulate outside of it, as well as material which is explicitly 
restricted in its circulation according to formal security classifications. Both unclassified and 
classified texts are subject to access to information laws which allow members of the public to 
obtain records with certain restrictions.14 Some interview participants provided me with copies of 
internal documents, although not necessarily sensitive ones.  
Between 2007 and 2013, I filed 68 formal and informal requests to federal and provincial 
departments under the federal Access to Information Act and Ontario’s Freedom of Information 
and Protection of Privacy Act.15 The use of access to information (ATI) processes as a research 
method has been described by Marx (1984) as an “institutionalized discovery practice” to get at 
the “dirty data” of organisations. This association with muckraking journalism has left ATI 
relatively marginal as a social science research method. However, critical criminologists and 
sociologists in Canada have increasingly been using ATI in studying policing, prisons, security, 
surveillance, and intelligence practices and institutions (e.g. Yeager 2006; Larsen and Piché 
2009; Dafnos 2011; Walby and Larsen 2011; Monaghan and Walby 2012; Mopas and Turnbull 
2011; Larsen and Walby 2012). Being able to make visible those processes and practices that 
are mostly hidden—or deliberately kept secret—is essential to (un)mapping. ATI is an 
indispensable tool for navigating political and legal mechanisms that impose secrecy. 
                                               
14
 Like Larsen and Walby (2012), I use the term “access to information” instead of “freedom of information” to refer to 
the process, which emphasizes its mediated nature. 
15
 These requests are managed by designated offices and personnel (coordinators) in each government department 
or agency subject to the legislation. Once information is processed and released through the ATI process, it becomes 
part of the public domain. Copies of these completed requests can be obtained by any member of the public through 
an ‘informal’ request to the institution, usually without a fee. Formal requests require an initial processing fee of five 
dollars. Additional fees may be assessed at the discretion of the unit for search and processing hours, 
photocopying/scanning, transfer media such as CDs, and mailing costs.  
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While departments are legally required to respond to formal requests within 30 days, 
extensions and delays are the norm.16 Being aware of the likelihood of delays I began filing 
requests during the exploratory stages of developing the project. I kept a log of all 
communications with the access to information coordinators. Over 23,000 textual pages were 
obtained through the access to information process (Table 1).17 A summary of the texts 
referenced in the dissertation and their ATI file numbers is included in Appendix A. 
 
Table 1 Records Obtained from these Institutions 
Access to Information Act (ATIA) (Canada) Pages 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS) 1273 + 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) 4132 + 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) /  
Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) 
13714 + 
Public Safety Canada (PSC) 2863 
Department of National Defence (DND) 439 
Department of Justice (DOJ) 31 
Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act (FIPPA) (Ontario)  
Ontario Provincial Police via Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 
(MCSCS) 
570+  
Total  23022 + 
 
The records sought through formal requests varied in scope and breadth, particularly at 
the earlier stages. In part this is a result of the “black box” problem in which outsiders are unable 
to know exactly what kinds of records exist within organisations. As such, some requests were 
worded based on the parameters of subject (e.g. “Aboriginal” or “native” protests) or event (e.g. 
National Day of Action 2007) and a specific timeframe. One of the issues associated with broad 
                                               
16
 Federal and provincial legislation provides for cases where extensions are allowed when the searching for relevant 
records would interfere with the operations of the department (s.9(1)(a)), or where consultations are required with 
external departments (s.9(1)(b)) (such as where multiple departments have contributed to a document). One or both 
of these provisions were invoked in the majority of my formal requests.   
17
 This includes records that were shared with me by journalist, academic and activist contacts. This total does not 
include pages that were completely redacted. Records responding to several of my requests were also fully withheld. 
In most cases, the withholding of information was on the grounds of law enforcement, national security, or cabinet 
confidences/advice to government provisions.   
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requests is that they generally take much longer to process, and may result in many pages of 
irrelevant material. Within the records obtained through broadly-scoped requests I was able to 
identify further items of relevance—specific texts or types of record. Subsequent requests were 
then made for specific records (e.g., the RCMP’s Communities of Concern report 2008-2009). 
This was a snowballing process. Informal requests were made for relevant records that had 
already been released by institutions in response to requests made by other users of the ATI 
laws. These were identified through lists proactively provided by some departments on their 
websites,18 or through consultation with ATI coordinators at the institutions of interest.  
Types of Texts  
Open source and restricted texts can be distinguished according to whether they are intended 
primarily for an internal or an external realm of circulation in relation to the producing institution. 
Within each realm, texts can be described in terms of intended function and target audience 
(Table 2). External texts are those created for an audience outside of the originating 
organisation and have a primary intended purpose of representing the activities of the 
organisation (including policy), or for public education about a “problem”. Internal texts are those 
produced for an audience within the institution as well as for distribution to its partners. The 
primary functions of these texts are related to institutional operations and practices, as well as 
coordinating activities between multiple organisations (see Table 3). 
These records reflect two dynamics of “(un)mapping”: texts produced for public/ external 
audiences are important for their discursive representations (as a form of ruling), and texts 
produced internally reflect inter and intra- institutional processes and relations. In broad-scoped 
requests, it was common to receive copies of texts produced by other departments. This was an 
important way of identifying inter-organisational networks. Draft versions of documents–internal 
and external–provide insights into the development of practices, policies and discourses. 
                                               
18
 As of January 2012, all federal entities subject to the federal ATI Act are required to list completed requests.  
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Table 2 Types of Institutional Texts 
 
 
Table 3: Types of Records Collected 
Intended Realm of Circulation/Readers-Users 
Internal External 
Administrative and Policy 
Emails  
Deck presentations 
Memoranda 
Briefing notes 
Policy drafts, commentary 
Meeting minutes 
Background papers 
Public Education 
Media/ news releases 
Annual reports  
Environmental scans 
Fact sheets / websites 
Policies 
Law Enforcement –Operational 
Incident commander notes 
Incident reports 
Intelligence / information collection 
Operations plans 
Training materials 
Public Relations/External Accountability 
“Media lines” 
Question period / house notes, transcripts 
Annual reports  
Departmental performance reports 
Reports on plans and priorities  
Speeches  
Court or inquiry transcripts  
Law Enforcement –Tactical / Strategic 
Situation reports 
Threat assessments  
“Deck” presentations (slides) 
After action reports 
 
Interviews   
On their own, texts tell a partial story. If texts organise and mediate social relations, it is 
important to examine social relations and processes themselves and the role that texts play in 
them. Interviewing people whose work activities are mediated by institutional texts provides a 
means of contextualising, situating and filling in the gaps of the textual trails to understand how 
different types of texts relate to each other, and how people engage with them—including 
 Intended Realm of Circulation 
 Internal External 
 
 
Intended Function  
Operational  
Tactical, Strategic 
Policy development 
Administrative 
Public education 
 
Public relations / accountability 
 
 
Target Audience 
Law enforcement / security  
 
Institutions / individuals with 
required security clearance 
 
Government decision-makers 
General public 
 
Institutions / individuals without 
required clearance  
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subversions and resistance. The use of interviews in (un)mapping is not to produce 
generalisations about the people or groups interviewed but rather to locate them and their 
activities within institutions and social relations; participants are informants rather than 
representatives (Mullings 1999; Devault and McCoy 2001).  
Between March 2012 and November 2013, I conducted 29 semi-structured interviews 
with representatives from three law enforcement organisations and officials from two federal, 
and two provincial government departments. There were two overlapping lines of inquiry 
undertaken in interviews. One line of inquiry was directed at obtaining insight into the “actual” 
practices and processes that occur in relation to Indigenous peoples’ protests. The second line 
of inquiry sought to explore participants’ experiences regarding changes to policing practices 
over time. These lines of inquiry were reflected in separate interviews guides for law 
enforcement personnel and for government officials. Following a semi-structured approach, 
interviews were open-ended with questions and probes based on the specific position and 
background of each participant, which emerged in the course of the interview.  
Participants  
I took a purposive approach in identifying potential participants, with a view to providing a range 
of perspectives and experiences from law enforcement and government institutions at both the 
federal and Ontario levels of jurisdictions. Further, I sought to include a range of work 
experiences as different points in “sequences of interconnected activities” (Devault and McCoy 
2001:757). In the case of law enforcement, this meant seeking participation from people with 
operational (“on the ground”) and policy work experience in the areas of intelligence, public 
order, and Aboriginal policing.  
Interview participants were recruited formally through initial letters of invitation and in 
some cases with follow-up phone or email contact. Some participants were identified from 
publicly accessible information such as web-based directories, website contact information, or 
from news media publications in which they are identified as spokespersons, representatives or 
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sources of information. Other participants were recruited by snowballing method through referral 
from other participants, or through organisational gatekeepers. In the latter case, I contacted the 
head of a specific section or division requesting participation. My request was reviewed and 
circulated on my behalf within the organisation; I was then provided with contact information for 
individuals who had agreed, or volunteered, to be interviewed.19   
At the federal level, interviews were conducted with members of the Royal Canadian 
Mounted Police (including members assigned at the divisional level), Public Safety Canada, and 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. At the provincial level, interviews were conducted with 
members of the Ontario Provincial Police, and with officials from the Ministry of Aboriginal 
Affairs and the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services. The Ontario Regional 
office of INAC declined to participate, as did representatives from Public Safety Canada’s 
Government Operations Centre and Emergency Management Ontario. In all three cases, the 
rationale provided was that the topic of policing Indigenous protest was not within their 
jurisdictions. Table 4 shows the distribution of interview participants. 
 
Table 4: Distribution of Participants 
Organisation / Department / Ministry Number of Participants 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 11 
Ontario Provincial Police 9 
Six Nations Police Service 1 
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada  2 
Public Safety Canada 2 
Ontario Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services 1 
Ontario Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs 3 
 29 
 
Interview Process and Ethical Considerations 
Interviews lasted between 45 minutes and just under three hours in length. Eighteen of the 
interviews were conducted at participants’ workplaces, seven at a university setting, two in 
public places, and one was conducted over the telephone. All but one participant agreed to 
                                               
19
 It is possible that in some cases superiors might request that certain people participate.  
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have their interviews recorded. Participants were offered a copy of the transcript to review for 
factual errors and to allow for further elaboration. Most participants declined the offer but 
expressed interest in receiving a copy of the final report. Audio recordings were transcribed with 
identifying information removed in the transcription process.  
Consent forms were provided to, and reviewed with, each participant prior to 
commencing with the interview. Every effort has been made to maintain confidentiality through 
individual anonymity. It is integral to the (un)mapping approach to be able to identify the actual 
policing organisations and government departments involved. Further, because of the objective 
of understanding the relationships among various components of the policing process, 
participants were asked for their consent to attribute their responses to their occupational role in 
addition to their affiliated organisation (e.g., as an OPP liaison team member). Depending upon 
the size of the organisation and the units/branches involved, there is a possibility that 
participants could be identifiable based either on their position or on the content of their 
interviews. I advised participants of this possibility and requested an additional indication of 
consent to be identified in the findings by their occupational role/position. In some cases the 
terms of identification were discussed and participants expressed their preferences for how they 
would like to be identified. The informed consent form included two consent options (one for 
organisational affiliation only, one for affiliation and occupational position/unit).  
 
Analysis: Synthesis of Texts and Interviews  
(Un)mapping, like any form of academic knowledge production, is a form of interpretation—the 
maps of processes are representations of practices and relations which are not static. Yet, 
consistencies and themes—regularity of processes—in texts and as articulated by informants 
through interviews can tell us about the ways that power works. Shifts, conflicts and disjunctures 
are not “failures” or aberrations but are a part of institutions.  
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I approached the analysis of texts on three dimensions that correspond directly to my 
(un)mapping objectives, namely, to identify how the “problem” (threat) is constructed and 
represented, to make visible the practices and processes of policing within and among various 
entities, and to map out the networks of the entities involved in policing. The first level is of the 
discourse contained in the text itself. Drawing on Foucault, this is an analysis of the “knowledge” 
that makes governance of subjects possible. Texts were analysed for how the “problem” of 
indigenous protest is represented as a “risk” or threat, and how the “problem” is to be managed. 
Reflecting Dorothy Smith’s (1999) approach, a second level of analysis identified by Walby and 
Larsen (2011) attends to the activation of texts. In other words, these texts are understood as 
mediating, or organising, practices and processes of the institutions in which they exist. How is 
knowledge “activated” and produced by and through the police and government organisations? 
What do these texts reveal about the work processes of people within these organisations? At a 
third level of analysis, texts are revealing of formal and informal networks that exist among 
people and organisations through their activities—the sharing, collaborative, and competitive 
relationships in the production and circulation of texts. How is information shared? How are 
policing practices and processes intertwined? Within each of these levels of analysis, counter-
discourses, conflicts, omissions, disjunctures and subversions emerge.  
 I engaged in analysis while carrying out interviews and continuing to acquire open 
source texts and file access to information requests. My analysis of these three levels of 
representation, activation and inter/intra-organisational coordination was organised around 
tracing the activities and sequences of action (e.g. decision-making processes) that occur in 
relation to Indigenous protest. Through this continuous engagement with interview transcripts, 
field notes, and texts, I developed conceptual diagrams to trace institutional processes and 
analytic themes concerned with the relationship between “ideal” or official discourses and formal 
policies of organisations and the actual practices evident in texts and described by interview 
participants. These themes captured broader organising logics—or, what Smith would describe 
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as ‘translocal’ relations—as well as complexities, tensions and conflicts. Diagrams and themes 
were constantly augmented and revised through the research process.   
 
Considerations  
As my focus is on the impact of the Ipperwash reclamation on police practices, this project takes 
the policing jurisdiction of Ontario as the starting point for (un)mapping these practices and the 
inter-connections with other institutions/organisations. A key distinction of Ontario is that it has a 
provincial police force; all other provinces except Québec are policed by the RCMP under 
contract. Until the 1970s, the RCMP was responsible for policing First Nations communities in 
Ontario, reflecting federal responsibility for “Indians.” Taking over this responsibility, the Ontario 
Provincial Police are now the force of jurisdiction in responding to Indigenous protests outside of 
urban centres that are not managed by a stand-alone First Nations Police service. The RCMP 
maintains a presence in the province however, and will often be involved in a support capacity 
for large and prolonged events. In Ottawa, the RCMP’s A Division have primary jurisdiction for 
the National Capital Region, as well as responsibility for “high-risk” investigations relating to 
“political, economic and social integrity” of Canada (RCMP 2013). While the impact of 
Ipperwash extends beyond the provincial borders, there is a specificity of practices, which are 
shaped by localised contingencies including variations in the organisational cultures of police 
forces and their historical relationships with individual communities. First Nations in Ontario 
have engaged in major protests and reclamations more frequently than in other provinces, 
which shape the specificity of policing in Ontario.  
The issue of policing Indigenous protests is politicised and contentious, which can 
increase “risks” for organisations in participating in research conducted by an “outsider” (Adler 
and Adler 2001; Lee and Renzetti 1993). With the OPP and one branch of the RCMP I had to 
engage in multiple negotiations with gatekeepers prior to their agreement to allow members to 
participate. In the case of the OPP, these negotiations spanned more than five months. Beyond 
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the organisational gatekeeping, another consideration is that currently employed members of 
the RCMP, OPP and government departments, may be limited in their candidness or the depth 
of information they can share because of operational sensitivities and the risk of repercussions. 
This is especially the case for those lower in organisational hierarchies. Several participants 
alluded to this, sometimes explicitly distinguishing “personal” views from their official capacities. 
Nonetheless, the people who I had an opportunity to speak with were generally receptive and 
sometimes enthusiastic in explaining their work practices and sharing their experiences. 
My approach in this dissertation has been to shift the research gaze onto key institutions 
and formations that reproduce settler colonialism in Canada. This is grounded in a commitment 
to decolonising practice through production of knowledge about these institutions as a means of 
disruption and change. The “problematisation” is of these institutions rather than the Indigenous 
struggles and peoples that they govern. However, in this focus solely on state institutions and 
the actors within those institutions, I have not included the perspectives and experiences of the 
Indigenous people and communities who are the targets of policing practices as primary 
sources in (un)mapping. While some of these perspectives are included through secondary 
sources, in choosing this approach, the project risks silencing Indigenous voices while giving 
space to dominant settler state institutions. I also recognise that in taking up Indigenous 
struggles as a topic, there is the risk of speaking for communities, groups, and individuals who 
are directly involved and affected by these struggles, or of asserting academic “expertise” by 
indirectly passing judgement about the effectiveness of strategies of resistance through, for 
example, my critiques of the institutionalisation of dissent. These “risks” are reflective of the 
academic institution as a colonial institution, and the privileged position of academics—
especially non-Indigenous researchers—in settler colonial society. 
 
 
 
56 
 
A NOTE ON “STUDYING UP”  
By shifting the research gaze onto dominant institutions that reproduce settler colonialism rather 
than making Indigenous peoples the object of knowledge production, (un)mapping can be 
described as a form of “studying up” that redirects the power of knowledge production. Laura 
Nader (1972) coined the term “studying up” in arguing that anthropologists should focus their 
research on developing knowledge about the exercise of power “at home” by studying the 
middle and upper classes. This would provide a necessary counterpoint to the convention of 
“studying down” common to both anthropology and sociology. Nader maintains that the 
objective of knowledge production should be to make visible the culture(s) of the colonisers and 
the powerful. By inverting the colonising research relationship studying “up” asks “‘common-
sense’ questions in reverse” thereby challenging hegemony (Nader 1972:289).  
When grounded in counter-hegemonic theoretical frameworks, “studying up” explicitly 
identifies the positions and practices of research subjects as problematic and necessitating 
transformation or eradication to eliminate oppressive social relations and structures. This 
approach resonates with the contributions of emancipatory (e.g. feminist, critical race, third 
world feminist, postcolonial) and decolonising methodologies (e.g. L. Smith 1999; Moreton-
Robinson 2000; Kovach 2005). These approaches have identified how processes of academic 
knowledge production, and of the knowledge itself have been and continue to be indispensable 
to racial and colonial forms of domination by enabling and legitimating governance (or 
pacification) strategies (see Deloria Jr. [1969]1988; L. Smith 1999; A. Smith 2014). 
Conventional academic research methods and the prescriptions or expectations for their 
“proper” use are based on assumptions of who the usual subjects of research inquiry are—
these conventions are inclined towards maintaining dominant institutions and power relations. 
There can be challenges when applying conventional methods and standards when studying 
“up” with commitment to decolonisation, making it necessary to think outside the research 
“toolbox”—such as by using ATI requests. 
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(Un)mapping, as a form of “studying up”, is a praxis-orientated activity in two key ways: 
First, it aims to shed some light on the inner workings of police institutions to demystify their 
internal practices, including their production of knowledge about “problem” populations, that 
sustain and legitimise pacification. Second, the methodological practice of studying up directly 
challenges institutions’ assumption of, or claim to, secrecy and “sacredness”, which are both 
sources and products of their power (Weber 1947; Mills 1956; Bok 1989; Manning 1997). 
Regimes of secrecy, which enable settler colonial governance, pose limits and obstacles to 
(un)mapping governance strategies.20 The research process itself—in particular the negotiating 
of access to representatives, physical spaces and texts of institutions—is inevitably embedded 
in broader power relations as the researcher herself is actively engaged in a political activity. 
For example, ATI requests for information on politically sensitive topics or that are submitted to 
security organisations are automatically flagged for additional scrutiny by ministers’ offices and 
their communications staff for review (Rees 2003). This allows government to prepare media 
lines or responses for any damage control that might be needed once material is made public 
(see also Roberts 2006). I know that at least two of my ATI requests were flagged for added 
review before their release.21 
Whether intentional or not, there are wider political implications of engaging in “studying 
up” and we must be cognisant of the impact and implications of our research activities on 
institutions as well as on those governed by them. Are we making institutions more transparent 
or accountable in their practices, and thus amenable to transformation? Or are we making them 
                                               
20
 In the period following Ipperwash, provincial government bureaucrats were directed to destroy records related to 
Ipperwash (Kelly 2006). The computer files of Ron Fox, an OPP Inspector seconded to the Ministry of Solicitor 
General, were “accidently” erased when he was transferred and could not be recovered as evidence for the Inquiry 
(see Edwards 2003). In these examples, we see the intersecting of the politics of information control, substantive 
topic, methodological issues, and justice. There are historical continuities of information control. As Keith Smith 
(2009) examines in his study of the nineteenth and early twentieth century surveillance networks governing Treaty 7 
and BC interior, the Department of Indian Affairs withheld documents (i.e. information produced through these 
surveillance activities, and other materials) from Indigenous peoples as a means of control; the denial of access to 
the ‘textual record’ was an intentional, conscious control of information. 
21
 I made separate requests for all records associated with the processing of two requests because I knew they were 
particularly contentious because of their timing and because of communications during the brokering process.  
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more aware—and selective—of what is committed to textual record (see Walby and Larsen 
2011; Dafnos 2011; Larsen and Walby 2012; Dafnos 2011)? Unprompted, several interviewees 
remarked that greater organisational awareness of the potential for access to information 
requests has had an impact how records are created. This points to a need for constantly 
evolving research methods; as institutions change their practices in response to our inquiries, 
we must also adapt.  
There is also a responsibility for how we use information that we gather in our research 
process. Once records are released through access to information they are considered public 
records, available to anyone, and can impact on real lives and political struggles. Just as 
“studying up” may disrupt institutions, it also intervenes in these struggles to some degree. I 
have sought to share the records that I have acquired, through various channels, with the 
communities identified in those records. To acquire and hold onto information for the sole 
purpose of scholarly production perpetuates the colonising work of academia by benefiting from 
the subjugation of Indigenous peoples.  
 
CONCLUSION 
My analytic framework of settler colonial pacification draws on the work of Foucault and political 
economy scholars on the trajectory of police as a mode of power historically specific to the 
emergence of capitalism and nation-state formations. One of the key limits of Foucauldian work 
on police is the de-emphasis on enduring juridical and disciplinary modalities of power. This is 
connected to a second critique of Foucauldian (and governmentality) studies in not addressing 
the significant presence of violence in the lives of racialised and Indigenous peoples. While 
political economy work on police power and pacification has addressed the enduring 
significance of “the state” and of the violence of police power, this literature is limited in not 
taking up the specificity of police and pacification in the contemporary colonial context. In 
addressing these limitations, I draw on the theorising of settler colonial formations in settler 
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colonial studies to articulate a concept of pacification as colonial police power. This analytic of 
settler colonial pacification centres ongoing processes of colonialism, emphasizes the spatial 
dimensions of order production, and takes resistance as a starting point of inquiry. The 
underlying assumption is that settler colonialism is an incomplete formation and pacification is 
ongoing because of enduring resistance; this produces insecurities of settler colonial order. 
Pacification strategies and legitimating discourses shift over time, shaped by this dialectic with 
resistance.  
I incorporate these dimensions in my methodological framework of (un)mapping, which 
draws on the approaches of Dorothy Smith and Sherene Razack. (Un)mapping identifies how 
pacification strategies work and through this, unsettles the naturalisation of settler colonial 
sovereignty and dominant legitimating discourses. Through institutional texts and interviews with 
police officers and government officials, I map policies, practices, and tensions that make up 
institutions of the police-security apparatus.  
This framework problematises conceptions of power (and policing) in binary terms of 
war/peace, military/police, high/low and hard/soft work. These binaries reflect dominant liberal-
security logics, which work to depoliticise and legitimate certain police practices. This highlights 
how, through academic knowledge production, our analytic frameworks and research practices 
can reproduce or disrupt settler colonialism. By (un)mapping practices of settler colonial 
pacification, the research gaze is shifted onto dominant institutions as the object of inquiry, and 
thus, as the problem and target for interventions.  
In the following chapters, I examine different mechanisms or strategies of settler colonial 
pacification and show how juridical and disciplinary modes of power endure alongside (and 
through) “liberal” modes of governance. These exercises of power are organised by entwined 
logics of liberal rights discourse and prevention-oriented security. While there are historical 
continuities, pacification strategies “shape-shift” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005) dialectically with 
resistance within and outside of institutions. In chapter 2, I trace the trajectories of rights and 
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rule of law, surveillance, and prerogative power as techniques of settler colonial pacification in 
the formation of the Canadian settler state. This provides a context for (un)mapping of 
contemporary techniques of reconciliation processes (chapter 3), rights-based and negotiation-
based front line policing (chapter 4), intelligence-led policing and national security (chapter 5), 
and the emergency management paradigm of national security (chapter 6). Rather than 
cohesive programs, there are contradictions, tensions and disjunctures in how they are 
activated (or resisted) at individual and institutional levels that reflect the anxieties of settler 
colonialism.  
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CHAPTER TWO 
Settler Colonial Pacification: Indigenous Resistance and the Canadian Settler State 
 
In this chapter, I draw on the concept of settler colonial pacification articulated in chapter 1 to 
examine the historical emergence and roles of law, police, and the Indian Affairs bureaucracy in 
Canadian settler state formation through territorialisation, assimilation, and criminalisation 
processes. This provides a context in which to situate contemporary pacification practices as 
continuities of settler colonialism as well as dis/continuities that arise from ruptures of settler 
colonial order.  
Applying the pacification concept to existing literature and secondary sources, this 
chapter begins with a discussion of the imperial and colonial origins of the police institution in 
Canada, which disrupts the dichotomisation of police and military power. I discuss the role of the 
early police forces in settler colonialism and their relationship with the Indian Affairs 
bureaucracy. The intertwined pacification strategies enacted by the police and Indian Affairs 
were simultaneously constitutive and repressive in their effects, reflecting settler colonial logics 
of elimination. In constituting settler state sovereignty, these pacification strategies work to 
eliminate Indigenous peoples as political-economic—“sovereign”—nations. Applying Comaroff’s 
(2001) concept of lawfare, I then discuss the significance of liberal legalism as a distinct means 
of colonial extinguishment and as an arena of resistance that shaped conditions of Indigenous 
militancy in the 1960s and mobilisations around the constitutional “patriation” process. The 
crystallisation of the liberal legal rights regime in Canada in the 1980s has shaped 
contemporary techniques of pacification. In the context of the liberal rights regime and 
reconciliation discourse, Indigenous militancy has produced moments of “rupture” to settler 
colonial order in which liberal-legal discourse is both disrupted and (re)produced. In the final 
part of the chapter, I focus on the encounters of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash, as three 
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historically significant ruptures that were catalysts for changes in federal and provincial policing 
practices and government responses.   
 
ORIGINS OF COLONIAL POLICING  
Policing (the) Empire  
The origins of modern police organisations in Anglo-American states, including Canada, are 
commonly attributed to Robert Peel’s London Metropolitan Police established in 1829, which is 
often identified as the first modern police force. However, the “Met” was preceded by another 
creation of Peel’s. In 1814, Peel, who was then the chief administrator of Ireland, implemented 
the Peace Preservation Force to address “banditry” and unrest in rural Ireland.22 The existing 
combination of local police magistrates and the Irish military had been ineffective to deal with 
the “unrest”. The Peace Preservation Force was a quasi-military organisation headed by a 
magistrate responsible to the central government. Reflected in its name, the force was tasked 
with pacification of the countryside—it would be deployed to regions where local magistrates 
were unable to maintain order or where they had identified a threat of disorder. The Force 
therefore served a preventative and suppressive role, while releasing the military to be used in 
other areas of more intense conflict (Broeker 1961). In 1836, the Peace Preservation Force 
merged with local constabularies to form the Irish Constabulary. In 1867, the force became 
known as the Royal Irish Constabulary (RIC).23 
In contrast to the RIC, the Met was characterised as a model of consent-based policing 
embodied by the unarmed “bobby” on the street who was answerable to law rather than to 
                                               
22
 The labelling of acts as “banditry” or “piracy” reflect the monopolization of “legitimate” force by the state, as well as 
the privatization of property and criminalisation of means of subsistence outside of wage labour market. The 
“disorder” and “unrest” created by these activities represented challenges to sovereign (or state) authority (on “social 
banditry” as a form of resistance, see Eric Hobsbawm’s Primitive Rebels (1959) and Bandits (1969)). Recent studies 
have challenged common claims about the degree of “violence” that these agrarian ‘uprisings’ involved, pointing to 
anxieties of British colonial rule (see Williams 2003).  
23
 In 1922, after the Irish War of Independence (in which the RIC was actively involved), the RIC was dissolved and 
replaced by the Garda Síochána in the republic and the Royal Ulster Constabulary (RUC) in Northern Ireland.  
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political interests. The Met model has been juxtaposed to earlier forms of policing, as well as to 
contemporaneous forms in the colonies and elsewhere, such as the continental model 
associated with France. These dichotomisations were important in securing buy-in among the 
population as the idea of a permanent police had been consistently opposed by both the 
working class and elites who saw a state police as a source of repression and a competing 
source of authority, respectively. A centralised police force was seen to be inconsistent with the 
principles of liberalism (Williams 2003).24 The Met was not the first professional police force in 
London. The private Thames River Police force, created by Patrick Colquhoun, was established 
in 1798 and then later incorporated into the Met.25 The force was made up of full-time officers 
responsible for patrolling the river banks and docks to prevent cargo theft.26 The introduction of 
the Thames River Police contributed to the criminalisation of customary practices, such as dock 
workers’ entitlement to take items of cargo (McMullan 1998). The Thames River Police was an 
example of the protection that a public police could offer in securing the bourgeoisie’s means of 
accumulation, and this was a key factor contributing to the eventual acceptance of the Met.  
The origins of the prevention-oriented public police institution are entwined with the 
emergence of capitalism and changing social-economic relations shaped by privatisation and 
the introduction of wage labour (see McMullan 1998). In addition to contrasting the Met model 
from the RIC and continental policing, a key factor in securing its acceptance among the 
bourgeoisie was the heightened discursive construction of the “idle” urban poor and working 
class as a source of danger and potential criminality (Neocleous 2000; Williams 2003). 
Colquhoun’s theorising of police was based on this assumed connection between poverty, 
indigence and crime. For Colquhoun, the role of police was to prevent the poor from becoming 
indigent, and thereby prevent crime. The Thames River Police force was just one of his 
                                               
24
 Several proposals to establish a police force had been made since 1785, but were consistently rejected until the 
1828 bill which established the Met (Williams 2003).   
25
 The private Bow Street Runners were established in 1749 as a formalisation of the practice of “thief-taking”. 
26
 Colquhoun is considered the “creator” of police science in England (Foucault [1973]2000; McMullan 1998). He was 
a merchant in addition to being a magistrate, which is reflected in his concern with cargo theft. 
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proposals for different police institutions (see Colquhoun 1806 in Rigakos et al. 2009; McMullan 
1998). The underlying moral discourse of idleness as criminality was racialised in colonial 
contexts. One of the significant parallels in the legitimation of the Met and RIC was in the 
construction of “enemy” populations prone to disorder and violence: the idle poor and working 
class, and the “uncivilised” Irish. The enduring potential for disorder or violence therefore 
provided the justification for permanent police. In the colonial context, the racialisation of the 
Other (as inherently different and inferior) legitimated more coercive interventions including 
overtly militaristic policing as in the case of the RIC in Ireland. As discussed in chapter 1, the 
construction of the Indigenous Other as “uncivilised” was a basis for legitimating imperial 
conquest with/in international law.  
The interchange between metropole and colonies is key to understanding the 
development of European nation-states and the idea of modernity as formed dialectically vis-à-
vis colonialism and the colonial Other. Foucault (2003) describes the interchange of governance 
practices between the metropole and colonies as a “boomerang effect” whereby colonial control 
strategies were adopted in the domestic context. However, rather than a “boomerang” of 
coherent/established strategies, Comaroff (2001:310) emphasizes that the colonies were 
“laboratories” for modes of regulation and legal mechanisms; this challenges the “myth” that “a 
well-formed Euromodernity exported itself to faraway places.” Rather than treating the Met and 
RIC as distinct “models”, there is fluidity among colonial and metropolitan policing practices 
(Brogden 1987a; Deflem 1994; Marquis 1997). As Marquis (1997) and Anderson and Killingray 
(1991) argue, colonial police forces were not facsimiles of the RIC, but are organic to the 
specificity of local conditions in which they are established. Other British colonies were generally 
not as heavily policed as Ireland. This was largely because of the relative lack of officers to 
cover large land areas and dispersed populations. Initially, military force was used “to guard, 
extend, and uphold the authority of the Crown and what was often new and alien law” 
(Anderson and Killingray 1991:4-5). Rather than crime control, the primary objective of 
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nineteenth century colonial police was to protect private property and the pax Britannica of the 
empire. In contrast to colonial policing in Africa and Asia, discourses of consent-based policing 
and accountability emerged in white settler colonies as they gained political authority through 
the nineteenth century (Anderson and Killingray 1991). The centralisation of policing in Canada 
was a direct manifestation of the gradual consolidation of the settler state, and emerges 
dialectally with both Indigenous and settler resistance.27 The fluidity between the “urban” 
policing embodied by the Met (and the Thames River Police) and the militaristic colonial RIC is 
reflected in the form of policing that emerged in the Canadian colonial context.  
 
The North West Mounted Police and Settler State Formation   
In 1873, the Dominion government established the North West Mounted Police (NWMP), which 
shared key commonalities with the RIC as both were intended as para- or quasi-military 
organisations. Like the RIC, the NWMP was under central government control, used military 
rank structures, had military training and weapons, and its members were housed in barracks 
(Marquis 1997). Originally, the NWMP were intended to be a force composed primarily of 
Indigenous (and specifically Métis) officers who would be commanded by British officers. This 
was the model used in British colonies in India, Africa and the Caribbean (Anderson and 
Killingray 1991; Deflem 1994). However, the plans changed after the Métis resistance and Red 
River Rebellions in 1869-1870 and the force was composed of white settler and British officers. 
                                               
27
 Before confederation, policing took different forms in each of the colonies, which were governed by their own 
administrations (Dickason 2002). In the towns of Upper and Lower Canadas policing had been carried out by local 
justices of the peace and constables, which reflected urban policing in Britain prior to the Met. In the early-mid 1800s 
and echoing events in Britain, several inquiries were held in response to political and labour conflicts (“riots”) in the 
colonies and were consistently concerned with avoiding “blatant sectarian repression by police or militia” which would 
hinder the establishing of rule of law as a basis for government legitimacy. These inquires laid the groundwork for the 
creation of public police forces, as well as provincial and federal police (de Lint and Hall 2009: 56). The first 
permanent territorial police force was the RIC-modeled British Columbia Constabulary, created in 1858 to prevent US 
territorial and gold field incursions (see King 1997). Temporary police forces were implemented before this period 
tasked with protecting infrastructure such as canals and railways (King 1997; de Lint and Hall 2009). The north-west 
territories were policed by the Hudson’s Bay Company’s constables. When Rupert’s Land was sold to the Dominion 
in 1869, policing was carried out by local militias and temporary RIC-style constabularies organized by colonial 
authorities to suppress emergent conflicts involving “problem populations” of French Canadians, Indigenous peoples, 
Métis and workers in Newfoundland (Marquis 1997). 
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Many of the commanding officers had been members of the RIC and other colonial police forces 
(Marquis 2005).  
The NWMP were an integral part of the settler state expansion west of Upper and Lower 
Canadas, established with immediate concerns around stopping US liquor trafficking across the 
border, and managing conflict between Indigenous people and settlers that were encroaching 
westward. They protected settlers, ranchers, Canadian Pacific Railway construction, trading 
posts, and recovered horses and cattle taken by Indigenous peoples. The NWMP also played a 
role in the making of the Numbered Treaties, which securing Crown access to land in the north-
west territories, through their presence at some treaty “negotiations”, facilitating the movement 
(and confinement) of people to reserves, and distributing payments and rations that were part of 
the colonial government’s treaty conditions. Reflecting their role in state formation, responsibility 
for the NWMP was transferred from the Justice Department to the Department of the Interior in 
1879 (Marquis 2005).28 In 1918, the RNWMP (the “Royal” prefix was added in 1904) took over 
responsibility for political policing from the Dominion Police, and in 1920 they fully merged to 
form the Royal Canadian Mounted Police with jurisdiction for all of Canada.29  
Until the 1960s, the RCMP was responsible for policing First Nations, Métis and Inuit 
communities because of federal government responsibility for “Indians”. In the early 1970s, 
policing responsibility shifted to the provinces and the Ontario Provincial Police (OPP) and 
                                               
28
 The police power of the NWMP was augmented by contracting with the Pinkerton detective agency to carry out 
criminal investigations and surveillance of radical political and labour groups. The NWMP was the Pinkerton agency’s 
biggest client in Canada (de Lint and Hall 2009).  
29
 After Confederation, the government created the Dominion Police in 1868. Initially the DP was a protective unit for 
securing the Parliament buildings in Ottawa as well as protecting politicians. Their mandate expanded in 1869 to 
include security-intelligence work, which included undercover operations related to the Fenian movement in the US. 
The anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist objectives of the Fenians made the movement of concern to both the settler 
and British governments (Whitaker, Kealey and Parnaby 2012). One of the catalysts towards the merger was the 
1919 Winnipeg General Strike. Through the 1920 and 1930s, the RCMP played a significant role in strike-breaking 
(de Lint and Hall 2009). Intelligence operations were central to the policing of labour conflict, political movements and 
Indigenous communities (de Lint and Hall 2009). The RCMP retained a national security intelligence role within its 
formal mandate until 1984, when the function was transferred to CSIS (see chapter 5).   
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Sûreté du Québec (SQ) took over in Ontario and Quebec.30 Like the RCMP, the OPP and SQ 
are accountable to government rather than to a civilian board, and thus retain a militaristic 
dimension.31 Most First Nations communities therefore continue to be policed primarily by these 
more militaristically organised forces. 
 
Policing Strategies—Disrupting the Dichotomies 
The central task for the NWMP was to establish order in the north-west territories and thereby 
extend the authority of the settler colonial government. The NWMP had magisterial powers and 
could act as “self-contained instrument[s] of colonial law” (Nettlebeck and Smandych 2010:360). 
Autonomy and discretion extended to the use of force in carrying out “justice”. Because of the 
relative isolation in the north-west territories, Beal and Macleod (1984:28, in Marquis 2005:198) 
describe the NWMP as “virtually a separate government” as the sole representatives of colonial 
government and sovereign power. The characterisation of the NWMP as “virtually a separate 
government” reflects the full extent of their delegated police functions, such as administering 
rations to reserve communities, delivering mail, and working as land agents, health officers, and 
electoral officials. As settler presence increased, NWMP administrative tasks expanded to 
include visiting farms and ranches and reporting on “crop yields, floods and wage levels for farm 
labourers” (Marquis 2005:201). The NWMP thus embodied police power in fabricating settler 
colonial order as representatives of, and advancing, sovereign authority.  
The NWMP used force against Indigenous peoples and settlers but lacked the resources 
in terms of personnel and equipment to do so on a regular or widespread basis. Their presence, 
signalled by the red serge uniform and show of weapons, was intended as a preventative 
measure, but had to be balanced to avoid provocation because of the physical and financial 
                                               
30
 A de-centralized provincial police were introduced in 1856 to police the northern parts of Upper Canada. This would 
later be centralized as the Ontario Provincial Police in 1909 (de Lint and Hall 2009). 
31
 The RCMP commissioner is equivalent to a deputy minister, and the OPP commissioner to an assistant deputy 
minister in the departments currently known as Public Safety Canada and the Ministry of Community Safety and 
Correctional Services, respectively (Beare 2007). 
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costs of wars with Indigenous nations (K. Smith 2009). Acknowledging that constant repressive 
armed force would provoke resistance and militancy, the NWMP relied on surveillance and the 
use of small patrols aimed at developing “good will” with Indigenous peoples. These were 
common strategies of colonial policing. Brogden (1987b) describes how paramilitary police 
forces in Sri Lanka, Jamaica, Guyana, and South Africa engaged in preventative policing 
through regular patrols and developing knowledge of the local population and geography.  
Integral to “good will” and knowledge production was the employment of Indigenous 
people as scouts and special constables to act as liaisons between the police and communities 
(Greer 1992; Marquis 1997). The small size of patrol units coupled with the presence of Métis or 
First Nations scouts decreased the intimidation factor and increased the potential for consent-
building. The NWMP established Indian police troops that recruited Indigenous people as scouts 
and as on-reserve constables. This was supported by the Department of Indian Affairs as a way 
to reduce financial costs while providing a means of surveillance at a level that white Indian 
agents did not have access to. The employment of Indigenous people by the colonial institution 
was also seen as a strategy of “civilisation” that would foster support among employees for the 
settler system of law and order (K. Smith 2009).  
As I discuss further in the next section, the assertion that Indigenous peoples were 
policed by “consent” requires several qualifications. First and most importantly, the possibility of 
policing depends on the theft of land and the denial of Indigenous peoples’ sovereignty. Second, 
continuous non-consensual surveillance was integral to securing “good will”. Third, factors such 
as the continuing encroachment of settlers and loss of access to traditional means of 
sustenance sometimes compelled Indigenous cooperation with the police. This “cooperation” 
included encouraging Indigenous people to report other community members to police and to 
supply information about the activities of other communities. These practices were furthered by 
NWMP threats to chiefs that they would be held accountable for the “good behaviour of the[ir] 
camp” (Nettlebeck and Smandych 2010, citing a NWMP Commissioner’s Report from 1877). In 
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the context of the Canadian Pacific Railway expansion, widespread starvation encouraged by 
government policies and exacerbated by the decimation of the buffalo population (see Daschuk 
2014), and in the aftermath of the 1885 North West Rebellion, police strategies shifted from 
“persuasion” towards more coercive methods of control (Harring 2005:117). As Marquis 
(2005:199) writes, “[t]he conditions that created First Nations unrest […] ultimately guaranteed 
the success of the police”. 
The extent of police power exercised by the NWMP/RCMP reflects sovereign-juridical 
power underlying the administrative roles that contributed to the formation of the settler state in 
producing geopolitical order through territorialisation. The myth of the mounted police has 
become part of nation-building ideology, an institution to be celebrated in contrast with the RIC 
which was seen as an occupying force, contributing to disorder through a “failure” to maintain 
“peace”. Of course, this myth and distinction are based on the dominant settler lens. The range 
of activities undertaken by the NWMP/RCMP as representatives of the sovereign and “the law” 
were pacification strategies that suppressed Indigenous peoples and nations in the process of 
securing settler colonial expansion.  
 
PACIFICATION BY COLONIAL POLICY 
As I discussed in chapter 1, Enlightenment liberalism recognised the personhood of Indigenous 
peoples while simultaneously providing the conditions for their subjugation to European 
authority. Colonialism and state formation were the basis for the emergence of international law. 
The construction of Indigenous peoples as lacking “civilisation” provided legitimation for colonial 
invasion. The international legal doctrine of terra nullius legitimated colonial claims of 
sovereignty by erasing Indigenous historical-political presence. Instrumental to the “civilising 
process” was to bring the “gift” of rule of law to Indigenous peoples (Merry 2004:572). As 
Comaroff (2001:309) writes, law was not just an “instrument” of domination but more 
fundamentally, “cultures of legality were constitutive of colonialism, tout court”, through the 
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process of territorialisation, instruments of economic and political rights and, perhaps most 
significantly, the constituting of Indigenous peoples as a legal category, as the basis for colonial 
governance. Law provides the “scaffolding” for sovereignty, as a structure for organising the 
state and the exercise of power (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:22, referring to Arendt 1998).32  
British colonial policy for the Canadian provinces sought to establish an “orderly frontier” 
built on the concept of rule of law and “liberal treatment” of Indigenous peoples (Harring 
1998:16-17). In large part, this approach was shaped by the cost and “disorder” of the US Indian 
Wars. Harring (1998) identifies this policy as having two central objectives of preventing colonial 
wars between Indians and settlers seeking to take their land, and being a means of 
(re)socialising (i.e. assimilating) Indigenous peoples to the colonial order. The “gift” of rule of law 
brought, on the one hand, subjection to criminalisation, imprisonment and impoverishment. On 
the other hand, liberal treatment recognised the “basic humanity of indigenous people” and thus, 
access to full legal rights—contingent on assimilation. Ultimately, liberal treatment manifested 
as paternalistic subjugation (Harring 1998:18). The introduction of legal mechanisms in the late 
eighteenth century should not detract from the fact that most of the dispossession of Indigenous 
peoples had occurred through force rather than by treaties or compensation and that treaties 
were often characterised by deceit, manipulation, coercion, falsification, non-fulfilment and 
violation (Lawrence 2004; Gordon 2010). 
 
Lawfare  
The simultaneously destructive and constitutive power of law in settler-colonialism is aptly 
captured by Comaroff and Comaroff’s (2006:30) concept of lawfare, which describes “the resort 
to legal instruments, to the violence inherent in the law, to commit acts of political coercion, 
                                               
32
 Arendt (1998) identifies the symbiosis of law and the state as evident in Classical Greece in the constituting of 
polis, the public space (in Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; my emphasis). The concept of police, as production of order 
in nation-state formation, depends on the foundations of law.  
71 
 
even erasure,” which is most evident in the colonial context. The legal apparatus “launder[s] 
brute power in a wash of legitimacy, ethics, propriety. Sometimes it is put to work [...] to make 
new sorts of human subjects” (p. 32). At the same time, reflecting the dialectic of domination 
and resistance, the Comaroffs emphasize that lawfare has become the arena of political 
struggle in which subjugated peoples engage in counter-hegemony and resistance—through 
direct appeals for justice, use of constitutional language as a basis for challenging 
discrimination, and using the prisoner’s “dock-as-platform” of protest (Comaroff 2001:307; 
Comaroff and Comaroff 2006; also Merry 2004). Indigenous peoples have long engaged legal 
processes as means of challenging colonizers and asserting the terms of treaties. The judicial 
system has shaped the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the British Crown since 
the late eighteenth century (Harring 1998:4).  
In the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, Indian policy was driven by Britain’s 
need for the military power of Indigenous nations in imperial wars. After the war of 1812, these 
military alliances were no longer as useful to Britain or the colonial government. In the 1820s 
and 1830s, Indian policy shifted to assimilation and away from a framework of sovereign co-
existence (Harring 1998:29). In 1860 responsibility for Indian affairs was transferred to the 
colonies from the British Crown without the consent of Indigenous peoples. The British North 
America (BNA) Act of 1867 created the Dominion of Canada, which included taking federal 
responsibility for the management of “Indians and lands reserved for Indians” in section 91(24). 
Drawing on Agamben (1998), Williamson (2009) describes this section as a “constitutionalized 
state of exception” creating a legal category of people to be governed as a necessary exception 
for the settler colonial state. This was the legal basis for the centralisation of colonial Indian 
policy. The 1876 Indian Act consolidated existing policies and regulations governing Indigenous 
peoples while centralising and enhancing the authority of the Indian Affairs bureaucracy based 
on a paternalistic responsibility as “guardians” of Indigenous peoples and their lands. 
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Organised through the logics of liberalism-security, these pacification strategies work to 
eliminate Indigenous (political, economic, cultural, spiritual, psychological) self-determination 
while constituting the “new” settler society based on capitalist accumulation (Monture-Angus 
1999; Alfred 2005a, 2005b; Alfred and Corntassel 2005; Coulthard 2007). These practices are 
continuous with policing techniques that fabricate class relations amongst the settler population 
through the protection of private property, the ordering of spaces, moral regulation and the 
criminalisation of alternatives to the wage labour market (see Neocleous 2000; Gordon 2006). 
However, what is significantly different, which defines Canada as a settler colonial state, is that 
Indigenous people are subject to a double legal system because they are governed by a 
specific institutional apparatus—the Indian Affairs bureaucracy.   
 
Pacification Strategies 
Both lawfare and the coercive power of the NWMP were integral in the process of 
territorialisation, which expanded and asserted setter state jurisdiction by physically and 
politically removing Indigenous nations. This was accomplished through a range of strategies 
from warfare, forced displacement, surveying and enclosure of land, settler occupation, treaty-
making processes based on legal extinguishment of title, the reserve system and pass 
regulation, and privatisation of property (and thus erasure of the commons and exclusion from 
those lands). In addition to extending the settler colonial assertion of sovereignty, these 
processes worked to constitute the settler state and capitalist relations by securing access to 
land for settlement, protecting settler ownership (including the establishment of municipalities), 
and facilitating infrastructure construction and resource extraction. These geopolitics of 
territorialisation underlie political, economic and cultural-spiritual elimination as each of these 
dimensions of self-determination have a connection to land.   
The elimination of Indigenous communities as autonomous political entities is grounded 
in territorialisation. As noted above, there was a shift in the positioning of Indigenous nations in 
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colonial policy from nation-to-nation terms to ‘dependents’ of the Crown. The creation of “Indian” 
as a legal category of exception subjugates Indigenous political authority to the colonial 
sovereign. Between 1885 and 1960, “Indians” were not allowed to vote in federal elections, and 
from 1927 to 1951 they were prohibited from engaging in political organising, and from mounting 
legal challenges. The legal exception also enabled the Superintendent of Indian Affairs to 
directly intervene in community governance by removing traditional/hereditary chiefs and 
imposing the electoral band council system funded by the government. This has worked as a 
divide-and-conquer strategy which has fostered divisions that fracture nations and disrupt the 
political-military power of Indigenous nations and confederacies. By weakening and eliminating 
competing assertions of political authority, settler colonial sovereignty is territorially expanded. 
Legal processes of enfranchisement that were contingent on giving up Indian status, and the 
imposing of band councils are modes of political assimilation constituting “liberal subjects of 
empire” (Coulthard 2007) through their adoption of settler colonial institutions. As I will discuss 
in the next section, the rights regime is also a means of political assimilation as collective 
Indigenous rights that precede the state itself are reconciled with individual liberal rights. For the 
settler state, the discourse of liberalism-security is reinforced as the state is positioned as the 
“protector” of Indigenous peoples, liberal democracy, and population (and economy) via its 
monopolisation of “legitimate” violence—police-military power. Criminal law worked to 
delegitimise political struggles against the state as ‘terrorism/extremism’.  
Economically, the displacement of communities from traditional territories also meant 
severing access to traditional modes and sources of subsistence. This was reinforced through 
both the criminalisation and regulation of mobility to and from reserves and of activities such as 
hunting, fishing, and farming. Early Indian Policy sought to exploit Indigenous people as a ready 
labour source for the industrial market. Reserves and criminalisation were ways of coercing their 
integration into wage labour. Through elimination of other modes of subsistence, these practices 
worked to secure a wage labour market and capitalist economy (Satzewich 1997; Gordon 
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2010). Not only did the elimination of indigenous ways of living contribute to the growing 
capitalist economy of the state, but displacement made land and resources available for 
accumulation by settlers (and foreign corporations). Criminalisation secures privatised (stolen) 
lands and capitalist economic production from interference or competition from Indigenous 
peoples. Through surveillance and enforcement activities, police prevent the threat of insecurity 
posed by Indigenous peoples’ presence. 
Cultural and spiritual destruction is entwined with displacement and political-economic 
suppression. The criminalisation of cultural practices such as the outlawing of potlatches and 
dances under the Indian Act in 1884, the limiting of movement, and the imposition of residential 
schools were “civilising” practices that attempted to not only eliminate cultural-spiritual identity 
but also to instil liberal subjectivity and morality. Church-run residential schools “trained” 
children and youths to adopt settler ways of living while repressing Indigenous languages and 
cultures. The physical separation of children from communities and their confinement to 
residential schools disrupted the transmission of knowledge and practices. One of the driving 
factors for this policy was an effort to foster the concept of private ownership, something that 
was reinforced with a later amendment restricting the sale of hunted animals or produce 
cultivated on reserve without the approval of Indian agents (Purich 1986). Prohibitions on 
alcohol, gambling and visiting poolrooms reflected morality concerns, and were reinforced by 
vagrancy provisions of the Criminal Code. While the suppression (elimination) of cultural 
difference was the objective of earlier assimilation strategies, cultural difference is now 
managed through the discourse of multiculturalism, as I discuss below. Whether in the earlier 
form of elimination or the current multicultural discourse, processes of cultural assimilation are 
integral to the formation of nation-state identity.  
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Agents of Pacification  
The Indian Affairs bureaucracy and NWMP were both central in these various strategies of 
pacification. While each institution deployed distinct forms of power, there is significant overlap. 
In the Department of Indian Affairs (DIA) bureaucracy, the role of the Indian agent was pivotal to 
the department’s ability to carry out its mandate of “managing” Indians and Indian lands. Indian 
agents headed local Indian Agencies, which served as the “field operations” of the DIA. 
Agencies managed Indian bands and reserves within a certain geographic region even where 
bands might be parties to different treaties (Satzewich 1997). There was significant variation 
between regions in the specific administrative tasks undertaken by Indian agencies, which 
ranged from school and health inspections, managing farming operations, administering rations, 
and enforcing compliance with Indian Act. With the quasi-autonomy of Indian agents, they can 
be described as “petty sovereigns” (Butler 2004)—bureaucrats who exercised the prerogatives 
of the settler colonial government through their own discretion. The agents themselves were 
invested with political-legal authority exercised through various powers. Agents had the power 
to affect changes in band governance/leadership, to enforce residential school attendance 
(1884), controlled the movement of Indigenous peoples through the pass system,33 issued 
rations based on their assessment of need, and restricted cultural practices (Satzewich 1997). 
The Indian agent could preside over band council meetings although without voting power. Yet, 
their presence was an important form of surveillance that, as Titley (1986) notes, could exert 
significant influence over proceedings. In addition to these administrative powers, Indian agents 
were empowered in 1881 to act as justices of the peace; in 1890, their legal power was further 
expanded as they were invested with power to enforce the anti-vagrancy laws of the Criminal 
Code (Dickason 2002). 
                                               
33
 The pass system was a policy developed by Indian Affairs after the North West Rebellion to prevent people from 
leaving their reserves. Anyone seeking to travel had to obtain permission from the Indian Agent who would provide a 
pass indicating the purpose and length of time permitted for being off-reserve. Those found off-reserve without a pass 
could be apprehended by police and returned to their reserve. Because there was no legal basis for the pass system, 
the NWMP became hesitant to enforce it, creating tension with Indian Affairs.  
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 While Indian agents were empowered with political-legal authority to enforce Indian 
policy, the police institution retained authority to use coercive force when Indigenous peoples 
refused to comply with imposed conditions and engaged in active resistance. In addition to 
organised and armed mobilisations, resistance occurred on an everyday basis through, for 
example, refusals to farm, leaving the reserve without permission, continuing to engage in 
traditional hunting, fishing and cultural-spiritual activities, and running away from residential 
schools. The NWMP relationship with DIA was a reciprocal one in providing enforcement and 
surveillance, but also in receiving information from Indian agents regarding the communities, 
especially concerning the number of guns on reserves and the movement of people to and from 
the US (K. Smith 2009). Smith (2009) writes that conflicts between the NWMP and DIA were 
constant as each felt that the other institution was interfering with its activities and jurisdiction. 
This is a dynamic that, as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, continues to characterise the 
relationship between these two institutions. The pass system became a source of contention 
between DIA and the NWMP—because it lacked a legal basis, officers became increasingly 
hesitant to enforce it (K. Smith 2009). NWMP officers also sometimes played the ‘good cop’ 
role, in opposition to Indian Affairs. The police would sometimes intervene to advocate in 
Indigenous interests, such as the provision of rations. As Smith (2009) notes, this was not 
necessarily an altruistic move but motivated by security concerns that deprivation could lead to 
unrest, which the police would have to deal with.34 The NWMP’s distancing of itself from the DIA 
in some situations parallels the contemporary tendency for police to explicitly adopt a “neutral” 
position in land disputes. 
 Despite the tensions between the NWMP and Indian Affairs, both institutions were 
central to the formation of the settler state. In the various mechanisms of colonial policy 
                                               
34
 Indeed, Dyck (1986) argues that deprivation of food was a catalyst for mobilisation among some Cree Nations in 
the west led by Chief Poundmaker during the late nineteenth century. However, as conditions worsened some 
nations eventually signed onto treaties and settle on reserves for rations. Noel Dyck. 1986.  “An Opportunity Lost: 
The Initiative of the Reserve Agricultural Programme in the Prairie West.” Pp. 121-137 in 1885 and After: Native 
Society in Transition, edited by F. L. Barron and J. B. Waldram. Regina: University of Regina Press. 
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discussed in this section, we can see the simultaneous deployment of both coercive and 
“liberal” administrative modes of power enacted by the agents of both the police and Indian 
Affairs bureaucracy. These strategies were enabled through law and legitimated by liberal 
“civilising” discourse.  
  
PACIFICATION BY THE LIBERAL LEGAL RIGHTS REGIME  
Since the late twentieth century human rights have become the dominant logics of 
contemporary lawfare. In the post-World War II period, the concept of “civilisation” was 
displaced in international law by the concept of human rights as standards or measures of 
belonging in international society (Neocleous 2011c). As I discussed in chapter 1 and earlier in 
this chapter, “civilisation” was a key rationale legitimating imperial conquest and colonial 
strategies of elimination. Historically, the concept of “civilisation” was conflated with police 
power as the production of order out of disorder—this is particularly evident in colonial contexts 
(Neocleous 2011c). Reflecting the dialectic of law and violence, the construct of human rights 
emerged as a means of regulation in the context of intense political violence in the twentieth 
century (Hajjar 2004, referencing Sarat and Kearns 1993). Human rights have become a 
rationale of pacification in producing internal and global order.  
The post-Cold-War fetishisation of law and constitutionalism has been characterised by 
the emergence of a global human rights paradigm (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006), which has 
intensified since the 1980s (Hajjar 2004). Goodale (2005:556) describes the human rights 
paradigm as “superliberalism” which has “conditioned” struggles in ways that “consolidate” 
existing hegemony of liberal legality. This context has intensified the “judicialisation of politics” 
as legal (courts) and quasi-legal venues (tribunals, commissions) become the primary spaces of 
political contention (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:27). In this space organised by the logics of 
liberal rights, rights as an object become a substitute for material self-determination, reparation, 
and structural or institutional changes (e.g. Orkin 2003). Drawing on Fanon, Coulthard (2007) 
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argues that in this liberal-rights regime context, the “freedom and independence” of Indigenous 
peoples are taken up as a politics of recognition through processes of negotiation, constitutional 
amendments, and the “bestow[ing]” of “rights”. These processes pre-empt contentious modes of 
struggle and conflict (p. 448). Alfred (2011:9) thus describes reconciliation as a “pacifying” 
discourse. As a dominant discourse of Indigenous–settler relations, the politics of recognition 
frames rights, cultural distinctiveness, self-government, and state obligations in ways that 
reproduce (strengthen) colonial structures of domination rather than transforming or dismantling 
them (Coulthard 2007).  
In white settler states, multiculturalism has become a strategy of assimilation and a 
discourse shaping the politics of recognition (Bannerji 2000; Thobani 2007; Veracini 2010). As 
Alfred and Corntassel (2005) argue, the category of “aboriginal” renders Indigenous peoples as 
an ethnic group among the plurality, which erases the colonial dynamic that is unique to 
Indigenous peoples. Self-determination and liberation struggles are channelled through politics 
of cultural recognition and reconciliation (Barkan 2000; Bannerji 2000). The assertion of 
Indigenous self-determination and inherent rights become cast in popular discourse as 
demands for “special treatment” inconsistent with multiculturalism and liberal equality.  
While the human rights paradigm emerges from and organises international-global 
order, the rights regime is very much a state apparatus. Rather than a weakening of “the state”, 
the human rights regime strengths states’ sovereignty assertions. As Alfred and Corntassel 
(2005:603) write, Indigenous issues have been “domesticated” in the sense that rights of self-
determination are confined “to a set of domestic authorities operating within the constitutional 
framework of the state.” While there may be international rights instruments such as the UN 
Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Indigenous self-determination continues to be 
subsumed by the settler state assertion of sovereignty through its legal apparatus. The liberal 
politics of recognition work through mechanisms such as land claims processes, ‘development’ 
projects, and self-government agreements to reconcile Indigenous nationhood with settler state 
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sovereignty through accommodations around land, political autonomy, and economic initiatives 
(Coulthard 2007).  
Coulthard (2007) argues that these accommodations sustain dominant colonial 
institutions, which are based on terms (and limits) for recognising Indigeneity that are defined by 
the state. Drawing on Fanon, he argues that these processes constitute Indigenous peoples as 
“subjects of imperial rule” (Coulthard 2007:443). Alfred and Corntassel (2005:612) contend that 
pursuit of change through these institutional(ised) forms “further embed[s] Indigenous people in 
the colonial institutions they set out to challenge” because of the inherent “logical 
inconsistencies” of these institutions. 
 
Rights Lawfare 
The contemporary Canadian rights regime is symbolised by the constitutional enshrining of 
individual rights. The 1960 Bill of Rights was the first piece of Canada’s post-World War II 
international human rights commitment. Canada’s inclusion of a Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms in its 1982 constitution marks its status as a liberal democratic nation-state within the 
global order, engaged in practices favourable to investment and accumulation. The inclusion of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights within the Constitution (section 35) and the Charter (section 25) 
were symbolic of Canada’s recognition of Indigenous rights. Engagement in negotiation and 
reconciliation processes reflect a state’s “political stability” in moving “beyond” past conflict or 
disorder and securing conditions amenable global capital (Barkan 2000:xxvix; Goodale 2005).35 
  Aboriginal and treaty rights are based on recognition of the existence of Indigenous 
societies prior to settler arrival and therefore are not derived from the settler state. This, in itself, 
is a fundamental conflict with settler colonial sovereignty. Indigenous collective rights (of self -
                                               
35
 Further, willingness to apologize “has also become a liberal marker of national political stability and strength rather 
than shame. It is an attempt to recognize that nations have to come to terms with their own pasts, primarily 
responsibility for the others, their victims.” (Barkan 2000: xxvix).  
80 
 
determination) are often the target of extinguishment via negotiations and land claim 
settlements through conversion to individual rights. The struggle to have these rights upheld 
reflects a conflict between the dominant liberal regime of individual rights versus the collective 
or group nature of Aboriginal and treaty rights. Alfred (2005b:112) writes that “Indigeneity is 
legitimised and negotiated only as a set of state-derived individual rights aggregated into a 
community social context—a very different concept than that of collective rights pre-existing and 
independent of the state.” Corntassel (2008) identifies four core ways in which liberal rights 
discourse is antithetical to Indigenous self-determination. First, he argues that liberal rights 
compartmentalise different dimensions of self-determination so that political-legal recognition is 
separated from the interrelationship of resources, livelihoods, sustenance, and land. Second, 
rights frameworks have been used to deny and erase the existence of Indigenous peoples. This 
occurs, for example, through Indian Act status and the rendering of Indigenous peoples as 
“ethnic minorities” through multiculturalism discourse. Third, the individualism of rights discourse 
de-emphasizes cultural relationships with family, community and the natural world. Fourth, the 
rights discourse “limits the applicability of decolonisation and restoration” because it sets 
restrictions for the scope of decolonisation (p. 108).  
Indigenous scholars such as Patricia Monture-Angus (1999), James Sákéj Youngblood 
Henderson (2002), Glen Coulthard (2007), Taiaiake Alfred (2005b), Jeff Corntassel (2008) and 
Mary-Ellen Turpel (2009) have emphasized that liberal rights-based discourse works to limit 
self-determination in ways that reproduce and reinforce colonial institutions.  Most 
fundamentally, claims must use the language, concepts, and frameworks of the dominant 
apparatus. Indigenous self-determination claims are forced to fit Eurocentric conceptions of 
sovereignty, which are incompatible with understandings of the interconnectedness of land, 
politics, livelihoods and culture. However, while rejecting the legitimacy of the colonial legal 
apparatus as the means of self-determination and decolonisation, rights discourse can be used 
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“as a conscious strategy” (Monture-Angus 1999) to defend against continuing colonisation and 
to “open new indigenous spaces” (Corntassel 2008:123; see also Turpel 2009).  
Reflecting the dialectical nature of resistance and pacification, gains have been made in 
the rights-based arena of lawfare—although not without significant limitations—such as the 
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights. For example, the removal of Indian Act 
prohibitions on political activities facilitated mobilisations in the 1960s that led to the inclusion of 
Aboriginal and treaty rights within the Canadian constitution. A number of regional and national 
Indigenous peoples’ organisations formed in the 1960s and 1970s including the National Indian 
Brotherhood (1968), the Inuit Tapiriit Kanatami (1971), and the Native Council of Canada (1972) 
(later renamed Congress of Aboriginal People).36 Legal cases have produced decisions that 
incrementally acknowledge inherent rights. For example, the 1973 Calder decision affirmed that 
Indigenous peoples’ land title and rights derive from their occupation of these lands before 
European arrival.37  
Yet, it must be emphasized that in many cases, these gains have come because of 
extra-legal mobilisation by Indigenous peoples, including the 1980 Constitutional Express and 
direct actions. In the drafting of the constitution, protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights was 
proposed as section 34. However, because the federal government sought provincial buy-in, the 
section was cut because these rights would conflict with provincial jurisdiction over natural 
resources. The implication was that provinces would have to share jurisdiction with Indigenous 
                                               
36
 The Federation of Saskatchewan Indians was created in 1966 and was the first native organization to receive a 
grant through the federal program. One of the first Indigenous organizations was the Grand Indian Council of Ontario 
and Quebec, composed of Haudenosaunee and Ojibwa nations. The Council folded in 1870 when the Department of 
Indian Affairs cut off funds. In the 1930s and 1940s several organizations were established, including the founding of 
the Native Brotherhood of British Columbia (NBBC) in 1931, the Indian Association of Alberta in 1939, and the Union 
of Saskatchewan Indians in 1946 (Purich 1986). In 1943, the NBBC led a trek to Ottawa in protest of the federal 
taxation of native fishers. The Brotherhood and the trek led to the formation of the National Indian Brotherhood in 
1968. The extent of indigenous political mobilisation in this period is reflected by the increase from one national and 
nine provincial organizations in the 1950s, to four national, one regional and 33 provincial organization within the 
decade (Purich 1986). Of course, this does not account for the extent of less formal, grassroots modes of organizing.  
37
 Calder et al. v. British Columbia (Attorney General), [1973] SCR 313. The Calder case was a Nisga’a land claim 
that ultimately failed. However, the Supreme Court’s split ruling reinforced the pre-existing inherent land rights of 
Indigenous peoples. The Nisga’a later negotiated a comprehensive settlement under the comprehensive claims 
process introduced as a result of the Calder ruling. 
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communities (Hall 1991). As Hall (1991) notes, the Indigenous population was seen as having 
insufficient electoral power to threaten politicians; however the power of mass mobilisations led 
section 35 to be re-inserted.38  
The formal recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights in section 35 has provided a basis 
for legal challenges to violations and encroachments. However, because of the ambiguities of 
section 35, it falls to the courts to interpret Aboriginal and treaty rights. In several cases, these 
rights have been upheld. For example, the 1984 Guerin case reaffirmed the pre-existence of 
Aboriginal rights before European settlement and that the federal government had a fiduciary 
responsibility to Indigenous peoples.39 In the Sparrow (1990) and Adams (1996) decisions, the 
Supreme Court held that section 35 rights to fish supersede provincial fishing regulations in BC 
and Quebec respectively.40 At the same time, judicial interpretation has also compromised the 
constitutional protection of Aboriginal and treaty rights. Although the 1997 Delgamuukw decision 
affirmed that section 35 protected Aboriginal title, the court ruled that the guarantee of exclusive 
use and occupation of land could be infringed by the Crown based on “compelling and 
substantial legislative objective”, which could include infrastructural, resource and economic 
‘development’ projects, environmental protection initiatives, and “general economic 
development” of interior British Columbia.41 As Henderson (2002:37) states, “[b]y their 
interpretations of the constitutional order and of our treaty order, the courts created the colonial 
structure of federal Indian law.” Most recently, these constitutional protections have been further 
eroded through the Conservative government’s unilateral adoption of omnibus Bill C-45 (Jobs 
and Growth Act), which included amendments impacting Indigenous self-determination (see 
                                               
38
 Similarly, in the initial drafting of the Charter, there was a provision (section 26) that the Charter could not be used 
to deny “non-Charter rights”—such as Aboriginal and treaty rights. Protests and mobilisations by Indigenous peoples 
and organizations against the ambiguity of this draft provision led to section 25, which specifies that Charter rights do 
not “abrogate or derogate” from Aboriginal and treaty rights, including those recognized in the 1763 Royal 
Proclamation.  
39
 Guerin v. The Queen, [1984] 2 S.C.R. 335. 
40
 R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101. 
41
 Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010. 
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Diabo 2012). Diabo (2012) describes these as part of a “termination plan” enacted by the 
Harper government, which follows a legacy of political-legal attempts to destroy Indigenous 
communities through assimilation. 
Drawing on Povinelli (2002), Coulthard (2007) argues that rights are “recognised” by the 
Canadian state (and settlers) as long as they do not disrupt political-economic relations.  As 
pacification strategies, rights-based processes produce social order conducive to accumulation. 
Land claims are geared towards extinguishment of Indigenous title and privatisation of land as 
property, while economic projects encourage adoption of capitalist relations and incorporation of 
Indigenous peoples as a labour source (see Coulthard 2007:452). Alfred (2005a:42) points out 
that self-government agreements are based on the delegation of political power by the 
sovereign state to a “‘minority peoples’ […] within the polity as a whole.” Pacification is not zero-
sum—rather than losing authority, by delegating a degree of political power to communities “and 
by foregoing a small portion of the moneys derived from the exploitation of indigenous nations’ 
lands,” settler state sovereignty is secured by preventing radical challenges (Alfred 2005a:44).  
 
Negotiating Rights: Comprehensive and Specific Claims  
Two of the most significant institutionalised spaces of contemporary lawfare in which recognition 
of Aboriginal and treaty rights are negotiated are the quasi-legal comprehensive and specific 
claims processes administered by Indian Affairs. Historically, treaty-making was a key 
mechanism of settler colonial lawfare, providing the state with a legal foundation for the 
assertion of sovereignty and subjugation of Indigenous peoples. Between 1927 and 1951, the 
Crown stopped treaty-making when the Indian Act was amended to make it illegal for First 
Nations to use band funds for legal challenges. The lifting of restrictions in 1951 on the use of 
government money to research land claims was crucial for communities to engage in 
negotiations. In the 1970s, the federal government began to provide funding to organisations for 
researching and documenting their land claims. On the surface, this reflects a liberal 
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commitment to reconciliation. However, these legal processes are always limited by their 
contradictions or “logical inconsistencies” (Alfred and Corntassel 2005:612). The comprehensive 
and specific claims processes established in 1973, in response to the Calder decision, are a 
prime example of this contradiction as the state—through Indian and Northern Affairs Canada 
(INAC)—plays a dual role as both negotiator for and defendant against Indigenous rights 
assertions.42  
The specific claims process is a venue for addressing grievances stemming from the 
federal government’s infringements of rights and failures to fulfil obligations under existing 
treaties. Between 1973 and June 2014, 392 specific claims have been settled out of the 1611 
that have been filed. With an average of twenty years to settle a claim, communities and land 
are left vulnerable to further encroachments as the claim moves through the process (Gordon 
2010; Pasternak, Collis and Dafnos 2013). Comprehensive claims have been referred to as a 
modern treaty-making process for communities that never signed treaties or land surrenders in 
the past. At the root of the comprehensive claims process is the objective of extinguishing 
Indigenous land title and consequently, of collective rights. In most cases, while First Nations 
communities have retained some of their traditional territories, the land on which title is given up 
is transformed to fee simple—private property subject to taxation (see Gordon 2010).43 The 
government seeks certainty and finality through the claims processes so that the community 
cannot mount future legal challenges (Johnson 2008; Alfred 2011). Since 1973, 26 
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 Although proposals to establish claims commissions were made in 1963 and 1965, the 1973 Calder decision, 
which affirmed that Aboriginal rights and title preceded settler arrival, was the major catalyst for the creation of the 
two claims processes to address the legal precedent. Prior to this, there was no legal mechanism for First Nations to 
assert land rights. The Office of Native Claims was set up in 1974 to deal with specific and comprehensive claims. In 
1986 the Office was abolished and specific areas of responsibility were split among different INAC offices.  
43
 In 1998, the UN Human Rights Committee found that the extinguishment clause violated the right of self-
determination under the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. The federal government subsequently 
changed the language from “extinguishment” to “modified rights” in which collective indigenous rights are superseded 
by (or converted into) individual rights and a condition of “non-assertion” of Aboriginal and treaty rights. In the Nisga’a 
Treaty, concluded in 2000, the Nisga’a nation gave up title in exchange for control of approximately 10% of its 
traditional territory, spread among small plots of land. The treaty also placed limits on Nisga’a jurisdictional authority 
over waterways and subsurface.  
85 
 
comprehensive claims have been settled, and as of March 2014, 100 claims are in progress 
(AANDC 2014).  
The land claims process is illustrative of how the settler colonial logic of elimination 
works through an administrative-legal process couched in the liberal mechanism of negotiation 
to extinguish self-determination while securing settler state sovereignty.44 The framework and 
terms for the claims processes are created by the state. Both comprehensive and specific 
claims involve long legal-bureaucratic process, which leaves land and resources vulnerable to 
expropriation, damage and worsening material conditions for a community. The processes have 
been critiqued for fostering the fragmentation of nations as negotiations will be undertaken with 
individual communities or bands. The preferred resolution for the state is extinguishment of title 
for monetary settlement, which can exploit the economically vulnerable circumstances of many 
communities. There are significant monetary costs for bringing forward claims and participating 
in the process—from research, hiring legal counsel, travel and lodging during negotiations—
which can be an incentive for a financial settlement in order to cover those costs.45 Yet, these 
processes are the arenas in which indigenous struggles are institutionalised—the implication is 
that the assertion of rights outside of these channels is treated as illegitimate and potentially 
criminalised by the settler state.  
The emergence of these legal-administrative mechanisms for responding to land and 
rights assertions has been a result of organised efforts within the legal regime (e.g. by national 
and territorial organisations), court challenges (i.e. Calder), as well as direct actions. These 
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 Between 1973 and 2007, 282 claims had been settled. In 2007 the federal government introduced an Action Plan 
to speed up the process. As of June 11, 2014, the status of the 1611 claims is as follows: 319 are in progress, 1163 
have been ‘concluded’ (392 settled; 410 were found to have no government obligation; 32 resolved through 
administrative remedy; 320 were closed), 73 cases are in active litigation and 56 cases have gone to the Specific 
Claims Tribunal. (AANDC Reporting Centre on Specific Claims. Online. http://services.aadnc-
aandc.gc.ca/SCBRI_E/Main/ReportingCentre/External/externalreporting.aspx) 
45
 Loans are provided by Indian Affairs with the rhetoric of supporting participation in the process but these loans are 
a double-edged sword because of significant constraining conditions. Loans are time-limited, which increases 
pressure to settle especially when coupled with the fact that failure to arrive at an agreement means that bands have 
to repay loans out of their own funds (as opposed to coming out of a monetary settlement) (Gordon 2010). Even if the 
government unilaterally ends negotiations, the First Nation must still repay the loan. There is therefore incentive to 
accept monetary settlement or conversion of land to fee simple rather than hold out for retaining title. 
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strategies have a common ground—whether by using or rejecting the liberal rights framework—
as they expose the inconsistencies of liberal discourse with the realities of enduring structural 
subjugation. As Rifkin (2009) emphasizes, the power of liberal regimes, that have been so 
fundamental in legitimating the subjugation of Indigenous peoples, has also produced conditions 
of contradiction as dominant institutions (i.e. the courts) have interpreted and applied law in 
ways that can work in favour of Indigenous peoples. As Rifkin emphasizes, this is a reflection of 
the inherent instability of settler colonial legal order and enduring Indigenous resistance. The 
emergence and intensification of the rights regime since the mid-twentieth century has been 
marked by widespread Indigenous mobilisation and militancy, which reflects these ongoing 
contradictions.  
 
MOBILISATIONS, MILITANCY AND “RUPTURES” 
In the global context of anticolonial movements and the black power movement in the US, there 
was an intensification of Indigenous mobilisation in the 1960s and 1970s. In part, these 
movements emerged out of the contradictions of liberalism made apparent through earlier 
movements, highlighting racial-colonial oppression in the context of the post-war international 
human rights discourse. The emergence of Indigenous militancy since the 1960s and certain 
high profile conflicts have been “ruptures” in the sense that they brought the contradictions of 
the liberal-democratic narrative of the nation state into stark relief, disrupting the apparent 
security of settler colonial authority (i.e. sovereignty). I conclude the chapter with a discussion of 
three significant conflicts at Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash, which continue to haunt both 
the national memory and the institutional memory of police-military organisations. By focusing 
on these particular events, my intention is not to de-emphasize everyday acts of resistance and 
other forms of mobilisation. These “ruptures” did not occur spontaneously, but in the course of 
ongoing struggles. They have also had lasting effects on the politics of Indigenous self-
determination and settler colonial pacification strategies.  
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As Alfred (2005b:230) writes, these encounters between Indigenous peoples and the 
state “force state authorities to demonstrate to the rest of the population what warriors already 
know: there is no morality, no legal base, no fairness, no truth or justice in any form in the 
state’s power, and its only undeniable power is that of overwhelming violence.” Direct actions 
that are met with the violence of military power disrupt the legitimating discourses of the settler 
colonial state and the war/peace binary. What we see is the (re)production or reinforcement of 
legal liberal discourse as a “solution” through a public commission or inquiry, the introduction of 
new policy measures, or both. These strategies work to institutionalise contention within 
dominant legal institutions and (re)assert the sovereignty, and thus legitimacy, of the settler 
nation-state.  
 
Militancy and the Rights Regime in the 1960s–1990s  
The 1960s and 1970s were a period of global anticolonial uprisings, decolonisation movements, 
the Vietnam War, and the civil rights movement in the United States. In Canada, there was also 
a visible increase in mobilisations around Indigenous self-determination. As discussed above, 
Indian Act restrictions on political organising were lifted by the 1960s, which contributed to the 
formation of political organisations. This was also a period in which warrior societies emerged, 
emblematic of growing political radicalisation influenced by global struggles and most directly by 
the American Indian Movement and Red Power movement in the US—itself influenced by the 
Black Panthers and Black Power. One of the key differences between the US Red Power 
movement and warrior societies is that the former was largely urban-based,  while warrior 
societies were—are—rooted in communities and accountable to traditional leadership (Alfred 
and Lowe 2005:11). The first high-profile involvement of a warrior society occurred in 1973 with 
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the Mohawk Warrior Society at Kahnawake (Alfred and Lowe 2005).46 In the late 1960s, the 
RCMP had identified concerns about the influence of the Black Power and Red Power 
movements in Canada (Hewitt 2002). An internal memo titled “Red Power – Canada” was 
produced for headquarters in 1969. The report raised concern that Indigenous protesters—
“extremists”—could “exploit” confrontations with RCMP members “for the purpose of gaining 
public sympathy and support for the Indian cause,” which could have a detrimental impact on 
the image of the organisation. Paralleling past and future discourse, the report noted “that 
discretion and tact will be of decided importance” during the summer of 1969 to mitigate the 
threat to the RCMP (in Hewitt 2002:157).  
On June 25, 1969, the federal Liberal government released its White Paper policy 
proposal. Reflecting the destructive and constitutive politics of liberalism, the White Paper drew 
on the discourse of individual equality recently enshrined in the 1960 Canadian Bill of Rights in 
proposing to eliminate Indian status, which was characterised as a form of differential treatment. 
This would entail the dismantling of the Department of Indian Affairs, abolishing the Indian Act, 
and phasing out existing treaties, with the implication that Aboriginal and treaty rights would no 
longer exist. Reserve land would be converted to private property, which could be sold by bands 
and its members (Purich 1986).47 The effect would be to eliminate Indigenous peoples as a 
legally recognised population—a symbolic erasure with significant material implications. 
Symbolic erasure would make it legally impossible for the settler state to be criticised for 
violating human rights of a distinct population. At the same time, it reinforces the state’s 
commitment to equality defined by individual rights of the legal-liberal regime. The 
extinguishment of Aboriginal title and treaty rights, and the privatisation of reserve lands 
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 The Ojibway Warrior Society emerged in 1974, followed by the Mi’kmaq Warrior Society in 1988, the Native Youth 
Movement in 1996, Okiijida Warrior Society in 1997, and the West Coast Warrior Society in 1999. Warrior societies 
have become the ‘face’ of Indigenous militancy in Canada whether or not Warrior Societies are involved. As Alfred 
and Lowe (2005:23) argue, warriors have been represented in mainstream media through enduring racial stereotypes 
of both the “Noble Savage” and “blood-thirsty renegade”. 
47
 Responsibility for remaining programs would be transferred to provinces, which would effectively be an end of the 
historical relationship between Canada (as proxy for the Crown) and Indigenous peoples. 
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facilitates settler territorial expansion and ultimately, augments the settler state’s sovereignty 
claim by politically and territorially eliminating competing assertions of self-determination. The 
complete assimilation of Indigenous peoples would mean that Canada would cease to be a 
settler colonial state (see Veracini 2010).  
The development of the White Paper involved consultations with First Nations people, 
but the final paper largely ignored the positions of those consulted. Yet, the performance of 
consultation could be deployed as signalling consent of Indigenous peoples to their own 
elimination. The White Paper was an important catalyst for a wide spectrum of Indigenous 
mobilisation, ranging from the development of counter-policy position papers (such as the Red 
and Brown Papers on self-determination) to more militant organising, including the formation of 
the National Indian Brotherhood. According to Long (1992:121), “the collective response […] to 
the White Paper signified the public emergence of a politicised movement of Native Indians that 
persisted throughout the 1970s and 1980s.” This was a period of increased Indigenous 
militancy, which continued at the same time as the entrenchment of the liberal legal rights 
regime in Canada.48 
There were a series of militant actions across Canada from the 1970s leading up to Oka 
in 1990.49 One of the higher-profile events was the 1974 occupation of Anicinabe Park in 
Kenora, Ontario by armed members of the Ojibway Warrior Society and supported by the 
American Indian Movement (AIM). The park had been bought by the Department of Indian 
Affairs intended for use by the Anishinabek people, but was then sold to the municipality of 
Kenora without consultation. The reclamation action highlighted the abrogation of land rights 
and sought recognition of rights to the land. While the Warrior Society threatened to destroy a 
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 See also, Richardson 1989; Hodgins, Lischke and McNab 2003.  
49
 Some of these actions included blockades and reclamations by the Bonaparte Indian Band (1974, housing), 
various communities in the 1975 “Indian Summer” in BC, the Mi’gmaq at Restigouche (1981, fishing), Nuu-chah-nulth 
nation (1984, logging in Clayoquot Sound), Haida nation (1985, deforestation), Lubicon Cree (1988, deforestation), 
Dene and Métis (1989, pulp mill), Innu in Goose Bay (1989-91, low-flying planes), the Algonquins of Barriere Lake 
(1989, logging), and Peigan Lonefighters (1990, dam project). See also Clairmont and Potts (2006). 
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pulp mill and hydro station, the occupation ended when the federal government promised to 
engage in settlement negotiations (Borrows 2005). On September 30 in the same year, the 
Ojibway Warrior Society and AIM members led a Native Peoples’ Caravan from Vancouver to 
Parliament Hill where they encountered barricades and RCMP tactical teams that used tear-gas 
to disperse the caravan (see Purich 1986; Borrows 2005). According to Purich (1986), it was the 
first time that such a level of force had been used at Parliament Hill. That year the RCMP 
identified the “Indian movement as the single greatest threat to national security” but this was 
downplayed by politicians as isolated incidents caused by extremists (Long 1992:127). This is a 
discourse that continues to be articulated by politicians—as well as police—during high profile 
actions. The effect is to depoliticise and de-legitimate the actions and claims while reinforcing 
the legitimacy of rule of law and legal processes.   
 
Kanesatake / Oka 1990  
The 78-day standoff of the “Oka crisis” arguably produced the most enduring symbols/images of 
colonial encounter—warriors dressed in full camouflage face-to-face with members of the 
Sûreté du Québec (SQ) and Canadian Forces. It also sparked solidarity actions by other 
communities across Canada, especially in British Columbia (York and Pindera 1999), and 
contributed to the growth of warrior societies (Alfred and Lowe 2005). According to Alfred 
(2005b), after Oka, the federal and provincial governments co-opted community leaders through 
increased funding and negotiation processes. The events had wider effects as the BC and 
Federal governments quickly introduced a BC Treaty Process, which “subverted the movement” 
that had been galvanised by Oka (Stewart Philip of the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, in Alfred 
2005b:185).  
The land on which the standoff occurred has been the site of ongoing struggle since the 
1700s. The Mohawks had made petitions since 1781 to have their title recognised (York and 
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Pindera 1999).50 With the stated intent of addressing the land claims of the Mohawks, in 1945 
the federal government purchased land in and around Oka that was under Sulpician title and 
occupied by the Mohawks. However, two years later, the province allowed the town of Oka to 
expropriate some of the land including the Pines, which were part of the Commons used by the 
Mohawks. In 1959, Oka planned to lease part of the Pines to a private corporation to develop a 
golf course. All of these transactions, which resulted in the reduction of the Mohawk land base 
to one percent of the original area, occurred without consultation and ignored the Mohawk claim 
to the lands. In 1975, a joint comprehensive claim was submitted by the Mohawks of 
Kanesatake, Kahnawake and Akwesasne. It was rejected on the basis that the communities 
could not prove their occupation since “time immemorial”. In 1977, Kanesatake submitted a 
specific claim, which was rejected in 1986 on the basis that the federal government did not have 
legal obligations to the community.  
In the context of this ongoing history of conflict, the Mohawks set up barricades and 
engaged in protests beginning in March 1990 to prevent the expansion of the existing golf 
course and construction of condos on burial grounds. In late June, the mayor and council of Oka 
obtained an injunction and the Mohawks responded by strengthening the barricade. On July 11, 
100 members of the Sûreté du Québec (SQ) carried out a dawn raid and Corporal Marc LeMay 
was shot and killed in the exchange of gunfire.51 The SQ retreated and surrounded the 
barricaded area, leading to a standoff. During the raid, the Mohawks from Kahnawake 
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 In the late seventeenth century, the Mohawks made peace with French after the destruction of towns and crops by 
the French. The land was granted to the Sulpicians with the understanding that it would be for Indian settlement, 
however no formal deeds were made indicating Mohawk land rights. In later struggles, the wampum belt recording 
the peace treaty with the French was not accepted as evidence of Haudenosaunee land title. After the French loss to 
Britain in the colonial wars, the Crown assured the Haudenosaunee that they could remain on the lands, which was 
included in the Royal Proclamation 1763. In 1840, the Crown recognized Sulcipian title, but also that they continued 
to have an obligation to hold lands for the Mohawks. However, in 1936, the Sulpicians sold portions of the land to a 
Belgian Baron without consultation. This land included a Commons area used by the Mohawks. 
51
 A Coroner’s Inquiry (the Gilbert Inquiry) into the death of Corporal LeMay began in 1995, after being continuously 
delayed in part by the SQ (Swain 2010). The inquiry was unable to definitively identify the source of the bullet that 
killed LeMay. There was no other formal inquiry into the events. 
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blockaded the Mercier Bridge in solidarity, which lasted for a month.52 The day after the raid, 
Canadian Forces personnel and equipment were deployed in a support capacity, including 
surveillance and intelligence operations (Swain 2010). As negotiations were occurring in July 
between the provincial government and Mohawks, the SQ increased its presence, which 
contributed to the suspension of negotiations. Supporters arrived from other First Nations 
across Canada, and there were solidarity actions.  
On August 6, Quebec Premier Robert Bourassa requested Canadian Forces 
involvement under the Aid to the Civil Power provision of the National Defence Act.53 While the 
Canadian Forces mobilised, the federal government became involved and tri-party negotiations 
began again. Bourassa called off negotiations on August 27 and the military planned to remove 
the barricades at Kanesatake and Kahnawake. The military operation escalated at Kanesatake 
on September 1, and included psychological tactics such as shining spotlights at night, playing 
loud music, and doing constant fly-overs. The standoff ended when the Mohawks burned their 
weapons and left the site on September 26. Thirty-nine people were charged with a wide range 
of offences. 
Soon after the events at Oka, the SQ, OPP, RCMP, and Canadian Forces met to 
develop an approach that would “move from immediate confrontational roadblock arrest to 
obtaining a court injunction first and only then enforcement if necessary” (King 1997:72). The 
injunction would provide police with the authority of law in forcefully dismantling blockades and 
effecting arrests. However, this approach was not evident at either Gustafsen Lake or 
Ipperwash, as I will discuss below. The strategy of avoiding confrontation and using 
enforcement as a last resort (if necessary) was part of the key recommendations of the 
Ipperwash Inquiry and the policy reforms enacted by the OPP (and RCMP) into the 2000s. After 
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 The Mercier Bridge is the most direct route between Montreal (island) and the US border. 
53
 Aid to the Civil Power enables provincial governments—as they have jurisdictional authority over the administration 
of justice—to request military assistance to civil authorities (i.e. police) in restoring “public order”. National Defence 
Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. N-5). The provincial legislative power is in the Emergencies Act, which replaced the War 
Measures Act in 1988. 
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Ipperwash, the use of injunctions became more contentious within government and police. At 
the same time that these forces were discussing strategies of de-escalation, the SQ increased 
the size of its Groupe D’Intervention (tactical unit) (Cormier 2011). The introduction of de-
escalatory measures alongside the enhancement of coercive capacities is a pattern that 
occurred after both Gustafsen Lake and Ipperwash.  
 
Ts’Peten / Gustafsen Lake 1995 
Most First Nations in British Columbia did not engage in treaty-making with the British Crown.54 
Much of British Columbia remains unceded territory, including Ts’Peten, the site of a month-long 
standoff between Secwepemc people and the RCMP and Canadian Forces. On June 15, 1995, 
Secwepemc people went to hold the Sun Dance on land within a ranch near 100 Mile House, 
BC, which they had done for previous five years. However, after initially agreeing to have people 
on the land, the ranch owner Lyall James obtained an eviction notice to force the 21 participants 
to leave, but they and supporters refused, deciding that it was time to reclaim a sacred site. In 
refusing to engage in dialogue, the provincial NDP government adopted a “law and order” 
discourse that characterised the protesters as criminals and terrorists. 
First Nations RCMP members were engaged as negotiators and had developed rapport 
with the land defenders. They had advised the organisation against taking enforcement action 
and argued for continuing negotiations. However, on August 17, the officers were pulled out and 
reassigned (“Native officers ignored” 1997). The next day, the RCMP Deputy Commissioner 
made informal inquiries into acquiring Canadian Forces armoured personnel carriers (APCs). 
The official request was made on August 25 for nine Bison APCs, bomb disposal units, rations, 
equipment, and Joint Task Force 2 (JTF2) (“A Chronology of the Gustafsen Lake Standoff” 
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 The exceptions are Treaty 8 (1899), part of the Numbered Treaties, and the Douglas Treaties (1850-54). 
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1996).55 Canadian Forces initiated Operation Wallaby and “Camp Zulu” was set up as a secret 
joint RCMP–Canadian Forces command post. The RCMP’s Operation Iron Horse treated the 
standoff as a counter-insurgency operation. The defenders were armed and there were 
numerous exchanges of gunfire with the RCMP.56 The standoff intensified into September, as 
the RCMP declared the area around the camp a “no-go zone”. On September 11, the RCMP 
engaged in a “gun-battle” with the defenders.57 On September 13, the RCMP requested JTF2 
take over for its depleted Emergency Response Team (“A Chronology of the Gustafsen Lake 
Standoff” 1996; Pugliese 2002). The standoff ended on September 17 as remaining defenders 
left camp after the intervention of spiritual advisor John Stevens. Eighteen people were charged 
and tried in a year-long trial that was the longest and most costly in history. The defense of 
colour of right was rejected by the judge and fifteen people were found guilty of various 
charges.58  
One of the key concerns informing RCMP command decisions was to avoid the kind of 
political and organisation fall-out of Oka.59 Reflecting the counter-insurgency approach taken by 
the RCMP, commanders approved smear and disinformation tactics to criminalise defenders 
and build support for the force and its response. These tactics included the strategic release of 
information, deliberate misinformation and misrepresentation to the media, and denying 
journalists’ access to the defenders. These politics of optics were shaped by the recent events 
at Oka, as well as the intent to “send a message” to concurrent protests and blockades in BC at 
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 JTF2 is a special operations unit used in counter-terrorism operations; the unit and its activities are classified. It 
was created in 1993 when the Canadian Forces took responsibility for counter-terrorism operations from the RCMP 
(Special Emergency Response Team).  
56
 Despite the scale of the state response and gunfire from both sides, just one woman was shot and injured by police 
and a Canadian Forces member lost a hand when a bomb detonated while he was setting it. 
57
 The precipitating event occurred when a truck driven by two people entered the no-go zone and hit “datasheet” 
explosives laid by the RCMP. The two people in the truck were unharmed and contrary to RCMP claims, were found 
to have been unarmed. They ran under fire, and were covered by other defenders. Over three hours, the RCMP fired 
20,000 rounds to 200 rounds fired by defenders. 
58
 In 2000, James Pitawanakwat, one of the defenders, left a half-way house and went to Portland. Portland refused 
to extradite on the basis that he had been criminalised for participating in a legitimate political action (Dickason 2002).   
59
 RCMP Assistant Commissioner Brown’s personal notes (August 10, 1995) [court evidence]. Settlers in Support of 
Indigenous Sovereignty-Gustafsen Lake Archives. Retrieved April 14, 2014 
(http://sisis.nativeweb.org/gustlake/trial.html#update). 
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Penticton, Adams Lake, Douglas Lake and Nanoose Bay.60 The RCMP had engaged Mike 
Webster, a psychological warfare expert, as a consultant during their operation. Based on the 
experience at Gustafsen Lake, Webster later wrote a “learning module” for the RCMP. 
According to Webster, one key to the RCMP's “success" was that negotiation and force were 
used co-jointly to “make it difficult [for the “opposition”] to disagree”. Thus, “force [was] utilized 
as a tool to educate not fight.”61  
The operation involved over 400 officers, and the combined cost of the RCMP-Canadian 
Forces operation exceeded five million dollars making it the largest and most expensive 
domestic paramilitary operation in Canadian history to that point. It was the first time that the 
RCMP used APCs and that its Emergency Response Team had been deployed in an extended 
operation. The BC RCMP used the events at Gustafsen Lake as an argument to support 
requests for armoured personal carriers and in 1998, the organisation purchased 4 APCs from 
General Motors. Despite the scale of the operation and the evidence that emerged during the 
criminal trial about RCMP practices, the BC government refused to establish an inquiry.62  
 
Aazhoodena / Ipperwash 1995 
Overlapping with events at Gustafsen Lake was the reclamation of Camp Ipperwash and 
Ipperwash Provincial Park from 1993 to 1995. Like Oka and Gustafsen Lake, the events at 
Ipperwash made explicit the enduring reality of settler colonial violence. At the root of all three 
cases is an ongoing struggle over land and cultural-political autonomy. The Kettle Point and 
Stoney Point reserves were created in 1827 by the Huron Tract Treaty, which allowed the 
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 These tactics were revealed during the defenders’ trial, which shed light and brought criticisms of RCMP tactics. 
RCMP Assistant Commissioner Brown’s personal notes (August 10, 1995); Sgt. Ryan’s testimony, (February 3, 1997) 
[court evidence]. Settlers in Support of Indigenous Sovereignty-Gustafsen Lake Archives. Retrieved April 14, 2014 
(http://sisis.nativeweb.org/gustlake/trial.html#update). 
61
 Webster, Mike. 1998. “Use of Force and the Gustafsen Lake Barricade.” RCMP Learning and Development. 
Retrieved from Internet Archive April 14, 2014 (http://wayback.archive.org/web/20000311135555/http://rcmp-
learning.org/docs/ecdd0085.htm). 
62
 During the Hughes Commission into RCMP conduct during the 1997 Asia-Pacific Economic Conference protests at 
the University of British Columbia, activists sought to make connections to the Gustafsen Lake events and the fact 
that there was no inquiry.  
96 
 
Crown to secure access to land for settlers. The “negotiation” of the treaty resulted in the First 
Nations losing more land and receiving less compensation than intended (Linden 2007a:672). 
Since 1912, the Crown continued to pressure the communities for additional land, leading to 
surrenders in 1927 and 1928. In the 1990s, the bands challenged the legal validity of the 1927 
land surrender. The courts ruled that the transfer was legal but questionable in terms of the 
“moral” obligation of the Crown to First Nations peoples. In 1928, the province bought a portion 
of the surrendered lands (which were not the subject of the court challenge) from the Federal 
government, which became Ipperwash Provincial Park in 1936 through settler pressures for 
access to the shore. In 1942, under the War Measures Act, the federal government expropriated 
land comprising the Stoney Point reserve for the purpose of building a military base during 
World War II, with the promise of returning the land to the First Nation afterwards (Linden 
2007a:673).63  
After decades of inaction by the federal government, members from the communities 
began protests in July 1990 at the Camp Ipperwash base. In 1993, Stoney Point members 
entered the military range and set up tents and a trailer. The Department of National Defence 
(DND) announced the closure of Camp Ipperwash in February 1994 and indicated that the land 
would be returned. This did not occur and military equipment and personnel remained on site 
into July 1995. Out of enduring frustrations and tensions with military personnel, the protesters 
expanded the reclamation and moved to occupy the military barracks on July 29, 1995. There 
were altercations between the protesters and military personnel, and the base commander 
brought in First Nation negotiators. The DND subsequently vacated the site to avoid further 
escalation. The OPP deployed ERT members and undercover officers to conduct surveillance. 
The provincial government took a “watch and see” approach” (Linden 2007b:13). The issue was 
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 The invocation of the War Measures Act is significant as it legitimated the Crown’s abrogation of existing treaty 
rights in the interests of (settler) state security. In chapter 6, I examine how prerogative power of the state is a 
continuous feature of pacification. 
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treated as a low-priority for the provincial government, which saw it as a federal problem. On 
September 4, 1995, the reclamation expanded to Ipperwash Park on the assertion that it was 
traditional territory and to protect burial sites. The group was composed of members of Kettle 
Point and Stoney Point First Nations as well as supporters. When it grew in public profile, the 
Conservative government of Mike Harris explicitly sought a quick end to the reclamation, 
treating it—like the BC government with Gustafsen Lake—as a criminal law matter.  
Two days after the occupation of Ipperwash Park, Dudley George was killed by a sniper 
from the OPP’s Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU). The shooting occurred in the context of an 
escalated police operation. The Crowd Management Unit (CMU) and TRU were deployed based 
on unconfirmed, verbally-transmitted claims that the people in the park had weapons and were 
mobilising.64 Without any communication to protesters about police plans, the presence of 
officers in “hard tac” gear, coupled with observed boat and helicopter surveillance, fueled 
protesters’ perceptions that police were preparing to move in. In response, protesters engaged 
in defensive activities anticipating police action (Linden 2007b:58). The OPP deployment of the 
CMU was intended as “a show of force” to move protesters from a certain area. While protesters 
did move back, within the park (as intended), one person—Cecil Bernard George—verbally 
challenged the OPP, waving a steel pipe. The CMU moved in to arrest Cecil George, who was 
beaten by officers in the process. Protesters emerged to help Cecil George and the 
confrontation escalated leading to the OPP firing weapons and Acting Sergeant Jeffery Deane 
shooting Dudley George. Deane claimed that he observed Dudley George with a rifle pointed at 
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 The precipitating incident was a confrontation between protesters and Band Councillor Gerald George who had 
been highly critical of the reclamation. A rock thrown at his car created a dent. Gerald George reported the incident to 
the OPP, also claiming that that protesters had numerous weapons including AK-47s. Shared verbally within the OPP 
without context, this information was not recorded nor verified prior to the deployment of the CMU and TRU. “Clearly 
this failure in OPP intelligence that evening resulted in faulty and precipitous decisions at the command post” (Linden 
2007b:56). This “critical failure” led to deployment of the TRU, the option of last resort for the OPP based on 
unverified, wrong information (p.62). 
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OPP officers, and believed he was about to shoot. There was no rifle found, and Deane did not 
indicate to anyone at the time that there was a rifle to be secured (Linden 2007b:72).65  
The Harris government refused calls for a public inquiry, but eight years later the new 
Liberal government established the Ipperwash Inquiry. In 2009, the Ontario government officially 
transferred Ipperwash Park to the Kettle and Stoney Point First Nations. In chapter 3 I focus on 
the findings of the Inquiry and consider the inquiry process as a technique of liberal governance.  
The events of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash were moments of rupture in 
dominant liberal democratic and multicultural narratives of the nation-state, and continue to 
shape current discourse on Indigenous-settler conflict. On one level, these events are invoked 
in reconciliation discourses as reflecting the implications of past intolerance, racism, and lack of 
understanding between Indigenous peoples and settlers. On another level, they are symbolic of 
the enduring potential of Indigenous militancy and the galvanisation of wide-spread mobilisation. 
These events have become cautionary tales for political, administrative and police institutions. 
The accumulated experience/legacies of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash have contributed 
to shaping the current landscape of settler colonial police-security practices.   
 
CONCLUSION  
In this chapter I have framed the formation of the Canadian settler state as an ongoing process 
of pacification, focusing on the role of the police institution and Indian Affairs bureaucracy in 
eliminating Indigenous peoples and fabricating settler colonial order. The origins of these 
institutions are rooted in imperialism and colonialism. They exist because of Indigenous 
presence and resistance which threaten settler state assertion of sovereignty.  
Liberalism has been integral in legitimating settler colonialism, and law has provided 
“scaffolding” for settler colonial pacification strategies of territorialisation, assimilation, and 
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 Deane was charged and found guilty of criminal negligence causing death. He was sentenced to 180 days of 
community service (see Edwards 2003 for more on the trial).   
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criminalisation. Through the application of rule of law, liberal legalism, and the human rights 
regime, lawfare strategies are enabled by the omnipresence of coercive power and surveillance. 
Even as the settler colonial state has intensified liberal strategies of pacification via this rights 
regime, it has not diminished the potential deployment of coercive force. Governance by lawfare 
is a disciplinary-juridical mode of power based on the assertion of state sovereignty. At the 
same time, lawfare is an arena of struggle, and Indigenous peoples have engaged with/in and 
against this arena, exposing inconsistencies of liberal discourse. The rise of Indigenous 
militancy since the 1960s makes visible the instabilities of liberal logics of settler colonialism. 
The events of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash were significant “ruptures”, which have 
shaped the contemporary policing practices. In chapters 4 to 6, I examine how these “new” 
police practices are articulated through the liberal legal rights logic. As settler colonialism is an 
incomplete ongoing project, there are underlying continuities with historical practices. At the 
same time, enduring resistance continues to create ruptures of settler colonial order, exposing 
disjunctures between liberal rights discourse and actual police practices that have manifested 
as tensions within and between dominant institutions. 
In chapter 3, I analyse the Ipperwash Inquiry and its findings in terms of the politics of 
liberal reconciliation. The Inquiry produced and legitimated a certain problematisation of 
Indigenous protests that recognises the impact of colonialism, while (re)producing ideals of 
liberal democratic policing reflecting liberal rights discourse. I argue that the translation of this 
problematisation within police reforms works to rationalise the conception of indigenous protests 
as high risk. The most explicit and visible deployment of rights as pacification is in the front-line 
policing strategies of liaison officers. In chapter 4 I examine how rights are actively used by 
police to define the limits of protest and as a basis for criminalisation and potential use of force. 
The objectives of prevention and reconciliation underlie demands for increased knowledge 
about Indigenous communities. This demand for knowledge converges with intelligence-led 
policing in a way that rationalises surveillance. In chapter 5, I ague that settler colonial anxieties 
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are translated through rationalising, scientific discourses of intelligence to legitimate expanding 
surveillance practices. In chapter 6 I return to the relationship between Indian Affairs and police 
institutions with a focus on the formalisation of ongoing surveillance of Indigenous communities 
within the paradigm of emergency management. I argue that this paradigm is a manifestation of 
the colonial emergency, a historical mechanism of executive colonial power that normalises 
“exceptional” forms of governance in the interest of national security. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
(Re)Securing Legitimacy: Post-Ipperwash Reforms and Testing Grounds 
 
In chapter 2, I examined historical pacification practices in the formation of the Canadian settler 
state, showing how liberal legalism and the human rights regime that emerged in the late 
twentieth century has been a site of settler colonial lawfare. I argued that resistance creates 
ruptures that make visible contradictions between liberal ideology and liberalism in practice, 
including dichotomisations of police/state power. The events of Ipperwash were amplified in the 
wake of Oka and Gustafsen Lake. The overt and lethal use of violence by police, involvement of 
military forces, evidence of overt political interference, racism, and disorganisation were starkly 
inconsistent with discursive ideals of democratic policing. As ways of “doing better”, 
organisational reforms after Ipperwash strengthen these discursive ideals of policing a liberal 
democratic multicultural nation-state, which are animated by broader discourses of individual 
rights and security. 
The legitimacy crises faced by individual organisations such as the OPP after 
Ipperwash, and policing as a whole, are inextricably connected to the broader legitimacy of the 
settler state as a liberal democracy. The events at Ipperwash created a moment of rupture that 
revealed the extent that political interests permeated police activities, disrupting the democratic 
policing ideal of neutrality and non-partisanship. The process of public inquiries and institutional 
reforms are integral to the politics of pacification in (re)constituting institutional legitimacy.  
This chapter draws on the Ipperwash Inquiry final reports and the OPP’s submissions, 
other texts, and interviews to examine the impact of Ipperwash and the Ipperwash Inquiry on 
police practices at the provincial and federal levels. I begin with a discussion of the politics of 
public inquiries and reform in remedying “legitimacy crises” as a site for the symbolic 
performance of liberal state sovereignty and for the production of “truths”. Through the 
Ipperwash Inquiry Indigenous peoples’ protests are (re)problematised as an object of policing in 
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a way that is consistent with prevailing discourses of “ideal” liberal-democratic policing 
practices. While acknowledging the unique colonial context of Indigenous protests, this 
(re)problematisation is grounded in liberal legal rights logics which underlie ideals of democratic 
policing. As a public stage, the inquiry process has symbolic political power in re-inscribing 
these logics as ideals or norms of multicultural liberal democratic society and part of the process 
of reconciliation.  
In the next section, I examine how these logics are evident in the main policy and 
structural reforms proposed and implemented by the OPP and the RCMP starting in the mid-
1990s. These reforms attempted to address systemic issues through (1) the adoption of a 
proactive and pre-emptive policing framework with an emphasis on building relationships with 
Indigenous communities in Ontario, (2) implementation of a measured response approach to 
critical incidents, and (3) the adoption of an official intelligence-led policing framework. While 
presented as “new” in the specific context of protest management, the reforms implemented and 
proposed after Ipperwash were consistent with existing trends of community-based policing and 
intelligence-led policing. These reforms must also be situated in the context of the expansion of 
the state’s national security apparatus after September 11, 2001. With/in the convergences of 
these quasi-autonomous processes, Indigenous protests and communities are problematised as 
objects of police management and of national-security information-intelligence production in a 
way that is consistent with liberal-security logics of prevention.   
If the Ipperwash Inquiry was an opportunity for re-establishing organisational and state 
legitimacy, subsequent high-profile protests were crucial stages where changes were tested. I 
conclude the chapter with overviews of four key “testing grounds” between 2006 and 2013 that 
have shaped the post-Ipperwash landscape of the police-security apparatus involved in 
responding to Indigenous protests and reclamations. I argue that cycles of reform that follow 
ruptures, couched in terms of securing liberal ideals and reducing insecurity (risk), have the 
effect of (re)producing settler state sovereignty.  
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PUBLIC INQUIRIES AS PACIFICATION:  ASSERTING POLICE AND STATE LEGITIMACY 
 
As Martin (2007) notes, crises of legitimacy in policing occur when things go significantly wrong, 
the issue gains public attention, and the problem cannot be simply dismissed as wrong-doing by 
a few “bad apples.” The shooting of Dudley George and the efforts of his family and community 
to seek justice brought the OPP’s actions and underlying issues to public attention. The 
accumulated experiences of Oka, Gustafsen Lake, and Ipperwash occurring in succession 
within a relatively short period of time exacerbated the scope of the crisis of legitimacy beyond 
individual “bad apple” actors and even beyond individual police forces. These events revealed 
disjunctures between existing norms of police practices and dominant liberal democratic 
discourses. This creates moments of rupture in broader hegemonic order, leading to processes 
of reconstructing police legitimacy and re-securing dominant discourses. In the liberal-legal 
human rights regime, these processes of “repair” are articulated in terms of recognition in the 
politics of reconciliation.  
 
Politics of Public Inquires and the Politics of Reconciliation  
Public inquires and organisational reforms are important venues or conduits of these politics of 
reconciliation. As “accountability” processes, they are political processes (and performances) 
that work to re-assert organisational and state legitimacy. As such, they can be understood as a 
mode of liberal politics, in the framework of pacification, that (re)construct the status quo of 
ruling relations. The inquiry as a mode of governance originated as an exercise of monarchical 
prerogative power and was “resurrected” in early nineteenth century Britain as a mechanism of 
knowledge production about “social problems” (Ashforth 1990:5; Foucault [1973]2000). In the 
colonial context, inquiries were a means of developing knowledge about colonial populations to 
inform strategies of control and therefore worked as modes of racial governance (Stoler 2009; 
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Mawani 2009).66 Although this role of knowledge production shifted to bureaucracies, public 
inquires remained significant mechanisms of legitimation (Andersen and Denis 2003, drawing 
on Foucault 1978). They also remain an exercise of executive power as only governments have 
the authority to establish “official” public inquests, inquiries, or (royal) commissions. Like its 
historical monarchical use, inquires work to secure social “peace”. Inquiries can function as 
“emergency apparatus[es] of government” in response to crises (Platt 1971, in Simon 2005). 
Simon (2005:1434) argues that commissions of inquiry work to “pacify both proponents and 
opponents of change” by signaling that “something is being done” but also by delaying change 
until an inquiry is completed; they are a means of institutionalising and depoliticising conflicts. 
As Ashforth (1990:12) writes, inquiries “serve in the transforming [of] contentious matters of 
political struggle into discourses of reasoned argument.” The rationalisation of politics occurs 
through two core dimensions of public inquiries: they are symbolic-performative spaces of 
liberal-democratic governance, and they are processes of producing and validating knowledge 
in defining the “problem” of inquiry.  
As such, Ashforth (1990:9) describes inquiries as “theatre[s] of power” in which the 
“truth” of state power, as existing to secure “the common good”, is enacted. This is reflected in 
the characterisation of inquiries as independent and thus impartial processes, and through 
public engagement (via direct participation or as audience). Demands for inquiries or 
commissions reflect the institutionalisation of this mechanism as a means of “truth” seeking 
about a precipitating event or social conditions. The initiation of an inquiry thus reflects the 
state’s commitment to establishing “truth” in the interests of the “common good” (Ashforth 1990).  
The second legitimating dimension of inquiries is in the production of “truth” about events 
or a “social problem”. Through “the rational, impartial, objective and independent procedures” of 
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 Foucault ([1973]2000:52) describes the inquiry as “a political form—a form of power management and exercise 
that, through the judicial institution, became, in Western culture, a way of authenticating truth, of acquiring and 
transmitting things that would be regarded as true”. 
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inquiries, the findings and final reports (re)produce and legitimate certain narratives about the 
“problem” which shape dominant discourses and inform policy responses. An inquiry’s final 
reports are rhetorical texts, which become part of the (colonial) archive as sources of “facts” 
(Ashforth 1990:7; also Stoler 2009).  
 While varying in form and mandate, official state apologies, truth and reconciliation 
commissions, and public inquiries are lawfare strategies (Comaroff 2001) of addressing wrongs 
and reconciling relations between groups, institutions and/or government. These processes/ 
performances signal an “end” or closing point of wrongdoing and the beginning for new 
relationships (Corntassel and Holder 2008). While public inquiries (including inquests, inquires 
and commissions) have made visible settler colonial violence perpetrated on Indigenous 
peoples, Razack (2011) and Monture-Angus (2000) argue that this violence tends to be 
naturalised and relegated to the past. As Wakeham (2012:2) writes, reconciliation processes 
work as “strateg[ies] of containment” that “manage Indigenous calls for social change” according 
to terms set by the state. Corntassel and Holder (2008) describe reconciliation processes as a 
“politics of distraction” grounded in a legal-rights framework that precludes the possibility of the 
restitution of Indigenous nations’ land and resources. The reparative solutions of these 
processes are “affirmative” in that they aim to incorporate marginalised, or “wronged,” groups 
into the social order by securing their “buy-in” into dominant liberal-legalistic discourses through 
their participation in the process of reconciliation (Woolford 2004; see also Corntassel and 
Holder 2008; Wakeham 2012). These processes reassert the sovereignty of the liberal 
democratic settler state through the power to “give” apology and allow for reconciliation while 
determining their terms. 
In the context of public inquires such as the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples 
(RCAP), the Ipperwash Inquiry, and the Hughes Inquiry into RCMP actions during the 1997 
APEC meetings, the inquiry process and the responses of the institutions that are subjects of 
the inquiries produce—symbolically and/or materially—changes to organisational practices and 
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rhetoric that are consistent, or realign, with dominant logics of the state. The public inquiry 
signals liberal democratic progressiveness through “truth-seeking” and resolution as a matter of 
public good. They are symbolic performances or exercises that demonstrate (and thus, 
reinforce) the supremacy of rule of law and the narrative of liberal democracy. In the case of 
Ipperwash and APEC, the OPP and RCMP introduced changes built upon the rejection of “old” 
practices. These are presented as “progressive” and representative of the ideals of liberal 
democratic social order.  
 
Repairing the Ruptures of Oka 
Oka was a precipitating factor leading to the establishment of the Royal Commission on 
Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) on August 26, 1991. The RCAP had a mandate to examine the 
relationship between the Canadian government, Canadian society and Indigenous peoples. In 
addition to Oka, an impetus for the Royal Commission was the failure of the Meech Lake 
Accord, which was filibustered by Manitoba MLA Elijah Harper in protest of the refusal to include 
constitutional recognition of Aboriginal self-government. Both Oka and Meech Lake reflected 
failures to uphold the spirit of section 35 in the relatively recently adopted Constitution Act.  
The RCAP is an example of how public inquiries and commissions are quasi-legal 
mechanisms of governance that can channel anger and resistance into a settler state process 
with outcomes (recommendations) that have little material impact. The final reports of the RCAP 
were released in November 1996, thus overlapping with the events at Gustafsen Lake and 
Ipperwash. There was significant symbolic value in the RCAP’s overall recommendation that 
Indigenous-setter state relations be reorganised to recognise Indigenous nations “as political 
entities”.67 However, despite the 440 recommendations, there has been little concrete change 
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 Andersen and Denis (2003) critique the RCAP’s validation of a conception of nation(hood) as territorially-grounded, 
which marginalizes urban Indigenous people. This reflects a Eurocentric conception of sovereignty applied to 
Canadian-Indigenous relations. 
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by government (Borrows 2002; Andersen and Denis 2003; Monture-Angus 2011). The RCAP 
was the first major reconciliation initiative of the Canadian government in relation to Indigenous 
peoples and one of the effects was to reinforce the liberal status of the state and its adherence 
to human rights after the events at Oka and the Meech Lake process exposed ruptures in those 
discourses (see Andersen and Denis 2003). While the RCAP findings have not led to material 
changes, the findings and recommendations continue to be referenced by First Nations groups 
and in judicial venues (including during the Ipperwash Inquiry), which reflects its symbolic power 
to shape future political engagements in the reconciliation arena (Andersen and Denis 2003).  
 
The Ipperwash Inquiry  
After Ipperwash, the Conservative government of Mike Harris rejected calls for a public inquiry, 
including from the provincial Ombudsperson and the UN Human Rights Committee in 1999.68 
Eight years after Dudley George died the newly elected Liberal government launched a public 
inquiry into the OPP’s conduct at Ipperwash and what led to George’s death. The Ipperwash 
Inquiry was established in November 2003 with Justice Sidney Linden, an Ontario judge, 
appointed as Commissioner with a two-part mandate. The first mandate was a specific inquiry 
into the events around the death of Dudley George. As an investigative inquiry, the objective 
was to engage in an “independent, comprehensive and transparent review” of events through a 
fact-finding process to determine the “truth” of what occurred. The objective was not to identify 
liability, and thus differs from criminal and civil proceedings. The second, broader mandate of 
the Inquiry was a policy-oriented review to develop recommendations aimed at “the avoidance 
of violence in similar circumstances” (Linden 2007c:1). Linden noted that inquires also serve a 
third core purpose as a public forum for the presentation of evidence and a space for public 
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 The George family filed a lawsuit against Mike Harris and other members of government as a means of obtaining 
information about the events at Ipperwash. The case was continuously delayed by procedural motions by the 
government lawyers (see Edwards 2003; Hedican 2013). The lawsuit was dropped when the inquiry began.  
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participation. The inquiry ended in August 2006 and the final reports were released in May 
2007. The underlying land claim was settled in 1998, which included $26 million for the Kettle 
and Stoney Point First Nation. Camp Ipperwash base was cleaned up, and in 2009 the Ontario 
government officially transferred Ipperwash Provincial Park to the Kettle and Stoney Point First 
Nations.  
The politics of calling the Ipperwash Inquiry reflected competing provincial political 
interests. While the Harris government rejected calls for an inquiry and delayed civil 
proceedings, for the Liberal government the Inquiry was an opportunity to secure its own 
legitimacy, drawing on the discourse of liberal democratic accountability to distinguish itself from 
the Harris Conservatives. In the realm of policing, the span of twelve years between the events 
at Ipperwash in 1995 and the release of Commissioner Linden’s final reports in May 2007 
provided an extended stage for these politics to play out. Most of the reforms identified as 
responses to police “failures” at Ipperwash were established or initiated within those twelve 
years, even prior to the establishment of the inquiry in 2003. This highlights the symbolic power 
of the inquiry process. Along with the public performance of “truth seeking” regarding the police 
response and political interference—an exercise of “responsibility”—for the OPP, the inquiry 
was also a stage on which their reforms could be presented and credibility rebuilt. 
Commissioner Linden’s acknowledgment and tentative approval of OPP initiatives further 
contributed to re-securing legitimacy for the organisation moving “forward.”  
The OPP reforms reflect an indirect “affirmative repair” (Woolford 2004) of ruptured 
social relations by (re)inscribing dominant discourses and working to incorporate Indigenous 
peoples into a reconciliation process. The findings of the Ipperwash Inquiry are based upon a 
(re)problematisation of the unique context of Indigenous protests as an object of “democratic 
policing.” This official discursive problematisation, discussed in the next section, sets the 
grounds for the “new” way forward for police-Indigenous relations and the basis for re-securing 
police legitimacy in settler society. These reforms reinforce dominant discourses without 
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threatening the foundations of settler-colonial society, and the position of Canada as a liberal 
democracy within the global context. Specifically, self-determination struggles are framed in 
legal-political terms while strengthening the ideological de-politicisation of police practices.  
These organisational reforms are articulated in and through the discourse of legal 
liberalism; they should not be interpreted as reducing or lessening the potential of violence, 
which remains an enduring characteristic of police power.  
  
(RE)PROBLEMATISATION OF INDIGENOUS PROTEST AS AN OBJECT OF DEMOCRATIC 
POLICING  
 
The Ipperwash Inquiry findings and recommendations reflected a (re)conceptualisation or 
problematisation of Indigenous peoples’ protests in liberal democratic societies and the role of 
police in relation to them. By (re)problematisation, I mean the process through which Indigenous 
protest is understood as a “problem” to be managed by police forces and government. This 
(re)problematisation is contextualised by broader “shifts” in public order policing that have 
emerged in Anglo-American and western European policing since the late 1980s. The effect of 
the Inquiry was to legitimate certain policing approaches. In this context, and echoing the 
recommendations of the RCAP, the Ipperwash Inquiry (1) acknowledges the history of 
colonialism in Canada and (2) distinguishes Indigenous protest(ers) as “a unique and discrete 
category” from other forms of political contention in Canada because of the underlying colonial 
relationship (Linden 2007a:24). As I will discuss, the elements identified in Linden’s report as 
making Indigenous protests different from others are rooted in the fundamental conflict of 
Indigenous self-determination against the settler colonial state assertion of sovereignty.   
 
 
Liberal Democratic Public Order Policing 
 
Democratic policing is foremost characterised as consent-based, dependent on the perceived 
legitimacy of the police institution and its authority—i.e. the rule of law. As Reiner (2000) notes, 
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consent depends on acceptance of police authority by the majority of society even when people 
may disagree with some police actions. By definition, “policing by consent” is the absence of 
use of force to compel obedience or compliance because it is accomplished through deference 
to the law. The minimisation of the use of violence is essential to maintain police legitimacy in 
liberal democratic contexts (Bittner 1990), dichotomised with repression-based policing in “non-
democratic” or authoritarian regimes. 
The legitimacy of the police institution and its practices in providing the “public good” is 
bound up in the perceived legitimacy of the governing apparatus of the state (i.e. government) 
and of law itself. At the same time, police legitimacy in Canada and the US is grounded to a 
significant extent in the foundational ideology of police independence from political influence; 
police are accountable to law rather than to political interests. This myth of apolitical, non-
partisan policing has been thoroughly challenged from within the police studies literature (see 
e.g. Westley 1970; Skolnick 1975; Manning 1997, 2010; Reiner 2000). Yet this myth continues 
to be an integral discourse in articulations of “democratic policing”. As discussed in chapter 1, 
this ideological separation of police and politics plays upon binaries of hard versus soft policing 
strategies (i.e., the minimisation of use of force), and the distinction between high and low 
policing (Brodeur 2007, 2010). These binaries of liberalism have been integral in the legitimation 
of the police institution since the nineteenth century. With the mid-twentieth century emergence 
of the liberal-legal rights regime as a basis of state sovereignty, the democratic policing 
principles of consent and political-neutrality have been articulated through the discourse of 
rights. This has perhaps been most evident in public order policing.   
Public Order Policing 
Beginning in the 1980s, and crystallising in the 1990s, there was a shift in Anglo-American 
public order policing to an approach de-emphasizing the use of force in favour of flexibility, 
communication, and a respect for protest as a democratic right. This shift occurred in the 
context of the emergent rights regime and the enshrining of individual rights in many of these 
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states, including Canada. The term “negotiated management” has been used in the US social 
movement studies literature to describe the “softer” approach in contradistinction to “escalated 
force” characterised by aggressive reactive policing. This terminology has been adopted by 
scholars writing in other Anglo-American and European contexts (see e.g. della Porta and 
Reiter 1998; McPhail and McCarthy 2005; della Porta, Peterson and Reiter 2006). “Negotiated 
management” is foremost characterised by an explicit emphasis on respect and protection of 
individual rights, including the rights associated with dissent. Second, police forces will often 
establish designated units to engage in outreach to protesters on an ongoing basis. These units 
engage potential protesters in the planning of an event.69 This third aspect of the negotiation 
approach involves the “negotiation” of the parameters of an event, such as location and route, 
timing, types of activities, use of marshals, and police escorts. A central mechanism in this 
process is the requirement to obtain a permit to hold an event in public space. Fourth, police 
interaction with protesters is defined by flexibility and discretion in enforcing law with the aim of 
minimising the use of force and potential escalation. 
The overly-simplistic dichotomising of “negotiated management” and “escalated force” 
has led social movement scholars to develop other explanatory and descriptive models to 
account for the persistent deployment of aggressive, coercive police tactics during global justice 
protests, particularly with marginalised peoples and “radical” or transgressive groups (see e.g. 
Soule and Davenport 2009). Researchers have described other models such as “command and 
control” (Vitale 2005), strategic incapacitation (Noakes, Klocke and Gillham 2005; Gillham and 
Noakes 2007; Gillham, Edwards and Noakes 2013), and the Miami model (Vitale 2005, 2007).70 
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 Depending on the size of a force, it may have specialized units or teams assigned to different “populations” or 
groups, such as labour, Aboriginal, and major events. 
70
 Gilham, Edwards, and Noakes (2013) argue that negotiated management shifted to a “strategic incapacitation” 
approach in the late 1990s to deal with “transgressive” protests. They describe it as characterized by spatial 
containment (use of ‘zones’), surveillance, and controlled information production and dissemination. This is similar to 
de Lint and Hall’s (2009) articulation of “intelligent control”. Vitale (2005, 2007) describes the NYPD’s “command and 
control” approach as restrictive “micromanagement” of protests and willingness to use coercive force for minor 
transgressions of law. “Miami model” refers to the approach used at the 2003 Free Trade Area of the Americas 
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Hadden and Tarrow (2007) attribute these policing approaches to the emergence of large-scale 
transnational global justice protests and the experience of the “Battle of Seattle” protests in 
1999. While these models utilise coercive tactics, they do not represent a reversion to 
“escalated force” because force is deployed in a preventative rather than punitive capacity. The 
aim is to contain and maintain police control of the event, reflecting a risk management 
approach (see Noakes, Klocke and Gillham 2005; Hadden and Tarrow 2007; Vitale 2007). 
There are also liaison policing approaches that reflect the “softer” principles of 
negotiated management, but are still control-oriented. Where “negotiated management” is an 
operational approach, specific to events, liaison policing is ongoing with longer-term objectives 
of developing and maintaining relationships and ‘trust’ with communities, organisations, and 
groups that may be likely to engage in protests and demonstrations. There is a clear continuity 
with the community policing philosophy.71 Palmer (2003) and de Lint and Hall (2009) identify the 
origins of this approach in Canada in the context of labour conflict in the 1970s. By the mid-
1990s, liaison policing was adopted by most forces in Canada.  
The conception of ideal public order policing articulated in the Ipperwash Inquiry and the 
Hughes Commission (APEC), which has become the organising logic informing official police 
policy, is based on three interconnected themes reflecting a rights-based articulation of consent-
based and politically-neutral policing. First, there is an emphasis that peaceful protest is a 
fundamental democratic right that must be protected and facilitated. Second, the police role is to 
“keep the peace” and maintain public order by preventing violence. Third, police must respect 
and balance the right to protest with the rights of other parties who may be affected, including 
                                                                                                                                                       
meeting in Miami. It is characterized by surveillance and pre-emptive arrests, use of public relations to create 
negative publicity for event/protesters, establishing joint-command centres, use of less-than-lethal weapons/special 
tactics, mass arrests, mass detentions, shows of force, and use of force to clear the streets (Vitale 2007).  
71
 On liaison and “dialogue” police in the UK and Sweden, respectively, see Clifford Stott, Martin Scothern and Hugo 
Gorringe. 2013. “Advances in liaison based public order policing in England: Human Rights and Negotiating the 
Management of Protest?” Policing 7(2) 210-224; David Baker. 2013. “Police and Protester Dialog: Safeguarding the 
Peace or Ritualistic Sham?” International Journal of Comparative and Applied Criminal Justice 38(1):83-104. 
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property owners. Fourth, the police remain neutral in disputes and their operational decisions 
are autonomous from political influence. 
 
Indigenous Protest as an Object of Policing  
Commissioner Linden (2007a) identified several key factors that distinguish Indigenous protests 
from other forms of protests, which he situated in the historically-grounded colonial relationship. 
These dimensions introduce added complexity in applying the idealised liberal democratic public 
order policing model to Indigenous protests. This complexity also increases the riskiness of 
Indigenous protests for police and the state. The most significant factor is the nature of the 
issues, which often involve land claims and the assertion of Aboriginal and treaty rights. This 
includes considerations of “colour of right,” which is a legal defence that, in the case of 
reclamations or blockades, participants have an “honest belief” that the land belongs to them 
and there is therefore a “moral right” for their actions. These considerations complicate the 
police objective of balancing and facilitating rights. Another aspect of this complexity is that the 
issues giving rise to protest actions are long-standing struggles that usually endure after the 
conclusion of a specific protest action. Because the issues are rooted in settler colonialism, 
Indigenous protests are often directed at governments, and therefore require responses from 
them to bring the specific protest action to a conclusion. In terms of the police role, the historical 
context of police-Indigenous relations, as outlined in the previous chapter, can make it difficult to 
develop trust on an ongoing basis and in the specific context of protests. 
Linden also identified several dimensions that could have operational implications for 
policing. Indigenous protests often involve a greater number of parties—“stakeholders” in 
current police vernacular. This includes groups representing different intra-community 
perspectives (such as political schisms between elected and traditional leaderships), third 
parties such as property developers, non-Indigenous residents, municipalities, provincial and 
federal governments, and multiple police forces. Linden’s report (2007a) also identified the 
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location or setting of protests as distinct because of a tendency to occur in non-urban settings 
and often on or near Indigenous territories, which complicate issues of policing jurisdiction and 
resource deployment. Linden (2007a:187) suggests that this may also shape the willingness of 
protesters to “push back” or at least to feel more secure in their position in the face of police 
attempts at enforcement—in short, there is a greater likelihood that Indigenous protesters will 
stand their ground and not disperse (as there is nowhere else to “disperse” to). The other 
important distinction of Indigenous protests is their greater geographical “disruption potential” 
through sympathy or solidarity actions by other Indigenous communities across the province 
and the country. 
The articulations of an idealised model of liberal democratic public order policing, and of 
the unique context of Indigenous protests, emerge from the Inquiry’s findings and inform 
Linden’s recommendations for police reform. While they are not necessarily “new” discourses, 
they are (re)affirmed and legitimated as consensual “truths” through the Inquiry and its reports. 
 
INQUIRY RECOMMENDATIONS AND POLICE REFORMS SINCE THE MID-1990s 
One of the key themes that emerged in the Ipperwash Inquiry is the importance of 
communication in managing “critical incidents” and the use of coercive force only as a means of 
last resort. Underlying this is the recognition of the specific context of Indigenous protests. 
However, it also resonates with police awareness that coercive responses can have escalatory 
effects. This “knowledge” about police practice and the specificity of Indigenous protests are 
reflected in three areas of policy and structural reform by Canadian police forces since the mid-
1990s: (1) the establishing of liaison-based policing, which is tied to building relationships with 
communities; (2) the formalisation of command and control decision-making processes; and (3) 
the adoption of intelligence-led policing. I begin with a summary of the Inquiry 
recommendations, followed by a discussion of the first two areas of reforms introduced by the 
OPP before, during, and after the Inquiry. I also discuss the introduction of policy for municipal 
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policing in Ontario. I then examine changes within the RCMP affecting their policing of 
Indigenous protest. While influenced by Ipperwash, RCMP reforms were more directly shaped 
by the events of Gustafsen Lake and the recommendations of the Hughes Commission. I end 
the section with a discussion of intelligence-led policing, which was a broader paradigmatic shift 
that was not a direct effect of these events.  
 
Ipperwash Inquiry Findings and Recommendations 
The final Inquiry reports had two sets of recommendations reflecting the dual mandate of the 
Inquiry. The first set of findings stemming from the investigation of Dudley George’s death were 
largely focused on the OPP but also addressed the actions—or lack of actions—by both the 
provincial and federal governments. The second set of policy recommendations were more 
wide-ranging, addressing: treaty relations in Ontario; the land claims process; the duty to 
consult in relation to natural resources; protecting burial sites; greater public education about 
treaty relationships; the creation of a provincial ministry of Aboriginal Affairs; policing Aboriginal 
occupations; First Nations policing; bias-free policing; and clarifying police-government 
relations. My discussion will focus on the findings and recommendations directed at the OPP 
and the policing of Indigenous protests.   
Linden identified two core elements as contributing to the escalation of conflict and the 
shooting of Dudley George. First, although the OPP’s operational priority was to resolve the 
event peacefully through negotiation, there was a complete failure to actually engage in 
negotiation with, and to communicate police interests or intentions to, reclamation participants. 
Contributing to this failure was the lack of trained OPP personnel with knowledge of the 
communities, histories, and issues, and not drawing on external facilitators or mediators. This 
reflected a lack of understanding of the unique context of Indigenous protests (Linden 
2007b:17). Linden (2007c:693-696) recommended that police operations should have a 
communication strategy for conveying messages to protesters (#2.a.), account for technical 
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aspects of communications (#2.b.), and identify potential external facilitators/mediators (#2.c.). 
He also emphasized the importance of ensuring that the unique context of “Aboriginal 
occupations and protests” is addressed in police strategies and training (#9), and that First 
Nations police services and mediators are engaged (#11). 
The second contributing factor was the “critical failure” of the police intelligence function 
(Linden 2007b:62). The intelligence component was treated as an “afterthought” to the overall 
operation and not incorporated into the organisational structure of incident command.72  One of 
the most significant issues was that raw information was not being analysed—i.e., verified and 
assessed for reliability—prior to being disseminated and provided to the incident commander. 
The lack of verified information was a direct factor leading to the deployment of the Crowd 
Management Unit (CMU) and Tactics and Rescue Unit (TRU) based on claims that protesters 
were preparing an offensive action and had firearms and other weapons. The offensive strategy 
of deploying the CMU as a “show of force” led to the escalation of conflict during which Deane 
shot Dudley George. Based on these findings, Linden’s (2007c:693-696) recommendations 
emphasized the importance of integrating intelligence operations into decision making (#3.a.), 
the timely recording of information and intelligence in written form (#3.b.), analysis and 
centralisation of intelligence data (#3.c, d.), direct reporting of the intelligence unit to the incident 
commander (#3.e.), and training senior officers in intelligence (#3.f.).  
A third concern pertained to the relationship between the police and government and the 
perception of political interference. While Linden did not find that there was actual political 
interference, he was critical of the relationship and the disorganised lines of communication and 
chains of command among government, the Ministry of Natural Resources (MNR), and the 
OPP. This resulted in “the appearance of inappropriate interference in police operations” 
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 The intelligence unit was not reporting directly to the incident commander but through an intermediary who was not 
trained in intelligence. Senior members, including the incident commander, were not trained in intelligence. There 
was also no intelligence analyst assigned to the unit. 
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(Linden 2007c:677). The provincial government’s desire to have the protesters removed quickly 
was shared with the incident commander, John Carson, who then relayed this to other officers. 
In doing so, Carson “created the risk or the perception of risk that his officers would be 
influenced in their actions” which “could compromise the approach of the OPP” and the 
objective of peaceful resolution (Linden 2007b:23). The presence of the MNR Park 
Superintendent at the command post also created potential for perceptions of government 
interference (Linden 2007b:24). Linden (2007c) recommended that greater caution must be 
taken by incident commanders in sharing political information, and that there should be a 
buffer—such as a liaison—between the incident commander and politicians (p.694). Stemming 
from the lack of clarity in communications and decision-making responsibility, Linden found that 
operational decisions were “neither transparent nor accountable.”73 In addition to creating 
obstacles to identifying responsibility, “secrecy or the lack of transparency” in the police-
government relationship fuels the perception of interference (Linden 2007c:677).  
Based on his specific findings directed at the OPP, Linden made broader policy 
recommendations for the policing of “Aboriginal protests” and, as I discuss later, these are 
reflected in municipal policing and RCMP reforms. The central recommendation was that police 
should adopt a “peacekeeping” role with objectives to “minimize the risk of violence,” “preserve 
and restore public order,” “facilitate the exercise of constitutionally protected rights,” “remain 
neutral as to the underlying grievance,” and “facilitate the building of trusting relationships that 
will assist the parties to resolve the dispute constructively” (Linden 2007a:237).  
Significantly, these recommendations reflect the recommendations suggested by the 
OPP in its submission to the Inquiry (OPP 2006a:102-3). The final recommendations thus reflect 
the reforms that had already been instituted (or proposed) by the OPP and presented in the 
course of the Inquiry. In other words, Linden’s recommendations adopted the language of the 
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 There were inconsistent and incomplete records of phone calls to and from the command post and of meetings 
involving the incident commander, all of which should be mandatory (Linden 2007c:693).   
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OPP or explicitly referenced its reforms. Initiatives such as the Framework for Police 
Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents and the Aboriginal Relations Team were identified 
as “high priorit[ies]” that “the OPP should maintain” and support with a “commensurate level of 
resources and executive support” from the organisation (Linden 2007a:238). Although directed 
at the OPP, the Inquiry’s recommendations can also be read as validation of their reforms. 
 
OPP Reforms  
 
Building Relationships and Trust  
One of the central findings from Ipperwash was that police lack of understanding of the reasons 
and issues underlying Indigenous protests contributed to enforcement-based responses. 
Several recommendations addressed the importance of developing organisational awareness 
and resources regarding the historical, legal, and cultural context of the relationship between 
Indigenous peoples and the Canadian state. This is linked to the lack of trust and lack of 
communication characterising the relationship between police and many communities. 
In 2006, the OPP presented the Inquiry with its program of “Building Respectful 
Relationships”, a bundle of initiatives that the organisation had undertaken since 1995 to 
address these trust and communication issues (OPP 2006b). The initiatives were framed as 
measures for improving the professionalism and accountability of the organisation. A key piece 
of this package of initiatives is the Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical 
Incidents (hereinafter, the Framework), a policy document outlining objectives for operational 
responses to public order and critical incidents involving Indigenous people. Underlying the 
Framework, which I will discuss in detail below, is a commitment to relationship-building. The 
other key initiatives of the “Building Respectful Relationships” program were enhanced “cultural 
awareness” training, outreach and recruitment platforms aimed at youths and ethno-cultural 
groups, developing the OPP’s First Nations policing partnerships, and mentorship of Aboriginal 
members. My discussion focuses on liaisons and outreach.  
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Liaisons and outreach Community liaison or outreach units in policing are usually 
introduced within the umbrella of “community-policing”. The adoption of a “community policing” 
philosophy in Canada sought to address an entwined problem of tenuous relations between 
police and racialised communities, which made “information uptake” and communications 
difficult. In the context of official multiculturalism, this was problematic for organisational and 
institutional legitimacy and for the authority of police forces. Operationally, the lack of access to 
information from and about racialised and immigrant communities contributed to an intelligence 
deficit (Deukmedjian and de Lint 2007). Many of these community liaison and outreach units are 
“community” specific, targeting local ethno-racial communities that the police force has lacked 
connection with, or, been in conflict with. One aspect of this “outreach” has been targeted 
recruitment activities to address the lack of diversity in the organisation. As with “cultural 
awareness” training initiatives, the underlying assumption in bolstering liaison and outreach 
activities is that police-community conflict arises from communities’ suspicion or mistrust of 
police, as well as from police suspicion and lack of understanding of “cultural differences”. 
Consistent with multiculturalism discourse, “diversity” has become a key aspect of “democratic” 
policing.  
Often arising from “crises” of legitimacy, community outreach activities reflect the politics 
of reconciliation aimed at mending relationships and incorporating marginalised communities 
into dominant institutions—whether through employment within the police organisation, 
participation in police-community liaison committees, or more generally in subscribing to the 
“common good” discourse. The onus for persistent conflict shifts to members of racialised and 
ethno-cultural communities who “fail” to contribute to these “democratic” processes.  
First Nations liaisons have long been a part of policing, but since the 1990s these 
positions have been formalised and elevated to more prominent and visible roles within police 
organisations. The OPP created the office of the Aboriginal Liaison Officer-Operations (ALO) in 
1996 to provide operational advice and support to senior members on historical, legal, socio-
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economic, and political issues affecting Indigenous communities.74 The Aboriginal Relations 
Team (ART) initiative provides similar capacity on the front line and like the ALO was developed 
in response to the events at Ipperwash. The concept originated in 1997 with the Western 
Region Aboriginal Strategy Committee which was mandated to build relationships with First 
Nations communities in West Region, which includes the Stoney Point First Nation and 
Ipperwash Park.75 The Western Region committee was instrumental in developing the first ART 
in 2004, tasked with a dual mandate of community liaison and operational support (Interview, 
OPP9). The ART was a unit composed of First Nations OPP officers who engaged in an 
ongoing relationship with First Nations communities with the goal of building trust.  
The ART and ALO members became central components of the Framework for Police 
Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents. In the event of a critical incident, ART officers act 
as liaisons to facilitate communication of the interests and intentions of police and protesters to 
each other, and provide advice to the ALO and incident commanders. During major events 
where Indigenous people and issues may be involved, the ART would work with Major Event 
Liaison Teams (MELT), which engaged with non-Indigenous activist groups.76 
By 2006, Aboriginal Strategy Committees were established in each of the OPP’s five 
regions, and from 2004 to 2006, there was a move to expand ART to each region (Interview, 
OPP9). However, Clairmont and Potts (2006:38) found that at the time of their 2006 report for 
the Ipperwash Inquiry, ART teams had not been fully implemented and were “more on the 
books than in the field.” The 2006 reclamation of Douglas Creek Estates near Caledonia by 
members of Six Nations of Grand River was a key catalyst in the refinement and formalisation of 
                                               
74
 The ALO role also includes supporting internal organizational development with respect to cultural awareness and 
fostering the OPP’s external relations with Indigenous communities and organizations. In 2006, the OPP elevated the 
rank of Aboriginal Policing Advisor and Aboriginal Liaison Officer from inspector to superintendent, reflecting the 
prioritization of these roles within the organisation. 
75
 Gwen Boniface, who later became OPP Commissioner during the Six Nations reclamation, was instrumental in 
establishing the Western Region Aboriginal Strategy Committee. 
76
 MELT was developed in 2004 in the Field Support Bureau (then known as Field and Traffic Support), influenced 
significantly by the recommendations of the APEC Commission of Inquiry (Hughes report) (Interview, OPP9).  
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the ART and MELT programs, which will be discussed in more detail in the concluding section 
of this chapter and in chapter 4. In September 2007, responsibility for Native Awareness training 
and the ART/MELT programs was brought within the newly established standalone Aboriginal 
Policing Bureau (APB). Within this housing, the ART/MELT now had dedicated full-time 
positions (Interview, OPP9).  
Following a review of the ART and MELT programs in 2008, they were combined to form 
the Provincial Liaison Team (PLT), which would deal with all public order events including 
“Aboriginal critical incidents”, while also maintaining the community liaison mandate. Since 
2006, ART and MELT had already been operating as one unit. The adoption of the PLT 
program name was approved in July 2009.77 As part of this process the organisation developed 
formal selection criteria, Course Training Standards, and Standard Operating Procedures, which 
have been revised on an ongoing basis. According to several members of the Aboriginal 
Policing Bureau, these initiatives are crucial to building the credibility of the program within the 
organisation (Interviews, OPP5, OPP9). The first PLT course was held in October 2009. Officers 
applying to be PLT members now go through an initial interview that includes a psychological 
assessment, followed by a two-week training course in which they are assessed on a pass-fail 
basis (Interview, OPP9).  
As of November 2013, the PLT consisted of a provincial coordinator, five regional 
coordinators, and approximately 70 trained members across the province. The PLT is a 
speciality unit like the Emergency Response Team (ERT). Like the ERT, most PLT members 
are part-time, meaning that they have regular full-time positions and will be called upon in their 
PLT capacity by their regional PLT coordinator when circumstances dictate—usually for specific 
events/incidents. While there is significant regional variation due to demographics, in 2009-
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 OPP. 2011. Provincial Liaison Team Review 2009-2010. MCSCS FIPPA request CSCS-A-2012-03063. 
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2010, 61 percent of PLT work was on “Aboriginal-related” issues.78 Several PLT members 
interviewed emphasised that relationship-building with First Nations communities and groups is 
a priority for the program despite the “name change” and combined mandate. The housing of 
the program within the Aboriginal Policing Bureau reinforces this priority in the PLT’s work.  
In 2007, the OPP’s existing First Nations Policing programs were consolidated within a 
standalone Aboriginal Policing Bureau (APB), which was the first in Canada. The APB has been 
actively building its relevance and legitimacy within the organisation and beyond, through active 
promotion and things like bulletins and newsletters. Corporately, the APB and the OPP as a 
whole have cultivated an “expertise” in the area of police Native Awareness training and public 
order liaison work. This is evident in their training of personnel from other police forces in these 
“competencies” and in the diffusion of their Framework as an operational policy. In 2006, the 
ART/MELT received the International Association of Chiefs of Police Civil Rights Award for 
exemplary protection and promotion of civil and constitutional rights. In 2008, the program 
received the Jim Potts Award for contributions to policing in First Nations communities 
(Interview, OPP9). Such accolades hold important symbolic value for securing the credibility of 
new programs and for the organisation as a whole.  
Measured Response 
The second major finding of the Ipperwash Inquiry related to the lack of clear operational 
decision-making processes. Not only did this contribute to the escalation of conflict, but it also 
limited transparency and accountability for the events leading to Dudley George’s death. Since 
the mid-1990s, the OPP and RCMP developed operational policies for managing Indigenous 
protests that incorporate explicit guidelines for incident command decision-making and use of 
force.  
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 OPP. 2011. Provincial Liaison Team Review 2009-2010. P.14. MCSCS FIPPA request CSCS-A-2012-03063.  
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Operational policies and measured response guidelines The most visible articulation of 
the (re)problematisation of Indigenous protests within the discourse of liberal rights is in the 
creation of formal operational policies. The standardisation of police action, as manifested in 
official policy, is a mechanism of professionalisation and transparency that is in large part 
fulfilled by the existence of the policy itself. Organisational performance can be measured and 
evaluated against the policy internally and, in the case of the OPP, publicly. As a concrete 
document, the OPP’s Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents was 
the hallmark of post-Ipperwash reforms. The first version was called a “Framework for Police 
Preparedness for First Nation Related Issues”, which identified issues that officers should 
consider when responding to indigenous protest or crisis events. In 2005, the Framework was 
revised and re-named, incorporating the operational roles of new initiatives such as the 
Aboriginal Relations Teams and Aboriginal Liaison-Operations. Based on suggestions emerging 
from the Ipperwash Inquiry process, including recommendations from the Chiefs of Ontario, the 
Framework was further revised.79 As will be discussed later in this chapter, the 2006 events 
related to the Six Nations reclamation led to the designation of the Framework as a critical 
policy within OPP Police Orders, providing formal operational guidelines for police responses to 
critical incidents.  
Reflecting the (re)problematisation of the police role vis-à-vis Indigenous protests, and 
consistent with the respecting and balancing of rights common to a liaison approach, the 
Framework opens with a statement of the OPP’s commitment  
to safeguard the individual rights …inclusive of those specifically respecting the rights of 
Aboriginal persons of Canada as set out in the Canadian Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms. …It is the role of the OPP and all of its employees to make every effort prior 
to a critical incident to understand the issues and to protect the rights of all involved 
parties throughout the cycle of conflict (OPP 2006c:2, emphasis added). 
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 The consultative process of review and recommendations undertaken as part of the inquiry process arguably works 
to legitimate the end-product as the outcome of democratic practice and implies buy-in from participants such as the 
Chiefs of Ontario. 
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The principles of a liaison or negotiated management approach are clearly reflected in the 
Framework’s purposes of implementing “flexible approach[es] to resolving conflict and 
managing crisis”, emphasising “accommodation and mutual respect of differences, positions 
and interests,” and using strategies that “minimize the use of force to the fullest extent possible” 
(OPP 2006c:2). These principles are to be implemented on an on-going basis—before, during 
and after a critical incident—emphasizing proactive relationship-building with communities with 
the goal of preventing an “Aboriginal related issue” from becoming a critical incident such as a 
demonstration, reclamation, or blockade. The problematisation of “Aboriginal critical incidents” 
as a “unique and discrete category”—to use Linden’s words—is reflected in its definition in the 
Framework as:  “An incident where the source of conflict may stem from assertions associated 
with Aboriginal or treaty rights, e.g. colour of right, a demonstration in support of a land claim, a 
blockade of a transportation route, an occupation of local government buildings, municipal 
premises, provincial/federal premises or First Nations buildings” (OPP 2006c:2).  
The Framework also explicitly positions police as neutral in these conflicts, which “often 
do originate with government agencies other than the police” (p.3). The guidelines of the 
Framework apply to all OPP members involved in an “Aboriginal critical incident”; however its 
implementation relies significantly on Aboriginal Policing Bureau resources, particularly the 
Provincial Liaison Team (PLT).80 PLT officers are supposed to “remain neutral throughout a 
major incident” and not engage in intelligence-gathering or enforcement (OPP 2006a).  
Decision-making: Incident command The OPP’s Framework incorporate three key 
components in applying a measured response approach to managing major events and critical 
incidents: the incident command structure, integrated response, and graduated use of force 
                                               
80
 The first version of the Framework identifies a third role, the Critical Incident Mediator (CIM). According to one OPP 
member, the CIM was never an actual position but rather a role or competency that most ART members were trained 
in. Reference to the CIM has subsequently been removed from a revised version of the Framework (Interview, 
OPP1). 
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strategies. Outreach and liaison officers are an integral component of the measured response 
approach as a support resource in the “use of force”.  
Addressing the Inquiry’s critiques of the lack of accountability in decision-making, and 
the impact of political interference in responding to protests, the OPP introduced a command 
and control model for public order policing and an integrated response protocol for responding 
to “critical incidents”. These reforms reflect a formalisation and institutionalisation of decision-
making responsibility and protocol aimed at reducing discretionary, reactive responses by front-
line officers during protests while clearly designating lines of responsibility.  
All major events and incidents will have an incident commander in charge of the police 
response. In 2001, the OPP adopted a formal incident command structure for public order 
events. Modeled on the “gold-silver-bronze” structure implemented in Britain, this practice 
institutes a formalised division and hierarchy of decision-making. Gold, silver, and bronze refer 
to three levels of incident command. While bronze commanders will always be assigned to an 
event, activation of gold and silver command depends on the seriousness and scope of the 
incident. The gold commander has overall responsibility and accountability for an event and is 
responsible for strategic decision-making, which informs the tactical planning of the silver 
commander. Silver commander is responsible for planning and coordinating missions, and for 
deciding deployment priorities. Bronze commanders are in charge of public order units (POUs) 
and engage in ongoing assessment of the situation including risk assessment and identifying 
potential opportunities for pre-emption. Bronze commanders make operational decisions to 
deploy resources and implement tactics. The on-site presence of bronze commanders is a shift 
from earlier practices where decisions may have been made by off-site incident commanders 
(OPP 2006d). The decisions and activities of all incident commanders are recorded by “scribes” 
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as a means of accountability.81 As noted in Linden’s report, the gold-silver-bronze incident 
command model has been adopted by most police forces in Canada.  
Between 2006 and 2010, the OPP has further developed its incident command structure 
from the basic gold-silver-bronze model. In part, this was influenced by the emergence of a 
standardised Integrated Command System (also referred to as Integrated Management System) 
that was being adopted by police, emergency response agencies, and government ministries 
(Interview, OPP2). In 2007, with the experience of the Six Nations reclamation, the OPP 
established three full-time Aboriginal critical incident commander (ACIC) positions within the 
Field Support Bureau. Whereas the standard critical incident commander role is fulfilled by 
personnel trained in those competencies (such as detachment commanders), the ACICs are 
dedicated positions without other command responsibilities. In addition to having additional 
training on Indigenous issues, an ACIC is able to manage incidents for extended periods without 
being pulled away to fulfil their regular duties. With three members responsible for managing all 
“Aboriginal critical incidents” in OPP jurisdiction, the ACIC positions can contribute to 
establishing a degree of consistency in OPP operational responses to events (Interviews, 
OPP1; OPP2; OPP5).  
Integrated response and use of force continuum The “triangle” of incident command 
decision-making is one element of the integrated response approach. Integrated response 
refers to the combined deployment of specialised police resources in the management of critical 
incidents including liaisons, crisis negotiators, criminal investigators, intelligence, and tactical 
units. The practice of integrated response was in place prior to 1995, but it was gradually 
formalised through the introduction of policies and training standards (OPP 2006e). Tactical 
units such as Emergency Response Teams (ERT) and Tactics and Rescue Units (TRU), are 
specially trained for “high risk” situations and are equipped with a range of less-than-lethal and 
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 The use of scribes was not new, but became a requirement and systematized. The OPP scribe program was 
formalised in 1999 with introduction of a week-long scribe course. 
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lethal weapons options. These units will often be activated in a standby capacity and the 
decision to mobilise them during an incident lies with the incident commander based on 
information and input provided by commanders of each of the tactical units.82 The incident 
commander for a “critical incident” works from a command post that is geographically removed 
from the location of the incident. This physical separation of the ultimate decision-maker from 
the events reinforces the “neutrality” of his or her decisions, which are based on the expert 
assessments of the multiple perspectives from the units involved on the ground.  
In the case of Indigenous protests, the OPP’s Framework is the operational guide for 
integrated response, which involves a critical incident commander, ERT, TRU and crisis 
negotiators.  The OPP’s Provincial Liaison Team and/or Aboriginal liaisons are considered part 
of the police use of force continuum as the first step of engagement with protesters. Escalating 
in use of force options are regular duty officers, public order units, and tactical teams. 
Recognising that the visibility of uniform presence is itself a display of force (OPP 2006e), public 
order and tactical units can be deployed in a range of “show of force” options. For example, the 
public order unit can be mobilised in “soft tac” mode without visible “use of force” (i.e. weapons) 
or full protective gear, which can be incrementally escalated to fully-equipped “hard tac” mode.83  
While liaisons and tactical units may be on different ends of the use of force spectrum, 
they are not dichotomous. They are strategies on a use-of-force continuum and work 
simultaneously towards common operational objectives, as I (un)map in chapter 4. 
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 “Activation” of a unit means that they are called up for duty but not yet deployed or mobilised. “Deployment” or 
“mobilization” means that a unit is actively engaged in an operation. RCMP. 2010. Tactical Operations Manual (part 2 
(3.1, 3.4). RCMP ATI request A-2012-07569. 
83
 Since 2000, ERT training includes intelligence gathering, operational planning, tactical rifle/shotgun, team 
movement, arrest techniques, less lethal and chemical weapons. In 2005 this was expanded to also include Native 
Awareness, ethics, conducted energy weapon  training, and joint training with TRU, canine, security and intelligence 
sections as well as external training with the military (OPP 2006e). This reflects enhancement of tactical capacities, or 
“militarization” of these units.  
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Policing in Ontario  
Linden (2007a) recommended that the principles and practices of the OPP’s Framework should 
be adopted by all Ontario police forces. At the municipal level, there has been a move to 
standardise police responses in Ontario through the development of policy by the Policing 
Standards Advisory Committee, which was established to address the recommendations of the 
Ipperwash Inquiry. In February 2012, the Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional 
Services added a new public order policy (PO-003 Policing Aboriginal Occupations and 
Protests) to the province-wide Policing Standards Manual. The Ottawa, Waterloo, Hamilton, 
Midland, Port Hope, Brantford, Peterborough Lakefield, and Niagara Region Police Services 
have adopted PO-003.84  
Like the Framework, the Ontario Policing Standards Manual identifies policing principles 
following the Charter and the Ontario Human Rights Code, as well as “sensitivity to the 
pluralistic, multiracial and multicultural character of Ontario society.”85 The PO-003 policy is 
intended as a model for individual police forces to adopt. The sample provided identifies 
priorities of discretion, “communication, negotiation and building trust with participating and 
affected communities.”86 The role of police is to “preserve the peace, prevent offences, and 
enforce the law in a manner that respects the rights of all involved parties” while “remain[ing] 
neutral as to the underlying grievance, where possible; and facilitating the building of trust.”87 
The guidelines set out suggested procedures to be adopted by police forces in their policies that 
emphasize these principles as well as the importance of having clear communications strategies 
for engaging with protesters and those affected by protests. 
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 the Toronto Police Service has not adopted a formal policy but a “Statement of Commitment and Guiding 
Principles” for Aboriginal Policing, which is not specific to occupations and protest. 
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 Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services [MCSCS]. 2011. “Policing Aboriginal Occupations & 
Protests”. Policing Standards Manual. P.1. Provided by interview participant.  
86
 MCSCS. 2011. “Policing Aboriginal Occupations & Protests”. Policing Standards Manual. P.2. 
87
 MCSCS. 2011. “Policing Aboriginal Occupations & Protests”. Policing Standards Manual. P.3. 
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Many municipal and regional forces have been developing their capacities for managing 
protest according to these principles through participating in the OPP’s PLT training. 
Participation by external agencies has increased over time, with officers from certain RCMP 
detachments, Windsor, York Regional, Niagara, Ottawa, Calgary, Sarnia, and Winnipeg Police 
Services having attended PLT training, as well as members from CP Rail Police (Interviews, 
OPP9, OPP1). This interest appears to reflect wider “buy-in” of the approach among police 
forces; at the same time, there is also a symbolic value for these police forces in securing 
legitimacy. 
 
RCMP Reforms  
While indirectly influenced by the Ipperwash Inquiry, the key catalysts for the institutionalisation 
of liaison-based policing and measured response in the RCMP were the events at Gustafsen 
Lake and the Hughes Commission—which examined the RCMP handling of protests during the 
1997 APEC summit in Vancouver (see Ericson and Doyle 1999; Pue 2000; King and 
Waddington 2006). RCMP reforms were not specific to Indigenous protests in the way that OPP 
reforms were, but there are clear similarities, reflecting broader ideals of “best practices” in 
policing.  
Measured Response: The Incident Management Intervention Model 
The concept and terminology of “measured response” was first articulated in the late 1990s by 
the RCMP in describing its approach to public order policing, and specifically in the context of 
labour conflict (Clairmont and Potts 2006:31). According to Clairmont and Potts (2006:31), at 
the root of measured response is the prioritisation of maintaining “peace and order, and 
avoiding harm” in a “disinterested approach on the substantive issues” underlying the protest. 
Like the OPP’s Framework, the RCMP Incident Management Intervention Model (IM/IM) reflects 
three components of measured response: incident command, integrated response, and 
graduated use of force.  
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Guided by the IM/IM, the RCMP’s measured response approach reflects principles of 
communication-based, negotiated, flexible management of public order events to avoid 
escalation of conflict. The RCMP’s Tactical Operations Manual states that “[t]he RCMP is 
committed to resolving potentially violent incidents using an integrated, measured approach 
response in accordance with the RCMP Incident Management and Intervention Model and the 
Criminal Code while ensuring the rights of Canadians are respected.”88  
While the RCMP had an “open door policy” of communication with (potential) protesters 
prior to 1997, this approach was enhanced and formalised after APEC through initiatives such 
as designated outreach and liaison teams (Commission for Public Complaints Against the 
RCMP 2001; Bradley 2002). Major urban centres such as Ottawa, Toronto, Montreal and 
Vancouver have full-time demonstration units that will respond ad hoc to major events. In the 
case of large events, where an integrated security unit is set up, community outreach/relations 
groups will be established.89 The implementation of liaison/outreach units is specific to each of 
the Divisions. For example, A Division has a Major Events Liaison Team, developed specifically 
in response to anti-globalisation protests (Clairmont and Potts 2006:32). Where an event might 
involve Indigenous issues or communities, the demonstration unit is supposed to engage 
divisional Aboriginal liaisons or outreach personnel (Interviews, RCMP6; RCMP9). 
Incident Command  
After Gustafsen Lake, the RCMP established a Major Case Management Task Force, which 
was tasked with reviewing the RCMP’s readiness for critical incidents. Emerging from one of the 
Task Force’s core recommendations, the RCMP established its Critical Incident Program (CIP) 
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 RCMP. 2011. Tactical Operations Manual, Part 2 (1.1). RCMP ATI request A-2012-07569. In response to the 
Hughes Commission recommendations, a National Policy was implemented by the RCMP in 2001 regarding 
independence from political interference. Principles of operational independence and police accountability to law 
were incorporated into the RCMP’s Protective Policing Manual (Bradley 2002).  
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 The first use of a joint Community Relations Group (CRG) was established for the 2002 G8 Summit in Kananaskis, 
Alberta, consisting of Calgary Police Service and RCMP members. The CRG included a specific liaison team 
focusing on Aboriginal communities (separate from the “activist liaison team”) (O’Rielly, Mike. 2002. “Community 
policing in action during the 2002 G8 Summit.” RCMP Gazette 64(1):10). 
131 
 
in 1999 to centralise incident command, negotiation, and public order (Roush 2002). Originally 
set up under the Criminal Intelligence Directorate, the CIP moved in 2002 to Contract and 
Aboriginal Policing (Roush 2002). The mandate of the CIP is to provide the basis for tactical, 
operational, and strategic coordinated planning and response “for all-hazards events” at the 
regional, national and international levels. This includes responses to natural disasters, terrorist 
attacks, civil unrest, hostage situations, and other “high risk critical incidents”.90 A “critical 
incident” is defined as “an event or series of events that require specialized and coordinated 
response”.91  
Like the OPP’s command-and-control model, the formalisation of incident command in 
the RCMP sought to address issues of continuity, consistency, and accountability in decision 
making during an event. During a critical incident, the incident commander works in a 
“triangular” manner with negotiators and the Emergency Response Team in “coordinating, 
managing and responding” and are therefore accountable for all decisions made during a critical 
incident (Roush 2002), including use of crisis negotiators, and deployment of public order units 
(tactical troop) and Emergency Response Team (in consultation with troop commander). 
Incident command has also been described by interviewees as a “triangle”, with the overall 
critical incident commander at the top and liaisons and tactical response as the two other arms. 
Although the RCMP does not have dedicated Aboriginal critical incident commanders like the 
OPP, they are directed to draw on Aboriginal liaisons and National Aboriginal Policing Services.  
Addressing the Specificity of Aboriginal Protests 
While there had been an emphasis on utilising trained conflict negotiators and resources such 
as Aboriginal liaisons and the Aboriginal Policing program since the early 1990s, the RCMP had 
no formal policy akin to the OPP’s Framework until 2011 when a section on “Aboriginal Protests 
                                               
90
 RCMP. 2007 (February 12). “Critical incident Program – Aboriginal Initiative.” RCMP ATI request 2007-02463. 
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 RCMP. 2010. “Incident Commanders”. Tactical Operations Manual (part 1.1 (2.1.1)). RCMP ATI request A-2012-
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and Occupations” was added to the RCMP Operational Manual.92 Development of this 
operational policy was most directly spurred by the 2007 Assembly of First Nations National Day 
of Action (NDA). Leading up to the NDA, the RCMP’s Critical Incident Program and Aboriginal 
Policing program were working to entrench a conflict negotiation approach to minimise the use 
of force, with direct reference to the Ipperwash Inquiry93 and identifying the OPP’s Framework 
as an example of good practice.94 While the OPP’s policy was made public in the course of the 
Ipperwash Inquiry and has been directly referenced during subsequent protest events in the 
face of criticism, the RCMP’s policy is part of its internal Operational Manual. It does not have 
the same reified quality that the OPP’s Framework has.  
Consistent with a rights-based negotiated management approach, the Operational 
Manual section on “Aboriginal Protests and Occupations” begins with statements regarding 
section 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights, and the Charter guarantees of the rights to engage in 
protest. In the context of these rights, “A measured response based on accurate and timely 
intelligence must form the basis for the management of aboriginal demonstration or protest.” In 
responding to a critical incident, members are directed to “attempt to negotiate the conflict 
before taking enforcement action” and to use discretion when enforcing injunctions. Reflecting a 
preventative orientation, RCMP commanders are expected to “keep informed of issues that are 
prevalent in your community which may lead to a demonstration or protest.”95 In developing an 
operational plan in the case of an incident, the commander and divisional Criminal Operations 
(CrOps) Officers are expected to consult with Aboriginal Affairs at the federal, provincial, or 
territorial level, and with First Nations, Inuit or Métis leaders “when necessary.” Operational 
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 RCMP. 2011. “Aboriginal Protests and Occupations”. Operational Manual. (38.9). Obtained from interview 
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 RCMP. 2007 (February). “RCMP Response to Aboriginal Occupations and Protests” [deck]. PSC ATI request 
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 If a potential incident arises, the commander is to advise the local governing body and notify National HQ. RCMP. 
2011. “Aboriginal Protests and Occupations.” Operational Manual. (38.9). Provided by interview participant.  
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activities are also supposed to draw on Divisional Aboriginal Policing Services which provide 
“support” through intelligence gathering, providing historical or contextual information about the 
community or issues, and identifying a liaison person to support the commander.96  
Aboriginal Policing and Liaisons 
In 2003, the RCMP made “Aboriginal communities” one of its five strategic priorities for the 
organisation reflecting a commitment to improve relations with communities. In 2006, the RCMP 
created a position of Chief Superintendent for Aboriginal Policing, which had previously been an 
Inspector-level rank. The elevation of the position in the organisational hierarchy was a symbolic 
and structural reflection of the force’s recognition of the importance of the role (Clairmont 2006).  
The RCMP’s National Aboriginal Policing program is a central resource to support this 
priority. The program is coordinated and managed by National Aboriginal Policing Services at 
HQ and the Aboriginal Policing Sections (APS) located in each division (Interview, RCMP2). In 
Ontario and Quebec the RCMP does not have provincial policing jurisdiction; however, the APS 
operates as a liaison program in which officers work with and in Indigenous communities. In 
Ontario (O Division), the RCMP’s APS was established in 2004 and now consists of seven 
personnel who support First Nations police services and communities in crime prevention 
activities. Previously, Aboriginal policing in Ontario was the responsibility of a single coordinator. 
Despite the organisation’s priority of “Aboriginal communities,” the Ontario APS has not had a 
permanent coordinator since 2008 (Interview, RCMP10). One of the roles that many of the APS 
liaison officers take on is conducting presentations or training for fellow members.  
The RCMP’s Divisional Aboriginal Policing Sections are the bases from which the 
organisation engages in the relationship building that is central to a liaison approach. In the 
context of a major protest or reclamation in Ontario, the RCMP’s liaisons in O Division may be 
involved in a support capacity by providing advice or awareness on the community dynamics 
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and issues in the context of Aboriginal and treaty rights to RCMP members who may be brought 
in to assist the OPP (Interview, RCMP10). A Division (with jurisdiction of the National Capital 
Region) currently has an Aboriginal and Ethnic Outreach liaison officer who is based out of the 
division’s National Security Criminal Investigations program as part of the National Security 
Community Outreach team. As discussed further in chapter 5, the outreach program was 
established as part of the RCMP’s bias-free policing policy with the aim of building trust between 
all “diverse” communities and the National Security Program, and “to ensure all persons are 
treated equally and with respect in RCMP national security criminal investigations” (RCMP n.d.). 
The role of the Aboriginal liaison officer is to build relations with First Nations communities to 
facilitate communication while also serving as a “subject-matter expert” (SME) for the rest of the 
division (Interviews, RCMP9; RCMP6). 
 
Intelligence-Led Policing  
One of the major contributions to the escalation of the police response at Ipperwash was 
attributed to the failure to corroborate rumours of weapons and violence by protesters (see 
Edwards 2003; Linden 2007c). As one OPP member notes, “I’d say back in the time of 
Ipperwash we were acting on information” and not “real intelligence” (Interview, OPP1). This 
was tied to problems with communications and a lack of coordination among units and 
commanders, which impacted on the decision-making process. The new incident command 
structures of the OPP and RCMP are based on the importance of having reliable intelligence at 
each level of decision-making, which is directed at proactive and pre-emptive responses when 
possible. As discussed, the measured response orientation to Indigenous protests (and protests 
in general) seeks to minimise the police use of force by adopting proactive strategies to address 
issues before they become “critical incidents” and to manage events to avoid escalation. As one 
RCMP member explains, the “old” way of approaching protests was to  
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Tactically, go in there and break it up. Remove it, haul everybody away. Go back if you 
have to and haul another group away. Just keep hauling ‘em away until you’ve got 
everybody in jail. Well, we moved away from that; and we moved away from that for a 
couple of reasons. One is that you can’t haul everybody away. People started to get a lot 
more coordinated, organised, about what they’re doing, and a bunch of different things 
happening at the same time, and they realise ways to… deflect or go around 
enforcement actions, and it just got to the point, ‘whoa, whoa, whoa. Okay, let’s stop and 
think about this’. So the intelligence-led model came out and said, we really shouldn’t be 
doing anything, unless we’ve got some intelligence behind it. (Interview, RCMP1) 
 
The RCMP’s Operational Manual explicitly states that “A measured response based on accurate 
and timely intelligence must form the basis for the management of aboriginal demonstration or 
protest”, and commanders are encouraged to stay informed of potentially volatile issues.97 While 
not explicitly identified in the OPP’s Framework, Linden (2007a:202) notes in his report that the 
principles of intelligence-led policing are evident in the Framework through its emphasis on 
informed decision-making.  
The use of intelligence in operational and tactical decisions had been a common 
practice, but the growing emphasis on intelligence analysis and the production of strategic 
intelligence reflects a much broader paradigmatic shift towards intelligence-led policing (ILP) 
independent of Ipperwash, Gustafsen Lake and APEC. For the OPP, Ipperwash was a catalyst 
for explicitly proclaiming the organisation as “intelligence-led” in 1999. In 2001, the RCMP also 
officially branded itself an ILP organisation. However, both the OPP and RCMP had already 
been moving towards intelligence-led policing in the early 1990s. In 1995, the OPP established 
a Strategic Intelligence Unit responsible for intelligence analysis—a function that had not 
previously existed in the organisation. This restructuring of the Intelligence Bureau included the 
creation of specialised sections and units to focus on anti-terrorism, and hate crime/criminal 
extremism (OPP 2006f:21-25). In 1999 intelligence training was incorporated into existing 
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courses, including incident commander courses.98 Between 1999 and 2006, the OPP 
institutionalised an ILP framework to define the organisation as strategic and prevention-
oriented, emphasizing increased collaboration with partners and on priority setting. There was 
also a professionalisation of intelligence gathering and analysis through measures such as the 
creation of formal competency requirements. The intelligence analysis function was also 
centralised so that all intelligence products are “filtered” from a single ‘focal point’ (OPP 
2006f:33). Stemming from the Inquiry recommendations, an Aboriginal Issues Unit was set up in 
2008 within the field intelligence section of the Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau (POIB) 
to focus on organised crime issues affecting First Nations communities. The Unit also works 
closely with the PLT program (Interview, OPP9). The adoption of ILP directly addressed the 
major factors contributing to ‘intelligence failure’ during Ipperwash.  
Many of the reforms introduced by the OPP and the RCMP came in the span of time 
immediately following the events at Ipperwash and before the release of final reports. The direct 
impact of the inquiry on bringing these changes about is limited. On one hand, inquiries lack the 
power to enforce compliance with recommendations. At the same time, many of the reforms 
reflected existing trends in policing. Without discounting the value of the inquiry for Dudley 
George’s family and those involved in the reclamation, the power of the inquiry as a mechanism 
of pacification lies in its symbolic affirmation of state legitimacy and (re)production of a certain 
problematisation of Indigenous protests for policing. In drawing on this authoritative “truth” 
established by the inquiry, police reforms and practices gain credibility and legitimation.   
 
THE NATIONAL SECURITY NEXUS OF POLICE REFORMS  
While presented as “new” in the specific context of protest management, post-Ipperwash 
reforms were consistent with existing currents of community-based policing and intelligence-led 
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policing. They have also emerged in the context of intensified security logics. In Canada the 
events of September 11, 2001 led to the introduction of the Anti-Terrorism Act as well as a 
National Security Policy, which established coordinated policy frameworks and new institutions 
based upon an emergency management orientation to securing critical infrastructure. This 
apparatus has implications for normalising the characterisation of Indigenous protests as 
potential “national security” threats. With/in the convergences of these quasi-autonomous 
processes, Indigenous protests and communities are problematised as objects of police 
management and of national-security information-intelligence production in a way that is 
consistent with liberal-security logics of prevention.   
 
Anti-Terrorism Act and National Security Policy  
The Anti-Terrorism Act (ATA) came into effect on December 18, 2001, introducing legal 
mechanisms such as security certificates, and enhancing investigative powers for police forces 
and intelligence agencies.99 The use of surveillance is facilitated under the ATA by decreased 
external and judicial oversight. Unlike similar measures in the US and UK, this enhanced 
investigative power is not limited to the federal level but extends to provincial, territorial and 
local police. The definition of “terrorism” added to the Criminal Code centres on threats to critical 
infrastructure, which has implications for Indigenous struggles. Under the ATA, terrorist activity 
is defined as  
an act or omission that is committed in whole or in part for a political, religious or 
ideological purpose, objective or cause, and in whole or in part with the intention of 
intimidating the public, or a segment of the public, with regard to its security, including its 
economic security, or compelling a person, a government or a domestic or an 
international organisation to do or to refrain from doing any act… that intentionally 
causes serious interference with or serious disruption of an essential service, facility or 
system, whether public or private, […] [that] causes a serious risk to the health or safety 
of the public or any segment of the public.  
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There is an explicit exception for “advocacy, protest, dissent or stoppage of work” unless it 
causes “serious risk to health or safety.”100 Critics have expressed concerns that direct actions 
by Indigenous activists such as blockades could be considered threats to critical infrastructure 
and thus, “terrorist” offences (see Roach 2001; Schneiderman and Cossman 2001). Indigenous 
groups argued that the ATA would formalise, or legally institutionalise, existing practices of 
government, law enforcement, and media that characterise indigenous resistance as terrorism 
(Orkin 2003). The potential breadth of the ATA’s definition of “terrorism” is reflected in the range 
of initiatives undertaken since 2001 as part of the federal government’s National Security Policy. 
On April 27, 2004 the federal government introduced Canada’s first National Security 
Policy (NSP), titled “Securing an Open Society”, intended as a framework and “action plan” for 
the Government of Canada to create an “integrated security system” of state departments and 
agencies in a whole-of-government approach to “prepare for and respond to a range of security 
threats, including terrorist attacks, outbreaks of infectious diseases, natural disasters, cyber-
attacks on critical infrastructure and domestic extremism” (Government of Canada 2004). In 
addition to integration, the NSP outlines six strategic areas of intelligence, emergency planning 
and management, public health, transportation, borders, and international security. The NSP 
provides structural and policy foundations for the priorities of system integration, enhanced 
intelligence capacity, and an emergency management framework based on the protection of 
critical infrastructure. Towards meeting the objectives of the NSP, the federal government 
established new security institutions: the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre within CSIS, a 
National Security Advisory Council and National Security Advisor,101 and the department of 
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada (PSEPC) (later renamed Public Safety 
Canada). These institutions have been central to the development and administration of a new 
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Emergency Management Framework and a Critical Infrastructure Strategy focused on securing 
“processes, systems, facilities, technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the 
health, safety, security or economic well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of 
government” (Public Safety Canada 2009a: 2). As will be explored through the next three 
chapters, this emergent national security object(ive) of protecting critical infrastructure 
permeates the contemporary policing of Indigenous protests.   
 
Securitisation in Policing: Expanding Mandates  
There was a significant influx of funding to police and security agencies as part of the 
government’s national security policy ($7.8 billion between 2001 and 2006), and a 
disproportionate share went to police forces—specifically, the RCMP—rather than to CSIS 
(Beare 2007).102 In addition to the extension of police investigative powers through the ATA and 
solidification of the intelligence-led policing framework, the emergency management paradigm 
has been incorporated into the mandates of police forces (see Murphy 2007). The more 
generalised impact of the augmentation of the national security apparatus on police forces is the 
prioritisation and demand for “more” and “better” intelligence as part of the intelligence-led 
policing framework in relation to “crime control” and contributing to national security awareness. 
Through the formation of new platforms and mechanisms to facilitate the exchange and 
circulation of information and intelligence, the localised policing response to an indigenous 
protest is interwoven with this extensive apparatus.  
While Brodeur (2010) and de Lint and Hall (2009) describe these dynamics in terms of a 
shift towards “high” policing practices, I contend that the formalisation or institutionalisation of  
long-standing practices of information sharing among government entities, security services, 
and law enforcement agencies renders the inherently politicised nature of policing clearer. While 
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this would seem to “contradict” liberal democratic values of rights as a basis for freedom—as is 
a common critique of “securitisation”—the post-September 11, 2001 security discourses position 
security measures as necessary to secure these rights and freedoms (Neocleous 2008). This is 
the symbiotic and self-justifying logics of security and liberalism at work.  
The pre-existing rhetoric and experiments with community policing and intelligence-led 
policing approaches provided a political, discursive, and structural groundwork on which new 
initiatives with respect to managing Indigenous protests, or “Aboriginal critical incidents”, could 
piggy-back. It is important to emphasize that problem-oriented community policing and 
intelligence-led policing are constructed programs developed at the policy and management 
levels within police organisations, influenced by the diffusion of strategies in other Anglo-
American states. Each is underpinned by philosophies of “best practice” articulated within the 
broader dominant discourses of liberalism and security, and the objective of “public safety”.  
To a large extent, these are political strategies of restoring organisational and 
institutional legitimacy by redefining the “problems” of “crime”, “security”, and the role of policing 
in society. As they are often introduced as responses to ruptures or crises of legitimacy, they 
represent ways “forward” in transcending the conditions that give rise to ruptures. Police reforms 
are continuous, as practices are shaped by subsequent encounters between the state (police 
and government) and Indigenous peoples. For the OPP and RCMP, this has manifested in 
deepening organisational consciousness—reinforced (validated) by the authority of public 
inquiries—in relation to the complexities of Indigenous protests and how to manage them. 
Successive experiences have contributed to the entrenching of some practices and discourses 
as norms, the reconfiguring other practices, and creating conditions for other changes.  
 
TESTING GROUNDS  
 
With the conclusion of the Ipperwash Inquiry, there was extra attention to the OPP’s response to 
a series of high profile direct actions by Indigenous peoples. Without discounting the 
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uniqueness and potential impact of every protest action, I focus here on four events which 
highlight disjunctures between ‘old’ and ‘new’ practices of relationship-building, liaisons, 
measured response, and incident command. Reflecting the continuous dialectic of pacification, 
each of these events posed unique and novel challenges to be reconciled with recent changes.  
Arguably the most significant event in Ontario after Ipperwash was the 2006 reclamation 
action by members of the Six Nations of the Grand River, which began prior to the conclusion of 
the Inquiry. As such, it was of particular significance and noted by Commissioner Linden in his 
final reports as a testing ground for recent OPP reforms.103 Indeed, the events related to the Six 
Nations reclamation had a significant effect on the OPP’s ART/MELT, incident command, and 
intelligence operations. As one OPP member noted,  
you know… I mean, Dudley George lost his life, in Ipperwash, and that certainly, the 
impact cannot be understated. But as time goes on, there’s other events that build on 
that. And Caledonia, I would, from an OPP perspective, would probably be the biggest 
single event since Ipperwash that has impacted things, and lessons learned. (Interview, 
OPP2)  
 
Subsequent events have therefore all become “testing grounds”, so to speak, for the 
lessons learned through the accumulated experience of earlier encounters. One of these crucial 
tests involves the Tyendinaga Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte, located near Deseronto and 
Bellville, who established rail blockades in solidarity with the Six Nations of Grand River in 2006 
and 2007. In June 2007, the Assembly of First Nations held a National Day of Action during 
which Tyendinaga Mohawks engaged in another blockade—one of the few direct actions of the 
day. Where the Six Nations reclamation was the first major “test” of the OPP’s new formalised 
approach, the National Day of Action could be seen as an opportunity to address issues with the 
OPP’s Framework with the experience at Caledonia.104 The National Day of Action is also a 
significant testing ground for the new government-wide emergency management paradigm into 
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which localised policing is interconnected. The Idle No More movement, emerging in December 
2012 and peaking throughout December into January 2013, produced another unique test for 
police forces. In the chapters that follow, I draw on these events as concrete reference points 
and examples in (un)mapping how the reforms and frameworks introduced since the events of 
Ipperwash have worked in practice.   
 
Six Nations of the Grand River Reclamation, Kanonhstaton  
On February 28, 2006, members of the Six Nations of the Grand River community halted the 
construction of houses forming the Douglas Creek Estates (DCE) development. Protesters set 
up barricades and made camp on the site, which they called Kanonhstaton, beginning a 
reclamation action that would last for years. There is a long history of struggle by the Six 
Nations that preceded the reclamation action, reflecting the ineffectiveness of “legitimate” legal 
channels for resolution (DeVries 2011). In 1784, the British Crown granted land, known as the 
Haldimand tract, to the Six Nations. Between 1982 and 1995, 28 land claims relating to the 
Haldimand tract were filed with Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. The specific claim covering 
the DCE tract was filed in 1987. Despite being the subject of this outstanding land claim, the 
provincial government sold the land to Henco Industries to build DCE. In 1995, the Six Nations 
sued both the Ontario and federal governments over this sale. In 2006, Henco Industries 
commenced construction of the housing development on the contested land.  
Facing the real possibility that construction would be completed before any progress in 
the claims process, the direct action of reclaiming the land and disrupting construction was the 
only means of ensuring that the land was not lost permanently. Exercising its private property 
rights, Henco obtained an injunction on March 3, 2006 to force people to leave the site. By 
March 17, 2006, three injunctions had been ordered and all were ignored leading to a finding of 
contempt by the presiding judge. Protesters were given five days to leave before warrants would 
be issued. After the five days, a criminal contempt charge was added to the existing civil charge 
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and the OPP were instructed by the judge to enforce the warrants and remove the protesters 
from the site. Reflecting their new approach, the OPP did not enforce the warrants, seeking to 
avoid unnecessary escalation. However, at 4:30 in the morning of April 20, OPP Emergency 
Response Team members conducted a raid and arrested sixteen people. Hundreds of 
supporters arrived at the site, at which point police disengaged and retreated and protesters re-
established blockades. At the time, the OPP rationalised the raid as necessary due to an 
increased assessment of threat, which was never identified.105 On April 22, an agreement was 
reached between Six Nations representatives and the Canadian and Ontario governments to 
resume negotiations. On June 16, 2006, the Ontario government purchased the land (back) 
from Henco. Throughout the reclamation, there has been conflict involving settler residents of 
Caledonia targeting Six Nations as well as government and the OPP for a perceived “double-
standard” in not enforcing the law against the Indigenous activists.  
 The immediate escalation of the conflict was attributed to the OPP’s raid. From the 
perspective of Six Nations Police,   
[…] it started with young people and then… they, I guess occupied, for lack of better 
word, that subdivision, to stop the building and then the OPP response to that triggered 
everything that blew up from there, right?  Which led to highways being blocked and 
railways being blocked… so nobody was really expecting that and we certainly weren’t, 
even as the police service for our territory, there was no plan… on our part, our part 
being this community, to see it escalate like that. But the morning that happened – 
actually prior to that, we had been saying to the OPP, because there had been some, 
they asked us, like we met with them a couple of time – we, being the Six Nations Police 
Service – and they had asked, on more than one occasion, what we thought the 
response would be if they actually went in and tried to remove some of them and we just 
kept telling them that’d be a bad idea, don’t think that would be, I’d think you would see a 
pretty significance response, right? So for whatever reason the decision was made that 
morning that they were going to remove them and all hell broke loose, right? (Interview, 
SNPS) 
 
There was acknowledgement of the disconnect from the rhetoric of negotiation, and the of 
escalatory effect of the raid on the OPP side as well:  
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[…] with the injunction there, look, they didn’t, they weren’t moving. And if you look back 
actually, when this whole thing started? We… corporately, from our police service, we 
had, when there was only 19 people at that demonstration at Douglas Creek – 
corporately, from the OPP side, we… like I said before, it’s all systemic, it’s nobody’s 
fault, right? Anybody who was dealing with the … with the folks of different communities, 
different stakeholders involved, we were saying, look we’re not going to come in and 
arrest anybody right now, we’re going to try to negotiate, right? But we went in there the 
early hours in April of 2006, we arrested 19 people just like that. But look what happened 
hours later. We didn’t have enough police officers. So they’re saying ‘you lied to us. You 
said you wouldn’t come in; you came in and you took us all out’. Right? But it’s just the 
way, whoever made the decision, and, in fairness, nobody saw that coming (Interview, 
OPP8)  
 
The policing of the DCE conflict—both the reclamation and the counter-protests by 
settlers—was highly significant in the future trajectory of the OPP’s approach. The highly visible 
nature of the conflict, magnified in the context of the Ipperwash Inquiry, put the OPP, its 
Framework and Aboriginal Relations Teams (ART) at the centre of the policing response. At the 
time of the reclamation the Framework, which was technically still a draft document, was made 
a critical policy and implemented “hot off the presses” (Interview, OPP1). Interviewees from the 
OPP, RCMP, Six Nations Police Service, and government commented on the immense political 
pressure on the OPP to prove the effectiveness of its post-Ipperwash initiatives and 
commitments to communication, flexibility, and negotiation. There was a pressure on 
ART/MELT teams in particular, as the front-line response under the Framework, to demonstrate 
their value to the policing world as well as to the general public. Operationally, one OPP 
member recalls, “it was trial by fire and officers trying to follow the Framework—a Framework 
that people hadn’t heard about before” (Interview, OPP1).  
Contributing to the overall volatility of the Caledonia situation for the OPP’s credibility 
and legitimacy, internal dissension became public in June when the Ontario Provincial Police 
Association openly criticized the new policing approach. According to the OPPA president at the 
time, “we’re supposed to be the law enforcers and somehow we’ve ended up in a United 
Nations peacekeeping mission” (quoted in Oliviera 2006). The OPPA claimed that “political 
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pressures and optics” were prioritized over officer safety as officers were instructed not to wear 
full gear (quoted in S. Clairmont 2006). 
As a “test”, there was a relatively immediate impact on key OPP programs relating to 
Indigenous protests: the ART/MELT, public order units, and incident command. One of the 
major changes was a re-evaluation of the operation of ART and MELT teams. The OPP’s ART 
teams had focused exclusively on the Six Nations community and protesters, and little work was 
done vis-à-vis Caledonia residents. As one member noted,  
we were so busy … as an organisation, trying to play catch-up on the First Nations 
background that we totally forgot about the folks in Caledonia that actually live there and 
also are affected by the event, because their lives were disrupted as well; never mind 
the land claim, which is a whole other issue, right? (Interview, OPP8)  
 
The ART teams were also heavily criticised from outside and within the OPP based on what 
was perceived as bias because of their close work with Six Nations protesters.  
The review of the ART/MELT program in 2009, which led to the renaming of the program 
to Provincial Liaison Team (PLT), was in large part driven by the experiences at Caledonia. 
Since 2006, the ART and MELT had been operating as a single unit, while using two names. 
This gave rise to challenges that became evident at Caledonia and subsequent events 
stemming from the confusion of having two names for what was the same team. This 
contributed to the optics of police bias, particularly for the ART members perceived as being “for 
the Indians” only: “having two separate programs almost made it look… almost like they were 
competing against each other. Or we had one for the First Nations folks, and one for the non-
First Nations folks, when really it was the same thing” (Interview, OPP9). Discussions over the 
renaming of the team were not unanimous as some members had concerns about losing any 
reference to First Nations. The ART designation was seen to have been useful in facilitating 
relationship building with First Nations communities, but also in holding symbolic value as a 
reflection of the Ipperwash recommendations and thus, of change. As one OPP liaison shared, 
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“they were—folks were always happy to see, when you said you were there with Aboriginal 
Relations Team” (Interview, OPP8).  
The duration and intensity of the DCE events were significant stressors for the OPP 
organisation:   
you know, that up until that point, I think our organisation was very secure in the fact 
that, oh yeah, we’ve got enough public order people, we’ve got enough incident 
commanders, we’ve got enough, you know whatever the resource was, and Caledonia 
was so intensive, staffing-wise, over such a period of time, we had to rethink on a 
number of fronts. (Interview, OPP2)  
 
At the time, only Emergency Response Team (ERT) members were trained for Public Order 
Unit (POU) duties. After Caledonia, the POU program expanded its resource pool by not limiting 
POU training to ERT members. The stress on resources was also a catalyst for establishing the 
Aboriginal Critical Incident Commander positions: “If we hadn’t been tasked so heavily, for so 
long, I don’t know that we would have necessarily … seen the higher priority of putting full time 
critical incident commanders in place. It was always something that was talked about. But 
learning from that experience really taught us, okay, we need to have that extra bit of depth and 
flexibility, you know” (Interview, OPP2). 
 
2007 AFN National Day of Action  
The National Day of Action (NDA) occurred on June 29, 2007, just over a year after the 
beginning of the Six Nations reclamation. It began with a resolution put forward by Chief 
Terrance Nelson of Roseau River First Nation that was approved at the December 2006 Annual 
General Assembly of the Assembly of First Nations (AFN). The NDA was organised with the aim 
of raising awareness of the situation of Indigenous peoples across Canada. Diverging from 
Nelson’s initial plan to blockade the rail line passing through his community’s territory, the AFN 
leadership emphasized that the NDA would be a non-confrontational and non-violent event. A 
wide range of events were held across the country, which reflected the official NDA theme of 
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“building bridges not blockades”. According to the RCMP, the NDA involved more event “sites 
than any other demonstration in Canadian history.”106 Events included over fifty demonstrations, 
including five blockades. While Chief Nelson eventually stood down his blockade plan, several 
groups engaged in direct actions that were not endorsed by the AFN. Along with a blockade 
related to the ongoing conflict at Caledonia, one of the most high profile actions organised on 
June 29, 2007 was a blockade of the CN Rail tracks and of highways 401 and 2 near Deseronto 
and the Tyendinaga Mohawk territory.107  
If Caledonia was the key test for the OPP, the NDA was the key testing ground for the 
RCMP as a national force after Ipperwash. Taking the role of lead agency, the RCMP was 
responsible for coordinating law enforcement responses across the country and took a 
preventative approach, led from National Aboriginal Policing Services (NAPS) at headquarters 
by a small group of First Nations officers (Interview, RCMP3). In a briefing note to a Deputy 
Commissioner, NAPS noted that the RCMP had addressed many of the final recommendations 
of the Ipperwash report (released before the NDA on May 31) over the course of the twelve 
years since 1995, and NAPS was assessing the final report for “its alignment with the [RCMP’s] 
policing approach for June 29”.108 A national steering committee was established to coordinate 
the NDA policing response, an approach that had never been taken by the RCMP before.109 A 
central emphasis was put on implementing a consistent measured response approach utilising 
conflict negotiation strategies. Soon after the December AFN resolution, a proposal was made 
to establish dedicated RCMP intelligence resources, citing intelligence gaps and shortcomings 
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that occurred with the Six Nations reclamation.110 This led to the creation of the Aboriginal Joint 
Intelligence Group (JIG) and the formation of an information and intelligence-sharing network of 
partners in law enforcement including the OPP and SQ, as well as CSIS, Canada Border 
Services Agency, Department of National Defence, Natural Resources Canada, Transport 
Canada, Health Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, and Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC).  
 
Blockades at Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory  
The blockades during the NDA 2007 were part of an ongoing effort by the Tyendinaga Mohawk 
community to address issues of poverty, the lack of access to safe water, and ongoing land 
struggles. The rail line and highways cross the Culbertson Tract—land adjacent to Tyendinaga 
Mohawk Territory that the federal government recognises as unceded by the Tyendinaga 
Mohawks.111 The Tyendinaga Mohawks challenged the sale of the Culbertson Tract in 1837 by 
John Culbertson to the Crown on the basis that Culbertson did not have authority to sell the land 
without consent of, or surrender by, the Tyendinaga Mohawk nation (see Pasternak, Collis and 
Dafnos 2013). In 1995, the band council of the Mohawks of the Bay of Quinte filed a specific 
claim seeking return of the land and compensation. INAC verified the claim as legitimate in 
2003, which opened the process of negotiations.  
On April 20, 2006, Tyendinaga Mohawks had blockaded the CN rail line as a show of 
solidarity with the Six Nations of Grand River in response to the OPP’s raid early that morning. 
The next year, there was another blockade on the one-year anniversary of the raid.112 With the 
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history of blockades and the publicising of plans to blockade the rails again on June 29, 2007, 
CN Rail pre-emptively cancelled all trains scheduled to run through the area, including both 
freight and passenger service. Protesters blocked Highway 2 on the night of June 28, and the 
OPP closed a section of Highway 401 before protesters erected their own barriers. The 
protesters opened up their barricades on Highway 401 in the mid-morning of June 29, but 
maintained the blockade of the rail line and Highway 2 until midnight. Shawn Brant, acting as 
spokesperson for the action (and previous actions) was charged with mischief and breaching 
bail conditions.113 Like Caledonia, the OPP claimed that its handling of the blockades was a 
success of its “measured approach” (Valpy 2007). During Brant’s preliminary hearings, it was 
revealed that ERT and TRU teams had been deployed on standby, and that Julian Fantino, 
OPP Commissioner at the time, had pressured commanders to go in and arrest Brant despite 
Brant’s active negotiations with police liaisons on site, and CN Rail’s willingness to wait until 
morning.114 After those events, the OPP instituted guidelines prohibiting the presence of the 
OPP Commissioner in command posts during an incident (Interview, OPP2). 
 
Idle No More  
Beginning in December 2012, Indigenous people and non-indigenous supporters engaged in a 
wide range of quasi-autonomous protests and direct actions including round dance flash mobs, 
demonstrations, blockades of rail-lines, highways and bridges, and hunger strikes affiliated with 
the Idle No More movement. Driven by social media, solidarity actions have occurred around 
the world. As of January 29, 2013, there had been 429 protests in Canada, including 129 
                                                                                                                                                       
Aggregates allowing the company to begin gravel mining on a plot of land located in the centre of the Culbertson 
Tract (see Pasternak, Collis and Dafnos 2013).  
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highway, road, rail, and bridge disruptions.115 On December 21, Aamjiwnaang First Nation 
blockaded the CN Rail tracks in Sarnia. CN Rail obtained an injunction, but Sarnia Police did not 
take immediate enforcement action and events concluded without conflict. As in the Six Nations 
case, the Ontario Superior Court judge who had ordered the injunctions directly criticised Sarnia 
Police as well as the OPP for failing to enforce them. The OPP—which were not the force of 
primary jurisdiction—defended itself with reference to the Framework and argued that it was 
“too dangerous” to enforce injunctions and that taking “unnecessary aggressive action” would 
“undoubtedly” cause greater risk to police and public safety (Canadian Press 2013). As of 
March 2013, Ron Plain has been the only person to face charges, related to the Aamjiwnaang 
rail blockade. One PLT member reflected on the significance of the OPP’s change of approach: 
Can you imagine Idle - now we say this, that Idle No More that happened? Put that 10 
years ago, 15 years ago, if that would have happened? God knows what we’d look like 
today, right? Which is, it wouldn’t have been good at all. There would have been 
thousands of charges, probably, and people hurt, and, right? So it’s hard to imagine 
without it now. So luckily we do do business that way. (Interview, OPP8) 
 
In Ontario, the management of Idle No More by the OPP involved several parts of the 
organisation in addition the PLT: the Aboriginal Policing Bureau, intelligence units, the Provincial 
Operations Intelligence Bureau, and field support (which includes the incident command 
program). The OPP also worked with municipal police services—as many events occurred in 
urban centres—as well as other external partners including the RCMP, First Nations Police 
services, CSIS, Canada Border Services Agency, and private sector entities such as bridge 
authorities (Interview, OPP9).  
Idle No More presented several unique dynamics that posed new problems for policing. 
The vast majority of events were grassroots-led, often by people who had not previously been in 
contact with liaisons in the context of protests. This was exacerbated from a police perspective 
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by the exclusion, in some cases, of elected chiefs and councils from community event planning, 
which meant that those relationships cultivated by police liaisons could not be relied upon in the 
lead-up to events. The frequency of multiple Idle No More-associated actions, often occurring 
simultaneously in different jurisdictions, and the protracted duration of the “peak” over several 
weeks during December and January were significant pressures on police resources, 
particularly for the OPP’s PLT. This was further compounded by the prevalent use of social 
media by event organisers. As several OPP members noted, prioritisation was crucial in 
determining the deployment of PLT officers based on assessment of potential disruption. As one 
member described it, “with the … the community members organising instead of the chiefs and 
council, and the social [media]—that was killing us” (Interview, OPP8).  
It was, however, a learning experience for the program and OPP, which was likened to 
Caledonia: “We’re better because of [Caledonia]. And … you have to have events like that” 
(Interview, OPP8). Several PLT members noted that the experience of Idle No More allowed the 
PLT to expand its network of contacts with “non-traditional leaders and youth” (Interview, 
OPP9). The central involvement of PLT in managing events associated with Idle No More, 
particularly during the peak of the movement was also crucial for the program in building 
credibility within the organisation (Interview, OPP9).116  
The events outlined here have been “testing grounds” for the range of “new” policing 
policies and practices introduced after Ipperwash to address what were perceived as systemic 
issues contributing to the escalation of conflict during Indigenous protests. At the same time, 
these are encounters in which policing practices and knowledge are shaped through a dialectic 
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relationship with resistance, which provides the basis for changes in institutional strategies. 
What has emerged between 1995 and 2013 is an assemblage of formal and informal policies, 
practices and relationships amongst police-security institutions that has been shaped by these 
encounters.  
 
CONCLUSION 
 
Public inquiries such as the RCAP, Hughes Commission, and the Ipperwash Inquiry are quasi-
legal processes consistent with the liberal politics of recognition and reconciliation that channel 
political struggles into institutionalised venues in which the parameters of engagement are 
established by state institutions. While they can be arenas for competing perspectives, inquiries 
are “theatres” for the enactment of the “common good” that legitimates the state’s assertion of 
sovereignty. The authority of inquiries and their findings stems from the perceived 
independence and rationality of the inquiry process. The final reports of inquiries—while lacking 
compliance or enforcement mechanisms—affirm certain “truths” about events or broader social 
“problems” that have disrupted dominant legitimating discourses of the nation-state.  
The Ipperwash Inquiry articulated a (re)problematisation of Indigenous protests as an 
object of policing that addressed the history of colonialism. This understanding of “the problem” 
informed three core sets of recommendations for police practices stemming from the events of 
Ipperwash: (1) to develop understanding of the unique context of Indigenous protests and 
communities, (2) to address the “intelligence failure” of Ipperwash, and (3) to ensure 
independence from political interference. These recommendations and the police reforms 
undertaken since the mid-1990s resonate with broader trends in public order policing in Anglo-
American and western European states. 
The conditions giving rise to the unique dimensions of Indigenous protests identified by 
Linden have been created by historical and ongoing settler colonial pacification strategies such 
as displacement to reserves and the expropriation and privatisation of land. When situated in 
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the context of quasi-autonomous organisational and philosophical shifts in the policing and 
security realm, the conciliatory liberal recognition of the “uniqueness” of Indigenous protests is 
an implicit confirmation of the riskiness of Indigenous struggles for the settler state. This 
riskiness is rationalised through the legitimating discourse of the Inquiry and by organisation 
reforms which reflect ideals of democratic consent and rights-based policing.  
The post-Ipperwash “testing grounds” make visible some of the tensions between the 
“ideals” of “new” reforms and the complexities of actual implementation. These tensions emerge 
from a disjuncture between the post-Ipperwash liberal-democratic discourse and the historical 
material conditions constituted by settler colonialism which shape encounters between police 
and Indigenous peoples. The Six Nations reclamation, 2007 National Day of Action, Tyendinaga 
blockades, and Idle No More protests demonstrate the ongoing dialectic of pacification 
strategies as police organisations have continued to modify practices and policies. In each of 
the following three chapters, I focus on a specific dimension of these practices and ruptures as 
entry-points to the larger constellation of the contemporary police-security apparatus. In chapter 
4, I focus on the cluster of practices and organisations involved in the front line police 
management of protests “on the ground” through the liaison-led, measured response approach. 
Chapter 5 analyses how these front line practices are reconciled with the dominant intelligence-
led policing paradigm. I show how the shared prioritisation of prevention entwines front line 
policing and national security. In chapter 6, I revisit the role of Indian Affairs as a central pillar in 
the process of securing settler state sovereignty through the interfacing of its administrative-
legal strategies of pacification with the practices discussed in chapters 4 and 5. The interfacing 
of these institutional clusters makes visible a constellation of institutions and practices mobilised 
in managing Indigenous struggles, which disrupts the legitimating logics of settler state 
institutions.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The “Meat in the Sandwich”: Front-Line Policing 
 
In the previous chapter, I mapped the various policies and structures that emerged after the 
events of Ipperwash. These changes were responses to a crisis of legitimacy for police forces 
as events like Ipperwash, Gustafsen Lake, and Oka ruptured the “sacredness” of the police 
institution, revealing disjunctures between the actions of the OPP and RCMP and the ideals of 
consent and political neutrality that underlie democratic policing. After crises, public inquiries 
can work as liberal governance mechanisms consistent with a politics of reconciliation. I argued 
that the Ipperwash Inquiry (re)produced a narrative about the “problem” of Indigenous protests 
that acknowledges the unique colonial context while lending legitimation to organisational 
reforms. These changes in policing were consistent with prevailing trends, characterised by an 
explicit prevention and pre-emption orientation and drawing on liberal-legal rights discourse to 
reinforce the “neutrality” of police.  
In this chapter I focus on the most visible set of reforms undertaken by the OPP and 
RCMP: the use of outreach and liaison units and the measured response approach. These 
reforms have been most visible because (1) they manifest in the activities of front-line officers 
who are the first point of contact between police organisations and protesters as well as with the 
broader public (directly or indirectly via media); (2) there has been a (political) “selling” of these 
approaches by police leadership as evidence of progressive change based on the “lessons” of 
past events; and (3) they depart—at the very least, discursively—from conventional or 
traditional policing approaches. Furthermore, the “testing grounds” between 2006 and 2013 
were visible stages on which these reforms could be implemented.   
As described in chapter 3, the use of liaisons as part of the measured response 
approach is grounded in the liberal democratic policing objectives of facilitating political rights of 
dissent and refraining from the use of physical force. Drawing primarily on interviews with OPP 
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and RCMP officers, I begin the chapter by discussing how prevention is conceptualised by 
these officers, and how these conceptions inform their activities aimed at developing “trust” with 
First Nations communities and those involved in protests as a basis of consent-based policing. 
In the next two sections, I (un)map how “trust” and relationships are mobilised in managing 
protest activities. Liaisons and measured response work as a governing strategy that deploys 
the legal liberal rights discourse to responsibilise protesters and to manage risks to “critical 
infrastructure” as well as risks to police personnel and organisations. These practices 
strengthen police grounds for escalating their use of force, as well as for the expanded use of 
covert intelligence operations, which is discussed in chapter 5. While not always applied 
directly, the coercive potential of police forces enables the effectiveness of negotiation-based 
management. Operational decisions—including any escalation of police response—are 
rationalised through the formalisation and “transparency” of police protocols. Rather than 
constraining police activities and decision-making, the introduction of formal policies, guidelines, 
training, and incident command structures have augmented and rationalised police discretion.  
Relative to other forms of dissent, the colonial relationship and the unique features of 
Indigenous protests carry greater risks for police organisations and for the settler state itself. 
This colonial relationship contributes to internal frictions and tensions within police organisations 
as well as with the judiciary and government. Despite these tensions—or perhaps because of 
some of them—the liaison approach to managing Indigenous protests is a relatively “successful” 
mode of governing through negotiation. As part of the broader police response, negotiation, as a 
strategy, works in ways that institutionalises protest and criminalises radical direct action. The 
“success” of these reforms is based on neutralising the political-economic leverage of 
Indigenous direct actions while reinforcing “legitimate” institutional avenues of dissent. While 
responsibilisation and “governing through rights” tend to be taken up as emblematic of 
(neo)liberal governmentality, I argue that as an explicitly articulated policing strategy, these are 
lawfare practices that are more aptly described as disciplinary-juridical modes of power. Rights 
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and law work as rules, and “choice”—as a basis of responsibilisation—is constrained by the 
potential for “punishment” through criminalisation and/or police use of force when people do not 
conform to settler state (legal) authority.  
 
PREVENTION THROUGH RELATIONSHIPS AND COMMUNICATION  
Consistent with trends in public order policing in most Anglo-American states, the OPP and 
RCMP rolled out proactive, formal measured response approaches through the 1990s and into 
the 2000s. Prior to this, public order policing was largely reactive with the objective of 
containing, isolating, and dispersing public disruptions (see King 1997). The “new” approach is 
associated with the policing of labour conflicts and the emergence of transnational global justice 
protests in the late 1990s (see King 1997; King and Waddington 2006; de Lint and Hall 2009). 
The Gustafsen Lake and Ipperwash “crises” for the RCMP and OPP fueled additional initiatives 
specific to addressing organisational relations with Indigenous communities. The introduction of 
dedicated Aboriginal policing bureaus, liaisons, and expanded “Aboriginal awareness” training 
signalled a commitment by these forces to address their often volatile relationships with 
Indigenous peoples and are consistent with broader reconciliation politics. While officially 
adopted as force-wide priorities by both the OPP and RCMP, the task of (re)building 
relationships with Indigenous communities falls largely to Aboriginal policing programs and 
designated liaison and outreach officers. In the context of protests, the “repairing” of 
relationships, or building of new ones, hinges on the assertion of political neutrality on the part 
of police. This underlying objective is linked to the ability of police to prevent threats to police 
and to public safety.  
 
Articulations of Prevention  
Liaison and outreach officers engage in a wide range of activities that reflect multiple 
understandings of “prevention”, which intersect with, or inform, activities undertaken in two 
157 
 
contexts. On one hand, prevention is articulated through an understanding of the liaison role 
(and police more generally) as a kind of social service concerned with issues grounded in 
colonialism (such as poverty and housing). On the other hand, prevention activities are 
instrumentally-oriented to the specific task of managing protest actions. These understandings 
shape police activities in both general and event-specific contexts. There is fluidity among these 
strategies and conceptions, and the specificity of how they are articulated at certain times and 
places reflects both individual and organisational motives and objectives. Most often, there is a 
balancing between the requirements of “getting the job done”—managing protests so that they 
do not cause significant disruption or lead to violence—and building trust on an interpersonal 
level and as representatives of an organisation (see Table 5). 
 
Table 5 Police Conceptions of Prevention 
 
 
Articulation  
Social service: 
Preventing and addressing root 
issues / causes such as housing, 
water will prevent growth of 
frustration  
 
Instrumental: 
Make connections with 
communities because they are 
vital sources of information, 
communication, and can self-
police during events 
 
 
Context 
 
Issue-oriented  
Regular part of the job  
 
Event-oriented 
 
 
From a “social service” perspective, officers see themselves as often being the sole 
representative of the state in First Nations communities, especially those in remote locales. One 
RCMP liaison described a large component of his role as working to identify and obtain social 
service or health resources for communities (Interview, RCMP10). Many of the officers involved 
in Aboriginal policing emphasize the importance of addressing issues such as poverty, housing, 
education, and access to water, which can eventually become the issues that lead to protest 
actions out of frustration with Indian Affairs and other state agencies’ failure to act. These 
officers see government inaction in addressing basic necessities and in fulfilling obligations as 
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foundations for continued and growing frustration (Interviews, RCMP10; RCMP1; RCMP3). 
Police initiatives such as youth programs have a preventative role that extends to stemming 
anger and militancy.  
From an “instrumental” perspective, the integration and intervention of police within 
communities provides a means of developing interpersonal relationships that can be drawn 
upon if community members engage in protests or direct actions. These relationships and 
officers’ knowledge of community dynamics enable the flow of communication between 
protesters and police that is necessary for a measured response approach. Where the primary 
emphasis is on “getting the job done” to successfully manage protests, the development of 
“trust” with community members and leaders is essential to negotiate parameters that allow 
police to meet their objectives of minimising disruption and risks to public, police, and protester 
safety. The ideal scenario is to pre-empt the emergence of a “critical incident” through 
facilitating resolution of the underlying issue. As one OPP member puts it, “if we do our job 
correctly—and we do—if you get in there early enough when an issue is starting to kind of 
smoulder, and try to resolve it? Then it doesn’t turn into a critical incident. And that’s where I 
think our biggest success is” (Interview, OPP9). This kind of intervention could be to encourage 
two sides—such as in the case of intra-band conflicts—to enter a mediation process. Liaisons 
would “give the concept” but not participate in the actual mediation (Interview, OPP8). This 
understanding of the role of police liaisons reflects the overlapping of the social service and 
instrumental concepts of prevention.  
This convergence of prevention roles echoes the historical role of police in governing 
Indigenous peoples through the administration of “bare life” (Agamben 1998), which sustains 
settler state “peace.” As discussed in chapter 2, since the nineteenth century the police have 
been a primary agent in containing Indigenous peoples in a ‘state of exception’ by sustaining 
their existence through, for example, administration of rations, while maintaining their exclusion 
from the body politic of the nation-state. Settler colonialism has produced the conditions in 
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which the contemporary social service interventions of police are made necessary. It is also 
significant that the treaty obligations of the settler state continue to be mediated by and through 
the police institution. 
 
Building Relationships in Practice  
There are a number of ways that police organisations have sought to build relationships with 
Indigenous people including formal relationships with organisations and people in leadership 
positions (both traditional and elected), being a visible presence with/in communities in a social 
sense as well as physically, and proactively reaching out to groups and organisers prior to 
protest events. All three strategies reflect elements of the social service and instrumental 
aspects of prevention.  
In terms of formal relationships, one key mechanism is the establishing of protocols. 
According to Public Safety Canada, “protocols can be a valuable tool” that can help to 
“institutionalize contention through communication and formal procedures.”117 One of the most 
significant protocols is the RCMP and the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) “Public Safety 
Cooperation Protocol.” Signed on June 19, 2004, the two-year protocol is a formal example of 
the policing emphasis on prevention and the centrality of information sharing. The protocol sets 
guidelines for the involvement of both the AFN and the RCMP in responding to (potential) 
conflict situations, but most significantly it establishes a formal agreement to share information 
on an ongoing basis. According to the protocol, the AFN’s role is “to identify situations that could 
lead to crisis” in First Nations communities, to share information with the RCMP, and to provide 
advice as to the RCMP’s response. The exchange of information is facilitated through local, 
regional, and national level AFN and RCMP liaisons. The protocol also provides for the 
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establishing of joint RCMP/AFN Crisis Response Teams.118 The protocol was strategically 
renewed for three years in June 2007, just prior to the AFN National Day of Action.119 Similar 
protocols were established at the Divisional level with regional organisations and chiefs in BC, 
Manitoba and the Northwest Territories.120 
More specific to Indigenous protests than those carried out by non-Indigenous people is 
the emphasis on developing visible and active police presence in communities. As several OPP 
liaisons describe it, it is about being there “for the good times” and not just responding in times 
of conflict: “we’re not always there for the bad stuff, so they say, ‘hey, they’re not just here for 
the bad news, they’re also here because they want to be here,’ right?” (Interview, OPP8). In 
addition to reaching out and identifying themselves to both elected and traditional leadership, 
liaisons seek opportunities to participate in community activities where appropriate. The degree 
of initiative undertaken by full-time liaison and outreach officers varies, but includes activities 
such as attending pow-wows and other community events, running youth programs, connecting 
with friendship centres, coaching sports teams, and helping with food and clothing drives.  
Some interviewees describe this as an important way to learn more about individual 
communities, cultures, histories, and issues, which allows them to develop greater 
understanding that can be relayed to their organisations as a way of challenging misconceptions 
and potentially defusing conflict if a protest occurs:  
So some of our education involves our own boys and girls in blue, right, who might show 
up to a roadblock or whatever, and in the past the ignorance has maybe not allowed for 
the most effective response. Whereas we’re helping to educate within; and so, and they 
like that, because everybody wants to know what’s going on. And… and that helps a lot 
too. (Interview, OPP4)  
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At the same time, proactive outreach with communities is strategic with a view to mitigating 
potential future conflict. According to the Standard Operating Procedures for the OPP’s 
Provincial Liaison Team (PLT), liaisons should “build upon existing relationships and initiate new 
contacts where it is determined that communication with these persons/groups would assist in 
resolving issues and events, i.e. National Day of Action or ongoing occupations.”121 This liaison 
work of building trust has long-term aims in building relationships that can be transferred beyond 
the interpersonal connection of individual officers. Liaisons will also proactively approach 
individuals, and groups involved in activism—or who have simply been vocal. Prior to any 
incident occurring, the OPP Framework states that officers (general duty and liaisons) should 
watch for “real or perceived inequities in privilege or power within the community or between the 
community and society,” planned or ongoing initiatives with potential for conflict, “words and 
images used to describe an initiative or event that could generate negative emotions, 
dissension, disagreement, or conflict,” and statements made by people that conflict “will ensue” 
“if an initiative or event is not dealt with sensitively” (OPP 2006c:4-5; OPP 2013:14).  
These “signs” of potential conflict could be observed in the course of their everyday 
interactions with/in communities, or through open sources (such as community mailing lists or 
media). PLT officers may also attend open community and organising meetings, although this is 
subject to the discretion of the people present. Balancing the need to maintain credibility and 
trust with operational objectives can become a “fine line”, and we can see how “transparency” 
and “openness” can be used strategically to gain access to groups of interest to police when 
presented as being in the interests of organisers:  
Actually, I will not go to any meetings, for anybody, without telling them that we’re there. 
‘Cause I could walk in like this—to any meeting, and just sign in as ‘Joe Blow’. Or just 
take out my licence; they don’t know who I am. But I don’t do that, I’ll say I’m with the 
PLT, I’m coming to listen; so that maybe one day if we’re ever needed, I’m somewhat 
effective. And we kind of go through our spiel. But we say too, don’t tell everybody on 
the mic that the police are here tonight, ‘cause it’s going to freak them out. If you want us 
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to address these folks at a future meeting, we’ll plan it together and we’ll do it, but this is 
your meeting, it’s not about the police, right; we’re just there to learn. But we don’t go 
incognito and sneak in. Sometimes they’re not happy. But we just say, that’s why we’re 
here, we want to hear, ‘cause we can forecast by your meeting –if there’s going to be 
issues down the road. ‘Cause we hear what people are saying, right, and stuff.  
 
[TD] If there was a sense that people weren’t happy having you there, I mean, would you 
leave? 
 
If they were really adamant, they really didn’t want us to go, I probably wouldn’t go—to 
that meeting. But I would, I would push to … and that’s the fine line, is what the 
boundaries are—to meet with them later, for ten minutes. ‘Cause I know that ten, fifteen 
minutes of conversation will probably get us to the next meeting. (Interview, OPP8) 
 
Liaisons consistently claim that the majority of people and groups that they have approached 
have been receptive, although not always immediately. Some liaisons noted that it can take 
“years” to open “just a tiny little door and you have to take baby steps” (Interview, OPP4; also 
RCMP4). The refusal of people to speak with police before or during a protest action is taken up 
in different ways. Refusal is sometimes recognised as rooted in longstanding tensions and 
mistrust of the police by Indigenous communities. Officers do not necessarily characterise them 
as “bad” or suspicious but as a challenge for the immediate police objectives of managing an 
event and for the longer-term priority of building a relationship, but with the recognition that it 
can take years to do so, or not be possible at all. As one OPP liaison describes, they must 
navigate refusals in ways that create future opportunities for dialogue: 
If they say no, we’ll say, well can—you know, and some groups, it’s a fair statement 
‘cause you don’t know what they’ve dealt with before, right—and, you know, in a month 
can I check in with you? ‘I’ll think about it’, and you call back in a month; sometimes it 
takes four months to meet. Especially if it’s something that’s down the road and you 
have the benefit of time, right. If it’s really, really, close and they really don’t want to talk, 
we just try to say, look—you know, you’re going to go do it but I’m telling you, we’re 
going to get called to, we’re going to be there anyway, we have to go, they’re going to 
call us, we know it’s coming; so can we just talk about it. And then usually they’re like, 
‘wow, we didn’t realise you guys would actually do this kind of stuff. (Interview, OPP8)  
 
In the case of an impending protest or blockade, liaisons might point out the inevitability of 
having to deal with them anyways. This is implied by another OPP officer: 
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[I]f there’s the very, the militant people that are, that don’t want anything to do with you; 
they’ll tell ya they don’t want anything to do with you. So you try, right? ‘Hey, how you 
doing guys?’ Well, they tell you to screw off, you know, then, at least you tried. But 
sooner or later, they’re going to need somebody to talk to, right? (Interview, OPP1) 
 
One of the central preventative outcomes sought by formal organisational agreements and 
interpersonal relationships has been to encourage people to proactively contact liaisons prior to 
protest actions or even where “unrest” may be emerging. As one RCMP member puts it, “we are 
proactive… in order to assist, not to deter” (Interview, RCMP8). According to members of the 
OPP, there has been a significant shift in the proportion of events that they are notified about in 
advance, as opposed to doing the legwork to find out what is happening. Several participants 
noted that they “don’t seem to get surprised anymore” (Interview, OPP8) and identified Idle No 
More events between December 2012 and January 2013 as an important catalyst in 
establishing this dynamic. As I discuss below, having a “head’s up” has significant operational 
benefits for police because it allows for planning and early interventions to shape protest 
actions. This is a crucial form of responsibilisation establishing a norm for organisers to contact 
the police to advise them of upcoming events and to seek assistance with planning.  
In addition to potential protesters, the OPP’s PLT program has increasingly spread their 
attention to other parties, especially those who may be impacted by protest actions. In the case 
of a reclamation or blockade, this might include nearby residents and business owners. The Six 
Nations reclamation at Caledonia was a key catalyst in this shift as much of the conflict after the 
April 20 raid stemmed from confrontations by Caledonia residents. The proactive outreach to 
keep “stakeholders” informed is seen as important to mitigate hostilities and the possibility of 
counter-protests, as was seen in Caledonia. Where an action may directly impact a corporation 
such as a mining company, liaisons will also outreach to them. Liaisons’ communication with 
“stakeholders” may involve providing updates, explaining their approach, offering advice to 
better cope with disruption, or even educating affected parties on the underlying issues. These 
activities further reinforce the “neutrality” of police in conflict situations. Several interviewees 
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described the police role as being “the meat in a sandwich” between protesters and 
government, as well as with other involved or affected parties such as business owners. As an 
RCMP member notes, “that’s kind of my opening line when I talk to cops, is that we are the 
meat in the sandwich in these conflicts […] we’re the meat here; all we’re here [for], is to keep 
the peace” (Interview, RCMP3). In the process of responsibilising other parties to maintain 
“peace”, these outreach activities work to establish police credibility and legitimate how they 
manage the protest.  
 
Interpersonal Trust and Internal Tensions 
Aside from formal relationships forged via protocols or memoranda of understanding, the 
preventative approach of liaison policing is based largely on the interpersonal rapport of 
individual officers with the people they engage with. Key to this is overcoming trepidations and 
suspicions by minimising the power differential—a defining feature of consent-based policing. 
One of the priorities for liaisons is to be transparent and open about their roles and to be visible. 
There is a paradox as liaisons seek to be open and clear about their roles as police officers 
while also downplaying the coercive power associated with their positions. One way of 
addressing the latter is by dressing in plain clothes, recognising that the police uniform itself can 
be perceived as a symbol of coercion or intimidation:  
We, first of all, wear plain clothes because, you know, there’s the adage of the whole 
use of force thing, which has always been a cultural issue; and so I find that when we 
work in, when we approach in very low-key kind of way—jeans, t-shirt—people in 
general are, you know, it’s that authority and with the use of force showing, you’re less 
approachable. And I can honestly say, in a career of twenty-five years that I believe 
that’s true in a lot of ways. (Interview, OPP4)  
 
When it comes to the specific context of potential protests or direct actions—and thus, a more 
operational role for liaisons—plain-clothes are important to reduce antagonism, while also subtly 
signifying their neutrality in relation to the issue of contention. As one liaison put it, “I always say 
we dress like the folks dress. So if I’m going to a lumber demonstration, I’ve got my plaid jacket 
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on, you know. Just ‘cause then they relate; they don’t want to talk to a tie, they don’t want to talk 
to a uniform” (Interview, OPP8).  
Conveying approachability in building rapport involves more than dressing in plain 
clothes. The personal characteristics and training of individual officers plays a significant role, 
and is a major part of the OPP’s recruitment process, particularly since 2009 when the 
Aboriginal Policing Bureau established formal selection criteria (Interviews, OPP9; OPP5).122 
The role of First Nations officers working as OPP and RCMP liaisons can sometimes be 
beneficial in building relationships, but most interviewees emphasized that the individual 
character of officers is most important regardless of whether they are settlers or First Nations. 
The personal risks, however, are often greater for First Nations officers. Some interviewees 
spoke about the importance of maintaining their reputations in “Indian country” as past actions 
could either help or “haunt” them in developing channels of communication (Interview, RCMP4). 
As an interesting juxtaposition to the rationalisation and formalisation of police practices, some 
First Nations officers identify their own informal, personal networks in “Indian country” as one of 
the most important means of de-escalating situations by disseminating information or countering 
rumours when police actions may be inflammatory (Interviews, RCMP4; RCMP3; OPP8). 
However, officers have experienced situations when identity is “thrown in my face” (Interview, 
OPP3) as “being Native” can also be “a double-edged sword because… I get called a traitor, 
right. […]—what are you doing? This is your people, you’re… you know” (Interview, OPP8).123 
While First Nations members can generally be important resources for the police organisation in 
creating opportunities for communication with First Nations communities, or providing contextual 
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information that can de-escalate policing responses, their social position can compound the 
difficulties of navigating their role as the “meat in a sandwich” vis-à-vis First Nations 
communities and their colleagues. 
The interpersonal relationships developed by liaisons (both settler and Indigenous) can 
become sources of tension or conflict for individual officers and for liaison units as a whole on 
various levels. If a protest occurs, liaisons will be the first response in managing the event, and 
communicating the interests of the incident commander to protesters. On an individual level, 
liaisons must manage the boundaries, which can be “difficult because, you know, you always 
have to maintain a professional relationship. As much as we have elders we work with who 
provide, perhaps, a more personal relationship, when we’re, during an event, we try to be—like 
when the event’s actually taking place—we’re more professional” (Interview, OPP4). Liaisons 
have to be careful “not to be overly friendly, but you know what I mean, like to the point where 
you’re best pals; and now, as best pals, I’ve gotta arrest you because you just punched 
somebody” (Interview, OPP3). For some officers, there can be personal frustration when “you 
care, genuinely care for” the people who end up at risk of getting injured because they do not 
follow police advice intended to prevent harm (Interview, OPP3).  
Organisationally, there are enduring suspicions of liaisons from other parts of the force 
because of the uniqueness of the liaison role and the interpersonal relationships, which are 
sometimes seen as affecting liaisons’ impartiality. Several OPP members noted that there is a 
persistent lack of understanding about liaisons’ relationship-building activities such as attending 
meetings, participating in community events, and “going for coffee with the chief” (Interview, 
OPP8). As one member shares, colleagues may have perceptions of “‘so your job is just to go 
talk to people? Or go have coffee with the chief and council, like, that’s it?’” (Interview, OPP9). 
The non-traditional nature of liaison work is viewed as “fluffy-duffy” (Interview, OPP9), “huggy-
feely” (OPP7), and liaisons as “warm and fuzzy marshmallow types” (Interview, OPP4), which is 
not associated with “real” police work (Interview, OPP6) and at odds with traditional police 
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subculture. This can create tensions when it becomes a staffing issue for local detachments. 
While there are a handful of full-time liaisons across the province, the majority of the program is 
made up of officers who are trained as liaisons but have regular duties with their detachments. 
They will be called upon for special duty in their PLT capacities when an event is on the horizon 
or actually occurring, which takes them away from their regular jobs. One PLT member relayed 
that “if you’re gone for PLT duties, away from your office and the shift is running short, you get 
blamed for making the shift short when you come back” (Interview, OPP8). The same process 
occurs with officers who are part of other speciality units such as Emergency Response Teams, 
but according to the interviewee, PLT “members take it pretty good” (Interview, OPP8) because 
PLT is sometimes not valued in the same way that tactical units are. This is supported by 
findings in the internal 2009-10 OPP PLT Program Review that less than 20 percent of PLT 
members felt that their role was understood and valued by other front line officers.124  
This suspicion or misunderstanding of the liaison role has had operational implications 
on the ground. During the 2006 Six Nations reclamation, criminal investigators were cautious 
about sharing information about their operations with the Aboriginal Relations Team (ART) 
members (Interview, SNPS). Similarly, at Tyendinaga in 2008, OPP investigators did not notify 
the critical incident commander or ART that they planned on arresting several people who had 
been involved in the occupation and road blockade.125 After the arrest of spokesperson Shawn 
Brant, who had been speaking with journalists, the ART representative reached an agreement 
with activists to defuse tensions but officers “suddenly and forcefully arrested four of the 
activists,” which led to an escalation of the situation (Amnesty International Canada 2011:19).  
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Intra-organisational tensions may also be fueled by suspicions of liaisons’ community 
relationships, especially for First Nations officers. One RCMP member shared that 
“[u]nfortunately a lot of times, what I’ve seen over my years, is that once you’re working in these 
communities and you’ve built trust in these, the organisation kind of has concerns sometimes in 
sharing stuff with you” and operational members may not contact them for consultation when 
they should (Interview, RCMP10). The 2009-10 OPP PLT Program Review included comments 
from members who felt they were not being called on when they should be: “when an incident 
occurs on the First Nation and ERT, marine and canine respond I am not advised. I even 
worked there as a First Nations officer for 6 years.” Another comment was that “[o]n many 
occasions we are called at the last minute unless it is an on-going land claims issue.”126 
According to the Review,  
While just over half the PLT members agreed that their job as PLT members puts them 
in situations where they sometimes feel conflicted by traditional police roles and the 
need to maintain the relationships they have built, three quarters felt there were 
sufficient checks and balances in place to protect the integrity of the relationships they 
build. Very few PLT members find it difficult to keep their personal and professional 
relationships separate and the vast majority felt their roles and responsibilities in PLT 
were very clear. Nearly all PLT members were aware of the risk of falling prey to the 
“Stockholm Syndrome”.127  
 
In the Review, while all PLT members responded affirmatively in their confidence to maintain 
impartiality, only 54 percent of Aboriginal Critical Incident Commanders, regional commanders, 
intelligence officers, and regional intelligence coordinators were confident. For most of these 
respondents, this was attributed to a belief that existing PLT members were not suitable for the 
role.128 Some of the interviewees echoed the findings of the review in that they may sometimes 
experience conflict in their roles, but are able to keep it in check. Several OPP members 
acknowledged that this was a problem when the ART program began, but improved training, 
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stringent selection criteria, and internal check and balance mechanisms have been effective in 
preventing potential “Stockholm syndrome” (Interviews, OPP9; OPP5). At the same time, some 
officers had a more nuanced reflection on the criticisms of the former ART members. As one 
OPP member put it, “[t]hey were dedicated officers that were put in some really tough, tough 
situations. It is challenging at times; like, you can’t help but be emotionally invested in this stuff 
too being an aboriginal person” (Interview, OPP1).  
 Overall, most interviewees acknowledged that there is still internal resistance to the new 
approach to policing Indigenous protests and the role of liaisons, but most emphasized that 
things were “definitely getting better” (Interview, OPP9). Most interviewees felt that greater 
acceptance among colleagues has come through on-the-ground exposure to the de-escalating 
potential of the PLT’s work and the Framework approach. 
 
Drawing on First Nations Police Services: The Politics of Cooperation  
 
One of the key recommendations of the Ipperwash Inquiry was that First Nations Police 
Services should have a lead role in managing protests in their own communities, and should be 
drawn upon in a substantial capacity as part of decision-making when outside forces such as 
the OPP or RCMP become involved. OPP interviewees emphasize that there is generally a 
strong working relationship with First Nations Police Services, although with variation depending 
on the status of the service as stand-alone versus OPP-administered.129 The OPP will “work 
with [OPP-administered services] a lot more” because they have reporting requirements to the 
organisation and are considered “part of the OPP umbrella” (Interview, OPP3). They are seen 
as being  
such a valuable resources for us; and perhaps understand both the players and the 
issues better than we do, right? Because they’ve got a history of I don’t know how many 
years in that community—they’re born and raised there, right? So you have to recognise 
that they’re… consulting them is absolutely necessary, and hearing what, you know, 
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allowing them, the consultation to have weight is another important aspect. (Interview, 
OPP4) 
 
Conflicts on First Nations territories where outside police forces may become involved can have 
significant implications for local First Nations police, who must continue to live with and manage 
the longer-term repercussions professionally and personally. In the case of a standalone force 
like the Six Nations Police Service (SNPS), it is important to maintain credibility as members of 
the community (Interview, SNPS). For OPP-administered forces, there is a significant conflict-of-
interest that can emerge in being community people employed by band councils but also under 
OPP administration. Sometimes in these cases—especially with political conflicts within 
communities over issues such as governance—the intervention of outside OPP members is 
seen as a way of insulating the local service and its members from negative fall-out: “[l]ike their 
bosses are chiefs and council and all that. So we […] recognised that part of the situation, so we 
wanted to make sure that... they weren’t caught, in this melee because it’s really… they don’t 
want them to be… caught in the vortex” (Interview, OPP3). This kind of outside intervention 
reinforces the “peacekeeping” image of liaisons.  
On the other hand, working with standalone or regional services can be “very difficult” 
(Interview, OPP3). As one of the first standalone services, the SNPS has dealt with and 
managed numerous protests and conflicts on Six Nations, without involving outside forces 
(Interview, SNPS). In cases of collaboration such as with the Douglas Creek Estates 
reclamation, the degree of input that SNPS might have into ultimate decisions about 
enforcement was felt to be limited. Prior to the April 20 raid, SNPS had strongly advised the 
OPP against taking any action because of the potential for escalation:  
they had asked, on more than one occasion, what we thought the response would be if 
they actually went in and tried to remove some of them and we just kept telling them 
that’d be a bad idea, don’t think that would be, I’d think you would see a pretty significant 
response, right? So for whatever reason the decision was made that morning that they 
were going to remove them and all hell broke loose, right? And…so, we weren’t 
expecting it. (Interview, SNPS) 
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According to the SNPS member, they were not privy to the ultimate decision by the OPP to 
conduct the raid. There is an ethos of self-determination underlying many stand-alone First 
Nations police services. The rejection of the enforcement option by SNPS was important to 
building the force’s own credibility within the community by distancing itself from the OPP. 
Reflecting on his own experiences, the SNPS member highlights broader colonial dynamics 
underpinning the involvement of Indigenous peoples with/in the police institution: 
[…] it’s easy to get into this, well… you know, you’re cops that’s your job’ yeah, we are 
cops but we’re also community people and… don’t make us, don’t put us in a position 
where we have to make that choice between… because it’s not as simple for us as it is 
your average Canadian cop, I guess, because… way back when we started this, I 
remember an OPP officer saying, ‘well now’, you know, ‘now that you’re into policing and 
that, your colour is blue’ – ‘like the rest of us’, right? And it’s like, our colour has never 
been blue. (Interview, SNPS)  
 
While First Nations police services and the OPP and RCMP may share concerns about 
community safety, tensions often arise in the context of protests, which reflect conflicting 
perspectives on risk and threat.  
In March 2007, Tyendinaga Mohawk community members occupied the site of a gravel 
quarry. The OPP-administered Tyendinaga Mohawk Police Service had an agreement with the 
OPP that they would maintain primary responsibility for managing the occupation. According to 
former Tyendinaga Mohawk Police Chief Larry Hay, the OPP were “anxious to have the 
occupation ended as quickly as possible to protect the property rights of the quarry owner” 
(Amnesty International Canada 2011:15). On April 17, then-OPP Superintendent Brad Blair who 
was in charge of the Ontario First Nations Policing Program informed Hay that the OPP would 
no longer provide compensation to the Tyendinaga Mohawk Police for overtime costs in relation 
to policing the occupation, and “he required an exit strategy.” According to notes from a meeting 
between Blair and then-Deputy Commissioner Chris Lewis, if Hay refused to withdraw from the 
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quarry situation, he would be suspended.130 On April 18, Larry Hay was suspended and the 
OPP assumed control of policing the occupation.  
Later that year, on the night before the 2007 National Day of Action, Tyendinaga 
Mohawk activists blockaded rail lines and a small highway. The OPP then pre-emptively closed 
highway 401. While Tyendinaga Police liaisons were actively meeting on site with activists, 
then-OPP Commissioner Julian Fantino became directly involved in attempting to negotiate an 
end to the blockade with spokesperson Shawn Brant. In wiretap transcripts of his conversations 
with Brant, Fantino dismissed these negotiations as well as Brant’s repeated emphasis that any 
decision to end the action must be a collective one amongst those involved. In the final 
conversation, Fantino tells Brant, “I’m now telling you, pull the plug or you will suffer grave 
consequences.”131 The experiences at Six Nations and at Tyendinaga were at odds with the 
OPP’s official rhetoric of prioritising the engagement of local First Nations police as a first 
responder and respecting the knowledge and authority of First Nations police “partners” in 
managing events. This is especially evident in cases involving “militant” direct actions and 
advice or approaches by First Nations Police services that are at odds with the objectives of the 
outside force. 
  There is a reconciliatory discourse underlying the emphasis by police organisations to 
(re)build relationships based on “trust” with First Nations communities as a means of preventing 
future conflict. Towards this, police have sought to establish formal and informal-interpersonal 
relationships with and in communities, including engagement of First Nations Police Services. 
Social service and instrumentalist articulations of prevention converge in a common objective of 
                                               
130
 Hay v. Ontario Provincial Police. 2012. HRTO 2316. CanLII. 124. These events were coloured by comments that 
Larry Hay had made about tensions with the OPP in an interview with the Online Pioneer, a student publication at 
Loyalist College, Hay stated that the OPP’s reluctance to provide resources to the TMPS was underlined by racism, 
and “[…] They (OPP) want to at least create the impression, to satisfy the Canadian taxpayer, that the police have the 
situation under control, when in fact, if they were here, it would be nothing but an escalation of violence.”  (Hay v. 
Ontario Provincial Police. 2012. HRTO 2316. CanLII. 118). Hay’s suspension was officially attributed to these 
comments. 
131
 OPP transcript of phone conversation between Shawn Brant and Julian Fantino (#3) (June 29, 2007), lines 237-
239. Retrieved June 28, 2014 (http://www.ocap.ca/supporttmt/files/brant-transcript-26a.pdf); also Amnesty 
International Canada (2011). 
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institutionalising or normalising the presence and the proactive engagement of police. Liaisons 
are central to this relationship-building and must manage paradoxical presentational strategies 
of being visible and “transparent” about their intentions while minimising their coercive power as 
police officers. This can be a source of tension vis-à-vis communities but also within the policing 
world in their own organisations and with other agencies. These tensions are rooted in the fact 
that police organisations are settler colonial institutions that are ultimately concerned with 
containing conflict.  
 
“NEGOTIATING” PROTESTS: PRODUCING LEGITIMATE PROTEST AND (AND SUBJECTS)  
Of all the reforms after Ipperwash, the use of liaison officers who engage in negotiations with 
protest organisers and participants before and during events has been the most prominent. 
Within the broader public order policing framework objectives of prevention and balancing 
democratic rights to protest with “public safety” concerns, the activities undertaken by liaisons 
reflect varying levels of flexibility, informality, and management strategy. The rationalisation of 
activities by officers range from, on one end, a desire to assist (without specific reference to the 
requirements of “the job”), to the other end where there is a direct association with “getting the 
job done” through conscious and deliberate shaping of events to enable police management 
and avoid escalation.  
Officers frequently describe their role as “facilitating” or assisting organisers in the 
planning process and during the course of the event. Thus, the community relationship-building 
work is central to enabling police involvement prior to a protest. Forms of police involvement 
include (a) educating or advising people of their rights, the limitations on those rights, and about 
the role of police; (b) advising and assisting with other aspects of planning; and (c) being the 
main point of contact for communications between protesters and incident commanders. These 
are lawfare strategies of responsibilisation that (re)produce liberal democratic ideals of 
“legitimate” protest. While this is largely defined by individual rights, it also incorporates degrees 
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of “tolerance” for violations of law and disruption. In the specific context of Indigenous protests, 
this “tolerance” is often linked directly to the recognition of Aboriginal and treaty rights, which 
conflict with individual and property rights. As de Lint and Hall (2009) have noted in the context 
of labour conflicts, police liaisons take on the role of experts—not of crime control, their 
traditional area of expertise, but of protest organising. In the case of Indigenous protests, this 
expertise is amplified in the post-Ipperwash context with the expectation that liaisons have 
specialised knowledge of Indigenous communities, issues, histories, and legislation through 
their training (e.g. “Native awareness” and PLT courses), other education, community 
engagement activities and/or personal experiences. 
One of the themes of the Ipperwash Inquiry recommendations was the importance for 
police to maintain neutrality in managing protests, reflecting the conception of policing as 
“peacekeeping”. As discussed in chapter 3, this is an important legitimating device for the police 
institution in distancing itself from the executive of government—i.e. “political interests”. Police 
actions are framed in reference to the objective of maintaining “peace” or order. This position of 
neutrality enables police to facilitate protest while simultaneously maintaining their law 
enforcement mandate and power of discretion. For liaisons, maintaining neutrality is what allows 
them to establish relationships and to facilitate communication and mitigation strategies. 
Incident commanders who are responsible for the overall management of critical incidents also 
emphasize impartiality in their decision-making. As I noted earlier, several police interviewees 
described the police role as being “the meat in the sandwich” between protesters and 
government, and with various other “stakeholders” linked to a protest such as private 
corporations, settlers, and municipalities. The emphasis on the “meat in the sandwich” analogy 
reflects an assertion of police autonomy from government in not being willing to “die in a ditch” 
(Waddington 2003) for politicians’ failure to deal with the issues giving rise to protests. After the 
fall-out of Ipperwash for the OPP, and Gustafsen Lake and APEC for the RCMP, there are 
interests in insulating the organisation and its members from further damage.  
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Nevertheless, the device of neutrality lends itself to the activity of negotiation, placing 
police officers as mediators of multiple sets of rights and interests that are often in conflict. This 
includes the interests of the police organisation in terms of successfully containing the protest. 
Liaisons occupy a unique role of being this “mediator” or negotiator and simultaneously acting in 
the interests of their organisation. As I will discuss, this creates internal and external tensions.  
 
Law: Educating and Advising on Legal Rights and Responsibilities  
One of the key roles of liaisons is advising organisers and participants of Charter rights 
associated with protest as the boundaries for acceptable, legitimate actions. As Brown (1995) 
and Ford (2002) argue, individual rights establish particular forms of behaviour as norms of 
liberal democratic citizenship. The centrality of rights discourse in how police manage protests 
disrupts the dominant conception of rights as safeguarding individuals from the arbitrary or 
excessive power of the state (Ford 2002)—which police represent. Instead, we can see how 
rights are used by police as an active form of regulation that is based on the presumption of 
state sovereignty. As I discussed in chapter 2, in the neoliberal context, rights and the politics of 
recognition have become a foundation for the assertion of settler state sovereignty. In the 
practices discussed below, rights are overtly used to establish grounds for negotiating the 
parameters for “legitimate” protest.  
Liaisons suggest that organisers and protesters are sometimes unaware of Charter limits 
or the illegality of certain actions, such as blockading a highway, and see their role as 
“educating” people to ensure their well-being. This is reflected in one PLT member’s example of 
how protesters might be approached: “I also am very well-rehearsed on our constitutional right 
to protest or have your say; could we sit down and just talk about what that might look like 
because I want to make sure that you, yourself, don’t get arrested or come out of this with a 
criminal offence or whatever” (Interview, OPP4). Liaisons will often provide organisers and 
participants with hardcopy pamphlets with the text of section 2 of the Charter, as well as the 
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section 1 limit on the guarantees of these rights. The RCMP and OPP materials both include a 
non-exhaustive list of Criminal Code offences that would serve to limit section 2 freedoms. 
There is a particular emphasis on the section 31 breach of peace provision, which is not a 
chargeable offence but used as grounds for arrest to “end the breach and restore order.”132 The 
role of police during demonstrations is also described. In addition to reviewing these parameters 
with protesters, liaisons will also advise event organisers of the potential legal liabilities of 
engaging in an action that carries risks for participants and the implications for ignoring 
precautions; organisers are thus responsibilised in a legal capacity.  
[…] Freedom of speech, that’s the first thing that I mention. The Charter of Rights; 
everybody has a right to demonstrate and speak their minds. So we do adhere to that 
strictly. But at the same time, okay, if it goes awry, well then you will be informed that 
here’s the boundary. You cannot cross that. You cannot throw things, you cannot make 
threats to anyone, because then it’s criminally, it’s not acceptable, and … there’ll be a 
reaction from the police… to this. (Interview, RCMP8) 
 
The effect of being directly advised of your rights and the possible implications for transgressing 
the limits of “legitimate” protest—verbally and/or with a pamphlet—evokes a parallel with the 
requirement that police advise people of their Charter rights upon arrest. The intentionality of 
this parallel is not as important as how it operates in shaping how police assess the risk or 
threat posed by protest participants and in informing their management strategies. The 
educating or advising of protest organisers and participants is framed as a form of transparent, 
open communication.  
[…] we’re not there to intimidate because we gave them, like we have this little handout 
on, there’s a thing about peaceful demonstrations, of what the Charter says you can do, 
basically what you can and cannot do; and the consequences of non-peaceful 
demonstration, and the charges that could occur there. And it’s not to be used as an 
intimidating factor; it’s sharing, being, giving them—like anybody who’s done a [forum] 
can say, ‘yeah, let’s go do a rally and go shut down the highway’. But if they don’t know 
it’s a criminal offence… given that informed information, they might give it a second 
thought. ‘Oh, if I do this, I might get charged. Should I do this, or shouldn’t I.’ And the 
                                               
132
 See Esmonde (2002) for a critique of the breach of peace provision. As a non-chargeable offence, there is little to 
no opportunity for challenging one’s arrest.  The standards for what qualifies as “breach of peace”, and thus for 
arrest, are ambiguous and thus highly discretionary.  
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ball’s in their court. And like I said, whether they decide to do it or not… you know? 
(Interview, OPP3)  
  
This education and transparency about the police role shifts ultimate responsibility for any 
negative outcomes of events to protesters, and especially organisers, who make an informed 
decision to risk criminal sanction or harm.  
Part of the legal “education” provided by liaisons is informing organisers of any 
requirements to obtain use of space permits, and the processes for obtaining them. Many 
municipalities have instituted bylaws requiring anyone planning on holding a large event in 
public space to apply for a permit, and this has become one of the mechanisms by which police 
can manage potential protests on multiple levels: first, the “choice” of organisers as to whether 
or not to obtain a permit, having been fully informed of this administrative requirement by police; 
second, if a permit is obtained, it provides police with information about protest plans which 
allows for preparation or further negotiation of parameters; and third, enforcing participants’ 
adherence to the terms of the permit. According to an RCMP member in Protective Operations, 
the utility of the permit processes is mainly for police planning: 
[…] we encourage people to apply for a permit, which gives us an opportunity to plan. 
It’s not, it’s not law. They don’t have to apply for the permit—well, actually it’s a bylaw I 
believe, a city bylaw, but you know, a city bylaw that the city’s never charged anybody 
yet with breaching the bylaw… with respect to failing to comply with a permit or failing to 
file for a permit. But we encourage it so that we’re able to plan appropriately. (Interview, 
RCMP7) 
 
The permit process is used primarily as a preventative, governing mechanism rather than a 
punitive one. None of the interviewees from the OPP or RCMP indicated that the lack of a 
permit alone would be a basis for fully preventing an action from happening or taking 
enforcement action, yet the communication of this to organisers can have a suppressive effect. 
And it also depends on the person too; because some people think we’re threatening as 
well; ‘cause we say, anybody, anything happens here, or goes wrong today, you created 
this incident, you could be held liable… and somebody could sue you. ‘Oh, you’re just 
trying to scare me, so I don’t do it’. And it’s like, no, no, no. You go ahead and do what 
you want, you know, but understand that this could happen; or you could get a ticket, or 
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you could—we might not arrest you right today, but you could get charged and get 
arrested down the road; because you’re breaking the law or whatever. We’re not … 
telling you not to do this; we’re just giving you the information. You make your choice. 
[…] like I know where there was going to be a protest up in [town] one day, you know, 
typically the town says you need a permit, and you need insurance. And to get the 
permit you need the insurance policy. And if you don’t do that… you know, now there’s 
bylaws. We found that out and we told the organiser, that’s what the town’s saying; he 
cancelled his protest. To the full extent that they were going to do it – they modified it to, 
so that they took away that issue, some of those issues. But… so, you know, they… it 
works in a lot of cases, and sometimes, you know, they say, ‘oh you’re just threatening 
me,’ or they say, ‘yeah, I know, don’t care.’ (Interview, OPP7)  
 
There is explicitness in the communication of rights and the role of liaisons to protesters; 
however, in practice there is a significant degree of discretion and contingency in how police 
ultimately respond to transgressions. While concrete in the sense of being “on the books”, 
Charter rights, limitations, and Criminal Code provisions such as breach of peace, are subject to 
interpretation in their application by police on the ground (see Esmonde 2002).  
Contingency also arises in large part from officers’ recognition of the complexities of 
Indigenous protests such as assertions of colour of right and the potential to spark solidarity 
actions elsewhere. In the context of land reclamations or disruption of resource extraction 
activities (e.g. mining, logging, fracking), these actions might occur on land that is under private 
ownership, the legitimacy of which is often the point of contention. Regulation via permits is 
irrelevant in such cases where space is governed by private property rights; instead, 
trespassing becomes a possible criminal charge. Yet, even in the case of public events, the 
expectation for Indigenous peoples to obtain permits to be on traditional lands—in many cases, 
unceded—is a more subtle example of Aboriginal and treaty rights being swallowed up by the 
liberal rights-based regimes of (a) delimited “freedoms” of expression and (b) private property. 
This complexity, and disjuncture from the “letter-of-the-law” communication of Charter rights and 
Criminal Code offences, surfaces in the absence of section 35 Aboriginal and treaty rights from 
the standard information pamphlet. Yet establishing legal parameters sets the grounds for 
further negotiations:  
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Like the example of setting a tent on Parliament Hill grounds. That’s illegal, but let’s 
negotiate something so… you know, the protest group can make their point and, and for 
the police, is that …there was no, nobody got hurt, no damage, no injuries. So that’s the 
ultimate objective. So I think over the years, and many years, and it hasn’t been just 
recently, you know, law enforcement agencies realised that in order to achieve a good 
result … we need to show some flexibility… and then protest groups also need to show 
some flexibility. So usually if you meet somewhere in the middle, um, the results will 
always be better. Where we found in the past, things don’t work out of course if you draw 
the line in the sand too early… then it’s just a dare of crossing that line, and it just gets 
worse. (Interview, RCMP6) 
 
Facilitation: Shaping Legitimate Protest 
The “educating” role of liaisons is directly connected to their involvement in the shaping of 
events to conform to the parameters of “legitimate protest”. Taking a direct role in the planning 
of protest activities is often framed in positive terms of providing assistance, showing the 
goodwill of the police, and a willingness of the police to “bend”, all of which are presented as a 
“win” for the protest organisers and participants.  
One common form of assistance is to close lanes of traffic or redirect it, which reduces 
potential for injuries or retaliation from those inconvenienced by an action. As much as 
individual officers may genuinely intend to “help”, their actions are foremost informed by the 
public order impetus of managing how an event unfolds. As discussed above, interpretations of 
“prevention” vary in terms of relationship-building, and “facilitation” also takes different forms. In 
some cases, this is a means of restricting activities. As one OPP liaison explains, “[s]o we kind 
of point out some of those things and try to have alternate, alternate solutions to help… to help 
facilitate their right to freedom of speech, and peaceful assembly—but maintaining public safety 
is the biggest thing, right?” (Interview, OPP9). Rather than explicitly restricting activities, liaisons 
will suggest alternatives and may facilitate access to venues or resources with the underlying 
objective of maintaining control and minimising overall disruption: 
Yeah, and you know what, and… they still got their protest across, traffic still moved 
freely—and we’ve had some of those discussions around some things, like, and that’s a 
really good thing of PLT; PLT will ask them, what do you want? ‘Well, we want to get out 
message across to the media’. Okay, if we set up a media staging area… over here, off 
the roadway… for you… will that help? You know? Or they’ll suggest to them, ‘hey, if 
180 
 
you really want to get your message across, why don’t you do just a traffic picket?’ You 
know? As opposed to a blockade. And they’ll provide them with some options that may, 
yeah, may… serve the police and public purpose, by increasing safety, but also allow 
them to meet their goal if that’s … what it’s all about. (Interview, OPP2) 
 
An RCMP liaison gives a similar example of facilitation:  
If you guys can give me that hour, I’ll make sure you’ll go in the Metcalfe gate… which, 
the Metcalfe gate is where I wanted them to go. But I made it sound like this is a big 
thing. […] It’s less impeding traffic and it’s to—they’re off the street quicker. But I made it 
sound, ‘we’ll take you right in the middle, Metcalfe’. So, to them, they were getting a deal 
from that end […] it’s just that little, as I said, give and take [and be able to bend]. Like I 
mean, if I go down there and said ‘no, you can’t do this, ain’t going to happen’—and then 
push to shove. (Interview, RCMP9)  
 
Other liaisons and critical incident personnel also talked about helping protesters with accessing 
electricity, bringing vehicles or equipment to Parliament Hill, gassing up generators, and setting 
up space for media personnel. The level of assistance offered by police sometimes catches 
protest organisers off-guard: “And people look at us and, ‘oh, the police are doing this for us?’” 
(Interview, RCMP8). One of the objectives of facilitation is to encourage proactive engagement 
in the future as people are familiarised with what liaisons can do “for them.” Often this 
assistance is leveraged to gain concessions from protesters, appealing to issues of safety for 
the participants themselves and people impacted by their action, the objective of their action, 
and the potential for negative optics:  
So what is your intention today; ‘we want to get some media attention’; okay, so how 
about we do a traffic slowdown for whatever, ten minutes on the hour, so you’re not 
really pissing off the public because you—a lot of them they want their support, they 
want to get their message about what their grievance is. That is their goal. Okay, so if 
that is your goal, then ticking public off, closing down a highway for eight hours isn’t 
going to get your message out. So then it turned into a lot of information sharing, 
pamphlet sharing; if people take them they take them, if they don’t, they don’t. They’re 
getting their message out, the media can get through, they can get their ten minutes of… 
of… media attention and then, so that’s how we try to help facilitate that whole… 
process. (Interview, OPP9) 
 
Evident in the preceding comments, the aim of liaisons is ultimately to discourage significant 
disruptive actions, especially those targeting critical infrastructure with the potential for 
economic disruption. Reflecting the liberal democratic ideals of civic participation (and even 
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multiculturalism), liaisons tend to identify “cultural” events, information sharing, and awareness 
raising events such as information pickets or rallies as legitimate forms of protest. Liaisons will 
try to shape how protests with disruptive potential are carried out—whether information pickets, 
marches, or blockades—which often involves negotiations relating to flow of traffic and the 
duration of the event.  
The willingness of protesters to heed police “advice” is taken as reflecting their 
reasonableness, which along with the perceived credibility of their intentions and legitimacy of 
their claims or cause, informs police assessments of the overall legitimacy and lawfulness of a 
protest action and its participants. One OPP PLT member describes how protesters’ 
cooperativeness informs police distinctions between peaceful and “criminal” protests: 
So… first of all, like… is the protest peaceful; is their intention to have a peaceful 
protest—and Idle No More, very much peaceful protests. What’s the rationale behind the 
protest. Is it—you talked about—is it about an Aboriginal treaty or inherent right, is it 
about hunting, is it a land claim, is it just about the fact that, um, I don’t know, I’m … 
cigarettes, something, what is the rationale behind the protest. Was there prior notice—
and a lot of times they’ll call… so is it just that random—that you said, how many times 
are we surprised and I said ‘very little’? Because most of them know our, the people. […] 
Specific location and timeframe disclosed. So if we have a protest, if we’re out there, 
random protest, and they’re not disclosing the time and location, like so they’re not 
cooperating with the police? They’re, like these are just, these things to talk about the 
criminality of a protest compared to being peaceful. (Interview, OPP9) 
 
One of the central themes in assessing legitimacy of protests is the degree to which protesters 
or organisers are perceived by police to be representing the interests of the wider community as 
opposed to acting out of “self-interest” or even having ulterior (i.e. ‘criminal’) motives. By 
extension, this is taken as a measure of the legitimacy of the issue or assertion at the root of the 
protest. As indicated above, the explicit assertion of Aboriginal and treaty rights using rights-
based discourse is associated with legitimacy as protesters are engaged with/in the dominant 
liberal-legal institution. This reflects a dual layer of rights-based regulation as the framework of 
Aboriginal rights is the “legitimate” arena of contention towards which individual Charter rights of 
protest can be exercised.   
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Many officers in Aboriginal policing recognise the complexities of determining 
“community interest” and are cautious about automatically associating representativeness with 
endorsement by elected (or even traditional) councils (Interviews, RCMP2; OPP4). A related 
indicator of representativeness for police is the demographics of participants. A member of the 
OPP compares events at Tyendinaga with Idle No More: 
…you go back to the protests in 2008, 2009, there’s a small nucleus of people that were 
causing… criminal issues. It was not the community en masse showing up… to block the 
road. You look at the difference between that and the Idle No More events in December 
and January. And you look at, for example, um, over in the London-Sarnia area where 
you had hundreds of people come out, ranging from toddlers to seniors—they came out, 
they came out as a community; the issue was strong enough that, as a community, they 
felt this was an action they had to take. Far different than… you know, 10 or 15 or 20 
people who do not represent the views of the entire community, deciding to take action 
on their own—under the reason that they are furthering the land claim or furthering 
whatever the issue is that, and you know, that’s, you know, that’s a big difference we 
have to take into account. (Interview, OPP2) 
 
The presence of elders, women and children was mentioned by some interviewees as 
an indicator that the action represents wider community interests. The implication is that 
elders, women and children are generally not “militants”. The distinction between 
legitimate and illegitimate—and criminal activities—is also assessed according to the 
tactics used by protesters:  
Is it high visibility, is there women and children involved in the protest—again, so Idle No 
More, women and kids, signs, during the day; it’s, compared to under the cover of, in the 
middle of darkness, sneaking in on a railroad track, no lighting, no visibility, you’re not 
getting your message across. If your issue is to get your message across about a land 
claim or an inherent right, then why are you covered in balaclavas, on a rail line, blocking 
a highway—and not communicating with the police, not telling us when you’re leaving, 
not—you know what I mean? (Interview, OPP9) 
 
The expressions of contention outside the dominant rights regime and land claims processes 
coupled with the use of direct action tactics are juxtaposed with the legitimate “civilised” 
avenues of liberal democratic participation, and participants are often “labelled defiant or 
unreasonable” (Fleras and Elliott 2003:199, emphasis added). They are often categorised in 
police and mainstream media discourses as “criminals”, “militants”, “extremists” or “splinter 
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groups” (see also Alfred 2005b; Adese 2009) with personal or questionable motives. The 
isolation of individuals and groups reflects a divide and conquer strategy based on 
responsibilisation. This responsibilisation is enabled or enforced through criminalisation and the 
potential use of coercion discussed in the next section.  
 
Responsibilisation: Self-Policing and “Choices” 
Another aspect of liaisons’ facilitation of legitimate protest is to assist organisers in preserving 
the integrity of the event, which could be disrupted by “outsiders”. The main approach is to instil 
responsibility for self-policing among organisers based on agreements reached through 
negotiations. One common strategy is the use of marshals—organisers or volunteers from 
among participants to monitor and help contain participants during actions such as marches. As 
an RCMP member with Protective Operations indicates, self-policing is presented as being in 
the interests of protesters:  
And sometimes with specific organisers, we go back and we say, ‘you know what? This 
is not acceptable. If you cannot control your people—well, within your own group, we 
want you to be organised.’ And we’re giving them some tips. […] So what we had said to 
the, actually there were two organisers, we said why don’t you take some people and 
give them […] the little vests, traffic vests, okay? So the group will be marching, so put 
some on the outside. And try to keep them within one or two lanes of traffic. And then 
yes, we will have our police officers to assist but we want you. So, it’s going to be better 
if your own people police themselves. (Interview, RCMP8)  
 
A central role of liaisons is to prevent “troublemakers” from either “hijacking” an event or 
engaging in actions that may change the tone or plans of a “legitimate” event. There are three 
categories that emerge in how police interviewees describe people presenting risks: 
“troublemakers”, militants”, and outside “hijackers”. The common elements of risk among these 
categories are their tactics and their rejection of police authority. “Troublemakers” are described 
as opportunists who attend and participate in protest actions with a primary aim of “causing shit” 
and to “start a fight with the police”:  
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[…] there were individuals who were obviously involved on the negative aspect of the 
law who were… who were all of a sudden, now they have a cause. And these individuals 
weren’t, some of them were… […] you’d be very careful what you’d say because they 
would twist anything you would say […] they just, you know, they were just there for, just 
to cause shit. (Interview, OPP3)  
 
Event organisers might be coached, in a sense, on how to manage potential “troublemakers” 
and “outsiders” who might seek to “infiltrate” and “cause problems” (Interview, RCMP8), or to 
“hijack their cause” to gain attention for their own agendas (Interview, OPP4). This includes 
encouraging organisers to point people out to police (Interview, RCMP9). Organisers are made 
responsible for ensuring that their events proceed as planned, with the understanding that 
police will react if “trouble” occurs. The advice provided by police liaisons to their contacts can 
sometimes reflect a degree of paternalism, particularly when organisers are relatively 
inexperienced:  
  
And we have some … that have stronger skill sets, who have done it; sometimes if 
they’re a community… say they’re the band office administrator, or somebody, they’ve 
been doing that job for a while, they’ve got more of the skill set; so they can be the 
leader and organise the logistics. If it’s a first-timer? That’s where they don’t sleep and 
they have issues. But someone with a strong skill set, we’ll tell them – ‘cause it’s not up 
to us to tell them—you need to tell the other group coming in that this is what you’re 
doing; you plan on doing nothing that’s illegal. No violence, no drinking; it’s a march 
together, it’s all good. And if they don’t want to abide they can go home. And it works 
well. […] ‘Cause if not, that’s where the issues are; ‘cause it’s someone who has nothing 
to do with the main cause that causes an issue—it can disrupt the whole thing. And they 
don’t want that. ‘Cause I always remind them, that all they’re going to remember is that; 
they’re not going to remember all the good work that was done, right? (Interview, OPP8) 
 
One of the concerns with Indigenous issues is the increased presence of settler-dominated 
groups, and especially “environmental groups, or left-wing extremists, who … jump in on any 
cause, right? […] And try to hijack that, their issue, and so you see a lot of support for, and 
solidarity for First Nations issues; some of it is good, and some of it there are those extremists 
who just want to cause … create criminal activity” (Interview, OPP9).  
Self-policing is encouraged by police as allowing organisers and participants to maintain 
autonomy over their protest actions. It also encourages the adoption of police categories of 
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legitimacy and risk as cooperative organisers are expected to distance themselves from 
troublemakers, militants and potential hijackers. However, people will self-police for a range of 
reasons and should not be assumed to be a result of internalised responsibility or desire to 
cooperate with authorities. Decisions to self-police can be strategic to minimise the amount of 
contact with police, which could take into consideration the greater risks of non-cooperation for 
racialised and marginalised people. While on one level self-policing may reflect liberal 
governance as “action at a distance” (Rose and Miller 1992; Rose 2000), it is the coercive 
potential of the police institution that is integral in shaping the exercise of autonomy. This 
resonates with colonial governmentality critiques that emphasize the enduring presence of 
violence in colonial contexts.  
The activities of police prior to, and during events, are about establishing choices for 
those engaging in protests. Police liaisons actively engage people in a “co-production of order” 
in the performance of liberal democratic citizenship (Marx 1998:258).These preventative 
policing strategies establish multiple points at which organisers, participants, and communities 
must make decisions on how to engage with police and how to proceed with an event. 
Decisions are shaped through police interventions in which “choices” are (sometimes explicitly) 
presented. The most blatant “choice” begins with whether or not people engage with police 
liaisons prior to or during protest events. For those who do engage, the planning and negotiating 
process involves a series of decisions including whether or not to adopt police constraints. The 
tendency to present constraints as suggestions in positive, constructive terms may lessen 
resistance by engaging with organisers as active participants in negotiation. Organisers or 
spokespersons who engage with police by informing them of planned actions, negotiating and 
agreeing to parameters, are held personally accountable for breaching agreed-upon terms, 
whether deliberate or not. This includes the failure to keep police updated on any changes, 
which creates risk for police because it introduces an unknown or unexpected element into 
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existing response plans. The interpersonal relationship between a liaison and a protester 
becomes a mechanism of responsibility:  
And if something changes it’s usually because somebody surprised us and didn’t tell us. 
But then they learn quickly that the deal’s off, and you’re going to be held accountable; 
that’s the big thing. You have to tell people, you’re going to be held accountable; if you 
change the rules on purpose, you’re held accountable. So if somebody gets hurt, later 
on it’s going to come out that you, as a leader, made that decision and didn’t tell the 
police. (Interview, OPP8)  
 
The protesters’ abrogation of the agreement means that the security offered by the liaisons 
through their facilitation activities, and being a protective buffer from angry motorists, counter-
protesters, “criminals”, “hijackers” and so forth, can be withdrawn because the implicit contract 
has been nullified through protesters’ actions or omissions. One OPP liaison spoke about a past 
experience in which PLT members withdrew from a protest site: “Now that sense of security, in 
which, us being there, is not there—wasn’t there for them anymore. Because, and I said, ‘we’ve 
been nothing but open and transparent’ in the sense of us being there for everybody’s safety; 
‘now we don’t feel safe. And you’re not doing nothing to control it’” (Interview, OPP3). 
Consistent with their role as police officers, liaisons see themselves as providing security for 
protesters. What we see through the preceding discussion is that security becomes a 
commodity that is offered by state authorities contingent on adherence to “negotiated” 
parameters within dominant liberal frameworks. The “openness” and transparency in police 
communicating potential legal consequences to protesters puts “the ball in their court.” The 
responsibility for police escalation in their use of force becomes shared with protest participants 
because of the quasi-contractual relationship established with liaisons, making verbal 
agreements, or even by passively receiving information from police. 
As the preceding discussion shows, the overt communication and negotiation strategies 
set boundaries—defined by law and ideals of the common good of public order/peace. The 
“educating” or advising role makes clear the potential repercussions of making certain choices. 
The refusal or rejection of police interventions is not necessarily always explicitly identified as 
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bad or immoral. Several interviewees expressed understanding for why Indigenous people may 
choose not to cooperate with police, violate law, or engage in “militant” actions—whether 
because of their levels of frustration, exhaustion of other options, or even recognising that some 
Indigenous peoples reject the legitimacy of the settler state’s law. Yet, the deployment of 
“choices” through legal and police power—even where officers may be sympathetic—is the 
exercise of constitutive power that (re)produces “good” liberal subjects (Brown 1995; Ford 
2002). In the colonial context, as Coulthard (2007) argues, the liberal rights-based discourse 
constitutes Indigenous peoples as “subjects of empire.” Liberal “rights” are activated by police 
as a governing strategy that shapes conduct to be consistent with liberal-security logics that 
(re)produce settler state sovereignty.133 While the discourse of responsibilisation is associated 
with neoliberal governance (in Foucauldian and governmentality conceptions), police practices 
suggest that responsibilisation in the context of a (settler) colonial power relationship is more 
aptly described as a disciplinary-juridical modality of power. In being deployed by police, 
responsibilisation works through mechanisms of rights and law as rules, which constitute the 
“choices” of security offered by police protection or of potential “punishment” for not conforming, 
as judged by the settler state’s institutions.  
 
ENFORCING RESPONSIBILITY: RATIONALISATION AND USES OF FORCE  
The use of the liaison and negotiation approach to manage protests is driven by recognition that 
coercive enforcement responses tend to escalate tensions and lead to violence, a central theme 
of the Ipperwash Inquiry. At the same time, reflecting managerial objectives of cost-conscious 
and efficient use of resources, a negotiated event can reduce the personnel and equipment 
requirements as compared to a reactive enforcement response. Prior knowledge and planning 
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 Constitutive powers are not inevitable or total – they are resisted and can be appropriated and subverted towards 
oppositional aims. On the appropriation and performance of neoliberal “citizenship”, see e.g. Nadine Changefoot. 
2007. “Local Activism and Neoliberalism: Performing Neoliberal Citizenship as Resistance.” Studies in Political 
Economy 80:129-149. 
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allow decision-makers to deploy proportionate resources required to manage the situation. In 
many cases, liaisons who have been working with groups can manage the situation with some 
additional support from uniformed officers and patrol cars that can redirect traffic from a 
demonstration or blockade. The concern with strategic, calculated use of resources reflects the 
discursive commitment to respecting rights through a peacekeeping role, while also addressing 
operational considerations that an excessive or disproportionate police presence can lead to 
escalation.  
While liaisons exercise significant discretion in deciding how to handle situations in their 
interactions with protesters, if further resources are needed, a higher level of decision-making 
authority comes into play via the critical incident response and decision-making shifts to the 
incident commander. Even in those cases, the incident commander may decide that the protest 
can be managed adequately by the liaisons. The difference is that an incident commander has 
authority to deploy and activate tactical units. As I discussed in chapter 3, the formalisation and 
augmentation of liaison policing and of tactical capacities have occurred concurrently.  
The formal adoption of tactical units in Canada originated with preparations for the 1976 
Olympic Games in Montreal amid concerns about potential hostage and terrorism incidents. 
Since then, the normalisation of tactical units is evident as almost every police force in Canada 
employing more than one hundred officers now has at least one such unit (OPP 2006d; de Lint 
and Hall 2009). The mandates of tactical units have expanded to include search and rescue, 
intelligence gathering, “high-risk” arrests and raids, as well as public order events such as 
protests. Units are trained in militaristic tactics as well as the use of specialised technologies. 
Since the 1980s, these units have increasingly engaged in joint-training with military units, and 
have adopted new lethal and less-than-lethal weapons, protective equipment, armoured 
vehicles, information technologies, and surveillance technologies (see Manning 1992; Haggerty 
and Ericson 2001; de Lint and Hall 2009)  
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Among the most prominent academic critics, Jefferson (1987, 1990, 1993) has argued 
that the militaristic culture, equipment, and training of public order units foster a perception of 
protesters as “enemies”, which could fuel anticipation among officers for a potential “battle” and 
thus increasing the potential for violence. Arguably, this is a greater concern when the 
“enemies” are also racialized or Indigenous “Others”. Jefferson also suggests that the presence 
of tactical units can have an escalatory effect on the situation. On the other hand and more 
closely reflecting dominant police rationales, Waddington (1987, 1993) counters that greater 
tactical training, and the use of command-and-control (i.e. incident command) with public order 
units increases restraint in the use of force. Both perspectives—emerging in the 1980s–1990s 
when tactical units were becoming normalised in policing—have salience in observing post-
Ipperwash policing practices. The command and control structure—along with greater 
awareness of the context and complexities of Indigenous issues among tactical teams—seems 
to have decreased the potential for disorganised escalation. However, this does not mean that 
the presence of tactical personnel and strategies has decreased. What I emphasise in my 
discussion is how these tactical units (and incident command structure) and liaison strategies 
work in and through each other. Even where integrated response may not be activated (i.e. 
where an incident is not deemed a “critical incident”) there is that potential—whether explicitly 
communicated to communities and protesters and/or in the collective historical memory, 
knowing the potential force that police have the capacity to deploy if, as one interviewee put it, 
protesters choose to “stay and fight” (Interview, OPP2).  
 
Incident Command and the Rationalisation of Police Actions 
As discussed in chapter 3, integrated response refers to the deployment of specialty resources 
under overall command of a critical incidence commander. These resources include crisis 
negotiators, Emergency Response Team(s), and Tactics and Rescue Unit. The measured 
response approach relies on an integrated command structure for critical incident management 
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and coordination of these different resources. This is a triangular model of operational decision-
making, with the overall critical incident commander at the top, and liaisons and tactical units 
represented by team leaders. The incident commander is removed from the front line and 
makes operational decisions based on information and assessments provided by each of the 
units represented at the command table, which may not necessarily be fully shared with all 
units. The partial perspectives from each unit, plus intelligence, are assessed as a whole by the 
incident commander to form a “bigger picture” of the situations. Liaisons (via their regional 
coordinator) then become mediators in some sense, relaying information between protesters 
and the detachment commander or the critical incident commander. The formalisation of this 
command and control structure reflects a rationalisation of decision-making through a linear, 
hierarchical structure in which responsibility for operational decisions lies squarely with the 
incident commander.  
Rationalisation refers to the translation and representation of subjective, contingent 
practices of policing into rule-governed processes that are linked to explicit objectives (see 
Manning 2001). These objectives are both operational (i.e. to maintain order) and organisational 
(effective use of resources, and maintaining authority). Decisions are therefore self-justificatory 
because of the assumed reliability and legitimacy of the decision-making structure and process. 
One discursive effect of rationalisation is to depoliticise decision-making. Through the 
Ipperwash Inquiry process, strategic communications, and proactive outreach activities, the 
incident command structure and tactical response protocol are couched in a discourse of 
transparency, which is associated with accountability. However, as de Lint and Hall (2009) and 
Brodeur (2010) have argued, the control of information through the deliberate and selective 
revelation of police activities works to reinforce and increase secrecy (also Chan 1999; Beare 
2007). The combined discourses of rationalised decision-making processes and transparency 
produce a presumption that operational decisions are justified, which curtails scrutiny of the 
information and police activities underlying those decisions. While the incident commander may 
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have ultimate responsibility for operational decisions, this would only occur after such decisions 
have been taken and implemented, and usually only where there is a negative outcome 
(including negative optics or public backlash). Even so, such accountability would be internal 
unless there is a court case (such as in Tyendinaga), public inquiry (e.g. Ipperwash) or 
investigation by an oversight body such as the Office of the Independent Police Review 
Director. Despite the emphasis on increased transparency and accountability for police 
decision-making during critical incidents, these processes remain contained within the police 
institution.134  
This shrouding effect is arguably intensified in the context of Indigenous protests. While 
some members of both the OPP and RCMP have emphasized that all protests are managed in 
the same way regardless of group or issue, the unique context of Indigenous protests—
especially direct actions—in the context of the integrated response approach is structurally 
disposed towards an escalated response. The formalised protocol serves to depoliticise and 
neutralise the policing response—it is not because they are Indigenous, but because of the 
elevated potential “risk” of the action, based on historical experience. While not irrelevant, the 
intentionality or motive of police personnel and decision-makers can be rationalised and thus 
legitimised as following guidelines and the ethos of prevention.  
This is most explicitly illustrated by the OPP’s Framework as “Aboriginal critical 
incidents” are defined in a way that normalises the grounds for an elevated precautionary 
response. OPP Critical Policies pertain to “areas of greatest concern, impact and repercussion” 
(OPP 2013:3). As a critical policy, the OPP’s Framework is supposed to guide police operations 
to minimise the risk of mismanaging “critical incidents” which have potentially significant political 
implications for police credibility vis-à-vis Indigenous communities as well as with settler society. 
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 The PLT and Critical Incident program keep records of all liaison activities (including all blackberry 
communications) and responses to events as a means of internally assessing consistency of responses and 
evaluating effectiveness (OPP1; OPP8).  
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The Framework applies to three categories of incident: major incidents, critical incidents, and 
Aboriginal critical incidents. Major incidents are events that require more resources than a 
normal police response. Critical incidents are high-risk and require mobilisation of integrated 
response. “Aboriginal critical incidents” are either major or critical incidents “where the source of 
conflict may stem from assertions of inherent, Aboriginal or treaty rights; or that is occurring on a 
First Nations territory; or involving an Aboriginal person(s), where the potential for significant 
impact or violence may require activation of an OPP Integrated Response” (OPP 2013:6, 
emphasis added). 
Note that this definition erases the distinction between “major” and “high-risk” incidents, 
with the effect of presupposing the “high-risk” nature of “Aboriginal”-related incidents. The 
“criticality” factor lies in the construct of “aboriginality” (identity and territory). The heightened 
sensitivity that arises from this categorisation as “critical incidents” presupposes greater risk for 
police members responding to them and for the organisation itself. For members, risk lies in the 
potential for escalating incidents and being harmed. While this risk underlies the emphasis on 
preventative strategies and the minimising of perceived conflict between police and Indigenous 
peoples, it also activates coercive elements of police power. One RCMP liaison candidly shared 
that in his experience with Indigenous protests, “a theme that gets […] played over and over 
again, [is] the excess of police presence at these issues, and all it does, in my opinion, is 
escalate the situation… and escalates the threat” (Interview, RCMP10). 
 
Preparing for the Worst Case Scenario: Prevention, Intimidation, or Escalation? 
The OPP Framework therefore rationalises the deployment of tactical resources in cases of 
“Aboriginal critical incidents.” The RCMP critical incident “protocol” is similar to that of the OPP, 
although not explicitly for Aboriginal critical incidents. Yet, in any case where RCMP public order 
units may be used, tactical teams will also be deployed. The Public Order Unit (POU) of the 
OPP is the equivalent of the RCMP’s Tactical Troop (which is also referred to as the Public 
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Order Unit, Crowd Management Unit, or colloquially as “tac troop” or “riot squad”). While both 
are trained in public order and crowd management, there are significant differences in their use 
of force capacities. The OPP’s POU members have a full range of use of force options, 
including lethal force. The RCMP Tactical Troop has access to batons, OC spray, conducted 
energy weapons, and restraints, but does not have the lethal force option (Interview, OPP2).135 
Where Tactical Troop is deployed, they must have lethal oversight—a unit able to provide the 
option of lethal force. This could be provided by another service during a joint operation, such as 
by the OPP’s POU, but otherwise, the RCMP’s Emergency Response Team (ERT) must be 
deployed to provide cover for its POU members (Interview, RCMP7). What this boils down to, 
according to one interviewee, is that “every blockade has a sniper” (Interview, RCMP4). For 
OPP-led operations, this is through the deployment of TRU team, and for the RCMP, their ERT 
team. 
These tactical resources can be deployed in a range of capacities based on the critical 
incident commander’s assessment of the minimal amount of force necessary to maintain order. 
For example, ERT members may be used in “soft tac” dress without full body armour or visible 
weapons. The incremental deployment of visible force is used strategically and is preventative 
in two ways. First, the presence of tactical units (including POU, ERT, TRU) in a standby 
capacity, deployed as part of the integrated response protocol, can be activated immediately in 
the case of an imminent escalation of conflict. Tactical teams provide relief, oversight (including 
lethal oversight), and recovery (such as rescuing officers) support for liaison and uniform 
officers engaged on the front line. This is prevention for police officer safety, which is also 
generalised as a safety precaution for all concerned.  
The second preventative aspect of the tactical presence is to provide use of force 
options where liaison negotiations are unable to contain the situation. As the tactical standby 
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 See also: RCMP. “Tactical Troop Use of Force Guidelines” [deck]. RCMP request (informal) A-2013-05807. 
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presence has potential to convey an escalation of police response and to inflame the situation, 
tactical units are usually intentionally kept out of sight. Yet, the controlled and incremental 
display of tactical presence is used as a deliberate strategy of intimidation. There is therefore 
the potential for escalation as well as deterrence at the same time.  
The deployment of an integrated response is consistent with the police logics of 
preparing for the worst case scenario. One OPP member describes the prevention-provocation 
effect of tactical requirements as a “no win situation”:   
Certainly, yeah, I’d be lying if I didn’t say our presence doesn’t inflame situations 
sometimes. But you’re kind of damned if you do, and damned if you don’t. People say 
‘get away, get away, get away’; and we’re away and something happens, people get 
hurt, people say, where were you, how come you weren’t there, right? So we’re kind of 
again in a no-win situation sometimes. We have to be there and be prepared in case… 
something, something does happen. And sometimes … we’re, you’re not there, you’re 
not in plain sight all the time. It’s not like you’re kind of looking over my shoulder and 
seeing eighty guys with shields and helmets, but, they’re out there and ready to be 
deployed if necessary. (Interview, OPP1)   
 
Similar sentiments are expressed by an RCMP member, who also notes the potential for people 
to find out about the presence of tactical units even if they are hidden:  
Yeah, so people in the community react, absolutely. You know, and I can understand 
that, you know. Again, from a tactical policing perspective, is that … we could never, as 
a policing organisation, afford… to not be ready. I mean, you know, Canadians would 
not stand for that, right? And… you know, it’s unfortunate, because the other thing is, 
we, to be honest, we really usually try to do it covertly, right? Because you don’t want the 
media finding out, right? Because, but even if the media don’t find out and the 
community still  finds out because they’re pretty intuitive or something, or they just have 
people all over, right? (Interview, RCMP3) 
 
This RCMP member alludes to how the discovery of “hidden” units can actually exacerbate 
protester and community concerns more than if they were in full view.136 One OPP member 
describes the relationship between tactical priorities and liaison objectives as a “chicken and the 
egg” situation in terms of the inability to privilege one set of requirements over the other 
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 Although the OPP have primary jurisdiction in Ontario, the RCMP often provides resource support for large and/or 
drawn out events. For the RCMP to be present at a protest, “[f]rom a policing perspective it’s not [an escalation], 
we’re just officers like the OPP, we’re just there to assist them. But from a community’s perspective it certainly looks 
like an escalation” (Interview, RCMP10). 
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(Interview, OPP1). As much as the emphasis is on negotiating “peaceful” resolutions, it does not 
lessen the police inclination to “over-ramp” to be prepared for the worst-case scenario 
(Interview, RCMP7).  
While the visible presence of tactical units could undercut liaisons’ efforts at facilitating 
and negotiating a favourable outcome, I argue that it may also enable those negotiations. The 
deliberate and strategic visibility of tactical resources entwines with transparency in 
communicating police intentions to protesters: 
And sometimes, like, people will say… you know, ‘you have all this overwhelming police 
presence, and you have officers dressed up with helmets and shields and sticks—that’s 
intimidation.’ Yes, it is. I freely admit that seeing, from a protester point of view, if you’re 
looking down a street—and you see… a group of forty police officers coming at you with 
helmets on and shields up and batons in their hand, that is intimidating. What [we] hope 
to achieve, prior to that, is a number of steps to get the protesters to leave that position. 
If they haven’t, and there’s an overwhelming need for public safety for [us] to move 
them—if [we] can move them through intimidation? [We]’ll do it. Because the alternative 
is, if they don’t leave, then we have to take the next level of force, which may be hands-
on arresting people, and if they resist… things continue to escalate. (Interview, OPP2)  
 
From an operational perspective, “If intimidation causes them to leave their position safely 
without anybody getting hurt” then it is a preferable strategy to arresting people on the spot. 
 The intimidation strategy must be weighed against the potential to inflame the situation, which 
“can be a real tough balancing act” because incident commanders “don’t want to over-react”. 
This balancing is based on the specificity of circumstances such as the proportion of police to 
protesters, and the input provided within the incident command centre (Interview, OPP2).  
Despite all of the emphasis on proactive liaison outreach and negotiation, and the fact 
that the vast majority of Indigenous protests are non-violent and relatively non-disruptive, the 
enduring police requirement to prepare for “contingencies” is based on a perceived inherent 
unpredictability of protests:  
Sometimes you, as much as you try and, you know, we may say, oh yeah, the last six 
times? They’ve all left; and we’ve made arrests later. You still have to put enough… 
contingencies to protect people just in case it changes like it did in June of ‘09. When 
they decided to change and fight, the fight was very short—‘cause we had overwhelming 
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numbers, which meant people got arrested quickly… Before a lot of injuries happened, 
you know. (Interview, OPP2) 
 
Although it was the actual enforcement action that led to escalation and the potential for injuries 
in the process of making arrests and forcibly removing protesters from the site, the “over-
ramped” police response is presented as preventing injury to both police and protesters.  
The preventative capacity of integrated response through tactical unit deployment begins 
even before any actual major or critical incident occurs. Liaisons are not the only members of 
the organisation to engage in “outreach”. Personnel from the critical incident program (which 
houses incident command and the tactical units) approach communities and groups to conduct 
presentations about what they do. The official objective of these presentations is to be 
transparent about the police tactical response to protests (and other critical incidents such as 
hostage or barricaded persons situations) if an incident arises and the units are deployed. In its 
submission to the Ipperwash Inquiry, the OPP noted that ERT and TRU teams participate in 
“integrated response presentations/simulations in Aboriginal communities” (OPP 2006e:45, 46). 
With First Nations communities, outreach and presentations are undertaken during the 
“downtime” of Aboriginal Critical incident Commanders and the ERT and TRU teams. According 
to an OPP member, the primary aim of these presentations is to decrease the potential for 
negative reactions to the intimidating presence of militaristic tactical units, which may be shaped 
by history and the legacy of Oka: 
[O]ur tactical team, in a majority of circumstances, particularly in the rural areas we 
police, they look very military. They dress in green, they camouflage, they have a variety 
of weapons. So … being able to sit down with First Nations leadership in a community 
and say, ‘you know what, if something happens next Saturday and we have to come in 
because somebody’s barricaded in a house with a weapon, on your community, we’re 
going to show up and a certain component of our officers are going to look like this’. And 
it’s not about looking like the military, it’s not about coming in … to attack. It’s about 
invisible deployment. It’s about being … able to get as close to that house as we can 
safely without being seen so that particular suspect isn’t agitated by our presence. 
Because depending on the scenario, police presence agitates people, whether it’s a 
crowd at a protest or whether it’s a single individual barricaded person. So having the 
ability to go in and sit down with First Nations leadership, on a proactive basis, and say, 
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‘you know what, here’s what we use, here’s why we use it, here’s some of the 
methodology behind it’—was also very much a part of our job. (Interview, OPP2)  
 
The presumption is that those who are being “educated” on the critical incident response can 
also help to defuse anxieties of other community members if an event arises. This can also 
decrease the potential for solidarity actions when there is tactical presence in other places. As 
with the work of liaisons (in communicating the police role in managing protests and how they 
can “facilitate” protest activities), there is a responsibilising function. But, whether intentional or 
not, this is also prevention through the display of the potential power of police forces—in other 
words, these presentations can also be have intimidation effects. These presentations are 
voluntary, so community representatives can pass on the “opportunity”. Transparency is 
explicitly deployed in carrying out these activities, and serves as a legitimating discourse for 
state power (de Lint and Hall 2009; Brodeur 2010), while shifting responsibility for potential 
escalation and police use of force to communities.   
 
Enforcement  
The emphasis on police facilitation of the right to protest does not diminish the priority of the law 
enforcement role—responsibility to law—as the foundation of police institutional legitimacy. In 
recognising the potential for resistance to arrests, escalation, and negative optics, incident 
commanders will tend to use discretion to lay charges after the fact except where they perceive 
imminent threat. A significant factor affecting enforcement decisions is whether there is an 
injunction requiring protesters to leave a site. Most of the officers who I asked about injunctions 
felt that they “tend to agitate” circumstances rather than to “hasten [protesters’] departure” from 
a site (Interview, OPP2). According to a PLT member, “injunctions don’t work to resolve the 
conflict. Injunction is to, yes, remove people off the roadway or highway—nothing is going to 
prevent them to come back” (Interview, OPP9). While police may exercise discretion as to the 
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timing and method of enforcement, their autonomy is circumscribed by injunctions, which are 
legally binding and are time-limited:  
If there’s a court injunction, a civil injunction, then yes we’re obligated to enforce the 
injunction, it is legal, but when and how to enforce that is the critical incident 
commander’s decision. And that’s all articulated, why do we wait until a certain point in 
time, what factors we take into account. We have to, we have to be accountable for that. 
Because certainly, as you know, the public gets pretty upset when there’s, you know, a 
railway or highway blocked for 2, or 3, or 5 days. But I mean, our goal, our goal at the 
end of it is to resolve the problem with minimum use of force. And if that means that 
people are going to have to detour around for a day or two, and they’re going to be 
upset, you know … be upset. But if it’s reasonable to wait that day or two to solve an 
issue by people peacefully walking away from a blockade? I’m good with that. Doesn’t 
mean they won’t be held accountable. (Interview, OPP2)  
 
While there are legal repercussions for not enforcing injunction orders, perhaps most 
concerning for police is the potential damage to organisational legitimacy.137 Delays in 
enforcement can lead to conflict with the judiciary, which can become highly publicised conflicts 
fueling public and media discourses that police are not enforcing the law, which challenges the 
negotiation-based approach as well as police credibility. As one OPP member stated, “it’s unfair 
for the judges to do that, especially in the media, because now you’ve got all of Ontarians 
looking at us saying, wow, even the judges are saying ‘do this’ and they’re not doing that, so 
how come, right? And it’s unfair to people, I think, to put us in that position; people lose that 
respect, or it’s credibility issues, whatever the case may be” (Interview, OPP1).  
A different source of tension with the judiciary as well as prosecutors emerges with the 
laying of charges. Several officers identified this as another dimension of being the “meat in the 
sandwich”, which further distances the police from other parts of government: “when charges 
are laid, most of them get thrown out, or suspended, or probation, whatever the case may be, 
so… it’s tough. We are, we are stuck in the middle...of this…like the meat in the sandwich” 
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 Between 2006 and 2010, a series of high profile injunction cases in Ontario have shaped how government and 
corporations use injunctions as a strategy of ending protests: Henco Industries Ltd. V. Haudenosaunee Six Nations 
(2006); Platinex v. KI First Nation (2008); Frontenac Ventures Corporation v. Ardoch Algonquin First Nation (2008); 
City of Brantford Injunction, Superior Court of Justice - Ontario, CV-08-334 (2010).  
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(Interview, OPP1). For the OPP, this contributes to public perceptions that they are not doing 
their job of enforcing law. These frustrations have led the PLT program to formally and explicitly 
articulate to the Crown Attorney’s Office their criteria for designating a protest “illegal” as a basis 
for laying criminal charges (Interview, OPP9). One OPP member assessed the multiple internal 
and external tensions associated with the current policing approach as proof of their neutral 
“meat in a sandwich” position: “I say we know we’re doing a good job when everyone hates us!” 
(Interview, OPP1). 
With or without an injunction, police actively monitor protest participants and document 
those engaging in chargeable offences. The formal laying of those charges may occur after the 
conclusion of the event, reducing visibility. This process is supposed to be explicitly 
communicated to protesters as well as to stakeholders and the public via the media. If the 
incident commander decides to shut down a protest having deemed it “illegal” and/or enforcing 
an injunction, liaisons will usually inform protesters of the impending police enforcement 
action.138 Liaisons will generally not carry out arrests themselves unless “something’s going on 
in front of them, where an assault’s taking place” (Interview, OPP9). The main purpose is to 
maintain the “neutrality” of liaisons and so that “it doesn’t necessarily damage those 
relationships? But absolutely, if something like that, they will, they will arrest if they have to; but 
we try to keep that role separate” (Interview, OPP9). Again, this “mediator” role played by 
liaisons during protests distinguishes them from their colleagues who will carry out enforcement 
actions. This can strengthen the effectiveness of negotiating “voluntary” disengagement by 
protesters.  
The decision of people not to leave or stand down is constructed not as a failure to 
leave, but an active decision to “fight” with full awareness of the consequences. This is an 
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 In some cases, liaisons may not be fully briefed on the reasons for such decisions. While this can create 
frustration, liaisons must “have faith that it’s the right direction” based on information they may not be aware of 
(Interview, OPP2). 
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important piece of the rationalisation for escalating police use of force. One OPP member spoke 
about a particular occasion where the gradual deployment of a fully equipped POU became 
necessary:   
[O]ur hope was that when they see us coming with that, those use of force options, they 
would leave voluntarily. They didn’t leave voluntarily; they fought. They chose that 
option. We left them an out. It’s our general rule, our general principles, to always leave 
them an out, in a protest situation; leave them an avenue of escape. We left them an 
avenue of escape, they chose not to take it, they chose to stand and fight. That’s their 
choice. (Interview, OPP2; emphasis added) 
 
One of the principles of measured response is to “always leave [protesters] an out”. This is 
evident in how liaisons produce “choices” for protesters before and during events. When it 
comes to enforcement of injunctions and/or removal of protesters, incident commanders will 
attempt to ensure there are clear opportunities for protesters to disengage.  
But we’re actually telling people ahead of time. The injunction’s coming, tomorrow at 10. 
There’s a hundred people here, right? You guys know that at 10 o’clock tomorrow we’re 
bringing in the public order teams—nobody’s going to get hurt, but we’re just going to 
peacefully have to remove you, you’re going to be processed; once you’re done you’ll 
have a court date, you know, and you’re going to be on conditions. 95 percent of those 
people are gone the next day. There might be five left—which, if they choose to stay and 
go to court, you gotta respect that. We still would tell those five people. You know the 
process, there’s going to be no fighting. Then we’d go back and say to the commander, 
we talked to them, they’re all fine, they’re not going to fight; they know they’re getting 
arrested, so let’s just make sure that nobody … puts a strong arm on anybody. We 
communicate all that; they do their thing and they get processed, and they go. ‘Cause 
they’re going to go to court and fight for whatever they believe in, you have to respect 
that, right?  And some people don’t want to get arrested, other people don’t’ mind doing 
it for their cause and that’s fine too as long as it’s done peacefully. (Interview, OPP8) 
 
This strategy of “leaving an out” is also informed in large part by resource considerations as an 
exponentially greater number of police resources (officers) would be required to carry out mass 
arrests, as well as the need for adequate detention facilities. Incident commanders must 
account for their use of personnel and the overtime costs incurred (Interview, OPP2). Another 
major consideration in operational decisions is the potential to spark sympathy/ solidarity and 
counter-protests elsewhere, which is one of the unique “characteristics” of Indigenous protests 
as identified through the Ipperwash Inquiry. Protracted and multiple events can strain the 
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resource capacity of police organisations, as was the case for the RCMP during the 2007 
National Day of Action,139 and for the OPP at Douglas Creek Estates in 2006, and during the 
peak of Idle No More in December 2012 and January 2013 (Interview, OPP8). 
Liaisons will therefore be involved proactively to prevent solidarity actions: 
if we are going to take an overt police action, on a protest in one community, one of the 
things that we like to have in place is […] the PLT links to other communities that may 
connected so that we can immediately … through PLT, reach out to those communities 
and say ‘yes, we did move at this time, this morning, and we did remove the blockades 
on highway 49’, you know, the bridge. And … you know, ‘we have, we have that done; 
do you have any questions? Is your community upset about it, are you planning 
anything.’ And that’s outside of it. So yeah, that communication piece is huge. (Interview, 
OPP2) 
 
As an RCMP member noted about the 2007 National Day of Action, “I know that the chiefs in 
British Columbia were calling the chiefs in the east, the day of, to find out how the police were 
responding; how the police were managing, right? Because that time difference was going to 
make the difference in how the west coast was going to respond, right? And, you know, we 
were mindful of that” (Interview, RCMP3). The use of social media by protesters and supporters 
has increased the impetus for police to be proactive with communications strategies to shape or 
counter the framing of events. The escalation of police actions at one site will usually be 
accompanied by a public media communication strategy as well as communication with 
colleagues in other jurisdictions (or with other police forces). Communication strategies are part 
of incident command operational planning and decisions, and therefore have an operational 
function, to prevent solidarity actions or supporters from attending the site, and a public relations 
function vis-à-vis outside observers. 
Despite all of the proactive (prevention) work of liaisons, there is no zero-sum decrease 
in potential coercive power. Conversely, through the rationalisation of decision-making and the 
presumption of the elevated risk of “Aboriginal critical incidents”, the police logic of preparing for 
the “worst case scenario” is self-justifying. Through official policy, guidelines, and “outreach” 
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 RCMP. 2007 (September). The National Day of Action – Debrief. RCMP ATI request A-2012-00178. 
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activities, the tactical response to “Aboriginal critical incidents” is normalised. Like the educating 
of protesters about rights and the parameters of “legitimate” protest, the strategic deployment of 
tactical response contributes to responsibilising those who “choose” to “fight”. Operational 
decisions are shaped by the specificity of circumstances along with organisational concerns with 
resource usage as well as maintaining the optics of neutrality and accountability to rule of law. 
 
CONCLUSION 
The most prominent of post-Ipperwash reforms has been the emphasis on managing protests 
through negotiation. Reflecting shifts in policing more broadly, the approach is prevention- 
oriented rather than reactive. In response to one of the most significant critiques emerging from 
the Ipperwash Inquiry, police organisations have emphasized a position of “neutrality” as “the 
meat in a sandwich”, disassociating from government which is often the target of protests. 
Liaisons play a central role in this process, which begins with the development of relationships 
to encourage communication between police and protesters. In the context of Indigenous 
protests, this relationship building extends beyond the specificity of protest events to fostering 
relationships and trust with Indigenous communities. The targeting of Indigenous communities 
for liaison outreach and presentations about tactical response, as well as the presumption that 
Indigenous protests are higher “risk”, have occurred because of conditions constituted by settler 
colonialism; but at the same time, these are settler colonial pacification strategies through 
‘rights’ and responsibilisation within broader discourse of reconciliation. As an institution, police 
are tasked with deploying disciplinary-juridical power grounded in settler state law. 
In this chapter, I examined how police organisations and liaisons articulate and act on 
prevention as an objective. The liberal rights discourse is a central mechanism of protest 
management. I argue that rather than a neoliberal form of governance “at a distance”, police 
practices reveal how rights are used strategically to establish limits for protest activities. 
Through “educating” (potential) protesters and “facilitating” protests, police impose parameters 
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and constraints that enable them to maintain control and avoid significant disruption to critical 
infrastructure. One of the key purposes of the outreach and relationship-building activities of 
liaisons is to obtain information that allows police to plan for events. While discourses of 
responsibility and self-policing are evident, these are enforced by the pervasive—if not always 
explicit— threat of force through the use of tactical units. The enduring potential and actual use 
of force / coercion by police enables negotiation strategies. The discourse of responsibility (and 
good “citizenship”) is used by police as a justificatory rationale for conducting arrests and 
escalating the tactical response as protesters are made responsible for failing to obey the limits 
of rights and legitimate protest. Because Indigenous protests involve competing rights 
discourses in the form of Aboriginal and treaty rights, and police have encouraged 
“understanding” among personnel of the complexities of underlying issues, we also see 
disjunctures and tensions within police organisations as well as critiques from outside—most 
explicitly from some members of the judiciary. Through the rationalisation of decision-making, 
accountability is contained within the police organisation, which arguably enhances autonomy 
and the claim to expertise. A major source of this “expertise” that is least transparent is the 
production of intelligence. As I discuss in the next chapter, the adoption of intelligence-led 
policing in the context of post-September 11, 2001 security logics further legitimates the secrecy 
of police operations and decisions.  
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Front Door, Back Door, Upstairs: Intelligence and the National Security Interface 
 
In chapter 4, I examined how the OPP and RCMP have implemented liaison-based policing as 
part of a measured response approach to managing Indigenous protests. I argued that the 
advising, facilitation, transparency, and responsibilisation practices that are central to this 
approach work to reinforce liberal democratic institutions—especially the rights regime—while 
establishing grounds for the use of force. I emphasized that these practices are not independent 
of the omnipresent potential for the deployment of state violence but are rather enabled by, and 
enabling of, this potential violence. In the context of Indigenous struggles, this reflects the settler 
colonial state’s assertion of sovereign-juridical power. This chapter situates the work of liaison 
officers in relation to the intelligence-led policing framework through which front-line policing 
entwines with the national security apparatus. Building on my discussion in chapters 3 and 4, 
the successive articulation and implementation of problem-oriented community-policing and 
intelligence-led policing are variations on preventative risk management through improving the 
information gathering and knowledge capacities of police. There is a common objective in 
identifying “problem” communities as important sites of knowledge and engaging in pre-emptive 
intervention based on that knowledge.  
Several interviewees described the role of liaison officers as a “front door” approach, 
distinguished from “back door” covert operations, which obtain information that is not voluntarily 
provided or that is “sensitive” (i.e. provided by informants). In the intelligence process, “front 
door” and “back door” information is corroborated and this is supposed to guide the operational 
decisions of the incident commander in the deployment of integrated response. This “front 
door”/”back door” analogy is a significant one from an analytical perspective, because it 
captures (perhaps unintentionally) the encompassing nature of policing and the totality of 
knowledge sought in an intelligence-led policing framework.  
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I begin with an overview of the ILP model and its implementation in Canada. I then 
(un)map the intelligence process and networks involved in producing the knowledge used in 
managing Indigenous protests in Ontario. Synthesising open source texts, records obtained 
through access to information (ATI) requests, and interviews, this map makes visible the extent 
of the intelligence apparatus and how front-line policing is entwined with national security 
interests. Starting at ground-level, I examine the operational co-existence of police liaisons and 
intelligence operations. For liaisons, their “front door” work depends on maintaining a tenuous 
distinction between “information” and “intelligence” gathering. While important for “transparency” 
and building “trust”, the role distinction is also a source of intra-organisational tensions when 
“intelligence” is privileged over liaisons’ knowledge in operational decisions, and is not fully 
shared with liaisons. The “need to know” basis for intelligence dissemination is grounded in the 
politics of secrecy, which characterise the national security apparatus.   
One of the distinctions of intelligence-led policing (ILP) is the emphasis on collaborative 
information-intelligence sharing among law enforcement agencies and a wide range of 
institutional “partners” beyond the police. Drawing primarily on ATI records because of the 
classified nature of intelligence work, I examine how intelligence collaboration occurs at multiple 
levels, which shows how localised incidents of Indigenous resistance are (made) objects of the 
Canadian state’s national security apparatus. This includes a level of intelligence analysis and 
political decision-making that occurs “upstairs”, removed from the front-line. I conclude the 
chapter with counter-narratives expressed by some interviewees that point to the potential of 
intelligence processes and products to exaggerate the threat posed by Indigenous protesters. 
This (un)mapping of information and intelligence practices disrupts the legitimating discourses 
of rationality and objectivity that underlie both the ILP model and the assertion that the police 
management of protests is autonomous from state interests. Like the omnipresence of tactical 
units, the intelligence operations undertaken by police and other agencies can both enable and 
undermine liaisons’ negotiation strategies. 
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(UN)MAPPING INTELLIGENCE-LED POLICING 
Intelligence has an interesting and telling origin story with the RCMP that reflects the colonial 
foundations of the police organisation. The story begins with Indigenous communities and the 
role of Métis guides and interpreters who facilitated knowledge production for NWMP.140 In an 
RCMP Gazette article, Smith (2004) writes that “[t]hey were invaluable both for their ability to 
collect information and, through a combination of knowledge and experience, to process that 
information into intelligence.” That intelligence “allowed constables on patrol to know what to 
expect from the people they encountered and the settlements they visited” (A. Smith 2004). As 
an officer-in-charge within the RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Directorate at the time, the author 
draws on a narrative of cooperative police-Indigenous relations in promoting organisational buy-
in for the RCMP’s “new” intelligence-led policing model. This version of history shows the 
continuities of policing strategies dependent on having (direct) knowledge of communities of 
interest and the symbiotic dynamic of “liaison” and intelligence work.  
 
The Intelligence-Led Policing Model  
Smith’s (2004) account of the historical antecedents of intelligence-led policing in the RCMP 
reflects three continuities in policing objectives: engagement of local communities and groups 
“at risk” (or of risk), the development of knowledge (i.e. intelligence) about them, and the 
precautionary use of that knowledge in encounters. A constant has been the concern with 
racialised and Indigenous communities. The specific trajectory of intelligence-led policing as a 
reified framework in Canada emerges from the community-based policing models of the 1980s 
and 1990s. The adoption of the “community policing” philosophy sought to address tenuous 
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 On the centrality of the “savage Indians” construct in the national mythology of the North West Mounted Police, 
see Daniel Francis. 1992. The Imaginary Indian: The Image of the Indian in Canadian Culture. Vancouver: Arsenal 
Pulp Press, chapter 4. In NWMP mythology, Francis (1992) notes that the image of the “half-breed” guide was 
juxtaposed to the “savage Indians”. Interestingly, Francis refers to Métis guide Jerry Potts as the archetype for the 
image of the NWMP’s “faithful retainer” (p. 62)—the same person Smith (2004) identifies as “an iconic figure” of the 
RCMP in his Gazette article. 
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relations between police and racialised communities, which made “information uptake” and 
communications difficult. In the context of official multiculturalism, this was problematic for the 
authority and organisational legitimacy of police forces; this was also an operational problem 
because of the lack of access to information and knowledge from and about these communities 
(Deukmedjian and de Lint 2007). The communities themselves were to be proactively engaged 
as “partners” in addressing “crime problems” (see Fielding 1995; Brogden and Nijhar 2005).  
The emphasis on proactivity and prevention in policing intensified towards the end of the 1990s, 
with the articulation of intelligence-led policing (ILP). ILP extended upon the “knowledge work” 
of community-based policing with greater emphasis on assessing and managing risk (Maguire 
2000; Brodeur and Dupont 2006). The communities themselves are problematised as risks 
(Murphy 2007) while the police institution (re)asserts a claim to (exclusive) expertise through 
partnerships with other law enforcement agencies.  
As a comprehensive model or program, ILP first emerged in the UK and then in other 
Anglo-American and western European police forces (IALEIA 2004). Driven in part by resource 
management concerns and the need to demonstrate “value for money”, the production of 
intelligence is understood as essential to enable the strategic deployment of limited resources to 
maximise impact. Prevention activities and enforcement operations would be directed at 
geographical “hotspots” and the “usual suspects” of criminal activities (see Gill 2000). While 
information and intelligence have long been central features of modern policing, ILP extends the 
use of intelligence beyond major case operations (particularly organised crime investigations) to 
everyday policing (Stewart 1996; Deukmedjian and de Lint 2007),141 reflecting the normalisation 
of proactive information gathering with the objective of prevention.  
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 The foundations of ILP initially lay the context of concerns about transnational organized crime as the emphasis 
on strategic intelligence rather than tactical intelligence was associated with longer-term investigations and 
operations aimed at disrupting large-scale criminal/terrorist operations and dismantling organizations and networks. 
The problem of transnational networks of organized criminal activity was mirrored by the emergence of collaborative 
networks of law enforcement intelligence and operations.   
208 
 
As a policing framework, ILP has three core defining features. First, the implementation 
of an ILP approach involves a rethinking or restructuring of policing that makes the intelligence 
process much more central, reflected by the adoption of a formal standardised intelligence 
cycle. The intelligence cycle generally consists of five or six stages: planning (priority-setting), 
collection, gathering/collation, analysis, dissemination, and increasingly, evaluation. In the 
idealised model, what distinguishes ILP from the conventional use of information/knowledge in 
policing is the emphasis on analysis (see Innes, Fielding and Cope 2005). Analytical work can 
range from the basic corroboration of raw information received from open sources, confidential 
informants, undercover work and/or surveillance activities, to active, directed intelligence 
operations to obtain information to confirm or dismiss information. Organisationally, this involves 
the centralisation of intelligence production and decision-making, as well as the 
professionalisation of intelligence analysts reflecting the “scientization” of intelligence work 
(Ericson and Shearing 1986). Through the intelligence process, police experiential knowledge, 
or “common-sense”, becomes a “consumable commodit[y]” in the form of intelligence products 
(Innes, Fielding and Cope 2005:40). 
A second key feature of an ILP model is a greater emphasis on the development of 
strategic intelligence in addition to tactical, or actionable, intelligence. The objective of future-
oriented strategic intelligence is to identify emerging trends and potential “issues” that can be 
addressed proactively through intervention. Targeting is determined through “objective” 
assessments of the risk and threat posed by individuals and groups based on the development 
of analytical tools and methodologies (see Innes, Fielding and Cope 2005). Strategic 
intelligence thus also has a corporate application for cost-effective resource management and 
organisational priority-setting (see Maguire 2000).  
 The third feature of ILP is a requirement for collaborative, integrated policing through 
“partnerships” with public and private agencies as a means of expanding the realm of 
information-intelligence gathering. This depends on dismantling both intra-and inter-
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organisational barriers fueled by factors such as occupational culture, information “hoarding” 
and “silos”, incompatible data systems, and “friction” with outside agencies (Sheptycki 2004). 
The imperative for greater inter-agency collaboration intensified significantly after September 
11, 2001, and ILP’s pre-emptive prevention orientation and emphasis on strategic intelligence 
has reverberated with security logics to formalise these partnerships.  
Critics have pointed to the self-fulfilling potential of ILP in targeting “usual suspects” 
based on perceptions of risk informed by systemic racism and class-bias (see e.g. Ericson and 
Haggerty 1997; Gill 2000; Sheptycki and Ratcliffe 2004; Dafnos 2007). As Cope (2004) argues, 
the process is driven by the raw information supplied by front-line officers who retain significant 
discretion in their everyday work. This “knowledge” of threat is imbued with scientific “validity” 
and thus, objectivity (Innes, Fielding and Cope 2005). ILP further secures the secrecy and 
“sacredness” of the police institution and methods of threat assessment as a matter of security 
(see de Lint 2008). The shifting security landscape after 2001 enhanced and intensified an 
existing intelligence paradigm, imbuing practices with the legitimating discourse of national 
security prevention. 
 
Locating Liaisons in the National Security Apparatus: Mapping Intelligence Process 
At the root of the intelligence-led apparatus are the “[f]ront-line police officers plugged in at the 
community level through contacts and relationships [who] represent a well-trained human radar 
system such that, if properly trained and resourced, can detect and report suspicious persons 
and activities that might constitute potential terrorist threats” (Julian Fantino, (former) OPP 
Commissioner, in Parliament of Canada 2007). Community-based liaisons are a crucial piece of 
this “radar system” on the ground because of their interactions and relationships with 
individuals, groups, organisations, and community leadership. Building outreach capacity and 
relationships with communities has a dual purpose in first, facilitating or expanding information 
gathering (through community-initiated contact, cultivating informants, and covert operations) 
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and second, to facilitate police interventions targeting “causes” or “origins” of criminal and 
“extremist” activities. These objectives mesh easily with the problem-oriented version of 
community policing in place already (Deukmedjian and de Lint 2007). As de Lint (2006:3) 
observes, “once the community reference is marginalized, problem-oriented policing and 
intelligence-led policing are much the same.”  
 
 
The symbiosis of liaisons’ relationship-building mandate with the intelligence-led policing 
approach is illustrated in Figure 1, which maps the formal flows of information and intelligence 
from the front-line to external entities (policing and intelligence “partners” or “stakeholders”). 
This map is based on the OPP as an anchoring point, but reflects a synthesis of OPP and 
RCMP practices and structures articulated in texts and by interviewees. It is important to 
emphasize that processes are fluid and actual practices do not always follow official flows. The 
Figure 1 Mapping Intelligence Processes 
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purpose of this map is to show (1) how the structural processes of ILP and liaison policing are 
entwined, and (2) how front-line police operations are situated within the national security 
apparatus and political and corporate realms. The intelligence cycle, which is the defining 
characteristic of the operational aspect of ILP, is at the centre of this map. This is the process 
through which raw information is confirmed, corroborated, verified and produced as some form 
of intelligence product and disseminated within and beyond the organisation.  
  In the context of Indigenous “unrest” or protests, information enters the intelligence 
process at “collection” stage through three primary channels. The first key source of information 
would be liaisons and general duty officers who report on their observations and interactions 
during the course of their everyday work. For both the OPP and RCMP, there is a general 
emphasis on incorporating general duty officers into the “cycle” of reporting:  
And then, you know, at the end of the day, if people want to demonstrate impromptu, 
they will do it. That’s why that we have the general duty police officer with in our own 
police community to be the eyes, to open, and they have a task to do, to protect those 
but also to be cognisant of their environment. If they see two, three buses … okay, it’s 
the middle of June… July… there’s no, there’s school’s out. What are those people? So 
we ask the general duty police officer to be proactive with the community. So it’s 
community-based policing. Go and ask the driver, hey, what are you here for? So on and 
so forth. And that’s being reported as well. (Interview, RCMP8) 
 
This is consistent with the way that ILP has been articulated in relation to the problem-oriented 
model of community-based policing. The general duty officers on the ground are woven into the 
ILP process as the eyes and ears in their interactions with communities (Deukmedjian and de 
Lint 2007).  
The second source of information originates from the intelligence unit through directed 
information-intelligence gathering activities related to a specific target or issue. This can include 
both open source research and covert operations. Organisational intelligence programs are 
centralised in headquarters (the OPP’s Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau in Orillia and 
the RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Program in Ottawa), with regional offices and field-level 
personnel.  
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The third key channel of information flow would be through relationships with “external” 
partners. These exchange relationships vary in degrees of formality, structure, levels of security 
clearance, and formats. External partners include other law enforcement agencies, CSIS, the 
Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), government departments, and corporate 
entities such as CN or CP Rail. Depending on the nature of the relationship, police intelligence 
products with appropriate security classifications will be disseminated to these external partners.  
Intelligence units produce different kinds of intelligence products because they service a 
wide range of “clients” that have different “needs” and security clearances. Even internally, 
products are distributed and parsed on a “need to know” basis. Types of intelligence products 
commonly produced in relation to protests are situational awareness (which could be as basic 
as a mass-distributed email about an upcoming event), geomatics (geographical imaging/maps) 
and threat or risk assessments, which are most directly related to informing operational planning 
and enforcement decisions. Generally, local intelligence units are concerned more with 
operational/tactical intelligence whereas HQ-units will also produce strategic products. At the 
command and corporate levels of police organisations, intelligence products can be used for 
longer-term corporate planning and prioritisation in the administration of resources. At the more 
operational level, prioritisation is also supposed to be informed by analyses of recent events and 
can lead to targeted pre-emptive activities to mitigate potential risks of disruption.  
The intelligence process is continuous, which increases the possibility of having 
advanced warning of potential unrest or the risk of protest activities. Both tactical and strategic 
intelligence are oriented to providing a foundation for police actions such as the initiation of 
contact by liaisons or incorporation into the development of an operations plan. RCMP tactical 
training identifies pre-event intelligence as a key crowd management tactic preceding 
negotiations with organisers. Such intelligence would include “reconnaissance” of the event 
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location and route—to inform planning and resource deployment—as well as assessments of 
the crowd in terms of “type”, size, mood, weapons/hazards, agitators or source of agitation.142  
In addition to the OPP’s standalone intelligence bureau, the OPP has an analyst within 
the Aboriginal Policing Bureau who provides analysis of trends and issues for the PLT program. 
Similarly, the RCMP’s Protective Operations branch in A Division (National Capital Region) also 
has an internal investigative and intelligence unit that includes an analyst. These internal 
analysts provide a more direct and quicker turnaround for supplying intelligence to OPP PLT 
liaisons and the A Division’s protective outreach and demonstration team members. Both the 
OPP and RCMP interviewees tend to identify these activities as information or research rather 
than “intelligence”. However, the sharpness of that distinction becomes less clear when 
compared to strategic intelligence, which is concerned with identifying larger social-political 
trends that may increase potential risk of protest activity. Similar information may come from 
designated intelligence units. Since 2007, the OPP’s Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau 
(POIB) has a dedicated Aboriginal Issues Unit (AIU), and the RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence 
Program (CIP) has resources dedicated to the “Aboriginal portfolio”. As will be discussed below, 
from 2007 to 2009, the RCMP’s CIP had an Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group (JIG). After the 
JIG was disbanded, the “portfolio” is now managed within the CIP by designated analysts.143 
The relationship-building underlying the liaison work discussed in the previous chapter—
in both “social service” and event-specific forms—would conventionally be understood as “low” 
consent-based policing. Like community policing, these liaison initiatives are characterised by 
their openness and couched in terms of trust. However, these policing activities cannot be 
disconnected from the broader institutional processes in which they are embedded. While 
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 RCMP. 2007. “Decision Making Process: Police Crowd Management Mandates” [deck]. RCMP crowd 
classifications: “crowds by circumstance, casual crowd, and intentional crowds. The latter are further categorized as: 
cohesive, expressive, demonstrative, aggressive, disorderly/civil disobedience/rioting. RCMP. 2006-7. “Tactical Troop 
Crowd Psychology” [course training presentation]. RCMP ATI request (informal) A-2013-05807.   
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 RCMP. 2009 (November 13). “Subject: Aboriginal JIG” [email]. RCMP ATI request (informal) GA-3951-3-
00094/12. 
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liaisons and other front-line officers working in a community-policing orientation may not engage 
in covert (i.e. non-consensual) information gathering, they are very much embedded in the 
intelligence process through their reporting of information and in receiving intelligence. Further, 
the intelligence that is produced based in part on information supplied from the front-line may be 
circulated beyond the organisation to its “partners” in law enforcement, intelligence, 
government, and private sector—and vice-versa—which troubles the “operational” autonomy 
asserted by front-line policing. 
 
FRONT DOOR / BACK DOOR: INFORMATION AND INTELLIGENCE  
In chapter 4, I examined the role of front-line liaison officers in the prevention and mitigation of 
“disruption” in relation to Indigenous “unrest”. This role depends on the cultivation of “trust” to 
facilitate the information sharing that enables police to maintain control over the course of a 
protest or direct action. Event-specific and contextual knowledge underlie the measured 
response approach in resource deployment decisions. Within the intelligence-led approach, 
liaisons approach their outreach to communities and groups with some background 
knowledge— whether from self-initiated research, internal research unit analysis, or intelligence 
reports. One of the major concerns about liaisons, which many of them describe as a 
misconception, is that they are gathering intelligence. Liaisons emphasize that they are not 
engaged in “spying” because they operate in an open and transparent capacity.  
Articulations of “intelligence” versus “information” reflect two conceptions in relation to 
intelligence-led policing (ILP). Liaisons often describe the difference as a matter of investigative 
methods or in terms of the sensitivity of information. Information-gathering is done overtly, and 
includes information that is “freely” or proactively shared with or in the presence of authorities, in 
mainstream or open social media platforms, as well as based on the observations of officers 
whose presence is openly visible. “Intelligence”, on the other hand, is considered sensitive 
information provided by people on condition of anonymity (i.e. informants) or which is gathered 
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through covert surveillance and undercover work, associated with “[…] the smoky mirror, what’s 
going on behind the curtain in the Wizard of Oz kind of thing” (Interview, OPP9). These activities 
are carried out by dedicated intelligence units that have a high degree of secrecy around their 
operations. 
The other conception of the information-intelligence distinction is more specific to the 
formal ILP model and process. Information is understood as the “raw” material that is collated 
with other pieces of information obtained from a range of sources to be corroborated through 
analysis to produce intelligence as an end-product. The source of raw information may be open 
source, surveillance or “sensitive” information—it is collated and corroborated through the 
analytic process. The core distinction among pieces of information is degree of verifiability 
based on the reliability of the source(s) and whether or not the information is confirmed. Several 
interviewees noted that the events at Ipperwash were characterised by “acting on information” 
rather than “real intelligence” that had been corroborated (Interview, OPP1). The OPP’s 
adoption of the ILP approach was linked directly to addressing the intelligence failure identified 
as a major factor contributing to the police escalation of force at Ipperwash.   
The distinction between information and intelligence is more than semantics. It relies on 
a dichotomisation that works in a way that legitimates “open” information gathering by 
contrasting it to covert intelligence operations, which are conventionally associated with political 
policing that is “unpalatable” in the context of the liberal democratic right to protest. Liaisons’ 
information gathering work is therefore positioned as desirable and, further, as emblematic of 
the ideals of liberal democratic society in which dissent can be expressed freely and openly. 
This dichotomy between information and intelligence enables liaisons and outreach officers to 
carry out their activities with/in communities and groups. Yet, any information they receive is 
supposed to be reported and therefore contributes to the intelligence cycle.  
My argument is not that liaisons are lying or being misleading in separating themselves 
from intelligence work—indeed, their role is not to engage in covert information-gathering— 
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however, they are an important piece in the intelligence process especially where they have 
developed closer relationships with communities or groups of interest, which facilitates 
information gathering. At the other end, intelligence feeds into how liaison activities are 
prioritised. For example, intelligence identifying an upcoming event as having an elevated risk 
because of the involvement or presence of “militant” activists will filter back to the liaisons, 
informing their outreach activities.  
 
Operational Co-Existence in Gathering Information-Intelligence 
One PLT member succinctly described the difference between PLT and intelligence approaches 
to information gathering as “[t]he PLT is meeting you at the front door, but the intel people are 
the guys knocking on the back door” (Interview, OPP3). This “front door” / “back door” metaphor 
was used by several of the PLT members I interviewed and is useful analytically. The open 
information and knowledge work of liaisons and outreach officers (as well as general duty 
officers) is assumed to be based on a consensual “sharing” of information from community 
members. As discussed in chapter 4, the effectiveness of this approach depends on the 
cultivation of relationships with a range of people in communities on an interpersonal level, as 
well as an organisation or program level. The interpersonal trust and rapport that individual 
liaisons have with people are most effective in facilitating the flow of information. In contrast, 
covert operations reflect an antagonist approach that depends on being concealed from targets 
and could involve active deception. This includes investigative techniques such as surveillance, 
undercover officers, and recruitment of informants.144  
                                               
144
 On the emergence of proactive covert police operations, see Gary T. Marx, 1988. Undercover: Police Surveillance 
in America. Berkeley: University of California Press; also Gary T. Marx. 1974. “Thoughts on a Neglected Category of 
Social Movement Participant: The Agent Provocateur and the Informant.” American Journal of Sociology 80(2):402-
442. Marx (1988) traces the historical emergence of undercover policing in modern US and UK policing institutions as 
response to concerns over political dissidents (e.g. Irish independence, organized labour, ethnic and political 
activism, communism, fascism, civil rights movements). He describes the increased use of undercover agents and 
covert operations as part of the “new surveillance society” in which surveillance is normalized. In the Canadian 
context, see de Lint and Hall (2009) and Whitaker, Kealey, and Parnaby (2012).  
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The further implication of the “front door”/ “back door” analogy is that people and groups 
of interest to the police are surrounded on all sides—while they are being openly engaged at the 
front door, intelligence operations have the back covered. “Back door” operations are not 
necessarily inversely tied to the “success” or failure of liaisons to obtain information from the 
“front door.” Significantly, one PLT member described the Aboriginal Issues Unit (AIU) of the 
OPP’s Intelligence Bureau as “probably our best friends in the realm of the policing” (Interview, 
OPP4). Other members expressed similar sentiments about the closeness of the working 
relationship between the AIU and PLT, which is a relatively recent development. Although AIU is 
housed in a separate bureau the two units work very closely in practice (Interview, OPP4). The 
symbiotic information-intelligence work between liaisons and intelligence units challenges the 
binary of consent/coercion in terms of eliciting information from communities or “targets”, as 
each strategy works to facilitate the other. Where liaisons are unable to gain access from the 
“front door”—for the various reasons discussed in chapter 4 such as historically grounded 
community suspicion—then “that’s the whole purpose of intelligence” (Interview, OPP9), to fill 
that knowledge gap. It provides a justificatory rationale for intelligence operations to establish 
the degree of risk or threat where there is suspicion of “unrest” or impending disruptive action.   
Although the two sides work closely together, one of the main points of separation 
between “front door” and “back door” functions is the handling of information provided by people 
who request confidentiality, whether out of concerns of reprisal or otherwise. Because liaisons 
are mandated to engage in open and transparent communications, they are expected to report 
any and all information and observations from their encounters. People may be more inclined to 
speak with liaisons that have developed a visible presence with/in communities on the basis of 
an interpersonal or trust-based relationship; however, liaisons are restricted from receiving 
sensitive information. As described by an OPP PLT member, they must connect would-be 
protected sources with intelligence officers.  
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So what we’re very clear on, is, we’re open information, so anything you tell me I am 
reporting it forward. So you need to know that. But it has happened—lots—where, if they 
want to tell us something and they don’t want to be identified and it’s information they 
don’t want to come back to them, and they, or they want to kinda go the informant side? 
[…] I am going to introduce you to my intelligence friend. I’m going to vouch for him; I 
might go to the first couple of meetings for them to get set up—from now on, open stuff 
comes to me; secret [squirrel] stuff, if you want to call it, goes to that person.  Because I 
don’t wanna, I don’t wanna know it. And … that’s how we do it. But in fairness to them, 
they need to know that; because I am going to report it, because I have to. ‘Cause if we 
hide stuff, then your reputation is over, right, and yeah. So that’s what we do, we set 
them up with [them], we don’t recruit at all. (Interview, OPP8) 
 
There is an added degree of trust that must exist between liaisons and people in the community 
when they are handed off to an intelligence officer. Yet, liaison officers may continue to have a 
relationship with the “source” in their capacities as liaisons without being privy to the information 
provided to the intelligence side. While liaisons are not supposed to be actively seeking to 
recruit informants, their presence in communities would seem to facilitate the opportunity. The 
relationship building done by liaisons produces the opportunities to gain informants as liaisons 
become a first point of contact—someone that can be trusted and then connects potential 
informants with intelligence personnel who have been vouched for.145 One OPP PLT member 
describes managing the role distinction as “a hard line to walk sometimes” (Interview, OPP4). 
Another PLT member shared that s/he initially had some difficulty with this “line” and was 
“almost recruiting” people to be informants, akin to the work of intelligence officers. 
The relationship-building and national security intelligence objectives converge within 
outreach activities that are predominantly couched in terms of trust and openness. As 
Deukmedjian and de Lint (2007:250) write, the “mechanisms and means under the auspices of 
intelligence become more transparently duplicitous and exploitative of trust relations with and 
within serviced populations” (emphasis added). Community groups, political organisations, and 
                                               
145
 Arguably, the ‘transparency’ or openness of liaison being proclaimed so overtly may actually encourage people to 
go the sensitive route being conscious that they will be identified in liaisons’ reporting; or conversely, (more strongly 
could be argued) that liaisons cultivate “good subjects”/citizens, in which informing is “an element of good citizenship” 
(Marx 1988:206). 
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influential individuals are targeted as potential “community intelligence feeds” that are also 
conduits for the dissemination of police communications (Innes 2006).146 Reflecting how 
community-based policing and national security intelligence objectives are mutually-reinforcing, 
the RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence Branch articulates effective intelligence-led policing as 
“encourag[ing] understanding of the origins of criminal and extremist activity, and the links 
between those origins and current activity. This allows the police to reach out to communities, 
leveraging intelligence to build support, to make contact with at risk groups and to break cycles 
of crime and violence” (A. Smith 2004; emphasis added). Intelligence is leveraged for 
relationship-building, which seeks to improve intelligence capacities. 
In January of 2013, then-OPP Commissioner Chris Lewis responded to judicial and 
public critiques of the OPP hesitance to enforce injunctions or make arrests during events 
associated with Idle No More. The video message was created for internal circulation within the 
OPP, and quickly ended up in the public domain. Lewis’ statement is highly significant because 
it makes clear that intelligence operations are ongoing while liaisons engage in negotiations and 
manage protests on the surface:  
[…] There has been much criticism recently in the media directed towards the Ontario 
Provincial Police and our supposed lack of enforcement response to these events. I 
have been quick to respond publicly that the OPP will continue to manage these protests 
in a safe and peaceful manner using the best practices established in the OPP 
Framework for Police Preparedness for Aboriginal Critical Incidents and the proper use 
of police discretion. […] these types of protests are difficult for police services to 
manage. The overall objective of the OPP is to work with all parties to ensure public and 
officer safety and to maintain orderly conduct and peace. That isn't us "not doing our job" 
as some would have it, but in fact that is our job. Members of our Provincial Liaison 
Team and other officers have done excellent work negotiating with event organisers to 
minimize disruption and danger. Our Provincial Operations Intelligence Bureau is 
keeping us well-informed so we can plan and deploy resources accordingly. (Lewis 
2013, emphasis added)147 
                                               
146
 The relationship between the AFN and RCMP (formalised through protocols) is a great example of what Innes 
(2006) a “community intelligence feed”—a relationship with leadership in a “community of risk” that provides police 
with information while also providing a conduit for police to disseminate messaging (e.g. to circumvent /pre-emptively 
counter potentially damaging framings of their actions). 
147
 In his message, Lewis also invokes the “meat in the sandwich” discourse: “Whether we like it or not, the First 
Nations people of Ontario have long-time disputes with government and we cannot solve those issues as a police 
service. As well, First Nations have the ability to paralyze this country by shutting down travel and trade routes. It is a 
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The public circulation of the Commissioner’s statement about the OPP’s management of the 
Idle No More protests—reiterated by police spokespersons—is also significant because it 
explicitly reveals, rather than denies, the ongoing role of intelligence. On one hand, this 
revelation addresses criticisms and concerns that the police are not engaging in law 
enforcement and thereby attempts to maintain credibility vis-à-vis those critics. On the other 
hand, Brodeur (2010) argues that revealing a glimpse of intelligence activities, which are 
defined by their invisibility and secrecy, can be an intimidation strategy that produces a “chilling 
effect”. In chapter 4, I discussed how the deployment of “transparency” can work as a strategy 
of governance through responsibilisation. In addition to producing a “chilling effect” the revealing 
of covert intelligence activities may also work to strengthen the role of liaisons by encouraging 
cooperation with them as preferable to the potential of being targeted by intrusive, covert 
intelligence investigations. Here, responsibilisation is reinforced as a “choice” between 
cooperation (openly or confidentially) or being a potential target of intelligence activities. 
 
A Tenuous Distinction between “Information” and “Intelligence” Gathering:  
Managing Role Boundaries 
 
The legitimacy and credibility of liaisons rests significantly on the differentiation of their role from 
that of intelligence gathering. This has been one of the biggest challenges both externally vis-à-
vis the communities they interact with, and internally within the organisation and in the world of 
law enforcement. This is a major part of establishing the “neutral” position of liaisons in their 
interactions with communities and groups. Being transparent about their intentions is an 
important device, which emphasizes openness in approaching and interacting with communities 
and protesters.148 In dispelling the association of dressing in plain clothes with undercover work, 
                                                                                                                                                       
difficult situation no matter how we view or address it. When policing these events, we will be criticized -- sometimes 
from all sides. Our response at all times needs to be measured, professional and sensitive. […] When the critical 
incident is over, it is the OPP, not our critics, that is responsible for the results” (Lewis 2013). 
148
 However, it bears mention that CSIS agents also openly identify themselves as agents to targets and, as civilians, 
are dressed in “regular” clothes (usually business attire) rather than uniforms. People are also not required to engage 
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one PLT member describes how liaisons might actively remove themselves from situations 
where their presence could be construed as intelligence-gathering:    
So, you know, if we take more of a low-key approach it works very well. And we’re more 
approach-able. We’re not covert though. A lot of people will say, oh, you know, are you 
undercover? No, we don’t hide the fact of who we are and we’ll have, sometimes, traffic 
vests on if we’re marching along a highway, or we’ll have some kind of thing on our 
jacket saying Police Liaison, OPP, that it’s not that we’re hiding that we’re police officers 
by any means and when we talk to people we tell them. Sometimes when they want to 
discuss certain strategies we’ll walk away because, you know, we’ll say… This is a 
conversation perhaps that you don’t want me to be privy to; just to remember I’m a 
police officer, so if we ever do go to court I would have testify, so, you know, I’m just 
going to… be over there.” (Interview, OPP4)  
 
While this boundary management reflects the liaison priority of maintaining ongoing 
communications and relationships, it has also contributed to perceptions of liaisons’ 
questionable loyalties and suspicions of “Stockholm syndrome” as discussed in chapter 4. 
Intelligence work is associated with the building of criminal cases; by not engaging in this work 
liaisons can maintain a position between protesters and the enforcement arm of their own 
organisation. In some cases, the weightiness of this discursive differentiation renders it 
precarious, and it must be constantly reinforced in their interactions, as well as amongst liaisons 
themselves and vis-à-vis the broader organisation. In part this is driven by a consciousness that 
their activities will be perceived as “intelligence” gathering rather than the stated purpose of 
relationship building and communication. As one PLT member put it,  
I want to make it very clear, the PLT do not…do intelligence work, gathering, covert 
operations; they’re not there spying on communities at all […] They’re there in an open, 
transparent way. If they’re on the communities and… like, they’re, so yeah, they’re not 
there writing down licence plates and doing all these things. That’s an intelligence 
function. And … I think it’s gotten a lot better now, people understanding their roles. So if 
there is a need to gather intelligence on participants at a protest, then intelligence 
will…will do that. (Interview, OPP9)  
 
                                                                                                                                                       
with agents when approached. In identifying themselves as agents of CSIS, however, they draw upon the symbolic 
power of CSIS as a coercive power that might compel cooperation. Arguably, when liaisons identify themselves as 
members of their respective police forces, there is a similar effect. This form of ‘transparency’ can have an 
intimidation potential.  
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Yet, in practice, the integration of liaisons with/in the intelligence process disrupts the 
simplicity of this distinction. For example, a PLT member describes a hypothetical scenario 
that might emerge from attending and observing an open community meeting and hearing 
someone speaking in a way that was “being overly radical” and about setting up a roadblock. 
After speaking to the individual, ‘Tim’, to convey that police were there to “work with you” in 
the community’s interests, and to advise ‘Tim’ of potential charges after-the-fact if he went 
ahead with the roadblock,  
[…] I would pass on to our intel side of the house, like there’s this guy named ‘Tim’ who 
was pretty vocal about what he’s planning on doing. And that’s where I would… […] be 
able to get his name, like who is that ‘Tim’ guy or whatever; and then I just pass that on. 
And then what they do with it at that point (Interview, OPP3) 
 
In this hypothetical scenario, the information about ‘Tim’ is considered open source because his 
statements were made in an “open” venue and not in confidence. The open presence of the 
liaison at this venue, however, derives from the relation-building work that has already been 
done; the liaison’s access to the meeting is secured through a degree of consent by some 
members of the community. There is potential that these “open” statements lead to future 
monitoring of ‘Tim’ (and, conceivably, any “associates”); this is a clear example of how the 
chilling effect can occur when there is a police officer present—even in an “open and 
transparent” way, and even when “invited” by organisers and/or community members.  
 
The Use of Intelligence at the Front-Line  
While liaisons do not get direct tasking requirements for information gathering from the 
intelligence side, PLT supervisors will filter relevant intelligence to liaisons, who would be tasked 
“to see; just keep your ears on the ground for this” (Interview, OPP9). In practice, there can be 
an indirect, filtered tasking or direction in the information gathering by liaisons. Liaisons will also 
utilise intelligence in planning their own activities. According to PLT Standard Operating 
Procedures (SOPs), officers are supposed to “contact the AIU [Aboriginal Issues Unit] 
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Supervisor to ascertain any officer safety issues” before engaging in any outreach activities.149   
Giving the example of hearing rumours or information about large groups of supporters on their 
way to attend an action, a PLT member describes reaching out to other liaisons as well as the 
intelligence unit:  
First thing we do is call down; and say, [NAME], can you just check with your folks and 
see if anybody’s coming; can you confirm this? If I have information, we’ll give it. We’ll 
check with intelligence as well. The Aboriginal Issues Unit, right? […] and usually 
within… no time at all, they’ll call back and say there’s two buses going, it’s elders and 
kids; it’s all good, there’s nobody coming to hurt anybody. (Interview, OPP8)  
 
The importance of having prior intelligence or knowledge about the groups and individuals that 
liaisons are approaching is framed in terms of the risk to officer safety, and by extension, to 
“public safety”: 
And the one with adverse… meaning or wants to, they don’t care about the law. They’ll 
break it. So… yeah, it’s scary to see that you’re about 30, you walk with them and then a 
few blocks away and then you [go], ‘whoa, where did all those people come in at the 
same time’, and then we’re overwhelmed and it’s a scary situation where you’re in the 
middle and then you’re being surrounded by a crowd that is not… friendly. So… then the 
safety; and that’s where you have to use that communication, try to get out. So yeah, 
intel… is a big challenge for us. (Interview, RCMP8) 
 
As discussed in the previous chapter, during a critical incident liaisons are subject to—and are 
expected to implement—the decisions made by the overall incident commander, sometimes 
without being provided with a supporting rationale at the time. Reflecting the hierarchical 
command, they are expected to “trust” the incident commander and the integrity of the incident 
command process while attempting to maintain their relationships with protesters. Intelligence 
requirements and the “need-to-know” principle of dissemination are often at the root of this 
incident command secrecy. There is a filtering of intelligence through the incident commander 
and between the liaison supervisor at the command table and the liaisons on the ground. There 
is therefore an uneven flow of information and intelligence between the front-lines and 
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 OPP. 2010. PLT Standard Operating Procedures. P. 8. MCSCS FIPPA request CSCS-A-2012-03063. 
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intelligence units. As Cope (2004) observes, this one-way flow can be a source of tension when 
the demands put on the front-line for information input is not felt to be reciprocated. Several 
interviewees attribute these tensions to a lack of understanding on the part of rank and file 
officers about the intelligence process and the reasons why intelligence cannot be freely shared 
with them. Significantly, these sentiments came from personnel who previously have worked in 
the intelligence realm.  
I think that’s kind of the challenge that way is even within law enforcement. Unless 
you’ve been a part of an intelligence unit and understand the … process, I suppose, it’s, 
it can be, and not everybody needs to know the information. The incident commander, 
who’s in charge of the incident, needs to know the information. (Interview, OPP9) 
 
The lack of reciprocation was also framed by other interviewees in a functional way in that 
intelligence is not shared with the front-line because it is superfluous or irrelevant to their job. 
However, the main reason lies in the sensitivity and confidentiality of intelligence obtained 
through covert gathering:  
But even within your own organisation, right, you have to – ‘cause if you’re an 
intelligence officer and you have… confidential information, you have to protect that 
information. But if it’s something that’s going to affect, impact the province of Ontario or 
there’s going to be a criminal offence or there’s going to be a major event, you have to 
act upon the information but you also have to protect, [in a sense,] you have to protect 
your source. So it could be single source information, like only one person knows the 
information and you can’t burn, you have to, you can’t burn that source, right? So you 
have to do other things to try to confirm the information; so intelligence may have 
information that a protest is going to go on. But it’s, maybe it’s common knowledge, so 
PLT would go out, now they’d say ‘listen, we have this information, we don’t know if it’s 
reliable; when you guys are out in the community can you see if you can firm something 
up.’ And then, that’s how we would do, and that’s how we corroborate each other’s 
information. (Interview, OPP9) 
 
Yet, the collaborative nature of PLT’s work in “firming up” intelligence would be difficult in the 
case that information came from a confidential “single source.” For liaisons that base their “trust” 
relationships on openness and transparency, there is a risk of jeopardising the security of 
intelligence and informants, and thus the viability of ongoing or planned investigations: 
‘cause we don’t want to, you know, you don’t want to find out that we’re giving secret 
information from, ‘cause we’re an open group, right? And also, information that’s 
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sensitive from their end, too, right? That, that, [their] stuff – and people always say that 
intel is one way and doesn’t come back? – they do send us stuff back but there’s a 
process for that. It’s gotta go in, be analysed. […] Um, and there’s certain things they 
can’t give it back; he just says, I can’t give it to you. That’s fine, I don’t even ask. 
(Interview, OPP8)  
 
There is another aspect that is coloured by past experience that raises the question of internal 
trust and the spectre of liaison partiality. For the OPP PLT, this was a significant source of 
organisational tension during the 2006 police operation in response to the Six Nations 
reclamation at Douglas Creek Estates. Current OPP members acknowledged that the 
relationship between the Aboriginal Relations Team and intelligence at the time was strained: 
“now [we] work together really well. I think when it first started, back in Caledonia days and 
Ipperwash days… not, not, not at all” (Interview, OPP9). This was attributed to a lack of 
understanding by both sides about the role of the other. Because of the collaborative nature of 
intelligence operations, involving the sharing of information among different organisations, the 
implications of institutional tension was not limited to one organisation. At Six Nations, there was 
suspicion that ART members lacked boundaries in their “transparency” with the people they 
were liaising with, and there was concern that they might share sensitive information as a 
means of gaining their trust. This led to withholding information and intelligence from liaisons, 
and isolating them to some extent, out of concern that ART would jeopardise an existing joint 
criminal investigation between the Six Nations Police and the OPP (Interview, SNPS). 
While the mistrust of liaisons by other parts of the policing organisation may not be as 
overt as they were in the early days of the ART, liaisons are still not privy to all intelligence 
related to a specific event. This is justified on the “need to know” principle of intelligence 
sharing. While they are integral to the intelligence process as sources of “open” “front door” 
information as well as conduits for potential informants, liaison must actively maintain a role 
distinction from intelligence work. The rhetorical distinction from “spying” is integral to maintain 
their “neutrality” as a basis for developing relationships and “trust”, which enable their 
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information gathering. Yet, as I show in the next section, liaisons are integrated into the broader 
national security intelligence apparatus that transcends their organisation the immediacy of 
operational requirements. 
 
INFORMATION-INTELLIGENCE COLLABORATION AND DISSEMINATION   
The ILP philosophy depends on integrated information-intelligence sharing both within and 
beyond the organisation. So far, I have examined the dynamics of information sharing within the 
OPP and RCMP. In this section I examine platforms, or what Gill (2006) describes as 
“brokerage” mechanisms, that have emerged to facilitate inter-agency collaboration: incident 
command, Joint Intelligence Groups, Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams 
(INSETs), the Critical Infrastructure Investigations Team (CIIT), the Integrated Terrorism 
Assessment Centre (ITAC), and the Security Intelligence Liaison Program (SILP). Each of these 
mechanisms is interconnected as information and intelligence circulates between and across 
them to varying degrees. Paralleling the intra-agency intelligence flow, the tendency is for 
information to flow “upwards”, while the “trickle-down” of security/strategic intelligence is filtered 
through security clearance levels and the “need to know” principle. The collaboration and 
integration of information-intelligence systems has been facilitated by the priorities of the 
National Security Policy, including the “all-hazards” emergency management framework which 
is taken up in chapter 6 where I focus on the interfacing of Indian Affairs into this expanded 
police-security apparatus.  
 
At the Incident Command Table: Tactical / Operational Intelligence  
The purpose of the incident command and integrated response structure is to maximise the 
information and intelligence available to the incident commander in order to make the “best 
possible” decisions in managing critical incidents. The command post set-up facilitates the 
circulation of real-time information being produced by the various entities involved in responding 
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to the “critical incident”. The emphasis is on tactical and operational intelligence, although this 
might be supported by strategic considerations of the potential broader impact that police 
actions could have in the immediate political environment (such as sparking sympathy protests). 
As discussed in the previous chapter, incident command decisions are based on information 
and intelligence provided by the range of participants at the table. This includes information 
provided by liaisons, the various tactical unit commanders (POU, ERT, TRU) if present, 
intelligence, criminal investigations, First Nations Police service representatives, and in some 
cases representatives of emergency services and government departments that may have 
direct enforcement mandates, such as Natural Resources (Interview, OPP2). Information and 
intelligence are not freely shared with all parties at the table however. As noted previously, the 
incident commander becomes a buffer of sensitive intelligence, which may be shared with other 
components, such as the liaisons, on a need to know basis.  
The incident command approach cannot be applied in the same way in all “critical 
incidents”. The political nature of protests requires greater restrictions on who can be in the 
command post, whereas “to have everybody involved at an incident command system” when 
dealing with floods or forest fires “works very well. But… it’s much different when you’ve got a, a 
protest. Particularly an illegal protest; because when we look back at Ipperwash and the 
allegations of political interference? We have to have a very clear separation between police 
operations and the political element. […] there’s no political representation at the Command 
Post. At all” (Interview, OPP2). The separation between police operations and political interests 
becomes blurred however, when ministries with enforcement mandates—such as Canada 
Border Services Agency, Natural Resources Canada, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, 
Transportation Canada, and the provincial Ministries of Natural Resources, and Transport—
share jurisdictional responsibility with police. 
 These agencies have their own intelligence operations and products such as situational 
awareness and threat assessments which are disseminated to partners, and supplement the 
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incident command pool of information whether directly through participation at the command 
post, or indirectly via the police force’s intelligence unit. Similarly, where there is a rail blockade, 
CN or CP Rail police will be involved and may have pressure from their employers to open up 
the rails (Interview, OPP2). While each entity may bring an important perspective to assist in 
decision-making their contributions may be shaped by different interests in the resolution of the 
issue. Historically, inter-agency conflict has contributed to disorganisation and escalation. At 
Ipperwash there was lack of communication and cooperation between the Ministry of Natural 
Resources and the OPP (Linden 2007c). Similarly at Burnt Church in 2001, the Department of 
Fisheries and Oceans and the RCMP had conflicting interests (Interview, RCMP4).150 The 
incident command structure is supposed to address communication issues by having parties 
represented at the command table. In each of these agencies there is a formal separation 
between enforcement and political spaces, and it is the enforcement arm that contributes to the 
incident command decision-making process. However, in the next chapter I critique these 
dynamics by examining the role played by Indian and Northern Affairs Canada and the Ministry 
of Aboriginal Affairs which do not have law enforcement mandates. 
 
Joint Intelligence Groups and Multi-Agency Forums  
Joint Intelligence Groups (JIGs) are event-specific collaborations where there are multiple police 
agencies involved in responding to a large-scale event. The aim of a JIG is to facilitate 
information/intelligence gathering and sharing among multiple “partners” by providing a venue 
for coordination. The use of a common referent to describe this type of forum reflects the 
formalisation and normalisation of inter-agency intelligence collaborations.151 Symbolically, it 
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signals a shift from the hoarding of intelligence by individual agencies, attributed to factors such 
as mistrust of other agencies, inter-agency competitiveness, and poor or non-existent channels 
of communication (see Sheptycki 2004). However, these “pathologies” (Sheptycki 2004) have 
not been eliminated by JIGs, which can be massive—for example, the G8/G20 JIG included 
over 500 personnel. The number of entities involved in a JIG can complicate rather than 
facilitate information/ intelligence-sharing because of issues such as security clearance 
requirements and incompatible databases.152 
The 2006 Six Nations reclamation and the 2007 National Day of Action (NDA) were both 
managed through the involvement of a wide range of law enforcement and security agencies.  
Although the Six Nations reclamation was arguably a “local” matter and the NDA involved 
actions across Canada, there were similarities in the police responses. The level of 
collaboration is reflective of the unique context of Indigenous activism and the greater potential 
for sympathy or solidarity actions in other jurisdictions. For the Six Nations reclamation and 
NDA, agencies were coordinated through a centralised command structure led by OPP and 
RCMP commanders, respectively. For the Six Nations reclamation, the OPP established a Joint 
Intelligence Group (JIG), paralleling the operational command group, which was run from a 
Special Operations Centre located in Toronto, approximately 90 minutes away from the site.153 
Beyond the OPP’s own intelligence bureau, participants in the JIG included intelligence 
personnel from RCMP, CSIS, and the Canadian Forces National Counter-Intelligence Unit 
(CFNCIU), all of whom had resources engaged in surveillance activities as well as source 
handling (i.e. use of informants).154 These entities will be discussed in further detail below.  
The NDA and the RCMP’s Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group  
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In January 2007, the RCMP created an Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) for the National 
Day of Action, composed of members from RCMP Criminal Intelligence and National Security 
Criminal Investigations (NSCI) and based in the Criminal Intelligence Program at Headquarters. 
The JIG was explicitly described as being “part of the RCMP’s ongoing commitment to support 
Aboriginal communities.”155 The RCMP’s strategic priority of “Aboriginal communities” extends 
beyond commitments to cultural awareness, community engagement and recruitment as the JIG 
rhetoric reflects the fusing of “community-building” with the imperatives of (national) security.  
Although JIGs are generally intended to be event-specific, such as the one convened for 
the Six Nations reclamation, the RCMP’s Aboriginal JIG existed until November 2009. There 
appeared to be two main reasons for its disbandment: (1) a lack of resources and support from 
other areas of the RCMP, and (2) concerns about duplication and confusion with the Vancouver 
2010 JIG. In particular, the JIG was unable to secure participation from NSCI as well as from 
the Contract and Aboriginal Policing program.156 Although the JIG relied on information/ 
intelligence contributions from a range of sources, its core was strictly RCMP and might better 
be described as a dedicated section or portfolio within Criminal Intelligence.  
The impetus for the JIG stemmed from the strain on Criminal Intelligence Program 
resources (i.e. one analyst responsible for Aboriginal issues) in meeting intelligence needs 
during 2006 in the midst of the Six Nations reclamation.157 The expansion of intelligence 
resources leading up to the NDA was seen as a priority to support operational preparations. It is 
significant to note the proactive approach here, in which intelligence is seen as a fundamental 
component of planning. The JIG had a mandate “to collect and analyze information, and 
produce and disseminate intelligence concerning conflict and issues associated with Aboriginal 
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communities.”158 More specifically, the focus was on conflicts that could escalate into “civil 
disobedience and unrest” such as “grievances pertaining to land claims, treaty disputes, 
environmental issues, economic and sovereignty disputes, internal conflict and social issues.”159 
Towards this, the JIG monitored “individuals of interest…because of their influence on activities 
in Aboriginal communities.”160 There was particular interest in “[t]ension against critical 
infrastructure” stemming from blockades (i.e. affecting physical infrastructure) as well as actions 
“concerning energy sector development.”161 The JIG would also provide historical knowledge 
about communities and issues to inform decision-making,162 thus serving as subject matter 
experts within the RCMP.163 At the regional level, the OPP, as police of jurisdiction in Ontario, 
established a JIG for the NDA in which the RCMP was a key participant.  
The Aboriginal JIG produced weekly “Aboriginal and Community Public Safety Situation 
Reports”,164 as well as three annual threat assessments on “Aboriginal Communities of 
Concern” in 2007, 2008 and 2009-10, which are forward-looking strategic intelligence 
products.165 Both the weekly and annual reports draw on contributions from the RCMP’s 
divisional level Intelligence and Aboriginal Policing Services, the Vancouver 2010 JIG, RCMP 
National Security Criminal Investigations and the Critical Infrastructure Criminal Intelligence 
Team, Sûreté du Québec (SQ), OPP, ITAC, and a protected third party.166 In the days preceding 
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the NDA, situation reports were more frequent, with multiple reports on June 29 providing 
updates as events progressed.167  
Internally, the key “clients” for the JIG’s products were the Commissioner, Assistant 
Commissioner of Criminal Intelligence, the Director General for Major and Organized Crime 
Intelligence, Criminal Operations officers, Contract and Aboriginal Policing Services (thus, 
disseminated to the divisions), and National Security Criminal Investigations. External clients 
were INAC, the OPP and SQ as well as any other agencies contributing to the JIG or affected 
by events.168 The intent of the RCMP’s JIG was also to build an information-sharing network 
amongst partners such as INAC, CSIS, OPP, SQ, Canada Border Services Agency, 
Department of National Defence, Natural Resources Canada, Transport Canada, Health 
Canada and the Department of Fisheries and Oceans. In 2007, situation reports were 
disseminated to 380 recipients169 and by 2009 this increased to approximately 450 law 
enforcement, government, and private energy sector “partners.” The JIG also produced ad hoc 
special bulletins and developing situation reports when required.170  
The formation of the JIG and its work on strategic intelligence reflects the prevention 
orientation of ILP, aimed at identifying issues, communities, and trends that could pose 
problems for police in the future.171 The annual threat assessments were intended to provide “a 
national outlook and short-term predictions intended to inform law enforcement” activities for the 
coming year.172 According to the 2009-10 annual report “[t]he scope of this report does not 
assess acts of lawful protest or legitimate dissent and it does not assess conflicts in Aboriginal 
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communities related to organised crime, gangs or profit motivated criminal acts.” 173 In addition 
to issues that may be sources of “unrest” in communities—such as court decision, land claims, 
environmental issues, or legislative changes—each of the reports identifies specific “Aboriginal 
communities of concern” with “existing issues and conflicts which could escalate to various 
forms of direct action.”174 Each of the communities is profiled with overviews of historical 
conflicts/issues, “current status”, future “outlook”, “key individuals” and other redacted 
information. In 2007, 11 of the 24 communities were in Ontario; in 2008, it was 12 of 23. In 
2009-10, seven of 18 communities in the report were in Ontario: Akwesasne, Grassy Narrows 
First Nation, Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI) First Nation, Munsee-Delaware Nation, 
Shabot Obaadjiwan and Ardoch Algonquin First Nations, Six Nations and Tyendinaga. Of these, 
Akwesasne, Munsee-Delaware, KI, and Shabot Obaadjiwan and Ardoch Algonquin also 
appeared in 2008.175 Grassy Narrows, Six Nations and Tyendinaga have appeared in all three 
reports, and were identified in 2007 as having a presence of “extremist activity”.176 
In large part, the communities identified in these reports have histories of engaging in 
either “militant” or “violent” direct action, conflict with the RCMP and other forces, and/or are 
dealing with multiple unresolved issues that could lead to future conflict. The reports also 
highlight the proximity of “communities of concern” to critical infrastructure. With each 
community profile, there is a map of the community/reserve’s location and surrounding area with 
clearly marked critical infrastructure points—railways, airports, gas and oil pipelines, and the 
electricity grid.  
                                               
173
 This disclaimer did not appear in the 2007 or 2008 reports. RCMP. 2009 (June). RCMP Criminal Intelligence. 
Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group. Aboriginal Communities, Issues, Events and Concerns 2009/10. P. 5. RCMP ATI 
request A-2011-06291. 
174
 RCMP. 2009 (June). “RCMP Criminal Intelligence. Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group. Aboriginal Communities, 
Issues, Events and Concerns 2009/10.” P.1. RCMP ATI request A-2011-06291. 
175
 RCMP. 2008 (May). “Threat Assessment of Aboriginal Communities of Concern.” RCMP ATI request A-2012-
0660. 
176
 RCMP. 2007 (June). “Threat Assessment of Aboriginal Communities of Concern.” P. 58. RCMP ATI request 
(informal) A-2012-06995. 
234 
 
The reports describe activists according to four categories, “based on the types of direct 
action typically encouraged, organised or participated in.”177 Resembling the distinctions 
between “legitimate protest” and “criminal activity” articulated by officers in chapter 4, each of 
these categories is defined by differing forms of threat posed to liberal, colonial institutions. 
“Traditionalists …believe in traditional forms of governance” and usually oppose band councils. 
There is no mention of “tactics”, which implies that this category refers largely to internal conflict 
within the community at a band level that threatens to subvert the governance structures 
imposed by the state. “Moderates” engage in “legal” forms of protest and “typically avoid road 
blockades, use of weapons, etc.” In contrast, “militants” engage in and encourage 
“confrontational tactics to further their cause,” which includes “illegal activities such as road 
blocks, trains [sic] stoppages and violence but typically stop short of using weapons or 
destroying property”. The 2007 and 2008 reports emphasize that moderates often express 
frustration with “slow and often ineffective process[es],” which may lead to militant actions.178 
“Extremists” are those who advocate and engage in violence, which “typically involves the use 
of firearms, and the destruction of property including critical infrastructure”.179 As I will discuss, 
“extremists” are considered national security threats. 
ILP’s strategic orientation and focus on critical infrastructure brings police intelligence 
into the realm of national security intelligence, which is characterised by a greater scope of 
information gathering compared to “criminal” intelligence, which is limited to specific criminal 
investigations and building cases. Because of the long-term prevention/pre-emption orientation 
of security intelligence, the scope for intelligence production is far broader, and more 
speculative. Although the RCMP’s Aboriginal JIG was disbanded, it reflected the expanding 
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national security mandate of the RCMP, and the central role that concerns around Indigenous 
protests played in this expansion. Prior to the 2007 NDA information and intelligence sharing 
amongst the various agencies identified above was non-existent in any formalised capacity, 
thus spurring the perceived “necessity” for the JIG and its extension beyond the 2007 NDA.180  
 
The National Security Web  
The discourse, funding, and infrastructure established through the Anti-Terrorism Act and 
National Security Policy contributed to significant “security creep” in the official mandates of 
police organisations. Murphy (2007:459) defines “security creep” as the process through which 
a “policing object is securitised, or transformed from a criminal to a security risk” to which 
enhanced powers and resources of national security are applied. As critics argue, the breadth of 
the Anti-Terrorism Act has potential to capture Indigenous direct actions within its purview (e.g. 
Roach 2001; Schneiderman and Cossman 2001; Orkin 2003). For Indigenous self-
determination struggles, the framing of resistance as a “national security risk” is not new; what is 
significant about “securitisation” in the 2000s is how Indigenous “unrest” is incorporated as a 
“normal” object of police within the security apparatus. While these initiatives are centralised at 
the federal level, the local ream of policing is also implicated as intelligence-led policing 
frameworks are the conduit that formalises the front-line policing role within the national security 
apparatus. The discursive problematisation focuses on activities as the primary object of 
concern, which is supplemented by knowledge about Indigenous communities cultivated in part 
by improved “awareness” training.  
The RCMP and National Security  
The RCMP’s Aboriginal JIG is a great example of  how security intelligence elides the distinction 
between police and  national security matters as an initiative legitimated on the grounds of 
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better “supporting Aboriginal communities”181 (i.e. by educating RCMP members and improving 
public safety for communities) and as consistent with best practices under an intelligence-led 
approach (i.e. through collaboration and increased information). As Murphy (2007:461) writes, 
communities become construed as “security problems” and thus as “legitimate space[s] for 
security policing operations.” The national security problematisation, Murphy (2007) argues, 
bolsters community-based policing with “a powerful new rationale” as communities are targets 
for information and intelligence gathering, as well as for instilling self-policing through active 
cooperation.  
 Like the Aboriginal JIG, the inclusion of a National Security Community Outreach unit as 
part of the RCMP’s National Security Criminal Investigations (NSCI) program also reflects the 
harmonised mandates of “community-building” and information gathering. As noted in chapter 4, 
the A Division (National Capital Region) Aboriginal liaison officer is housed within this outreach 
unit. On the other end of the spectrum of information gathering within the NSCI program are 
Integrated National Security Enforcement Teams (INSETs) and the Critical Infrastructure 
Intelligence Team. INSETs are counter-terrorism investigation and operations units composed 
of RCMP members and partners from federal and provincial agencies.182 In 2002 and 2005, 
members of the West Coast Warrior Society were targeted by INSET operations, which 
contributed to the demise of the Society (Young 2005; West Coast Warrior Society 2005). In 
June 2012, an INSET was established in K Division (Alberta) to address specific concerns with 
“extremist” threats to the growing energy industry from a convergence of environmental and 
Indigenous groups (see Preston 2013).  
 Reflecting its concern with securing sovereignty the NSCI Orientation Guide states that 
the branch is “alone in attempting to prevent and/or investigate incidents where the state itself 
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(and not necessarily any citizen in particular) is the direct target” (emphasis added).183 The 
official position of the NSCI program is that First Nations communities are not targeted for 
information gathering as they, and Indigenous protests, are not considered “national security 
threats” per se. The object of the Critical Infrastructure Intelligence Team’s (CIIT) work, 
however, is threats to critical infrastructure that have potential to cause “serious harm”. 
According to a member of the NSCI: 
[W]e are not involved in… anything to do with aboriginal protests, peaceful, violent, or 
otherwise. That’s not considered to be a national security issue. But, because [the CIIT] 
is responsible for critical infrastructure protection, as you’re aware, critical infrastructure 
is sometimes the target of these … of the protests. So, in that sense it is something that 
we follow, along with our critical infrastructure partners. So for example, you may be 
aware that… I believe it was a month or so ago, in Northern Quebec, there was a… 
there was an incident where a track was being blocked; and so, we were interested in 
that, only from the point of view of that the trains were not running (Interview, RCMP5) 
 
Public Safety Canada defines critical infrastructure as “processes, systems, facilities, 
technologies, networks, assets and services essential to the health, safety, security or economic 
well-being of Canadians and the effective functioning of government” (Public Safety Canada 
2009b:2). Critical infrastructure is classified as one of ten sectors falling under the primary 
responsibility of a specific federal government department (Table 6). As of August 2012, the 
RCMP’s CIIT focuses on three sectors: energy and utilities, transportation, and finance. It is 
significant that both the energy and utilities sector and transportation are those most likely 
disrupted by protests and direct actions such as blockades—whether of transportation routes 
(roads, highways, bridges, railways) or of access to sites of energy production. The CIIT section 
relies significantly on information provided by the federal departments in each sector, but also 
on the cultivation of information-intelligence sharing partnerships with the corporate owner-
operators of critical infrastructure. 
                                               
183
 RCMP. 2008. National Security Criminal Investigations Orientation Guide. Obtained via Media Co-op. 
(http://s3.documentcloud.org/documents/515233/rcmp-nsci-orientatioguide-2008.pdf) 
238 
 
Table 6 Critical Infrastructure Sectors and Departments (Public Safety Canada 2009c) 
Critical Infrastructure Sector Federal Department 
Energy & Utilities Natural Resources Canada (NRCan) 
Information & Communications Technology Industry Canada 
Finance Finance Canada 
Health  Public Health Agency of Canada 
Food Agriculture & Agri-Food Canada 
Water Environment Canada 
Transportation Transport Canada 
Safety / Emergency Preparedness Public Safety Canada 
Government Public Safety Canada 
Manufacturing Industry Canada; Department of National Defence 
 
 In preparation for the 2007 NDA, the CIIT contributed to the production of Aboriginal JIG 
intelligence reports as a member of the JIG:  
[A]t that time, […] we tapped into our critical infrastructure partners to discuss with them 
and to include in that report if there was anything that they were concerned about… in 
the areas where they had critical infrastructure locations; cause as you know, in a lot of 
Canada, … trains, particularly, and some energy facilities … the only people that are 
within hundreds of miles often, are aboriginal groups. And in some cases there has been 
some issues in the past, and primarily peaceful ones with just blockades and things like 
that, but for a railway obviously, that’s very, very expensive and it’s one of the reasons 
they’re chosen as a target. […] So… so that’s the type of thing that we’re concerned 
about is; so we look specifically at… criminal threats to critical infrastructure… because 
criminal threats to critical infrastructure are considered to be, are by definition, national 
security threats. (Interview, RCMP5)  
 
The ability of the Aboriginal JIG to be “plugged into ...the aboriginal communities across the 
country” made the JIG’s NDA reports of interest to National Security Criminal Investigations. 
However, none of the activities associated with the NDA ever reached the threshold of concern 
for national security, and since then, “when we discuss the aboriginal issues… very little of that 
would reach a threshold that we, would be of concern to us” (Interview, RCMP5). The 
threshold—i.e. definition of national security threat—has also changed over time since Oka:  
[…] it is the case in the past… that national security has looked at aboriginal issues, but 
it would have been… I guess it’s probably fifteen years ago now for example, certainly… 
Oka, where we had … where there was a lot of firearms involved, where there was, you 
know, long stand offs and that sort of thing, so it was, so that, at that point was 
considered national security, but there’s kind of been a reassessment of that… one of 
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the assessments that I know around Oka, was that a lot of that was… was organised 
criminals using aboriginal sovereignty issues as kind of a shield. So that wasn’t really 
what they were interested in, but they just kind of hid behind that; as opposed to, for 
example, Caledonia, which appears to be a legitimate… sovereignty concerns. So… 
but… I don’t, I can’t recall in the last ten years… us doing any aboriginal files in national 
security; I can’t recall that we did, I mean there may have been individuals which were 
subjects of investigations … because of associations, or something like that. But that 
would be, other than that I can’t recall. (Interview, RCMP5)  
 
While “aboriginal protests” may not have been subjects of investigation for the RCMP’s national 
security branch, they are monitored. In the case of Ontario, this is less direct than in other 
jurisdictions where the RCMP provides provincial, territorial and municipal policing services:   
So… but for example, if we look at Caledonia…that’s an issue, so that’s an issue that’s 
handled by the province, it doesn’t  involve the RCMP at all…so we monitor that, see 
what’s going on there, to see if there’s anything gonna happen there, but that’s a, that’s 
a provincial, OPP issue […]So… and our partners are not indicating any concern about 
that, again because it’s a fairly static, fairly static position. So that’s … the extent of what 
our intelligence involvement would be. So we’re keeping an eye on any of those issues, 
same as we would any other issues, but it’s certainly not an area  from our point of view 
that we’re, we have, like I don’t have anyone who looks at that at all, extensively. 
(Interview, RCMP5)  
 
There is a distinction between the “monitoring” of issues and active intelligence work—a 
distinction that plays upon binary thinking in positioning “monitoring” as benign, but also 
consistent with the prevention orientation, as distinct from intelligence work. The normalised 
monitoring of Indigenous political activities becomes part of the National Security Criminal 
Investigations program through its mandated responsibility to investigate “terrorist activities” 
defined in the CSIS Act as ideologically motivated criminal activities. The coupling of “aboriginal 
sovereignty” as a form of ideological motivation, with the potential risk to critical infrastructure 
due to the nature of issues and geographical proximity of communities, arguably make 
Indigenous self-determination a constant object of national security even on a relatively limited 
scale, despite the fact that “aboriginal sovereignty issues” have not met a formal “national 
security threshold”.  
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 The implications are significant, as “unlike other crime, we can’t take a chance with 
national security, so everything has to be investigated; we can have a source that’s, that’s really 
not credible, but we do have to find out if what they’re saying is the case. So… it’s, it can’t be 
mismanaged, we have to look at anything” (Interview, RCMP5; emphasis added). This broader 
threshold for national security investigation amplifies the concerns identified by Six Nations 
Police regarding the tendency for everything to go into the intelligence “chute”, especially when 
Indigenous issues are involved.   
The impetus to investigate “everything” and “anything” where there is a potential 
implication for national security underlies the activities of CSIS and was also the rationale for the 
creation of the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre.  
CSIS and the Integrated Threat/Terrorism Assessment Centre 
Since 1984, CSIS has been responsible for national security intelligence and investigations. 
CSIS gathers and disseminates intelligence to government policy-makers based on a security 
intelligence cycle, which parallels the intelligence cycle model adopted by police organisations. 
Where police intelligence cycles are supposed to be directly informed by “priorities” based on 
assessments emerging from the intelligence process itself, CSIS also receives direction for its 
activities from the Government of Canada via the Minister of Public Safety. Government 
knowledge requirements are integrated into CSIS’s intelligence cycle based on consultations 
with other government departments via its Government Liaison Unit.  
CSIS’s mandate includes “domestic terrorism”, which entails monitoring “individuals and 
organisations that might be involved in […] state-sponsored terrorism, domestic terrorism (which 
includes the threat or use of violence by groups advocating for issues such as the environment, 
anti-abortion, animal rights, anti- globalisation, and white supremacy, and the dissemination of 
militia messages by groups in the United States), and secessionist violence” (CSIS 2005). 
However, the Service is prohibited by the CSIS Act “from investigating acts of advocacy, protest 
or dissent that are conducted lawfully” unless “they are carried out in conjunction with one of the 
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four previously identified types of activity. CSIS is especially sensitive in distinguishing lawful 
protest and advocacy from potentially subversive actions. Even when an investigation is 
warranted, it is carried out with careful regard for the civil rights of those whose actions are 
being investigated” (CSIS 2005). While there is an explicit exclusion of “lawful protest” from 
CSIS’s investigative mandate, this is tempered significantly by the caveat that any “potential” 
link to “terrorist” methods will be investigated. Indigenous protests, groups and individuals have 
been captured within CSIS’s monitoring—all four of the post-Ipperwash “testing grounds” 
discussed in this dissertation have been subjects of multiple CSIS and Integrated Threat 
Assessment Centre reports—and Indigenous activists have been approached by CSIS agents 
seeking information (Friesen 2008). The low threshold in the realm of national security 
investigations means that the potential for a “terrorism” or “extremism” connection provides 
sufficient justification to engage in monitoring or more invasive investigations. The threshold for 
CSIS would be lower than in the case of the National Security Criminal Investigations program 
of the RCMP.  
The establishment of the Integrated Threat Assessment Centre (ITAC) in 2004 as part of 
the National Security Policy parallels the proliferation of “fusion centres” in the US; however, a 
key difference is the centralisation of ITAC within CSIS and thus the direct link to federal 
government interests. Fusion centres in the US have been described as decentralised entities, 
which are more like hubs for intelligence exchange that respond to requests for intelligence from 
partner agencies (Monahan 2009). One of the purposes of fusion centres and of ITAC is to 
produce intelligence products with varying levels of security classification that can be widely 
disseminated to law enforcement, government departments, political officials, non-governmental 
organisations, and private sector “partners” for their own situational awareness. In 2011, ITAC 
changed its name to Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre. 
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The ITAC was tasked by the National Security Advisor to be the main intelligence source 
for the 2007 NDA.184 The first ITAC threat assessment related to “Aboriginal Protests – Summer 
2007” was released on May 11, 2007.185 At least four additional assessments were produced bi-
weekly until May 29 and then weekly up to the week of June 25 at which point ITAC released 
daily reports.186 These assessments were supplemented with reports on specific issues or 
actions. Besides law enforcement, versions of these assessments were distributed to 
government departments and other “stakeholders.” The ITAC threat assessments were 
identified in a Department of National Defence e-mail as being “where the best info is housed” 
relating to the NDA.187 According to the preamble of the ITAC reports, “[t]he right of Canadians 
to engage in peaceful protest is a cornerstone of Canada’s democratic society. ITAC is 
concerned only where there is a threat of politically-motivated violence, or where protests 
threaten the functioning of critical infrastructure.”188 When political action is tied to a perceived 
potential for violence or disruption of “critical infrastructure,” it becomes classified as a terrorist 
threat.  
The construction of potential risk associated with the NDA reflects the conversion of 
unique features of Indigenous protests into indicators of risk and threat. Reports identify the 
history of Indigenous resistance as an indicator of continuing and future militancy: “past protests 
have demonstrated that acts of violence or disruptions of critical infrastructure are possible”, 
with specific identification of rail blockades. One assessment identifies two risk factors: “First, in 
most cases, local groups will not plan their participation until relatively close to the event. 
Second, any negative or high-publicity incident just prior to or on the NDA might cause 
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significantly more people to participate than would otherwise… Consequently, the full scope of 
the NDA will be difficult to assess until just prior to the event”.189 These are evident concerns 
about the potential for prolonged, multiple and escalated protests.190 
 Similar ITAC assessments were produced for summer of 2008.191 Both the Six Nations 
reclamation and the planned Tyendinaga blockades were regularly highlighted items of concern 
in 2007 and 2008. Caledonia was also the subject of several event-specific CSIS threat 
assessments called “lasers”.192 More recently, Idle No More was identified by CSIS as an 
“emerging issue – topic of interest”, but in the ITAC lasers that I obtained the focus was on the 
potential for reactive counter-protests and white supremacists.193 
 Monahan and Regan (2012) observe how US fusion centres quickly expanded their 
mandates beyond counter-terrorism to encompass “all crimes”. They suggest that this has been 
driven by two central factors: the need to be relevant to the police agencies that access them for 
information, and to assert their relevance to maintain (or increase) funding. Monahan and 
Regan’s (2012) research found that the mandate “creep” of fusion centres has been rationalised 
by conceptualising “crimes” or “suspicious activities” as potential “precursors” to terrorism. This 
is consistent with the take-no-chances, “everything must be investigated” orientation of security 
intelligence. In the US context, Monahan (2009) found that this mandate creep is fuelled by the 
“all-hazards” paradigm, which ensures the continued “relevance” and existence of these entities.  
 This same direction is evident with ITAC’s inclusion of critical infrastructure security 
within its purview and in how protest has been problematised as an issue of national security. 
Within the relatively short span of ITAC’s existence, a new threat category of “multi-issue 
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extremism” has emerged as a catchall that captures the alliances amongst a wide range of 
political actors that have historically engaged in “transgressive” tactics of protest, including 
Indigenous activists and settler solidarity groups. Monaghan and Walby (2012) identify the use 
of this category beginning in 2007, and concretised in 2008, which they argue is linked to the 
beginning of anti-2010 Olympics organising. As Monaghan and Walby (2012) argue, threat 
categories such as “multi-issue extremism” take on a “real” quality as problems for continued 
monitoring and investigation. Aboriginal communities and warrior societies have been included 
as an “ongoing security concern” in the area of “domestic issue-based extremism” within ITAC’s 
“Bi-annual Threat from Terrorists and Extremists”: “Aboriginal communities across Canada 
remain focused on key issues such as sovereignty and outstanding land claims, and at times 
more radical members of Aboriginal warrior societies advocate violence as a means to resolve 
these issues.”194 Following Monahan and Regan’s (2012) argument about fusion centres, the 
persistence of Indigenous activism and the construction of new threat categories provide a basis 
for these intelligence agencies to assert their continued relevance and their need for expansion.   
National Defence and the CF National Counter Intelligence Unit 
The “militarisation” of policing has been identified as a major “trend” reflecting a convergence 
between police and military organisations in practices and jurisdictions. As I argued in chapter 1, 
this is a problematic analytical framework because it is founded on one of the central ideological 
binaries of liberal-security logics. As part of his militarisation thesis, Kraska (2007) argues that 
armed forces have become increasingly involved in domestic matters. De Lint and Hall (2009) 
extend on this, suggesting that military forces have become increasingly involved in the policing 
of public order events, particularly where “the existential right of the nation-state itself is said to 
be threatened” (p.271). The long history of Canadian Forces involvement in Indigenous 
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struggles supports this assertion by de Lint and Hall, but counters the underlying militarisation 
thesis that this is something new.195  
 The role of the Canadian Forces at Oka in 1990 was “exceptional” because of their 
highly visible lead operational role. Subsequent involvements in policing Indigenous 
communities have been in a standby support capacity and in providing planning assistance 
and/or equipment, as was the case at Gustafsen Lake and Ipperwash. Indigenous resistance 
continues to be a matter of interest to the Department of National Defence / Canadian Forces 
(DND/CF) but their involvement in policing Indigenous struggles has become much less visible 
through collaborations with police forces (such as joint trainings) and counter-intelligence 
contributions. A 2005 draft version of the DND’s Counter-Insurgency Manual indicated that “the 
rise of radical Native American organisations, such as the Mohawk Warrior Society, can be 
viewed as insurgencies with specific and limited aims” (in Curry 2007).  While this was removed 
from the final version after complaints by Indigenous organisations, the framing of radical 
Indigenous movements as a problem of domestic national security is evident in ongoing 
DND/CF intelligence activities.196  
 In 2007, Canada Command offered assistance to the RCMP and attended government 
coordination meetings prior to the NDA.197 In the case of the 2006 Six Nations reclamation, 
Canada Command issued a directive on May 3, 2006, stating that Canadian Forces members 
would “neither visit nor conduct reconnaissance of the sites.” Further, any assistance that the 
Canadian Forces would provide to law enforcement would require approval from the Minister of 
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National Defence (under the Aid to Civil Powers Act). The directive also indicated public 
messaging that the Canadian Forces “has no role in this situation [at Douglas Creek Estates], 
and does not anticipate one.”198 The timing of the directive is significant because there is 
documentation of intelligence activities a few days earlier.   
 DND/CF domestic intelligence activities are carried out by the Canadian Forces National 
Counter-Intelligence Unit (CFNCIU) and through its Security Intelligence Liaison Program 
(SILP). The SILP is a standing venue for the collection and sharing of security information and 
intelligence from civilian police and security agencies for the purpose of “early warning of 
threats” and to support the Canadian Forces where it might be called on to assist civilian 
authorities under the Emergencies Act.199 The CFNCIU produced several reports in relation to 
the events at Douglas Creek Estates in 2006. These reports indicated that information was 
shared with SILP participants, which included CSIS and the OPP. One report from April 24, 
2006 by the Toronto detachment of the CFNCIU refers to information provided by five sources 
with “established reporting record[s]” and whose information had been “deemed to be superior 
and has been confirmed by other sources.” These reports indicate that the SILP was a conduit 
for information-intelligence sharing to the OPP’s JIG at Caledonia.200 SILP meetings related to 
“Native protests” were held on December 6, 2006 at the OPP’s Kingston intelligence 
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detachment and on April 4, 2007, hosted by the OPP’s “ART Intel”.201 According to DND/CF, the 
CFNCIU “routinely exchanges information with local police departments and other agencies to 
stay abreast of developing issues.”202 
 CFNCIU reports have also been produced on other communities and actions including 
Tyendinaga,203 anti-HST protests in 2010, Red Power United protests during the G8/G20,204 and 
Idle No More.205 According to the DND/CF, CFNCIU reports are concerned with activities that 
“may have an impact on Canadian defence operations or personnel,” which includes conditions 
such as road closures that can affect the movements of equipment and personnel. The 
“peaceful” protests of Idle No More were specifically identified as not being “consider[ed] […] a 
threat to Canada or Canadians.”206  
Disrupting the ideological binary of police and military power, these collaborative 
intelligence sharing arrangements between the CFNCIU and police forces “close the circle” of 
the national security counter-insurgency realm and front-line policing. The CFNCIU, SILP, ITAC, 
RCMP National Security Criminal Investigations, and “best practices” of incident command and 
joint intelligence groups (JIGs), are “brokerage” mechanisms (Gill 2006) through which front-line 
policing is integrated within the national security apparatus. The specific problematisation(s) of 
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Indigenous protests as higher “risk” for police and for national security normalises and 
rationalises their subjection to surveillance and intelligence activities.   
 
THE UNINTELLIGENCE OF INTELLIGENCE (PRODUCTS) 
Throughout the preceding discussion, I have identified sources of tension and disjuncture in the 
intelligence-led “management” of Indigenous protests. Interviewees have also expressed more 
explicit counter-narratives about the intelligence process and about the assessment of risk as 
reflecting colonial anxieties about Indigenous peoples, communities, and self-determination 
struggles. Together these observations disrupt the depoliticising discourse of scientific 
objectivity in which ILP is couched.   
Reflecting quasi-autonomous institutional factors, there appears to be an organisational 
difference between RCMP and OPP liaisons in their views of intelligence and their relationship 
to the intelligence process. I spoke with two current and one former RCMP liaison, and a 
member who was previously in Aboriginal policing who, unlike current OPP liaisons, identified 
significant limitations and critiques of intelligence processes and products. They attribute these 
critiques to the distance and disconnect of intelligence processes from the realities of 
communities. While OPP members acknowledged past limitations of intelligence capacities, 
citing Ipperwash and even Caledonia as significant learning experiences, interviewees were 
relatively positive—sometimes enthusiastic—about the complementarity of intelligence and the 
synthesis between the liaison and intelligence sides (while still reinforcing the separation of their 
roles). As noted previously, this is identified as an outcome of improved relations between the 
Aboriginal Issues Unit (intelligence) and the PLT (and Aboriginal Policing Bureau in general) 
attributed in large part to the current presence of former intelligence officers within the PLT 
program. Because of the political pressures and impact on organisational legitimacy stemming 
from Ipperwash and Caledonia, the OPP as an organisation and its members may be more 
vested in (promoting) the success of their post-Ipperwash reforms. 
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Unintelligent Intelligence  
A significant tension between liaison and intelligence “knowledge” arises from a critique of “back 
door” information gathering. One former RCMP liaison remarked that intelligence is 
“unintelligent”, because in the context of protests or direct actions the only people who will talk 
to police to provide “sensitive” information—and thus, under anonymity—will be those with 
conflicting or opposing positions (Interview, RCMP4). The implication of this observation is to 
challenge the integrity of information obtained via intelligence officers, which is then 
corroborated against the information obtained through “open” channels, including from liaisons. 
At the same time, liaisons are not immune to the potential of deliberate misinformation arising 
from enduring mistrust of police. These critiques highlight the fallibility of the intelligence 
process and the potential for the construction of elevated assessments of risk and threat. This 
was identified by the SNPS interviewee with reference to the 2006 reclamation and some of the 
people that were speaking to—and “bullshitting”— the ART: 
I remember, right at the beginning, someone saying to me, well we told the OPP that… 
[…] basically that a terrorist organisation had reached out and… ‘and we’re going to 
meet with them.’ I’m like, why would you tell them that. […] do you have any idea what 
they’re going to do with that? They’re going to take that and by the time that intelligence, 
that intelligence officer is going be like, ‘Whoooaaa’. By the time it gets, yeah, it’s going 
to be like ‘Al-Qaeda’s got a tent on Douglas Creek’ and you know, and, ‘they have 
weapons of mass destruction stashed in that house there’. […] so like I say, we know 
our people here, right, and we know that it’s like they think, yeah, we’re just going to, you 
know, screw with them for a bit and we’ll tell them that we’ve got hand grenades and 
whatever; but there’s no, there doesn’t seem, there’s, like to me there’s almost like no 
common-sense filter when it comes to intelligence. [They] just take what you hear and 
it’s like there’s no… I guess to me, at that time anyway, there didn’t seem to be any onus 
on really looking at it and really kinda following up; and really kinda, it’s like, ‘nope, I hear 
that, we gotta pass it on’. (Interview, SNPS) 
 
This example is significant in the context of the national security mandate to take “everything” 
and “anything” seriously for investigation (Interview, RCMP5). Noting that things seem to have 
improved since 2006 in terms of how information is verified, the SNPS member had significant 
reservations about the intelligence produced in relation to the reclamation action:  
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[…] there were so many times during Douglas Creek where there were reports about 
guns and gunshots, so there was information that there were guns and it was like… 
really? Not saying that there’s not, it could be, but – really? Sometimes I just wonder, 
like… people are just too quick to want to accept stuff like that because it adds to the – 
again, it’s kind of like, justifies … an existence of either an individual or a group, right? I 
don’t know, because we weren’t buying … and we were the ones that were going on 
Douglas Creek. Now, we weren’t completely discounting it, thinking there’s no, but we 
weren’t buying that … guns were as prevalent as some of that intelligence that was 
coming across and even that group that we had to deal with that was armed, it was like 
two guns – that we know of – right, but… so it wasn’t like they were all running around 
with AK-47s, right. But sometimes you think about that, right? You just think, ‘really?’ Is 
that really, like, and that’s the other thing with intelligence – it’s kind of like nobody has to 
justify, it’s like, you know, your intelligence officer just has to say, ‘oh yeah, it’s from a 
good source’. And it’s like, okay, good enough, right?  
 
He highlights three significant limitations with intelligence. First, intelligence processes are 
coloured by the politics of organisational or program interests in asserting their relevance. This 
latter point was echoed by RCMP interviewees in relation to the Aboriginal Relations Team in 
2006. Second, in the immediacy of an occurring event and demands for intelligence, there may 
be a loosening of verification standards. Third, in the intelligence world the need for secrecy 
justifies the lack of transparency or accountability for how intelligence assessments are made. 
The assessed “credibility” of an informant (in part because they are a confidential informant) is 
justification for pursuing that information. The dependence on informant “reliability” becomes a 
significant determination in ultimately shaping command decisions. As one OPP liaison 
observed, while both liaison and intelligence sides provide real-time information to the incident 
commander on which to make decisions,  
[…] sometimes the intelligence can’t work through that cycle that quickly, but that’s 
where that reliability of the information comes in. So those are the questions that an 
incident commander would ask. Well, how do you know this information, how fresh is the 
information, can we update the information, how reliable is the source, can we confirm 
this information another way. And we do all those things. It takes time, but we would err 
on the side of caution of taking the time to confirm information before we act on 
unreliable information. (Interview, OPP9) 
 
Returning full circle then, the danger is where informants may indeed be reliable in providing 
information to the police—whether liaisons or intelligence officers—but their interaction is 
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shaped by their own motivations. As alluded to by the SNPS interviewee, the believability of 
potential weapons, violence, and links to “terrorists” is fueled in part by enduring stereotypes. 
He compared the claims about guns at Douglas Creek Estates to the failure of the OPP to 
prove the actual presence of guns at Ipperwash. I would add that this “believability” stems 
from enduring anxieties of settler colonialism as the insecurities of settlers’ claims to land and 
assertions of “nativeness” fuel racist constructs of the Indigenous Other as “Noble Savages” 
and “blood-thirsty renegades” (Alfred and Lowe 2005:23). The failure of police to confirm 
allegations of weapons, violence or “terrorist links” does not dispel those anxieties.  
 
Competing Knowledge Claims: On the Ground versus the “7000 Foot Level”   
Across the board, interviewees generally acknowledged that intelligence products have 
improved over time in terms of the verification of information, but this is a relatively recent 
development considering that these critiques related to events in 2006 and 2007. Overall, 
interviewees from the RCMP and OPP indicated that improved threat and risk assessments 
(among other intelligence products)—in terms of the accuracy of information and utility of 
analyses—relies on the raw information being provided from the front-lines and thus depends 
on front-line officers’ integration within communities. There is a distinction however, between 
the veracity of information and how it is interpreted through threat and risk assessments.  
In the case of Indigenous protests, some liaisons’ critiques of intelligence are directed 
at the definitions and assessments of threat, which reflect dominant state interests. They also 
allude to the enduring issue that racialised stereotypes permeate these assessments. 
[T]here is, interestingly enough, sometimes a disconnect between what the provincial 
and federal governments think is an intelligence issue, and the First Nation [police] 
service who may not think that’s required intelligence information. So it’s interesting. And 
I’ll give you an example. There have been issues in the past where I have heard from 
our headquarters in Ottawa that particular people were identified, or read it in 
documents, that they pose a potential threat. And when, knowing the community that I 
know, I know these people are no threats; they feel very passionate about not losing any 
more land. […] And so, I’ve had some of these discussions with Ottawa and they say it 
meets a… level… a defined level, and meets their definition of a particular threat; and 
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so, my question has always been, well, perhaps that needs to be readdressed in 
defining these issues. Because that, and I can speak from a community perspective, 
would say, those people are no threats. There may be others that are, but those 
particular people you’ve identified, no way, would they be identified  because they are 
passionate about saving that community’s land; it’s not recognised as a threat in that 
community. So defining the threat is sometimes, contradictory, between the 
government’s interest and the First Nation’s interest. And the police are very often 
caught in the middle of that situation. (Interview, RCMP10) 
 
Significantly, one of the main points of contention stems from competing philosophical 
frameworks of policing and reflects ILP’s reclaiming of problem-solving “expertise” from 
community partnerships back to the domain of law enforcement. Liaisons who are critical of 
intelligence take a position that threat or harm should be based on community definitions and 
greater input of First Nations police services. Such definitions reflect understandings of the 
underlying issues of self-determination, which are fundamentally at odds with the state’s 
interests:  
Absolutely. Yeah, it is a disconnect. Now having said that, when you look at the 
definitions, you would, you could agree that yeah they’re all, they’re all appropriate. But 
knowing the situation, these threats are somewhat different in my opinion; and 
particularly from First Nation services that are … very interested in moving forward in 
their own nation-building. So that’s a huge part of what they see as – well, like it’s been 
called in Six Nations— in reclaiming their position within the … within Canada. So it’s a 
contrasting interest in land, is what it comes down to. And so, one interest is saying that 
if somebody, anybody does this, this is really against, you know, it should be identified at 
this level as a threat against Canada. And internally at [community] or elsewhere in First 
Nations communities, they would say that’s not. And in some instances, they’d say those 
people should really be praised for putting in the time and putting in the effort, in making 
an effort, for standing up for our collective rights. (Interview, RCMP10) 
 
One First Nations RCMP member involved during the National Day of Action 2007 made an 
interesting distinction between police intelligence, national security intelligence, and information 
from the community level, which seems to be unique to the context of “the aboriginal world.” 
Like the previous interviewee, this RCMP member locates the conflicting perceptions of “threat” 
as rooted in enduring settler colonialism, which has the implication of criminalising “radical” 
Indigenous peoples.  
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[…] in the aboriginal world, I’ll say this: there’s the intelligence that’s documented in a 
report, briefing note, whatever, and there’s CSIS doing their thing, type of thing, that 
produce, you know; and then there’s what the community people are telling ya, right? 
And sometimes… they’re not aligned, okay? In 2007, there were often times they 
weren’t aligned, right, and … I don’t know what the reason is for that, I don’t know how to 
explain that myself […] I think when people work in aboriginal communities, they know 
who the radicals are, right, but I’m not sure they see them as a… threat per se, right? 
[…] But you see, I go back to, and I mean if you’re interviewing people in CSIS they’ll 
have a very different view than I—Like they’ll probably say, you know, (a) there’s some 
bad Indians out there, you know and we gotta keep an eye on them, right? But really, 
like… I guess my argument to that is—I don’t profess to know everything, and maybe 
there are some bad Indians out there; but how do we define ‘bad’? Because I gotta tell 
ya, you know, the anger and the radicalisation of young people… that has happened 
over the years; and the things that could have happened in this country—and has never 
happened? I’m saying to myself, I go back to the line, our people are pretty patient 
people, like, you know they’re pretty… okay, you know? They don’t want… because the 
capacity is there, the capacity is there… to cripple the economy, you know… I could go 
on. And you can figure that out, right? I mean, we can look at Caledonia and there was 
talk, there was fear about that; but it didn’t happen, you know? It didn’t happen. 
(Interview, RCMP3)  
 
As I discussed earlier, the problematisation of Indigenous protests as “high risk” and/or 
national security threats is based in large part on the potential to disrupt critical infrastructure. 
This RCMP member counters this dominant problematisation in emphasizing the “patience” 
and historically non-violent approach of Indigenous activism. This speaks to how settler 
colonial anxieties are incorporated into the “prevention”-orientation of national security logics. 
While intelligence products may reproduce this dominant problematisation of Indigenous 
peoples and protests, for this officer, one of the benefits of having intelligence products—
rather than no textual record—is that they can be challenged:  
So… you know, I understand intelligence is important, it’s totally important and 
sometimes, I guess even 2007, it was important to get those and say, ‘hmm I don’t think 
that’s true’ but, you know it was there on paper—it’s important. [….] Because if anything, 
you can pick out and say yeah, yeah, yeah that’s all true, that’s not true, and actually this 
is what’s true, let’s replace it; so it becomes your check and balance, type of thing. 
(Interview, RCMP3) 
 
Another RCMP member experienced frustration with the intelligence being contributed by 
partners as part of the 2007 NDA Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group, and participated in the 
“check and balance” that the previous interviewee described:  
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I was involved with the Aboriginal JIG during the big National Day of Action. I would be 
called in to give them a briefing, like I sat at their committee, and … all these other 
agencies would be supplying these reports. And I’d go ‘no, no… this is, no, no.’ and I 
always felt like, Christ, these people are going to stone me. But I’m telling you the truth… 
like I’m… why do we have all this when I’m sitting right at the committee? (Interview, 
RCMP9) 
 
For these liaisons—and OPP PLT members—these differing perspectives on the “reality” of 
threats reinforce the importance of their roles on the ground and working with/in communities 
in order to challenge problematic assessments, which they see as benefiting communities as 
well as their organisations even where it may create “difficulties”: 
Yeah, within our own organisation that sometimes creates difficulties. But at the same 
time… without us being there, we would, the organisation would never know that there’s 
this other position that’s really a community position, they would really not understand 
that. So we’re very often put in situations where we have to advise on that, and advise 
our own organisation, which is … probably the position, or the part of the job I like the 
most because it provides a real value to the organisation. And without us being there, we 
can sometimes say or do things or document things that can embarrass us without even 
knowing, and not doing it on purpose; it’s just the fact of not having anybody there and 
not really knowing; we’re looking at a situation from a 7000 foot level where it probably 
would be better if someone were on the ground and had an understanding. (Interview, 
RCMP10)  
 
Underlying these narratives is a critique of the centralisation of intelligence at RCMP 
headquarters—i.e. the “7000 foot level”—and the national security logics that infuse risk 
assessments. While this seems to bolster the rationale for greater liaison presence at the 
ground level, the caveat is that the “check and balance” they provide can only occur if they have 
the opportunity to do so, which means being consulted and having access to intelligence 
reports, and having their perspectives and contributions given sufficient weight. This becomes 
problematic where intelligence products are treated as the outcomes of a “scientific” ILP 
process and where liaisons—particularly those who self-identify as Indigenous—may be 
perceived as being “biased.” Most OPP and RCMP liaisons and officers in Aboriginal policing 
felt that their perspectives were valued. However, one interviewee was candid about the need 
for rank and file officers to challenge “unintelligent intelligence” before something “stupid” 
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happens. At the same time, he noted that many liaisons do not have the job security of being 
“fire-proof”, which can make it difficult for those in lower ranks to intervene (RCMP4).  
 The observed differences between the OPP and RCMP interviewees in their views on 
intelligence assessments may be reflective of the structural and organisational differences in the 
relationship between liaisons and intelligence counterparts. On one hand, the closeness of the 
OPP liaisons with intelligence counterparts—“best friends”—could be understood as creating 
greater opportunities for liaisons to provide “checks and balances” on threat assessments. At 
the same time however, this closeness conflicts with the rhetoric of separation that is so central 
to liaisons work with/in communities.  
 
CONCLUSION  
As I discussed in chapter 2, and which has been reinforced by the RCMP’s own “origin story” 
about intelligence-led policing, surveillance and intelligence have been integral strategies of 
settler colonial pacification. In this chapter, I (un)mapped the contemporary articulations of 
intelligence-led policing from the front-line to the less visible institutions of the national security 
apparatus.  
The “front door”/ “back door” metaphor used by liaisons captures the encompassing 
nature of policing and the synthesis of multiple strategies in an intelligence-led policing 
framework. The relationship-building objectives of police liaisons—consistent with liberal 
democratic policing ideals—are characterised by their “openness” and couched in terms of trust 
and consent. However, liaisons are very much embedded in the institutionalised intelligence 
process through their reporting of “raw” information and in utilising intelligence. The symbiosis of 
liaisons and intelligence units challenges the binary of consent/coercion in terms of eliciting 
information from communities or “targets”, as each strategy works to facilitate the other. 
Disjunctures emerge between (legitimating) discourses and actual practices, which manifest as 
an inherent tension that liaisons actively and continuously manage by asserting the distinction of 
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their role from “intelligence” in order to maintain credibility vis-à-vis the communities and 
individuals they interact with, but also vis-à-vis members of their own organisations. 
The liberal democratic discourses underlying post-Ipperwash police reforms have 
worked to legitimate intelligence practices that are increasingly entwined with the intensification 
of the national security apparatus. The democratic policing ideals of neutrality and 
peacekeeping based on respect for the complexity of Indigenous issues underlying protests is 
articulated in a way that not only legitimates but necessitates the “rational” and “scientized” 
framework of intelligence-led policing, and the emphasis on relationship-building with/in First 
Nations communities. Both these approaches are integral to (national) security operations and 
the central object(ive) of developing greater knowledge of communities and people of current 
and future risk to the settler state.  
Liberal democratic ideals of policing reinforce and strengthen rationales for enhanced 
national security operations as prevention measures. At the same time, preventative security 
logics and the ideals of an intelligence-led policing model require community-based policing as 
not only a crucial source of raw information input but to provide “checks and balances”. In 
practice, there are tensions between the ideals of, on one hand, relationship-building by liaisons 
as a community-based source of knowledge and, on the other hand, the rationalised, objective 
rhetoric of the intelligence process. One way that this tension manifests is in differences in 
perceived threat of Indigenous “radicals”. Interestingly, therefore, the post-Ipperwash 
organisational commitments to increase the numbers and involvement of liaisons, First Nations 
officers, and First Nations police services creates conditions within police organisations for the 
potential increase of challenges to criminalising discourses that are (re)produced as 
“intelligence”. These conditions for internal institutional tensions and conflicts have emerged as 
the outcome of “ruptures” to institutional assertions of legitimacy, reflecting the dialectic of 
resistance and pacification.   
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We can draw a parallel between the police priority of managing “public safety” and 
preventing “militant” disruptive actions discussed in chapter 4, with the “national security” priority 
of critical infrastructure. At root, these priorities are based on the same problem of securing 
settler-state political-economic sovereignty by managing enduring anxieties through surveillance 
and the production of intelligence. Rather than exceptional, the policing practices examined in 
chapters 4 and 5 are the “norm” of the contemporary policing of Indigenous protests. These 
practices demonstrate the multiplicity of power strategies at work in which there is a heightened 
response to Indigenous protest. This is made evident by the interfacing of police intelligence 
operations with other agencies extending beyond the public police force of jurisdiction, making 
clear the politicised nature of policing. In chapter 6, I further this argument with a focus on the 
role of the bureaucratic apparatus of Indian Affairs as a pivotal policing institution in both an 
information/intelligence capacity but also in preventing and mitigating protests as an extension 
of its mandated role of managing the state’s relationship with First Nations.  
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CHAPTER SIX 
Managing Colonial Emergencies: Indian Affairs and Emergency Management 
 
The previous chapter examined the role of intelligence in the decision-making of front-line 
officers, and identified some of the tensions that arise between liaison roles and operational and 
intelligence functions. Through an (un)mapping of the police-security intelligence apparatus, I 
showed how the work of front-line liaisons is entwined with intelligence production. The 
symbiotic relationship between liaisons and intelligence (in its various incarnations) is part of the 
post September 11, 2001 interpretation of the intelligence-led policing approach to augment 
integrated information-intelligence sharing. I showed how the political interests of state 
sovereignty problematise Indigenous resistance as a threat to national security.  
As discussed in chapters 3 to 5, front line officers articulate their role as being the 
“neutral” “meat in a sandwich” between protesters and government—particularly the Indian 
Affairs bureaucracy.207 One of Commissioner Linden’s central recommendations was for police 
forces and government to establish policies and procedures to prevent political interference in 
police operations. At the root of this recommendation is the ideal of democratic policing, which is 
responsible to law and not to political rulers. While direct and overt interference in the vein of 
Ipperwash has not been evident since the mid-1990s, Indian Affairs have had a growing role in 
managing political contention, undertaken within the same framework of prevention and 
mitigation that drives both the intelligence-led and negotiation-based approaches in policing. 
Since the early 2000s, Indian and Northern Affairs Canada has been enhancing and 
systematising its own internal production of “situational awareness” under the emergency 
                                               
207
 As I noted in the introductory chapter, I use “Indian Affairs” to refer to the institutional bureaucracy established by 
federal government to “manage” Indigenous peoples. This bureaucracy has changed in structure and name over 
time, most recently to Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada (AANDC) in 2011. When referring to the 
administrative apparatus, I use “Indian Affairs” and include both provincial and federal bureaucracies. For the sake of 
continuity I use Indian and Northern Affairs Canada (INAC) and Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs (MAA) when referring 
specifically to the federal ministry as this was its name during most of the time period that I cover.  
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management paradigm. While these contemporary practices adopt new means, formats, and 
configurations, they are continuous with the historical surveillance practices of Indian Affairs as 
a key mechanism of settler-colonial pacification.  
Historically, the contribution of Indian Affairs to the production of national security 
intelligence stems from the department’s cultivation of knowledge about the social, political and 
economic dynamics, geographies, and legal situations of the Indigenous communities under its 
administration. As discussed in chapters 2 and 5, the exchange of intelligence information 
among Indian Affairs and law enforcement and intelligence agencies is a long-standing practice 
that can be traced back to the relationship between Indian Affairs and the North West Mounted 
Police in the nineteenth century (see K. Smith 2009). Surveillance, as Smith (2009) argues, was 
the main modality of colonial power in this period, backed by the omnipresent threat of coercive 
police or military intervention. These intelligence practices were indispensable to a key 
mechanism of British imperial rule—the “colonial emergency”—as a basis for “exceptional” 
emergency measures exercised through the sovereign prerogative, or, executive power.  
In this chapter, I argue that the contemporary paradigm of “emergency management” is 
an extension of the “colonial emergency”. By showing the symbiosis of the everyday regulatory 
power of surveillance and the exercise of settler-colonial prerogative power, my analysis 
disrupts the characterisation of emergency powers as “exceptional”. Instead, these are colonial 
pacification mechanisms that exist, and change shape, because of the inherent instability of the 
settler state’s assertion of sovereignty. Ongoing anti-colonial resistance brings that instability to 
the fore, creating a persistent state of “emergency” for the settler state.  
I begin with a discussion of emergency power in relation to British colonial rule and 
suggest how “colonial emergency” continues to underlie the contemporary emergency 
management apparatus. Relying primarily on texts obtained through access to information 
requests and supplemented with open source reports and interviews, I then examine how “civil 
unrest” has become a central object of knowledge production by Indian Affairs within the logics 
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of “all hazards” emergency management. I trace how this information (knowledge) is produced 
and then disseminated in and through Indian Affairs’ networks with other government 
departments, the corporate sector, and with law enforcement and national security agencies. At 
the root of these flows of information is the rationale of protecting the critical infrastructure of the 
state. Indian Affairs and other government departments have adopted standardised formats and 
terminology reflecting an intelligencification of practices aimed at improving the synthesis with 
police-security institutions. With these formal convergences have come tensions between Indian 
Affairs and police organisations that emerge from institutional interests in securing their own 
jurisdictional authority and expertise. In the final section of the chapter, I examine how this 
“intelligence” informs the lawfare mechanisms deployed by Indian Affairs in mitigating potentially 
disruptive protests.  
 
THE PROBLEMATISATION OF INDIGENOUS PROTESTS AS AN OBJECT OF EMERGENCY 
MANAGEMENT 
 
The Enduring “Colonial Emergency”  
“Colonial emergency” is a political mechanism of managing threats to imperial power, based on 
the “prerogative power” of executive authority and with legal foundations in martial law within 
British political-legal theory.208 These political-legal mechanisms are based on the power to 
declare a “state of exception”—the condition of “being-outside, and yet belonging” vis-à-vis the 
modern nation-state—which is a reflection of sovereignty (Agamben 1998, 2005). For Agamben, 
this is a bio-political power that contains certain bodies within “zones of exclusion” that are 
“banned” from political and legal life of the body-politic. This “ban” is enabled and legitimated by 
law and rather than a void or absence of law, the categories and zones of exclusion are 
governed by legal regimes (Agamben 1998; also Thobani 2007; Rifkin 2009). Conceptually and 
                                               
208
 Agamben (2005) identifies “martial law” and “emergency powers” as specific terms used in Anglo-Saxon political-
legal theory, which are equivalents to the concept of “state of exception”, a term found in German theory. Other 
conceptions include emergency decree and “state of siege”.  
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discursively, the “exception”—and specific mechanisms such as “emergency measures” or 
“martial law”— is defined by opposition to the “norm” and, more concretely, to the rule of law. 
The state’s use of coercive interventions—or omissions—aimed at eliminating threats is 
legitimated by security logics to defend the body-politic and nation-state sovereignty. As 
Thobani (2007), Rifkin (2009), and Morgensen (2011) among others have emphasized in 
critiquing Agamben’s Eurocentric focus, the principle of “state of exception” in western legal 
systems, and as the foundation of state sovereignty, emerged out of colonialisms and the 
elimination of Indigenous peoples and nations.  
The concept of “emergency” has allowed liberal democratic states to maintain an 
authoritarian “prerogative power” of rule in a legal form consistent with principles of liberalism 
(Neocleous 2008). This prerogative emergency power has been instrumental to British 
imperialism throughout the empire to assert control through political and coercive means (see 
Furendi 1993; Hussain 2003; Neocleous 2008). This imperial prerogative power has been 
transferred to colonial and post-colonial governments through “emergency law” provisions 
(Hussain 2003). Importantly, Furendi (1993:90) points out that declaration of “emergencies” 
were not always reactive responses to uprisings or unrest, but were also “pre-planned attempts 
at the political management of anti-colonial forces”. Hussain (2003) emphasizes that the 
persistent reality of anti-colonial resistance was the foundation for prerogative power.   
In the Canadian context, the prerogative power of the state has its legal foundations in 
section 91 of the 1867 British North America Act (The Constitution Act), which transferred 
authority from Britain to the federal government to make laws in the interest of ensuring “Peace, 
Order and Good Government” of Canada. According to Valverde (2006:78) courts have 
interpreted this power as pertaining to “extraordinary measures to deal with emergencies” and 
any regulatory matters that are not specified in section 92 as being of provincial jurisdiction. This 
included transfer of Britain’s colonial imperative power in governing Indigenous peoples to the 
federal government, specified in section 91(24) as authority for “Indians and lands reserved for 
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Indians” (Diabo 1996; Valverde 2006).209 While Valverde (2006) describes the invocation of 
“extraordinary measures” as “illiberal”, reflecting a framing of “emergency powers” as being 
outside of rule of law, Neocleous (2008:58) argues that the “constitutionalization of emergency 
powers is liberalism’s gift to the modern state”—the prerogative, or emergency power, is 
enabled by and exercised through law. As Williamson (2009) writes, section 91(24) is a 
“constitutionalized state of exception” that makes it “both natural and expected that Indians 
receive differential treatment” (p.73). The perceived legitimacy of emergency powers—such as 
the War Measures Act—depends upon the invocation of discourses of threat and the need for 
the state to provide security through its asserted monopoly of violence.  
In the contemporary context, there is an expansion of the official definition of “emergency” 
beyond political threats to include natural disasters and economic crises as threats to state 
security. Hussain (2007:514) describes this as part of the emergence of a broad “structural shift 
in governance” and the creation of a post September 11, 2001 “permanent” state of exception 
(also Agamben 2005).210 Consistent with trends in the US, UK, and Australia (Palmer and 
Whelan 2006), the Canadian government’s adoption of an “all-hazards” approach to 
“emergency” in its revised Emergency Management Act 2007 reflects the definitional and 
structural expansion of governance through the mechanism of emergency. Neocleous (2008) 
argues that this expansion masks the political—and I add, colonial—origins of emergency power 
and its contemporary effects. In addition to emergency powers instituted through the War 
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 Section 91: “It shall be lawful for the Queen, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate and House of 
Commons, to make Laws for the Peace, Order, and good Government of Canada, in relation to all Matters not 
coming within the Classes of Subjects by this Act assigned exclusively to the Legislatures of the Provinces; and for 
greater Certainty, but not so as to restrict the Generality of the foregoing Terms of this Section, it is hereby declared 
that (notwithstanding anything in this Act) the exclusive Legislative Authority of the Parliament of Canada extends to 
all Matters coming within the Classes of Subjects next hereinafter enumerated; that is to say, […]  subsection 91[(24)] 
Indians, and Lands reserved for the Indians” (The Constitution Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict, c 3). 
210
 On the emergence of the National Security Policy and emergency management in broader context, see Bell 
(2006, 2011). Bell takes up these structures / processes with a focus on “anti-terrorism” and the implications for 
Muslims.  
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Measures Act211 during the two World Wars and in 1970 during the October crisis, more recently 
through the Public Works Protection Act for the 2010 G8/G20 summits,212 and Bill 78 to contain 
the 2012 student protests in Montreal,213 emergency power operates through mechanisms that 
are not explicitly identified as the exercise of executive prerogative. These are most evident in 
the colonial mechanisms of the intertwined biopolitical and geopolitical elimination of Indigenous 
peoples (Rifkin 2009; also Thobani 2007).  
Embodying the prerogative power of the state, the 1867 Indian Act constitutes a 
population to be governed by a distinct legal regime outside and apart from that which is the 
“norm” of settler society, creating an enduring state of exception. The racialised political-legal 
category of “Indian” erases historical and political identities of Indigenous peoples as nations in 
producing an object of colonial power that is relegated to reserves as territorial zones of 
exclusion, governed through the legal regime of the Indian Act (see Alfred and Corntassel 2005; 
Thobani 2007; Coulthard 2007; Rifkin 2009). As discussed in chapter 2, the Act empowered 
Indian agents as the ultimate “petty sovereigns” (Butler 2004) in controlling movement to and 
from reserves, acting as magistrates, administering welfare provisions, and having the power to 
veto band council decisions, among other roles.214 As Rifkin (2009) argues, at the root of 
colonial exception is a geopolitics of eliminating Indigenous political collectivities (“bare 
habitance”) in asserting settler territorial sovereignty (see also Williamson 2009). The existence 
of the Canadian settler state depends upon the continuous governance of Indigenous peoples 
through “exceptional” legal regimes based on the biopolitical and geopolitical constitution of 
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 The War Measures Act, 1914, 5 George V, Chap. 2. In addition to internment of Ukrainians during the first World 
War, and Japanese Canadians during the second World War, the War Measures Act was used to expropriate First 
Nations land for military buildings. Camp Ipperwash was built on land taken from the Stoney Point First Nation in 
1942.  
212
 Public Works Protection Act, R.S.O. 1990, Chapter P.55. On June 2, 2010, the Regulation 233/10 was passed 
under the Act, which expanded police stop and search powers. The Act was used on August 14, 2013 to arrest 
people during a court solidarity action in Hamilton for people arrested during an anti-pipeline protest.  
213
 An Act to enable students to receive instruction from the postsecondary institutions they attend, SQ 2012, c.12. 
Repealed September 2012. 
214
 Whereas Butler (2004) describes “petty sovereigns” as emerging in the contemporary context, reflecting a 
“resurgence of sovereignty within the field of governmentality”, my argument—following anticolonial and settler 
colonial scholars, is that sovereign power is persistent in colonial relations.  
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Indigenous peoples and nations as subjects of the sovereign state. For the state, the fact of 
enduring Indigenous resistance within and beyond zones of exclusion necessitates the 
prerogative power—as “exception”—as a continuous feature of settler-colonial society.215 This is 
an important framework in which to ground an analysis of the contemporary legally mandated 
emergency management apparatus and the central role of the Indian Affairs bureaucracy in 
containing threats to settler colonial rule. The monitoring of Indigenous communities for signs of 
potential “unrest” allows for pre-emptive, preventative interventions to maintain settler state 
sovereignty.  
 
The Emergence of the Emergency Management Paradigm in Indian Affairs 
The contemporary emergency management paradigm reflects a biopolitical concern with the life 
(health and security) of the nation-state’s population (Bell 2006, 2011). Indigenous peoples are 
included within this biopolitical concern but also occupy a state of exception, which is most 
directly managed by the Indian Affairs bureaucracy. As part of the Canadian government’s 
implementation of the Emergency Preparedness Act in 1988, Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada (INAC) established an Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP). Initially, 
the EMAP was limited to coordinating assistance for fire suppression services and search and 
recovery operations for reserve communities. The scope of “emergencies” was expanded in 
2004 to include a wider range of activities relating to health and safety, as well as infrastructure 
and housing. At this time, the EMAP was managed on an ad hoc basis by INAC employees 
“from the corner of their desks” meaning that they would deal with emergencies as they 
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 Zones of exclusion are political-social and spatial. Reserves are the most obvious form of settler colonial 
exclusion, but prisons have also become spaces of exclusion and containment, reflected in the high incarceration 
rates of Indigenous men and women.  
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occurred, as a side component of their regular tasks. Thus, resources would be shifted as 
necessary, and without formal guidelines, procedures, or responsibilities.216 
In November 2006, INAC held discussions around “rebuilding” the EMAP. In addition to 
the impending Emergency Management Act (Bill C-12), one of the key drivers of rebuilding was 
an assessed increase in “environmental and political volatility” at the time, and looking forward 
to the future. Contributing to this “volatility” were “occupations and protests”, and the Six Nations 
reclamation in particular.217  The environment was also characterised by demand for increased 
intra-governmental collaboration. For INAC this included greater collaboration with CSIS on the 
basis of a shared “preventative agenda”, “complementary views of risk”, and common 
understanding of “the nature of risk”.218  As CSIS’ mandate is one of national security 
intelligence, the common “problem” linking INAC and CSIS is the “political volatility” of 
Indigenous protests. In January of 2007, the EMAP was transferred from INAC’s Corporate 
Services to its Socio-Economic Policy and Regional Operations sector. According to a 2007 
evaluation of the EMAP, this was driven by financial pressures and the broader “operational and 
legislative environment of emergency management in Canada”.219   
This “environment” consisted of a gradual shift towards a prevention orientation to 
emergency management, which was legislatively mandated when the federal government 
enacted the Emergency Management Act (EMA) on June 22, 2007.220 The EMA sets out four 
pillars of emergency management reflecting a preventive “all-hazards” approach: mitigation, 
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 Holman, Brad. 2007 (July 31). Final Report: Formative Evaluation – Indian and Northern Affairs Emergency 
Management Assistance Program. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. P. 7. INAC ATI request A-2011-
01156. 
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 INAC. 2006 (November 28). “Rebuilding INAC’s Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP). ARDG 
Forum” [deck]. P. 3-4. INAC ATI request A-2013-00499. 
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 INAC. 2006 (November 28). “Rebuilding INAC’s Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP). ARDG 
Forum” [deck]. P. 10. INAC ATI request A-2013-00499. 
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 Holman, Brad. 2007 (July 31). Final Report: Formative Evaluation – Indian and Northern Affairs Emergency 
Management Assistance Program. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. P.4 INAC ATI request A-2011-
01156.  
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 There had already been movements towards this approach through federal, provincial and territorial (F/P/T) 
government working groups. In a July 2004 Council of the Federation meeting and a January 2005 decision by F/P/T 
Ministers responsible for emergency management, there was agreement to collaborate and harmonize their 
emergency management systems (Public Safety Canada. n.d.:2). 
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preparedness, response, and recovery. The EMA directs all federal departmental ministers to 
implement this “all-hazards” approach to emergency management, which would standardise 
practices and procedures throughout the federal government to facilitate integrated responses 
when necessary (Government of Canada 2011). Through the EMA, each department is given 
responsibility for managing its own “risk environment” in terms of the department itself (i.e. 
business continuity/continuity of operations) and for the sector under its specific authority 
“including those related to critical infrastructure.”221 INAC’s emergency management 
responsibilities include both its own risk management as a department and, because of its 
Indian Act authority, for risks affecting—and emanating from— First Nations reserve 
communities. As of January 2011, INAC, Health Canada, and Food and Agriculture were the 
only three sectors that had developed departmental emergency management plans, which 
speaks to the significance of these jurisdictions within the national scope of emergency 
management.222  
The central recommendation of INAC’s 2007 Emergency Management Assistance 
Program evaluation was for the department to establish a dedicated section with resources and 
personnel to administer the program. In 2008, INAC established the Emergency and Issues 
Management Directorate (EIMD) to manage the program in line with the four pillars set out in 
the EMA, and based on an Incident Command System that has standardised emergency 
management amongst government departments, police forces, and operational command 
centres.223 Of significance, which I unpack in the rest of this chapter, the new EIMD combines 
emergency management with “issues management”.  
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 Emergency Management Act (S.C. 2007, c. 15) s.6(1) 
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 The first draft of the department’s National Emergency Management Plan (NEMP) was produced in February 
2009, and a final version issued in 2011. Closely resembling the federal Emergency Management Framework, the 
NEMP sets out the emergency management functions of INAC, including clear lines of communication, reporting and 
decision-making internally and in relation to other EM entities (discussed further below). 
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 Police command and control (incident command) structures are consistent with the ICS standards.  
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There are two main contexts for emergency management operations: everyday 
situational monitoring and instances in which a situation and/or operations may escalate due to 
actual or potential “emergency”. Reflecting an increasing formalisation and standardisation of 
emergency management, the EIMD created an Emergency Operations Centre in July 2011 to 
serve as the central point of coordination and monitoring. This will be discussed in the next 
section. As sketched out in chapter 3, the new emergency management paradigm is linked with 
the National Security Policy initiatives introduced after 2001. The specific identification of 
“critical infrastructure” as a core object of risk management is significant because it is key to the 
problematisation of Indigenous peoples’ protests as “issues” falling under the purview of the 
new emergency management agenda of INAC and other government departments. How 
Indigenous activism is constructed as a problem, or object, of emergency management shapes 
the manner in which protests and direct actions are managed by the EIMD, the Indian Affairs 
bureaucracy, the political realm (provincial and federal governments), and the broader web of 
policing entities.224 
 
Defining Indigenous “Civil Unrest” within the Scope of Emergency Management 
Drawing on Carl Schmitt, Hussain (2003:17–19) emphasizes that “emergency” is an inherently 
“elastic category” as the conditions of an emergency situation cannot be “exhaustively 
anticipated or codified in advance”. This elasticity enables sovereign power in the capacity to 
decide and declare when conditions reach a threshold necessitating exceptional response. This 
power is captured in the constitutional enshrining of prerogative powers such as the “Peace, 
Order and Good Government” provision. Yet, what we see in the emergency management 
paradigm is the explicit inscription of this elasticity in law and policy, affording “emergency” a 
normative character. Adopting the terminology of federal policy, INAC’s National Emergency 
                                               
224
 Here I use the term policing in the context of a form of governance/power. 
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Management Plan defines an emergency as “a present or imminent event that requires prompt 
coordination of actions concerning persons or property to protect the health, safety or welfare of 
people, or to limit damage to property or the environment” (AANDC 2011:3). The emergency 
management paradigm formalised by the Emergency Management Act is based on an “all-
hazards” definition of emergencies that would fall within the scope of the Act. A “hazard” is “a 
potentially damaging physical event, phenomenon or human activity that may cause the loss of 
life or injury, property damage, social and economic disruption or environmental degradation” 
(Public Safety Canada 2011:15). The all-hazards approach assumes that emergencies can be 
managed through a common set of practices (Public Safety Canada 2011). According to INAC’s 
National Emergency Management Plan, the “all-hazards” standard  
could include a wide range of situations including, but not limited to: tornados; 
earthquakes; landslides; avalanches; floods; forest fires; industrial accidents; hurricanes; 
air crashes; storm surges; severe storms; ice storms; pandemics; cyber; chemical, 
biological, radiological and nuclear issues; shipping accidents (oil tanker spills); train 
derailments; blackouts; pine beetle infestation; tsunamis; and dependant on the 
situation, issues of civil unrest (Aboriginal Affairs and Northern Development Canada 
2011:3, emphasis added).   
 
While this appears to provide a detailed and exhaustive list of types of emergencies covered by 
emergency management operations, this is not so much a definition as an open-ended list of 
examples without defined parameters other than protection of “health, safety or welfare of  
people”, property, and the environment. Within this open-endedness, “civil unrest” is a problem 
of security and becomes an object of management. Civil unrest is described as an “issue” that 
may or may not always be an “emergency”. According to emergency management policy, an 
“issue” is “a situation that somehow challenges the public’s sense of appropriateness, tradition, 
values, safety, security or the integrity of the government.” Importantly, the policy explicitly notes 
that “issues” and “emergencies” “are closely linked as the escalation of an issue (e.g. civil 
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unrest) could become an emergency by definition” (AANDC 2011:3).225 The breadth of an “all-
hazards” standard brings overtly political “issues” of potential or actual contention under the 
official purview of the emergency management apparatus and its resources. The legal inscribing 
of “civil unrest” as a possible condition of emergency, equated with natural disasters, diffuses 
sovereign power through(out) the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, with Indian Affairs having 
a central role.  
“Civil unrest” appears more prominently in INAC’s National Emergency Management 
Plan than in the federal government’s policy frameworks. This was an evident concern in the 
2007 Emergency Management Assistance Program (EMAP) evaluation, which had 
recommended the inclusion of “civil disobedience” within the formal mandate of the program.226 
The extended scope was rationalised as “reasonable” because “if the underlying causes of 
Aboriginal civil disobedience are a departmental responsibility then the EMA encumbers the 
department as the drivers of the conflict are related to the Minister’s area of responsibility”.227 In 
making this argument, the report identifies the 2007 National Day of Action (and presumably, 
the Six Nations reclamation):  
Climate change, emerging issues of civil disobedience, public policy and legislative 
changes will further tax the department’s emergency management requirements. The 
June 29th 2007 National Day of Action, major flooding and forest fires combined with 
various overlapping civil disobedience situations in the spring and early summer of 2007 
are prime examples of how the evolving surge of emergency management will 
increasingly impact the department’s ability to react.228  
 
Following the logic of all-hazards risk management, the evaluator further argues that structures 
and procedures must be in place to prevent future instances (or issues) of civil disobedience—
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 The federal emergency management plan uses the term “crisis” instead of “issue”, defining it as “A situation that 
threatens public safety and security, the public’s sense of tradition and values or the integrity of the government” and 
also includes the caveat that “The terms “crisis” and “emergency” are not interchangeable. However, a crisis may 
become an emergency. For example, civil unrest over an unpopular government policy may spark widespread riots” 
(Public Works and Government Services Canada. “Emergency Management Vocabulary – English-French.” PWGSC 
Translation Bureau. Retrieved March 22, 2013 (http://www.btb.gc.ca/btb.php?lang=eng&cont=1149). 
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 Holman, Brad. 2007 (July 31). Final Report: Formative Evaluation – Indian and Northern Affairs Emergency 
Management Assistance Program. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. INAC ATI request A-2011-01156. 
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seen as increasing in frequency and intensity—from “escalat[ing] into full-blown emergenc[ies]” 
like Oka or Gustafsen Lake.229 
As implied by the above, INAC had long been involved in some form with “civil 
disobedience” or “civil unrest” involving Indigenous communities; however, the formal 
incorporation of these issues within the new emergency management program area of 
responsibility required active discursive work. In a 2009 draft of the department’s National 
Emergency Management Plan, there is no mention of either “civil disobedience” or “civil unrest”. 
In a follow up evaluation of the EMAP in 2010, there was a recommendation to clarify the role of 
the department in relation to civil unrest, being a matter that falls under the primary jurisdiction 
of other agencies (i.e. police) (INAC 2010:iv). The evaluation noted that the monitoring of 
protests at the regional level remained “beyond the current EMAP program authority” and thus 
had to be reconciled within the EMAP’s formal parameters and program delivery structures 
(INAC 2010:18, 29). The rationale for monitoring civil unrest relating to Indigenous communities 
stems from the fact that “the outcomes of these events have a direct impact on First Nations 
and, by extension, on the Department.” This includes civil unrest that occurs off reserves, which 
is outside INAC’s authority, but comprises the majority of protests (INAC 2010:18, 32). All 
potential and occurring “unrest” and events “are closely monitored and, in cases of escalation, 
INAC’s regional offices are in a position to provide assistance to first responders in order to 
better understand issues that may have triggered these protests and to  mitigate risks to 
individuals and property” (INAC 2010:39). Of course, in the case of protests, “first responders” 
would be the police forces of jurisdiction.  Being outside of INAC’s jurisdictional authority, its role 
would be to “focus on monitoring and documenting these events” (INAC 2010:32).  
In 2011, INAC officials were still trying to clarify and rationalise the inclusion of civil 
unrest within the all-hazards emergency management framework in terms of the “whole of 
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government risk picture.” In an email sent to the Director of Emergency Management Planning 
at Public Safety Canada, a senior policy analyst with the EIMD suggested that “Although to [sic] 
vast majority of First Nation protests are peaceful in nature, we believe it should still be captured 
due to the threat of protests evolving into incidents such as road blockades, rail blockades and 
bridge closures. Accordingly, perhaps Civil Unrest could fit within the Adaptive/Malicious 
Threats section?” 230 This language appears in the All Hazards Risk Assessment (AHRA) 
methodology, a Public Safety Canada guide developed to assist emergency management 
planners in their risk assessment practices. The guide includes “risk taxonomy”—a classification 
system—that distinguishes between “malicious” and “non-malicious” threats. Civil unrest is 
listed as a non-malicious, unintentional social threat, but “extremist acts” are identified as an 
adaptive/malicious criminal threat. The AHRA classifies malicious threats as matters of national 
security (Public Safety Canada 2012). This is significant because, as discussed in the previous 
chapter, national security intelligence discourse has adopted the category of “extremism” as a 
catch-all for a wide range of political groups and forms of direct action. 
Consistent with this AHRA framework, the final version of INAC’s National Emergency 
Management Plan (2011) incorporates “civil unrest” into the formal purview of the EIMD as a 
form of “human induced emergency”—a category that also includes “terrorist acts”. As I showed 
in chapter 5, the definition of “terrorism” has expanded to encompass a continuum of threats to 
national security in which more militant forms of political protest are increasingly characterised 
as “extremism”, bringing it within the purview of national security intelligence. 
 
Constructing the Risk of “Civil Unrest”: 
A Sovereignty Problem for INAC and the Government of Canada 
 
In the problematisation of protest within the framework of the all-hazards emergency 
management work of INAC, there is no explicit identification of how civil unrest/protest might 
                                               
230
 INAC. 2011 (February 10). “Subject: Civil Unrest” [email]. INAC ATI request A-2012-00032. 
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turn from an “issue” into an “emergency”. Whereas the risk to life and critical infrastructure is 
evident and measurable in the case of flooding or forest fires, the danger posed by “civil unrest” 
emerges from an underlying political-economic threat linked to disruption of critical 
infrastructure. This ambiguity reflects first, that the classification of “unrest” as “emergency” 
must be based on a decision and second, that this decision is based in geopolitics of settler 
state sovereignty. There are two primary contexts in which Indigenous communities may 
therefore be directly implicated as “threats to national security”: where physical critical 
infrastructure is located on or near First Nations communities, or where direct actions (such as 
blockades) may directly target critical infrastructure (such as pipelines, highways or railways).231 
The AHRA methodology is a set of guidelines intended to guide decisions at the bureaucratic 
level based upon standardised criteria that reflect foundational pillars of state sovereignty in a 
global context. The formalisation of this decision-making process through policy works to mask 
its political character and effects. The AHRA uses six impact categories through which the 
degree or level of risk of an event or issue is to be assessed: people, economy, environment, 
Canada’s reputation and influence, territorial security, and social and psycho-social impact. The 
impact on the “health and safety of Canadians” is measured in terms of fatalities, injuries, 
displacement, and access to necessities of life after a risk event (Public Safety Canada 
2012:26). Environmental impact is assessed in terms of the “size and severity” of environmental 
damage (p.30). It is through the other four categories and their ambiguities that Indigenous 
protests can be defined as “malicious threat”.  
 “Economic impact” is assessed in terms of the monetary value of “damage(s) or loss to 
economically productive assets and disruptions to the normal functioning of the Canadian 
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 Interestingly, the nexus is evident in the 2007 EMAP evaluation which notes that the EMA delegated responsibility 
for CI protection to federal ministers, and as such, CI could be seen as falling within view of INAC because “the 
continuation of a First Nations government is the only way to properly and effectively deal with an emergency” 
(Holman, Brad. 2007 (July 31). Final Report: Formative Evaluation – Indian and Northern Affairs Emergency 
Management Assistance Program. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs Canada. INAC ATI request A-2011-01156. P. 
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economic system, which may result in the loss of service as a result of a risk event occurring” 
(Public Safety Canada 2012:27). This includes “direct” losses caused by damage or destruction 
to buildings, infrastructure, machinery/equipment or raw materials, as well as “indirect” losses 
caused by the interruption or reduction in “flows of goods and services” due to disruption of 
production/infrastructure (p.28). In the case of a direct action such as the railway blockades in 
Tyendinaga in 2007 and 2008, there are both monetary losses as well as disruption in the flow 
of goods and services. In 2012, the blockade of CN lines near Sarnia had a critical impact on 
the flow of supplies to Sarnia’s “chemical valley”, which threatened manufacturing operations 
and had potential ripple effects on other industrial sectors.232 
Impacts on “Canada’s reputation and influence” are assessed based on the potential for 
an emergency to have “repercussions for the way foreign governments, populations and 
organisations view Canada, and the influence Canada maintains on a global stage” (Public 
Safety Canada 2012:37). Evidence of such impact could include “protests against Canada” and 
“deterioration of bilateral political relations”.233 High profile situations that draw attention to the 
relationship between the Canadian government and Indigenous peoples are often couched in 
terms of human rights and/or Indigenous rights violations, which disrupts the liberal democratic 
narrative of the nation-state and its dominant discourses of equality, multiculturalism and 
diversity. Canada’s treatment of Indigenous peoples has been criticised by United Nations 
committees and international human rights organisations like Amnesty International.234 As 
Goodale (2005) argues, the uncertainty of a state’s human rights practices presents investment 
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 There is a geographical concentration of petrochemical refineries and plants in Sarnia, in an area referred to as 
“chemical valley”. This potential economic disruption was identified in a December 28, 2012 Notification issued by the 
Government Operations Centre (GOC). GOC. 2012 (December 28). “Notification – Incident NT122-12” [email]. PSC 
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233
 Other examples given in the AHRA methodology: “damage or loss of control over Canada’s embassies, 
suspension of international agreements, protests against Canada, imposition of travel restrictions to Canada, 
deterioration of bilateral political relations, etc.” (Public Safety Canada 2012:37).  
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risks to other states and to corporations in the global economic context. The federal and 
provincial governments have been criticised by corporations for failing to concretely address 
land claims and treaty rights issues that lead to confrontations with First Nations and economic 
losses for the corporations.235 
The impact category of “territorial security” assesses risk to “the free movement of 
Canadians, other people and legitimate goods within the country and across borders” and is to 
be assessed in terms of “losses in the ability of Canada to control its territory, either through 
annexation or invasion” and on the geographical size of the area “disrupted”, its population 
density, and the duration (Public Safety Canada 2012:34-35). Indigenous self-determination is 
inherently tied to land, and thus on a fundamental level, are territorial struggles. Direct actions 
such as rail, bridge and highway blockades cause disruptions to movement of people and 
goods.236 During Idle No More, there were several blockades at international bridges such as 
the Seaway Bridge at Cornwall (Akwesasne), the Blue Water Bridge between Sarnia and 
Michigan, and the Rainbow Bridge in Niagara Falls.237  
“Social and psycho-social” impacts can manifest in “social actions such as protests, civil 
disturbances and vandalism” that would be indicators of “public outrage” and “public anxiety”. 
Concerns about secondary manifestations of civil unrest reflect the politicised dimension of risk 
management within the logics of the AHRA framework. The uniqueness of Indigenous activism 
and the potential for territorially dispersed solidarity actions as well as the potential for counter-
protests and “unrest” by settler groups or communities, is an added dimension of risk shared by 
police and government.   
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 For example, in November 2013, Cliffs Natural Resources, a US mining company, suspended its project in the 
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 Of course, one of the persistent “national security” concerns for the Canadian state (and the US) is Akwesasne, 
which the US-Canada border cuts through. 
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 During the NDA 2007, the US Department of Homeland Security (DHS) was a “partner” for the dissemination of 
both situational awareness and intelligence. See e.g. GOC. 2012 (January 3). “Addendum to ST122-12G First 
Nations Protests” [report]. PSC ATI request A-2012-00438. 
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Through the AHRA methodology, Indigenous peoples’ protests are problematised as 
direct threats to the sovereignty of the Canadian nation state. The most direct impact would be 
the potential economic impact that might be caused by blockades or the halting of building 
projects which disrupt critical infrastructure and economy.238 Politically, visible acts of resistance 
and the state’s responses to them shape the political image of Canada and the Government of 
Canada’s reputation in the international realm. This could have potential economic 
reverberations in trade relationships. What becomes evident in the formalisation of EIMD 
processes within this new emergency management program is a clear political concern with 
“civil unrest” and the management of optics around the underlying issues giving rise to protests. 
The “state of exception” for Indigenous peoples is normalised through these emergency 
management structures.  
 
INTELLIGENCIFICATION:  
MANAGING POLITICAL CONTENTION THROUGH KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION  
 
The emerging process of emergency management within the INAC bureaucracy reflects an 
intelligencification of knowledge production and risk management across government 
institutions as bureaucracies adopt the language of national security intelligence.239 De Lint 
(2008:280) describes intelligencification as “a colonization or fertilization of security politics via 
the tools of intelligence and its deferred reference to state auspices and exclusions”. He argues 
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 This is explicit in ITAC discourse, which clearly reflects the entwining of “International dimension/ economic 
impact”: “First Nations initiatives to assert authority over claimed traditional lands have met with some success. For 
example, Idaho Boise Inc., an American company, recently wrote a letter informing Montreal-based Abitibi Bowater it 
will no longer buy wood fibre logged from the Whiskey Jack Forest, the site of a five-year blockade by Grassy 
Narrows First Nation, without the explicit consent of Grassy Narrows Leaders. [redactions] It has been calculated that 
the twenty-four hour blocking of rail lines in Ontario during the 2007 NDA cost in excess of $104 million dollars in lost 
commerce”. (ITAC. 2008 (April 16). “ITAC Situation Report: Aboriginal  Protests – Summer  2008” (8/32). P. 4. CSIS 
ATI request 2012-210). 
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 De Lint (2008:291) describes intelligent governmentality as “recycl[ing] methods of exemption and 
exceptionalism”. In drawing on this concept, my emphasis is on the diffusion of intelligence formats beyond police 
and national security institutions as a means of facilitating integration. I would argue against the assertion that 
“exemption and exceptionalism” are redeployed in ways that have disconnected from the sovereign power of the 
state formation.  De Lint adapts his theorizing here in his work with Alan Hall (2009) in conceptualizing contemporary 
public order policing as “intelligent control”.  
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that intelligencification is a unique form of governmentality that works through information 
control, and intensifying secrecy around knowledge production and executive decision. The 
language of intelligence imbues this process and content of knowledge production with a 
scientific and technical “truth” quality (see Ericson and Shearing 1986). This intelligencification 
process is driven by the demand for integrated, collaborative information sharing and the need 
for interchangeable terminology and decision-making structures. One factor in this process is 
organisational interests in establishing expert credibility as well as authority among internal and 
external “stakeholders”. The structure of knowledge production through INAC’s monitoring 
closely parallels intelligence operations in the law enforcement-security realm. These structures 
are characterised by centralisation at institutional headquarters (HQ), which are the policy and 
political centres for government bureaucracies.  
 
Mapping EIMD Monitoring and Knowledge Production  
The Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) was formally established within the EIMD in July 
2011 as the operational “hub” of the directorate (as distinguished from policy sections). One of 
the main functions of the EOC is the continuous monitoring of issues and emergencies to 
produce “situational awareness” for senior officials and partners. This is consistent with the 
preparedness and mitigation pillars of the all-hazards framework.  
The HQ EOC centralises the monitoring carried out by each of INAC’s ten Regional 
Emergency Management Operations Centres,240 which report events and activities occurring 
within the region to the national EOC. The regional offices are responsible for developing and 
maintaining direct relationships with reserve communities, and a range of other “partners” 
including provincial and territorial emergency management offices, non-governmental 
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 Each province and territory has its own regional office except for the Atlantic Provinces, which are served by one 
Atlantic regional office. While the idea of an “operations centre” might evoke images of a dedicated, secure, high-tech 
physical space, this is not the case. At most, these are meeting rooms that may or may not have computers or 
televisions to monitor news broadcasts. 
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organisations, private sector representatives, Indigenous peoples’ organisations, and municipal 
governments (AANDC 2011). INAC’s monitoring also draws on information provided by federal 
(claims) negotiation teams, the Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Northern Resources 
Canada, media, and police intelligence.241 Both the regional and national EOCs produce a 
variety of “situational awareness products” that are shared with INAC senior management, 
intelligence agencies, law enforcement and other first responders (such as fire services), and 
other agencies on a continuous basis.  
Ontario and BC have been identified as the regions in which the majority of Indigenous 
protests occur. These two provinces developed monitoring practices relating to protests/ civil 
unrest prior to the formalisation of practices at the national level (INAC 2010).242 The Ontario 
Region office developed its own set of incident management guidelines that reflect overt political 
concerns with the risk of protests, not only defining “incidents” as potentially threatening to 
physical environment, safety, and well-being of people, but “also any event, allegation or set of 
circumstances which threatens the integrity or reputation of the department or Minister.”243 The 
expansionist inclination of emergency management as a preventative security project is evident 
as “emerging issues” are of major concern. According to Ontario Region’s incident management 
guidelines, “without mitigation, [emerging issues] have the potential of becoming incidents. They 
should also be given close attention; in-depth monitoring, continuous evaluation and proactive 
and preventative action.” 244  This problematisation rationalises broad and continuous monitoring 
to maintain situational awareness, even where “issues” may not exist, as a preventative activity 
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that can identify issues before they enter the public sphere. The objectives of the region’s 
incident management program are to provide early warning about “impending problems”, which 
would allow for timely intervention, coordination of responses, peaceful resolutions and sharing 
lessons learned.245  
There have also been event/community-specific monitoring systems established since 
2007. Prior to the 2007 National Day of Action (NDA), INAC HQ established an NDA 
Management System. In Ontario Region, a similar Incident Management System was 
established prior to the 2008 AFN Day of Action.246 In 2009, the Region developed a Brantford 
Incident Management System to specifically monitor incidents involving Six Nations/ 
Haudenosaunee activists and various property developments in the City of Brantford, identified 
as “areas of highest risk”, politically. The objective of this system was to “improve service and 
communications to senior management and the Ministers Office.” 247 The dedication of 
resources to a specific reporting system for issues involving Six Nations reflects concerns about 
the long-running Douglas Creek Estates reclamation being a “beacon” for wider Indigenous 
mobilisation.248 The ongoing tensions relating to other property developments in Brantford would 
therefore have been seen as a priority for INAC to proactively manage at a political level 
through public relations and media communications.  
 
Monitoring and the Production of Situational Awareness  
The “situational awareness” produced by the Emergency Operations Centre (EOC) is 
disseminated through different “situational awareness products”. Situation reports and 
notifications about specific events are produced and distributed as events or “issues” emerge. It 
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is common for two or three notifications to be issued for a single event, at its start, conclusion 
and sometimes as it is in-progress. Weekly summary reports—also referred to as “hotspots” 
reports—are produced to provide a roundup of issues coming onto the EIMD’s radar for that 
week, and thus, as items to watch. Weekend summary reports are notices of events to monitor 
during weekends or holidays. During these periods, duty officers are on stand-by as reporting 
contacts and to maintain the continuous “flow of information.”249  
Based on an analysis of weekly and weekend summaries produced between 2007 and 
2013 by HQ and Ontario Region, the most common types of events appearing in these reports 
are forest fires, flooding and “civil unrest”.250 Despite “civil unrest” being outside of the formal 
program scope, these issues have comprised a substantial portion of the situation awareness 
products produced by the EIMD. According to EIMD officials, approximately half of the data 
collected and of the information produced in the program is related to “civil unrest”. The amount 
of information work is significantly disproportionate to the “actual work” or resources put towards 
civil unrest-related matters, which they estimate as approximately ten percent of the overall 
EIMD workload (Interviews, INAC1; INAC2). According to the EIMD’s 2009-2010 incident report, 
109 of the 217 total “incidents” reported by the EIMD were protests (50 percent); in 2010-2011, 
it was 91 of 251 incidents (36 percent).251 Responding to forest fires and flooding affecting First 
Nations reserves makes up most of the remaining proportion of reported incidents and the bulk 
of operational response. 
Two observations can be made. Firstly, as evident from the preceding discussion, “civil 
unrest” has been identified as “one of the department’s key risks” and yet relatively few 
resources are actually used in managing this “risk” area. Secondly, much of what is being 
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monitored is outside of INAC’s jurisdictional authority. A 2011 briefing note to INAC’s Deputy 
Minister indicates that “only 30%” of these monitored protests “were related to areas within 
INAC’s jurisdiction”.252 This suggests that organisationally the extent of the EIMD’s monitoring 
practices not only significantly exceeds the department’s formal mandate and jurisdictional 
authority, but also exceeds the actual “threat” posed to the department by “civil unrest”, even in 
a political sense. According to the incident reports, no emergency management funds were 
used in the management of protests. 
The on-going evolution of the EIMD itself seems increasingly driven by the impetus of 
managing political contention relating to Indigenous peoples and issues. The 2007 National Day 
of Action was the catalyst for the formalisation of the EIMD (Interview, INAC1). An earlier 
iteration of the reporting system was referred to as the “hot spots reporting system”, particularly 
in reference to protest “hot spots”. Since 2009, the EIMD appears to be devoting more 
resources to not only monitoring but analysis of “civil unrest” incidents with an interest in 
identifying trends. An EIMD official noted that they were able to produce substantial situational 
awareness but were lacking capacity to engage in analysis (Interview, INAC1). This is reflected 
in the production of incident reports, referenced above, beginning in 2009–10. These reports 
observe patterns in provincial locations and the underlying reasons for protests, with the 2010–
2011 report engaging in a preliminary trend analysis over the three-year period covered by the 
two reports. According to another EIMD official, the production of analysis would be “helpful” for 
their law enforcement partners (Interview, INAC2).  
This conceptualisation of INAC’s “hot spots” reports shows the move towards 
intelligencification as what are originally internal issue management tools become repackaged 
for distribution to external clients in the law enforcement-security apparatus. EIMD reports and 
notifications are disseminated to a wide range of recipients within the Indian Affairs bureaucracy 
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as well as to external partners including representatives at the Assembly of First Nations 
(including an INAC-funded Emergency and Issues Management advisor), the Red Cross, 
Treasury Board Secretariat, First Nations and Inuit Health (Health Canada), Transport Canada, 
Justice Canada, the Privy Council Office, Public Safety Canada, Emergency Management 
Ontario, and the Government Operations Centre. These products are also distributed to the 
RCMP, Sûreté du Québec, OPP, CSIS and ITAC.253  
 
INAC’s Knowledge about Indigenous Civil Unrest 
The development of annual incident reports as an analytic product provides insight into the 
problematisation of civil unrest for the department. The reports are based on the accumulation 
of data from all of the situational awareness products produced by the EIMD which is compiled 
in a database.254 Thus, the incident reports capture all of the incidents that would have been 
reported to the EIMD, which would have been assessed as being within its purview. The 
incident report is intended to “be a key analytical tool which will improve INAC’s ability to 
anticipate and plan necessary emergency mitigation and preparedness activities in First 
Nations, Inuit and Northern communities”.255 The incident reports have separate analyses for 
each of the three categories of emergencies, protests, and “other incidents”. Of note, the “other” 
category includes “planned protests that did not occur”. In each report, this made up a 
substantial number of the “other” category (33 percent in 2009-10 and 47 percent in 2010-11).256 
Decisions as to what information would be considered relevant or significant for inclusion 
in reporting reflect the interests and concerns of the Department. These interests shape (and 
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are shaped by) the standardised data fields of the various situational awareness products and 
the input categories of the master database. The defining of analytic categories influences the 
EIMD’s analysis of trends or patterns, and thus, any potential planning or mitigation activities 
undertaken by the department based on those analyses. The reports contain statistical 
breakdowns of the reasons for protests, the regional location of events, the month in which the 
events occurred, the specific locations (targets), and the types of protest activity. 
Perhaps the most important—and contentious—category, evident from an email 
exchange between EIMD personnel working on the protest database, was the classification of 
“reasons for protest”.257 In both reporting years, the most common reason for protests was 
“disputes with government”, followed by “band governance issues”. The “disputes with 
government” category is broken down further by jurisdictional areas—i.e. INAC, a province, or 
law enforcement—but without specification as to types of disputes. “Land claims” is listed in the 
2009-10 report as included within the “disputes with government” category but without any 
further data. The category of “land claims” does not appear at all in the 2010-11 report. After 
“disputes with government” and “band governance issues”, other primary reasons identified in 
2009-10 were the “National Day of Reconciliation”, “environmental concerns”, the torch run, 
“human rights” (including actions relating to missing and murdered women), “economic 
development opportunities”, and “other”. In 2010-11, additional reasons were classified as 
“economic development disputes”, “other”,258 “environmental concern”, and “native rights”. 259 
Aside from concrete events, most of these categories correspond to policy areas.  
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Protests were broken down in terms of types of activities in the two reports: 
demonstrations, marches/rallies, road, bridge or airstrip blockades, occupations, traffic 
slowdowns, hunger strike, threat to contact media, and destruction of US-Canada border 
marker. The inclusion of “threat to contact media” as a type of protest in 2009-10 is indicative of 
the issue management orientation of EIMD monitoring in relation to “civil unrest”.260 The reports 
include regional comparisons of where protests occurred, with Ontario having the majority of 
incidents. Although the band(s) involved (and its reserve location) are identified in the master 
databases, this is not reported. One suggestion for analysis was to examine “how many times a 
band located in a different province protests in another protest”, which suggests an interest in 
acts of solidarity, coordination/collaboration, and movement-building.261 This, of course, is one 
of the “unique” risks of Indigenous direct actions. The ambiguities and scope of what is 
monitored by the EIMD reflects the inability to pre-define or anticipate concrete “emergency” or 
“crisis” situations and, thus, the perpetual anxieties underlying the “logic of necessity” that is 
inherent to the concept of emergency (Neocleous 2008:71), which forms the rationale for 
constant situational awareness. 
Although statistical, the analyses in these incident reports are translatable to 
“management” concerns by identifying “hot spots” in terms of geographical areas, issues, 
location targets, and—linked to the master database—knowledge of which bands engage more 
frequently in protests and the degree of disruptive threat they may pose. The dedication of a 
substantial space in these reports to protests, treated as equivalent to emergencies despite 
being outside INAC’s official authority, is indicative of the political dynamics underlying the work 
of the EIMD. At the same time, it could be argued that the analyses are simply confirming 
“common knowledge” amongst INAC employees. This would parallel a common sentiment 
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expressed by police officers that strategic intelligence products (i.e. the future oriented as 
opposed to operational intelligence) is just confirming or repackaging what they already know 
from experiential knowledge. Yet, “intelligencification” depoliticises this knowledge and its 
production through the administrative rationality (Hussain 2007) of the INAC and Public Safety 
Canada bureaucracies.  
 
Intelligencification through Standardisation 
While INAC had been producing “hot spot reports” prior to 2007, the reporting formats of the 
EIMD’s various situational awareness products have become increasingly structured and 
standardised with guidelines developed by HQ to ensure consistency in the regions’ reporting 
with HQ standards. In 2009, notifications became structured as formal reports with standard 
fields: title/subject; First Nations profile summary; Description of threat/event; Current actions/ 
responsibilities; threat/event analysis and/or assessment; source of reporting; and the 
Emergency and Issues Management official who issued the notification.262 Providing further 
standardisation paralleling an intelligence process, the EIMD developed three separate logic 
models in 2011 to guide personnel in deciding whether or not to produce notifications for 
protests, emergencies, and “other” events.263  
The significance of the change in format is that it reflects the formalisation and 
institutionalisation of a process to enable sharing and collation at the HQ level. This format 
ensures that what is considered relevant information is captured in the monitoring process. At 
the same time, this standardisation constrains how information is presented—what is and is not 
reported about these events. Standardisation is also a means of bringing the EIMD reporting 
systems in line with those of other government departments as well as with law enforcement 
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and security agencies. To an extent, these reports increasingly resemble—in form and 
terminology—those of security intelligence.  
In 2010, there was a concretisation of EIMD processes, coinciding with two significant 
events that required an “all of government” preparation: The Huntsville–Toronto G8/G20 
Summits and the Vancouver Olympic and Paralympic Games. Both events had an “aboriginal 
issues” dimension, which brought INAC into the fold. INAC/EIMD involvement in pre-event 
planning was the catalyst for the creation of two types of documents, commonly seen in law 
enforcement and military operations: Concepts of Operations and After Action Reports. These 
documents were created by the Police Interchange Program officer in the role of Senior 
Emergency and Issues Management Advisor at the time for each of these major events 
(Interview, INAC2). Concepts of Operations were also developed by the BC and Ontario 
Regions. These documents—and their production processes—were seen as good practice in 
line with the requirements of the new emergency management framework. As standard 
templates, the Concepts of Operations “[could] be used as a blueprint for future emergencies 
and potential disasters”.264 Of note, each of the Concepts of Operations included a separate 
threat assessment for protests and public demonstrations. In summer 2012, the Police 
Interchange Program officer was in the process of developing a general “civil unrest” Concept of 
Operations that would be appended to INAC’s National Emergency Management Plan 
(Interview, INAC2).265 
While established by INAC in response to specific moments of (impending) potential 
“crisis”, governance techniques—whether as policies, reporting systems, or collaborations—do 
not disappear with a return to “normal” conditions (i.e. before the introduction of these 
techniques). As Neocleous (2008) and Hussain (2007) argue, “emergency” measures become 
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permanent, producing shifting, or “new”, conditions of normality. Whereas scholars have 
described the managerial re-organisation of police organisations as reflecting increased 
bureaucratic professionalization (e.g. de Lint 1998; Chan 1999), administrative bureaucracies 
have been adopting terminology and practices of the law enforcement realm. These are not two 
separate trends, but rather the emergence of a common logic across policing entities through 
the all-hazards emergency management paradigm. This logic is aimed at facilitating greater 
collaboration. 
 
COLLABORATION:  
INTERFACING WITH THE INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY AND “STAKEHOLDERS” 
 
Following from the primary role of the EIMD in monitoring and producing situational awareness 
about issues and emergencies, the second key role for the directorate has been the 
development of relationships with all the other entities involved in emergency management—
other government departments, law enforcement, national security agencies, NGOs such as the 
Red Cross, and private-sector corporations. There are three inter-related levels through which 
these relationships have emerged: formal networks (via centralised hubs), direct bilateral 
relationships with specific agencies, and in ad hoc collaborations for specific “critical incidents” 
such as at Six Nations-Caledonia or the Days of Action in 2007 and 2008. Within these 
collaborations, the EIMD has been attempting to establish its relevance and credibility within the 
INAC bureaucracy as well as to gain traction amongst its “security” partners. 
 
Formal Interfaces  
There are two overlapping sectors of formal network collaboration that INAC participates in. The 
first is the emergency management network via the federal level Government Operations Centre 
and regional emergency management operations centres (EOCs). The second network is the 
law enforcement-intelligence sector via the Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC) and 
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the RCMP’s Criminal Intelligence and National Security programs. While each is a discrete 
entity, as I discussed in chapter 5, they are all interconnected.  
As the ministry responsible for whole-of-government coordination, Public Safety 
Canada’s Government Operations Centre is the centralised hub for the dissemination of 
situational awareness provided by ministries, law enforcement, intelligence agencies, provincial 
and territorial level emergency management organisations (EMOs), and a wide range of 
“stakeholders”. INAC employees might be embedded with the Government Operations Centre 
during major events, as they were during the G8/G20 Summits.266 As in the case of the RCMP’s 
National Security Criminal Investigations, there is a consistent insistence by representatives of 
the Government Operations Centre and provincial level EMOs (i.e. Emergency Management 
Ontario) that protests are not within their scope of concern or jurisdiction. However, it is evident 
based on the situational awareness products produced by these entities, as well as in products 
of the EIMD, that protests are objects of concern for the Government Operations Centre and the 
provincial and territorial EMOs.267  
During the 2007 National Day of Action, Ontario’s Provincial Emergency Operations 
Centre issued “NDA Bulletin[s]” providing updates on the status of various events such as the 
blockade at Tyendinaga Mohawk Territory.268 Similarly, the Government Operations Centre has 
produced regular reports and a matrix database tracking all events related to Idle No More.269 
These reports include events such as flash mobs, horse rides, the Victoria Island “open house” 
during Chief Theresa Spence’s hunger strike, teach-ins, fundraisers, and community gatherings. 
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INAC is the main source of reporting for these reports. 270 While concerns about rail or highway 
blockades could be justified as falling under the Government Operations Centre and emergency 
management purview, inclusion of events such as teach-ins and fundraisers reflect concerns 
about managing the Idle No More movement, its visibility, and its future trajectory. As noted in a 
secret Government of Canada planning exercise for future protests, “success breeds success” 
and the success of Idle No More in mobilising media attention will “[inform] future protest 
organisers and the success of their endeavours.”271 
One of the major reporting sources for the Government Operations Centre is the 
Integrated Terrorism Assessment Centre (ITAC), and there is a significant overlap and, 
arguably, duplication of reporting by emergency management offices such as INAC’s EIMD to 
both entities. As discussed in chapter 5, ITAC was established in 2004 within CSIS as a 
centralised national security intelligence hub, which is fed by numerous law enforcement and 
government ministries. As noted above, INAC’s EIMD disseminates its situational awareness 
products to ITAC. ITAC intelligence reports are also shared with the EIMD and senior INAC 
officials. The collaboration between INAC and ITAC has also been more direct as EIMD 
employees have been embedded within ITAC before and during high profile events including 
the 2007 National Day of Action. Amongst representatives of the intelligence community, INAC 
was identified as one of “the top departments with intelligence” relating to Indigenous 
protests.272  
Beyond the formal “brokerage” mechanisms of operational centres (Gill 2006), there are 
direct relationships between INAC and various partners including the Department of National 
Defence, CSIS, Canada Border Services Agency, the OPP, Ottawa Police Service and Sûreté 
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du Québec (Interview, INAC2). One of the key mechanisms for building these direct 
relationships is the Police Interchange Program, which was established in 2008. The purpose of 
the Program is to “provide enhanced networking capabilities with law enforcement agencies and 
other federal/provincial/territorial government departments across Canada” through the 
placement of a police officer within the EIMD in the role of a Senior Advisor.273  The program 
was spearheaded by former Ottawa Police Service Chief Vernon White, and as of 2013, there 
has been three officers in this position (Interview, INAC2). The Police Interchange Program 
Advisor provides INAC with “enhanced intelligence and coordination of activities” with Public 
Safety Canada, CSIS, the RCMP’s Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group (JIG), Canada Border 
Services Agency, and the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in relation to 
civil unrest.274 As noted above, the Police Interchange Program officer has been instrumental in 
the creation of Concepts of Operations for the EIMD. One of the aims of the Police Interchange 
Program was to overcome the reluctance of police agencies to share information with outsiders 
(Interview, INAC2). One significant bilateral relationship was between the EIMD and the 
RCMP’s Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) as representatives contacted each other 
directly seeking information or confirmation about potential and occurring protests.275 
The formal networks and relationships facilitate ad hoc collaborations in response to 
major events, such as the 2007 and 2008 National Days of Action, the G8/G20 summits, 
Olympic Games, and Idle No More. By the fall of 2006, INAC was already engaged in a “public 
safety network”, contributing its hot spots reports, risk analysis and advice, “incident 
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management teams”, and “fact finders and special representatives”.276 Part of this network was 
a standing forum to share information about protests. The group was chaired by the RCMP and 
involved the Privy Council Office, CSIS, Canada Border Services Agency, the Government 
Operations Centre, Department of Fisheries and Oceans, Natural Resources Canada, Transport 
Canada, and INAC among others.277  This was a foundation for collaboration ahead of the 
National Day of Action (NDA) 2007. Public Safety Canada developed a Federal Coordination 
Framework for the NDA to coordinate the response amongst government departments. INAC 
was the lead on the policy side and the RCMP was the lead on the operational side. In 2007, 
there were weekly meetings of the Assistant Deputy Ministers Emergency Management 
Committee (ADM-EMC) on Aboriginal Issues in advance of the NDA. The participants were 
INAC, Public Safety Canada, National Defence, Transport Canada, RCMP, Privy Council Office, 
ITAC/CSIS, Justice, Fisheries and Oceans, Treasury Board, Health Canada, Parks Canada, 
and Canada Border Services Agency. At one of these meetings,  
INAC mentioned it would benefit from a brief roundtable during the weekly meetings to 
provide them with any intelligence committee members may be able to share … ITAC 
noted that people from INAC have been seconded into their centre. It was mentioned 
that ITAC produces both weekly reports and reports as required, in both classified and 
unclassified versions. There was a discussion on how information is fed into ITAC 
reports. It was noted that the top departments with intelligence are RCMP, CSIS, INAC, 
DFO and Transport.278 
 
The 2007 NDA was a key catalyst for the EIMD’s formalisation and its inclusion in wider security 
networks through its contribution of intelligence and “expertise” in the area of government–First 
Nations issues. The longer-term timeframe for planning leading up to the 2010 Olympics and 
G8/G20 Summits provided an important opportunity for EIMD to further build its capacity and 
credibility among security partners. Although the Olympics and the G8/G20 Summits were not 
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considered to have a significant “aboriginal” component, INAC was directly involved in 
preparations and operations for both major events. While the role of INAC was relatively limited 
in the overall scope of these events, the department’s involvement appears significant to the 
evolution of the EIMD. According to a briefing note, the Police Interchange Program officer 
participated in the Integrated Security Unit for the Vancouver Olympics and “[e]ffectively, the 
police constable ensured that INAC was fully integrated within the overall security operations. 
Similar operations took place for the G8/G20 Summit as well.”279  
During the G8/G20 Summits, INAC was involved because there are First Nations 
reserves within the 50 kilometre security corridor of the G8 in Huntsville –the emergency 
management concerns – and because of a broad concern about First Nations communities 
“whose political affiliations and attendant assertions may be of relevance”.280 Compared to the 
Olympics, the EIMD involvement in planning for the G8/G20 Summits was “limited to providing 
situational awareness and consequence management assistance”.281  Prior to the summits, 
INAC was “taking actions such as strengthened information gathering and information 
sharing.”282 INAC had planned to have an Ontario region representative “embedded” in the 
Unified Command Centre, which was an operational command space. Here the representative 
would be a liaison “integrated with other federal / provincial partners as a trusted agent of 
INAC”. The liaison would report to the Ontario Emergency Operations Centre, which would then 
report to INAC HQ’s Emergency Operations Centre.283 However, the After Action Report 
indicated that this operational presence did not occur. 
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An INAC representative participated in the RCMP-led Joint Intelligence Group (JIG) for 
the Vancouver Olympics, which also included CSIS, Canada Border Services Agency, Interpol, 
and the US Department of Homeland Security. The purpose of this “employee interchange” was  
to obtain a good understanding of not only the RCMP but also of the Department’s 
relationships with BC First Nation leaders and communities identified in the Areas of 
Interest to the security pillar of the Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic Winter 
Games. This representative provided assistance in consequence management and 
mitigation of issues. 284 
 
The liaison person was “not [to be] involved in front line work but are deployed to outside 
organisations to provide intelligence support and report back to the Department”285 In 
evaluating the “sensitive information sharing” that INAC engaged in during operations, one 
respondent to the After Action review commented that “INAC has good working relationships 
with both CSIS and our policing partners” and that “INAC’s secondment to the JIG enhanced 
our ability to receive sensitive information.”286 The level of integration of INAC on both the 
intelligence and operations sides through the JIG and Integrated Security Unit challenges the 
post-Ipperwash emphasis on police autonomy from political influence. 
 
Informal Interfaces: The “Official Unofficial” Way  
Despite the proliferation of formal channels of collaboration between government 
departments and law enforcement in the managing of Indigenous protests, there is also an 
“unofficial” network of informal interpersonal relationships among police personnel and 
government officials “in the field”. These channels of communication are an outcome of the 
formal structures and policies discussed above, and of attempts to institute boundaries 
between police operations and political interests. On one level, “relationship building” with 
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partners and stakeholders—such as undertaken by the Police Interchange Program officer—
draws significantly on interpersonal contacts and relationships, which may evolve into more 
institutionalised channels of communication as discussed above. On another level, there is 
what one official from Ontario’s Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs (MAA) described as a “furtive” 
“official unofficial” means of communication between government and police entities 
(Interview, MAA1). These practices circumvent the official channels of communication 
implemented after Ipperwash. Front-line police and Indian Affairs (and other government) 
officials are not supposed to communicate directly, but must report upwards internally 
through their respective chains of command. Information may then be shared laterally by the 
Commissioner or OPP liaison on a need-to-know basis to counterparts in the Ministry of 
Community Safety and Correctional Services (MCSCS). On the ministry side, this information 
may then be selectively disseminated to other ministries and then downwards.  
The “furtive” practice of communication is directly attributed to the strength of Linden’s 
recommendations and the partitions between the OPP and government. According to the 
MAA official, the findings of the inquiry regarding Mike Harris’ influence on policing 
operations, “scared everybody in the system silly […] And… as a result of that, people not 
only don’t do anything that could be perceived as committing that sin, but they don’t do 
anything that could be seen as committing that sin” (Interview, MAA1; emphasis by 
interviewee). As a result, communications between the government and police sides are “not 
disciplined and focused and organised” with the implication that “we don’t respond in the 
optimal fashion because we’re all too afraid” (Interview, MAA1). The formal exchange of 
information is “sanitised” at the senior management levels of the respective organisational 
bureaucracies, which this official criticised as inefficient and prone to miscommunication or 
misinterpretation as information travels through multiple levels, individuals, and reporting 
formats. While these channels exist formally, in practice, Aboriginal Affairs negotiators will 
talk with police officers in the field. While being “leery” and careful about whether they would 
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be seen as crossing the line, “if you really, really, really need to find out something, then 
that’s the official unofficial way to go” (Interview, MAA1). 
As another MAA official describes, the post-Ipperwash “leeriness” extends to a 
greater consciousness among officials to confirm the validity of information before taking 
action, which echoes the objectives of intelligence-led policing. However, it can foster “official 
unofficial” avenues of communication: 
When somebody hears something, there is a process to have that checked with a 
reliable source on the OPP side before that information is, is supposed to go anywhere 
else – it may depend upon where it comes, how it comes through, so there’s always that, 
you know, amorphous kind of, you know, ‘well I heard from so-and-so, and I heard’, well 
okay let’s check on that. Let’s make sure we’ve got accurate information before we act 
on it. And in like fashion, that the OPP have a way of making sure that they’ve got a 
clear line of communication to know what it is that the government is saying about, you 
know, this kind of, whatever the nature of the issues are. (Interview, MAA2)  
 
Another interviewee discussed the importance of informal networks alongside formal structures 
as being a consequence of the disjuncture between the traditional cumbersome hierarchies of 
bureaucracy and the contemporary realities of instant communication: “I think that’s also why 
you see the growth, or you’re hearing more about informal networks and contacts and 
everything else, is… because you can’t wait to get the, you know, approved briefing note that 
has to go through ten hands… as much” (Interview, MAA3). This observation is supported by 
the comments of the other MAA official regarding the process of information sharing via “official 
official” channels of senior officials (Interview, MAA1).   
 The emphasis on informal communication channels echoes the importance placed on 
activating personal networks in the realm of policing. In both cases, one of the strengths of 
these informal channels is a perceived reliability or accuracy about what is happening 
because of the proximity of sources to the issues or people of interest. The relative autonomy 
of front line police officers in their exercise of discretion is well-documented (see Skolnick 
1975; Ericson 1982; Manning 1997), and this autonomy provides a space for “unofficial” 
communications outside of the formal reporting structures. Police suspicion of outside 
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agencies seems to be mitigated by a frustration—shared with bureaucrats—with what is 
perceived as the politically-driven creation of bureaucratic obstacles to “optimal” responses 
(Interview, MAA1). These insights about informal, “unofficial” communications disrupt the 
construct of streamlined, structured, “scientific” processes characteristic of intelligence-led 
policing rhetoric, which underlies the contemporary police-security apparatus. It also subverts 
the assumptions that formal lines of decision-making and communication increase 
transparency and accountability.  
 
OPERATIONAL COLLABORATION: NEGOTIATED MANAGEMENT, INDIAN AFFAIRS STYLE  
Thus far I have discussed the information work—surveillance—of INAC’s EIMD. In this section, I 
examine the role played by INAC in managing protests as “critical incidents”. Interviewees 
emphasized that there is a separation between the EIMD and the policy and negotiations sides 
of the INAC bureaucracy; however, in practice the convergence of political interests with the 
front-line management of protests is inevitable. The Indian Affairs bureaucracy is the 
administrative arm of the colonial apparatus of the settler state—it is the defendant to, and 
arbitrator of, Indigenous legal and quasi-legal challenges while also being responsible for 
“supporting” Indigenous peoples. Drawing on Hannah Arendt’s argument that race and 
bureaucracy are the “defining elements of imperial rule”, Hussain (2007:518) argues that the 
prerogative power—the executive decision—to declare “emergency” or crisis rests upon 
classifications of threat determined by the bureaucracy. The formalised surveillance of “unrest” 
carried out by the INAC bureaucracy and the intelligencification of these practices introduces 
ways of classifying threats based on bureaucratic expertise.  
The connection between bureaucratic governance and executive decision becomes 
evident in the central role played by INAC as “subject matter expert” in operational responses to 
“critical incidents”. There are two main ways that they might be involved, which would come 
from different areas in the federal and provincial Indian Affairs bureaucracies: negotiations and 
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emergency management. The first “expert” role would be as representatives of the department 
most familiar with the history and status of any specific land claims or rights challenges at the 
root of a protest, through its direct engagement with these challenges. The second role as 
subject matter experts would be in the EIMD context with the department’s knowledge about the 
situation as a safety and security “risk”, based on its monitoring of the “issues”, groups or people 
involved. Both roles stem from the historical proximity that Indian Affairs employees have to 
communities in the capacity as field agents (negotiators) or as emergency management 
coordinators. There are divergent perspectives, however, in what members of INAC, MAA, and 
law enforcement see as an appropriate level of involvement in managing protests. Part of this 
stems from claims to “subject matter expertise” on both sides. There is an evident tension 
stemming from the idealised and formal separation between government and police decisions. 
As discussed in chapter 4, several OPP and RCMP interviewees expressed frustration with the 
lack of involvement from INAC or MAA in addressing the issues underlying protests. What 
emerges with greater inter-organisational collaboration in managing Indigenous protests are a 
number of inter-institutional tensions between police and government, and between the federal 
and provincial levels.   
 
Managing the Heat: Strategies of Mitigation and Response  
The EIMD’s work in documenting “hot spots” and potential hotspots of “civil unrest” is meant to 
inform senior officials and their decisions on whether and how to respond. This sheds light on 
the rationale of including civil unrest within the mandate EIMD in terms of the potential for 
“hotspots” to impact upon the department itself (and on other First Nations communities). For 
INAC—as part of the whole-of-government response—the primary objective is to prevent 
hotspots from escalating and igniting wider mobilisations. The spectres of Oka, Ipperwash, and 
Caledonia are often invoked in planning documents and messaging, emphasising the 
importance of taking mitigative action to prevent “validat[ing] the threat and/or use of violence” 
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by “militants”.287 This is an objective that is also articulated by front-line police. The strategies 
employed by INAC draw on the same liberal legal-security logics as police strategies in 
managing protest actions. Rather than addressing the underlying issues giving rise to direct 
actions—such as housing, land and consultation issues—prevention and mitigation in the 
emergency management framework pertain to the problem of protest actions.   
The 2007 National Day of Action (NDA) was a highly significant event in the 
concretisation of INAC’s EIMD but also for “integrated” responses among government and law 
enforcement to manage high profile protests. As discussed in chapter 3, the NDA 2007 
converged with the ongoing Six Nations action at Douglas Creek Estates and with blockades at 
Tyendinaga—two of the major enduring “hot spots” of concern to government and police. Here I 
will focus on INAC’s active engagement in strategies of mitigation and response alongside those 
of front line police. These strategies took two interconnected trajectories through working with 
First Nations leaders and by making strategic policy announcements. Both of these strategies 
are enabled by Indian Affairs’ administrative relationship to Indigenous peoples and its specific 
jurisdictional authority—an authority that police forces are not vested with. Yet, we see the same 
organising logics of pacification at work. Central to INAC’s strategies is the fabrication of the 
good liberal “subject of empire” (Coulthard 2007) through a divide and conquer strategy that is 
specific to Indigenous peoples. Unreasonable and illegitimate groups are positioned as 
extremists or criminals outside of “legitimate” institutionalised avenues of dissent. At the same 
time, the liberal-legal institutions of land claim negotiations and Aboriginal rights are reinforced. 
Although emanating from separate institutions, there are clear commonalities in Indian Affairs 
and police strategies in managing resistance to prevent political-economic disruption.  
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Isolation of the “Militants” (or, Criminalisation)   
Underlying the goal of “mitigating” potentially disruptive events, INAC’s efforts worked to isolate 
“militants” while reinforcing the status quo of colonial systems, reflected in an INAC presentation 
to the RCMP in March 2007:  
Incidents led by splinter groups are arguably harder to manage as they exist outside 
negotiation processes to resolve recognized grievances with duly elected leaders. We 
seek to avoid giving standing to such splinter groups so as not to debase the legally 
recognized government. Incidents are also complicated by external groups such as 
Warrior Societies or non-aboriginal counter-protest groups.288 
 
Those who engage in activities outside of the formal mechanisms of the negotiations and legal 
systems are constructed as inherently risky. They are positioned as illegitimate in 
contradistinction to the “legally recognized government” of Indigenous communities, which are 
products of the elected band council system imposed on First Nations through the Indian Act. 
To maintain the status quo of the state-imposed governance systems, which it administers, 
INAC must “seek to avoid giving standing” to those who challenge those systems. The power of 
the imposed governance systems as a mode of pacifying political resistance is captured in the 
description of “incidents led by splinter groups” as being “harder to manage as they exist 
outside” these institutions.289  
The Public Safety Canada Federal Coordination Framework for the 2007 NDA identified 
two “success indicators” for mitigating the threat of “militant incidents,” which can be understood 
as objectives of pacification strategies: “[i]solate the splinter group as an anomaly in efforts to 
improve relations with First Nations” and “[a]void situations developing which cause others to be 
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attracted to the splinter groups (e.g. confrontations which may be provoked for this purpose).”290 
These “indicators,” or objectives, work through constituting “good liberal subjects” or “subjects of 
empire” (Coulthard 2007) through a divide and rule approach that incorporates some First 
Nations communities and people into the Canadian state while Othering the “militants”. The 
identification of “militants” as “anomalies” positions them as aberrations to the norm of settler 
state-First Nations relations and to liberal democratic norms. The settler state seeks to forge 
common identity or purpose with Indigenous communities and peoples against the “splinter 
groups”.  
There are “hotspots” that appear as persistent areas of concern because of their 
“unpredictable” quality due to the involvement of “splinter groups” and “militants”. These include 
Douglas Creek Estates (identified as Caledonia in documents), Belleville, Brantford, Deseronto, 
Grassy Narrows, and Maniwaki (Barriere Lake, QC). 291 Reflecting the nexus of political and 
“security” concerns, all of these “hotspots” were identified as “communities of concern” by the 
RCMP’s Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group’s threat assessment (see chapter 5, p. 223). For 
INAC and the RCMP, there are two main implications of these events which stem from their 
high profile. First, these events have potential to be “beacons” or “lightning rods” that fuel 
solidarity actions and broader Indigenous mobilisations. A second implication is that the ways in 
which government responds to these events can create precedents that potentially validate 
militant tactics.292 
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Shaping the Message (or, Institutionalising Dissent) 
Just as the RCMP drew on its Public Safety Protocol with the Assembly of First Nations (AFN) 
prior to the 2007 NDA, one of the key mitigation activities undertaken by INAC was to use its 
existing relationships with First Nations leaders and the AFN to shape the branding of the event. 
This was an important piece of the formal integrated government management of the 2007 
NDA, as identified in the Federal Coordination Framework: “INAC has proposed to the AFN that 
events be organised around the theme of Building Bridges not Blockades. To this end, they 
have proposed to the AFN a number of suggested events to build public support and deter 
militant protests”293. This occurred through meetings and discussions between INAC 
representatives and the AFN—including then-INAC Minister Jim Prentice—aimed at persuading 
leaders to “stand down their plans”.294 The AFN’s own promotion of the event reflected their 
adoption of this branding in explicitly stating that the AFN was not “calling for blockades” but 
intended “to build bridges—not blockades—with Canadians.”295 
Of significance is that this direct involvement of INAC in encouraging “legitimate” forms 
of protest, and directly working with the AFN, is not evident in many of the unclassified versions 
of intelligence products, including ITAC reports. Further, in a version of the Public Safety 
Canada Framework released by the Department of National Defence via access to information, 
this information had been entirely redacted.296 This gives the impression that the NDA was an 
autonomous event led by the AFN based its December 2006 resolution. The redacting of this 
information is significant because it indicates awareness—at least in some parts of the state 
apparatus—that these political interventions were part of the policing management of the NDA.  
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Policy Announcements (or, Active Lawfare)  
INAC’s bureaucratic and political power—deriving from its administration of claims, policy, and 
funding—was deployed as a key strategy in the “negotiations” aimed at mitigating the impact of 
the 2007 NDA. One month before the NDA, Public Safety Canada officials noted that INAC 
officials were meeting with individual First Nations leaders “to ensure that Ministerial 
commitments are acted upon. It would appear that the FN leadership in those provinces may 
establish a moderate posture in relation to the protest activities.”297 Rather than an ad hoc 
approach this was a deliberate political strategy of mitigation. At a June 6 meeting of the 
Assistant Deputy Ministers-Emergency Management Committee on Aboriginal Issues, “INAC 
reported that three major policy initiatives are to be announced next week. INAC noted its cross 
country Ministerial tour is having a significant impact”.298 Public Safety Canada officials 
observed that these activities and the content of the policy announcements “may help minimise 
protest activity.”299 A secret National Defence email more bluntly stated that “INAC has made a 
significant offer related to Caledonia and plans to make some broader policy announcements in 
the coming weeks as preventative measures. Everything will be timed carefully.”300 
The major announcement made on June 11, 2007 by then-INAC Minister Jim Prentice 
related to the federal government’s establishment of an independent specific claims tribunal with 
a committed annual fund of $250 million to resolve land claims. On June 25, Prentice 
announced that his priority during the summer of 2007 was to “jump-start the treaty process” 
and address outstanding claims in BC. This was a significant commitment in light of the collapse 
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of the Kelowna Accord, which contributed to the call for the day of action.301 Two other policy 
announcements were directed specifically at mitigating two of the “hotspots” identified by INAC, 
Public Safety Canada, ITAC, and the RCMP: the ongoing Six Nations reclamation and the 
intended rail blockade by Roseau River First Nation. Roseau River Chief Terrance Nelson had 
spear-headed the AFN resolution in 2006 calling for the NDA and had announced his intentions 
to blockade rail lines on June 29. On June 20, the federal government transferred 30 hectares 
of land to settle an outstanding claim of the Roseau River First Nation. The following day, 
Nelson announced the blockade had been called off in favour of a rally and concert.302  
The Caledonia announcement had been made earlier on May 30, 2007, regarding a 
settlement offer of $125 million in four out of 27 outstanding Haudenosaunee/Six Nations land 
claims—but not the one encompassing the Douglas Creek Estates site. On the day of, but prior 
to, the announcement an email exchange in Public Safety Canada noted, “[t]here will be offer 
made today re: Caledonia which includes the requirement for everyone to leave the site.”303 
According to an INAC Ontario backgrounder produced after the NDA, “One condition of the offer 
is cessation of the Douglas Creek lands occupation. The H/SN representatives would also have 
to demonstrate a strong consensus in the community in support of the agreement, signalling no 
further occupations.” 304 In the time between the offer and the NDA, officials were careful in their 
communications with the Haudenosaunee/Six Nations representatives  “1) [t]o minimise the risk 
that it becomes a trigger for direct action prior to the June 29 National Day of Action; and 2) to 
prepare the ground for a frank discussion (i.e. a reality check on what is and is not open for 
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further discussion between Canada and H/SN), at the first scheduled meeting post June 29 
[…].”305 The Six Nations representatives rejected the settlement offer and its conditions.   
While the flurry of political activity in response to the perceived potential threat of 
widespread disruptive protest in the summer of 2007 could be viewed as “successful” results of 
the intensity of Indigenous mobilisation, the “carrots” offered as preventative measures—
specific claim settlement offers and improving the treaty process—have been severely critiqued 
as assimilative mechanisms that extinguish aspects of Indigenous self-determination (see e.g. 
Diabo 2012). As I discussed in chapter 2, liberal mechanisms have often followed high profile 
encounters between Indigenous peoples and coercive state power. The refusal of communities 
to accept settlements can be construed as “unreasonableness” in rejecting a reconciliatory 
gesture from the state; being outside of state-imposed systems—like “splinter groups”—they 
may be subject to more coercive forms of mitigation by police-security agencies as ‘extralegal’ 
subjects who choose to be outside of the “legitimate” state apparatus. 
 
Conflicting Perceptions on the Role of Indian Affairs in Managing Protests  
The incorporation of “civil unrest” within the work of the EIMD has not been entirely welcomed 
by those within INAC. As one of the EIMD officials noted, some of their colleagues feel that civil 
unrest should not be included within the EIMD purview because it is seen as a law enforcement 
matter (Interview, INAC2). Indeed, such sentiments were expressed by some of the law 
enforcement personnel interviewed, who critiqued both INAC and Public Safety Canada’s 
Government Operations Centre as reaching beyond their respective realms of authority and 
being somewhat redundant.  
These tensions have an evident impact on the flow of information between law 
enforcement and their “partners.” One EIMD representative acknowledged the continued 
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reluctance of police contacts to share information and intelligence. But to one RCMP liaison 
officer, the lines are clear: “They’re an outside agency; they’re not a police agency. Some of 
these people kind of forget that issue. And I’m very cautious of what I release and who I release 
it to.” In terms of dealing with EIMD personnel seeking information about protests,  
They call for like, ‘how many people are in the protest’. Well… what’s that gotta do with 
INAC? I mean, like… […] I don’t get a phone call from some other agency wondering 
how many uh, Chinese people are there. Y’know. So I uh, y’know, I said ‘I couldn’t tell 
ya, I didn’t pay attention to the numbers’. Which I do [I do] but I mean, it’s not an issue. 
They can hear it from the media. If it’s open source stuff, I’ll give it to them. (Interview, 
RCMP9)  
 
Similar annoyance was expressed in relation to the Government Operations Centre and 
emergency management more generally: “And they’re always asking us, ‘well what’s up? 
What’s up?’ Well there’s nothing goin’ on right now, you know, leave us alone! […]But you 
know, they’re sending stuff out […] they’re looking for things sometimes” (Interview, RCMP6). 
Interestingly, this interviewee suggested that in relation to emergency management, “Other 
government departments try and manage those command centres out of the corners of their 
desk, and that’s the way it should be done” (Interview, RCMP6; emphasis added). As 
discussed, this was the predominant model of emergency management prior to the 2007 
Emergency Management Act and INAC’s establishment of the EIMD.  
Some OPP liaisons have experienced similar interactions with Indian Affairs: 
Well, you know something, I don’t really talk to government… and not to be disrespectful 
– I have command staff … that speak for me. You know? I know like, when we were in [a 
highway blockade/slowdown] I was getting calls from the government, like from INAC 
and all that, and trying to get more of a feel for on the ground. I go, well, I said, ‘I’m not in 
a position to talk right now. Right now things are peaceful’ – and I kept it generic – ‘but, 
you might want to speak to my bureau commander…who could give you more insight. 
Because those are the people that, I mean, those are the people that … run in your 
circle,’ so to speak, you know? And more, like, I’m not here to be your intel – and that’s, 
and I’m not here to be your, your… your scapegoat, you know, and like, you know you 
ask me how are things going and how many people are there? Well, why aren’t you 
having some people here to deal with this? (Interview, OPP3, emphasis added) 
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The OPP interviewees indicated that direct contact on the front line from INAC “doesn’t seem to 
happen anymore. We feed our stuff up and then someone in our organisation talks to someone 
over there. So, I think that’s pretty stream-lined now” (Interview, OPP4). As discussed above, 
the organisational protocols in the sharing of information between the OPP and MAA coupled 
with this reluctance by police to share informally, is a source of frustration for some of the 
government officials, related to assertions of expertise: 
[I]f the idea of collaborating to manage … incidents… means that they get to ask us 
anything they want but we can’t ask them anything that we want… and they get to get all 
our information and we don’t get any of their information… That’s kind of not the best 
basis, just at a bureaucratic level. […] you never know what happens to the information, 
and you never know how it gets interpreted, and …sometimes you could see the effect 
of its use; you’re pretty sure, ‘oh, I said that, look what happened.’ And sometimes you 
have no idea and … but we, we you know, don’t ever ask any questions back for fear of 
crossing the line. And so, although you could make some inferences from the kinds of 
questions you’re getting, but generally there’s been, it’s just been a one-way 
collaboration when it’s happened” (Interview, MAA1).  
 
From the police intelligence side, there is a question as to the utility of intelligence material for 
INAC or MAA, but also security restrictions on sharing sensitive information that may have been 
obtained from confidential sources:  
Now we’re always criticised that it’s always a one-way thing, right? ‘We’re going to give 
you all this and we get this from you guys’. But again, you know, my position I guess – 
biased opinion – the value of giving you a [thirty day] report on … several  organised 
crime investigations… and then we’re challenged with the added burden of we have to 
go to a court and then protect the integrity of […] this; those issues come into play as 
well. And then where does it go in your wider community? So you know what I mean? 
So for you, if you’re going to report it out, that, okay, this is the awareness issue in …. 
Davis Inlet, you know, it’s not really going to create another secondary issue, but for us it 
would, eventually would. So that’s why… and then, we’d have to give you a heavily 
redacted … which, the value of which would be questionable. (Interview, RCMP11) 
 
On the police side, official findings such as those of the Ipperwash Inquiry or of the APEC 
inquiry are a means of reasserting police autonomy: “because of the Hughes Inquiry…if 
politicians or anybody tries to interfere in our operations, we say, take a look at the Hughes 
Inquiry! You know? So they step right back […] it becomes something for us to…clearly show, 
you know, anybody who forgets, what our mandate is and the distance that needs to be kept” 
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(Interview, RCMP6). An OPP member alluded to the new climate of “being scared silly” within 
provincial government as a result of Ipperwash:   
[…] political, politics, political entities, political [masters], I think since after Ipperwash 
have gotten the message loud and clear. In eight years […] I’ve only had one instance 
where a political entity called into a command post, and actually they didn’t quite make it 
into the command post, but somebody knocked on the door and said, this ministry’s on 
the phone. I said, no, you tell them that’s not an appropriate contact. Tell them to go 
through their, go through to our minister. Wanna talk? Talk to our minister. That’s the 
appropriate line of communication; not directly into a command post… during a police 
[incident].  
 
[TD] Yeah. I mean I’ve talked to some folks at the Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs, and –  
 
And I’m sure that frustrates them! (Interview, OPP2) 
 
Indeed, the one-sidedness is seen as integral for police preparedness in managing potential 
protests. One OPP member distinguished between the utility of having information about 
government positions and plans in relation to outstanding First Nations issues versus 
operational interference: “For us to be aware of it, to be able to sit down and have a cup of 
coffee, and say ‘how are things going’, on either side of the table? Great information. But if it 
sparks a critical incident? When it comes to operational decisions—that’s where we have to 
draw the line” (Interview, OPP2). 
The views on INAC’s involvement in police planning and coordination are mixed. For 
some liaisons and Aboriginal Policing sections, these tensions are subtly related to the deeper 
frustrations about being the “meat in the sandwich” where government—particularly INAC—is 
seen as part of the problem:  
And… the… the different agencies like INAC and Public Safety … are all looking out for 
their interests, within their programs, to brief up to their ministers about the issues that 
are happening. And they’re… I’m not sure they’re quite as concerned about putting the 
issue to bed as we are. We’re the ones that get left wearing it. They don’t have to show 
up. […]but I find the other agencies, because they’re not on that front-line of doing that -- 
we gotta let them know what’s happening, let ‘em know what’s going on, but… yeah, do 
they gotta get out there and solve that tomorrow? (Interview, RCMP1) 
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Some police personnel see INAC involvement as indispensable, particularly from a political 
management perspective and with their jurisdiction for addressing land and rights claims. 
Speaking about the NDA 2007, a former member of RCMP Aboriginal Policing stated that “it 
was so important to have them join with us at the hip; and you know, working very closely with 
Public Safety Canada, right, because I know, like the way government works, the questions 
would be coming to Public Safety, National Security Advisor, and also CSIS right?” (Interview, 
RCMP3). On the operational side,  
[…] when you’re dealing with a real time live issue, it’s good to have those more frequent 
interaction type of things, you know, if it can’t be face-to-face the phone works, you 
know, so… but no, it was important to have INAC’s participation and they were right 
there you know; they were pretty good, like, for the first year it was, ‘cause there was 
some things they had to move on pretty quick and they were moving […]. (Interview, 
RCMP3) 
 
For some officials working in federal and provincial Indian Affairs, there is also a sense that the 
police are overstepping their realms of expertise and authority. This is directly tied to a lack of 
communication coming from the police, whose operational decisions are seen as reflecting 
arbitrary judgements on the validity of protesters’ claims:  
I mean, we don’t know what standard they use. So sometimes they go in there on 
something that seems, to me, to be completely spurious. Some claim from somebody—
never heard of this claim, never heard of these people, like they have no legitimacy in 
any community. And the OPP are out there acting like this is the best established claim 
in the world and keeping everybody apart. Doesn’t happen too often, but it does 
sometimes, so you just shake your head, you know? And think then, so we’ll watch this. 
If it gets bad enough, then we’ll have to find a way… to say to the OPP, are you sure you 
know what you’re doing in this one? (Interview, MAA1)  
 
While there is a significant degree of inter-organisational collaboration in the managing of 
Indigenous protest, there are also conflicts. These inter-organisational tensions reflect anxieties 
and discontinuities of colonial governance. Rather than monolithic or absolute, colonial 
institutions are characterised by instability that must constantly be dialectically (re)negotiated 
both internally and externally vis-à-vis other organisations. These discontinuities and 
disjunctures arise in part from the constant shifting of pacification strategies and legitimating 
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discourses, as well as from quasi-autonomous bureaucratic interests, federal-provincial 
jurisdictional politics, and inter and intra-organisation tensions such as competing assertions of 
“expertise”. 
 
CONCLUSION 
While the Indian agent may no longer exist formally within the Indian Affairs administrative 
apparatus the surveillance role endures, articulated within the language and logics of the “all-
hazards” emergency management paradigm. In this chapter, I have shown how the construction 
of Indigenous “civil unrest” as a perpetual potential “emergency” serves as the rationale for 
continuous monitoring of Indigenous people on and off reserve. The emergency management 
paradigm works as a means of managing Indigenous peoples as a distinct category, or 
population, defined by the geopolitical colonial relationship. This relationship is (re)inscribed 
with/in emergency management programs and operations and is therefore a(n other) 
mechanism of racial-colonial governance. Through this paradigm, we can see how front line 
policing entwines with the lawfare mechanisms of claims negotiation and settlements, deployed 
by Indian Affairs as prevention strategies.  
The contemporary emergency management apparatus is continuous with the “colonial 
emergency” as a liberal political mechanism justifying “exceptional” modes of governance for 
Indigenous peoples. Enduring colonial anxieties over threats to settler-colonial order are 
institutionalised and de-politicised through the language and practices of intelligencification and 
the “common good” objective of securing critical infrastructure. The expansion of the emergency 
management apparatus is self-rationalising because of the perpetual and potential nature of 
anti-colonial challenges. Measures implemented in response to “exceptional” events such as the 
2007 National Day of Action, blockades at Tyendinaga, the G8/G20, or the Olympics, are not 
dismantled once the events end. Rather, they are incorporated as “best” practices or 
improvements in managing “issues” to prevent “emergencies”. The “normalisation” of so-called 
309 
 
exceptional measures is, as Neocleous (2008) and Hussain (2007) have argued, characteristic 
of liberal-security logics. The anxieties over potential “civil unrest”, as fundamental challenges to 
the state’s assertion of sovereignty, are an enduring feature of settler colonialism. By disrupting 
the ideological dichotomisation of the “norm” of rule of law and everyday practices of 
surveillance on the one hand, and “exceptional” conditions or emergency, on the other hand, we 
see how settler state sovereignty is an incomplete, unstable project. 
The tensions and disjunctures between ideal models of governance and actual practices 
reflect this instability. Despite the formalisation of processes through text-based formats, at the 
“ground” level of responding to protests (potential and occurring), the activities of Indian Affairs 
bureaucrats is very much informal particularly in their relationships with law enforcement 
partners. This is consistent with the importance of informal relationships emphasised by those 
working in law enforcement, particularly in liaison and operational roles. Also, as in the case of 
police-intelligence operations, there is a disconnect between the formalised processes of 
intelligence production (and even decision-making) and the on-the-ground activities that operate 
through informal relationships amongst colleagues and between sectors “in the field”. The 
expansion of bureaucracy resulting from the multiplicity of formal collaboration platforms and 
channels has perhaps consequently fueled the unofficial, informal means of communication 
among bureaucrats and police personnel. The “furtive” nature of these exchanges—driven 
underground because of the “fear” of being perceived as crossing the line—raises implications 
about transparency and accountability as such communications are generally not documented.  
The multiple sites of both formal and informal knowledge production (i.e. situational 
awareness products) and monitoring processes, creates a redundancy and excess in 
information production. Despite the formality of official structures and processes, there is 
evident overlap and circularity in communications among entities. As one member of INAC 
Ontario Region stated in an email updating colleagues on a recent meeting with the provincial 
emergency operations centre ahead of the 2008 NDA, “Only the government could make things 
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this complicated, they are receiving the same info from about six sources!”306 The establishing 
of centralising entities such as the Government Operations Centre, ITAC, the HQ EIMD at 
INAC, or provincial emergency operations centres, appears to institute an order to the 
production of information, yet there is significant overlap among these processes alongside 
those of police organizations as discussed in the previous chapter. The result is a proliferation 
of official, formal documentation of varying classification levels and ranging from “heads’ up” 
messages to operational plans. Again, this production of documentation significantly exceeds 
the assessed potential for “actual” emergencies arising from the documented events. One 
implication of the formal apparatus is the sustained, or even amplified, perception of risk and 
threat in which the anticipation of potential threat—with reference to Oka, Ipperwash, and 
Caledonia—to economic and political state interests may be(come) self-fulfilling.  
  
                                               
306
 INAC. 2008 (May 28). “Subject: SITREPs Ontario Region” [email]. INAC ATI request A-2011-2003. 
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CONCLUSION 
The Meat of the Sandwich?  
 
The OPP handling of Idle No More protests in 2012 and 2013 was consistently identified as 
emblematic of the significant changes made to the organisation since Ipperwash, and even 
since the 2006 Six Nations reclamation. There were blockades of international bridges, 
highways, and railways, and in the end, there was only one arrest at Aamjiwnaang spurred by a 
CN Rail injunction. Returning to a quote from earlier in the dissertation, an OPP member 
reflected, “ten years ago, fifteen years ago, if [Idle No More] would have happened? God knows 
what we’d look like today, right? Which is, it wouldn’t have been good at all. There would have 
been thousands of charges, probably, and people hurt” (Interview, OPP8). Embedded in this 
sentiment, which was echoed by many of the police officers interviewed, is an 
acknowledgement of the police role in escalating conflicts. Following from this, an important 
caveat is needed, in that the outcomes of any event cannot be attributed solely to the actions of 
police and/or government, but are shaped by the intentions and decisions of organisers and 
participants. The history of Indigenous political actions has been largely non-violent, even in the 
few cases where participants were armed; those events that have escalated have often been 
fueled by aggressive policing and/or settler provocations.  
In Ontario, current police practices seem to have been successful in limiting the 
escalation of conflict by decreasing antagonism and tempering aggressive police enforcement. 
In the post-Ipperwash context, the policing of Indigenous protests has adopted discourses of 
prevention and of reconciliation through building relationships. Carried out within the institutional 
objective of maintaining police control in managing events, these practices reveal the 
paradoxical nature of these discourses in the context of settler colonialism in which Indigenous 
self-determination is antithetical to settler state sovereignty.  
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As policing strategies, prevention activities work in ways that constrain the parameters of 
“legitimate” protest while intensifying governance and having punitive implications for those who 
transgress. These processes are organised through and reinforce the symbiotic logics of (1) 
liberal legalistic discourses of rights, and (2) security discourses of prevention and 
management. These processes are part of settler colonial pacification that simultaneously works 
to suppress Indigenous nationhood and (re)produce the authority of the Canadian nation-state. 
The tensions and disjunctures of policing practices made visible in my research reveal tensions 
in these governing logics.  
In this concluding chapter, I bring together the preceding chapters by (re)presenting the 
various institutions of the police-security apparatus as a visual “map”. I then (un)map the rights-
prevention logics that organise the institutional practices of this apparatus as they are applied in 
the specific context of Indigenous communities and protests. In concluding, I identify some 
limitations and implications of this project, which open up avenues for further inquiry.  
 
MAPPING THE POLICE-SECURITY APPARATUS 
The convergence of public order policing, intelligence, and national security developments in the 
post-Ipperwash period has produced a policing-security landscape in which responses to 
Indigenous resistance extend far beyond the local police force of jurisdiction. Encounters at 
events such as those at Six Nations in 2006 (which is ongoing), the 2007 National Day of 
Action, blockades in Tyendinaga, and the Idle No More movement have contributed to shaping 
this apparatus/map. There have also been many other events that I have not discussed in 
detail, such as the anti-mining protests at Kitchenuhmaykoosib Inninuwug (KI) First Nation and 
the anti-uranium exploration actions by Ardoch Algonquin and Shabot Obaadijiwan First 
Nations. In 2008, six leaders from KI and the co-chiefs of Ardoch Algonquin First Nation were 
jailed for participating in the respective protests. Both of these cases involved government 
failure to consult the First Nations before granting access to corporations, and led to judicial 
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precedents around the use of injunctions. In addition to these high-profile events, there are also 
all of the encounters that occur on an everyday basis as police engage in relationship-building 
with/in communities, and “governing at a distance” through various modes of surveillance by 
police, intelligence, government, and corporations.  
The institutions and social relations that form “the state” are not static monolithic entities. 
While I describe these institutions and organisations as symbiotic on an institutional level, they 
are shaped by quasi-autonomous interests and objectives that may conflict or compete with 
others. This gives rise to inter-organisational tensions, such as between police organisations, 
and between police and government, especially with Indian Affairs.  
In chapters 4 to 6, I unmapped this landscape by examining how it has and is being 
constituted—and challenged—through concrete policing practices in three overlapping 
institutional clusters of front line policing, national security, and the Indian Affairs bureaucracy. 
As I have argued, the involvement of these institutions is not new. The symbiosis among police, 
security, bureaucratic, and corporate entities are the foundations of settler colonial pacification. 
Strategies of pacification shift continuously, and are (re)organised in configurations deploying 
new rationalisations. The post-Ipperwash configuration of practices works through symbiotic 
discourses of liberal rights and prevention-based security. 
Figure 2 maps a constellation of the key institutions that compose this landscape that I 
have examined at the micro-level in the dissertation. The landscape consists of both formal 
(institutionalised) and informal relationships and has been built-up over time in terms of the 
entities involved and the relationships among them; it is important to understand this as a 
shifting constellation that fluctuates especially in relation to events such as high-profile “critical 
incidents”. This map is produced from a specific standpoint of the problematic of policing 
Indigenous resistance—it is not an exhaustive or static arrangement. Institutions may fade in 
and out in terms of their relevance or roles during particular events. While I have emphasized 
the interconnectedness of institutions, facilitated by “brokerage” mechanisms such as ITAC and 
314 
 
the Government Operations Centre, I have not included lines or arrows on this map to 
symbolise the relationships amongst the entities because they are constantly shifting and vary 
in terms of degrees of formality or “officialness”.  
 
Figure 2 Police-Security Apparatus Post-Ipperwash 
 
   
(UN)MAPPING PRACTICES AND LIBERAL RIGHTS-PREVENTION LOGICS  
My research addresses limitations of the substantive literature on public order policing within 
both social movement studies and the field of police studies. It also makes an intervention in the 
relatively new body of work in theorising and applying the concept of pacification. Extending on 
Neocleous’ argument for “re-appropriating” the concept of pacification in the study of policing 
and security, I draw on settler colonial theory to articulate an analytic concept of settler colonial 
pacification in understanding police power in the specificity of Canada as a settler colonial state. 
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Pacification is a process, not an event or programme, and thus, is ongoing (dialectic) and 
characterised by dissonances, disjuncture, conflict, disruption and constant tension. There are 
three interconnected analytical pillars for this framework: (1) centring imperialism and 
colonialism(s), (2) spatial governance and territorialisation, and (3) resistance and agency.  
First, by analytically centring colonialism, the ongoing subjugation of Indigenous peoples 
informs our understanding of state institutions such as the police. The study of policing cannot 
be disconnected from the historical foundations of the police institution which are rooted in 
imperialism and colonialism. The social, political and economic relations of the state have 
emerged out of the historical and ongoing attempted elimination of Indigenous peoples. The 
enduring resistance and presence of Indigenous peoples and assertions of self-determination 
means that the settler state sovereignty remains insecure.  
Second, because settler colonial sovereignty depends on the assertion of political-spatial 
authority, it is important to address the spatial dimensions of order-production. The assertion of 
sovereignty is based on the maintenance of boundaries of authority; settler colonial 
territorialisation is an ongoing process, reflected in the abrogation of treaties and the 
comprehensive claims process. Protests and direct actions, as assertions of Indigenous self-
determination, are spaces in which the incompleteness of settler state sovereignty can be the 
most visible. The significance of “the state” as an idea and as a system of institutions, including 
law, remains a relevant level of analysis. Although situated in a global state system, 
international law, and global capital, pacification is enacted through localised institutions. The 
policing of Indigenous protest is not “just” the management of an event to minimise disruption 
and harm, but it works to contain self-determination while asserting settler state sovereignty 
(and the assumed legitimacy of the state). The disruption and (re)production of settler colonial 
order occurs in legal, political, institutional and geographical spaces.  
Third, spaces of resistance are spaces in which the exercise of power is made visible. 
Understanding pacification and settler colonialism as processes emphasizes the dialectic of 
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power and resistance in shaping social, political and economic relations. The constant flux 
produces disjunctures where institutional shifts may not align with other institutions. “Ruptures” 
to settler colonial order can occur when dominant discourses of liberalism appear irreconcilable 
with institutional practices, leading to shifts in practices and/or discourses. While there are 
continuities of settler colonialism, the techniques and discourses through which they are 
organised have changed over time, often in direct response to “ruptures” emerging from 
confrontations with Indigenous resistance.  
In chapter 1, I discussed the role of international law in legitimating imperialism and 
colonisation as a means of making peace. The legitimation of the sovereign power of nation-
states was based on the “common good” of security. Drawing on the contributions of Foucault 
and political economy, police is a modality of power that is historically specific to the symbiotic 
emergence of capitalism and the formation of nation-states. Policing was a state project of 
organising “public life” to maximise productivity and wealth of the population as a source of state 
power. If police is the production of public order, pacification was—and is—a form of imperial 
and colonial order production, couched in Enlightenment ideals of “civilisation”. In the settler 
colonial context, the making of ‘peace’ is contingent on elimination of Indigenous peoples.  
In chapter 2, I showed how liberalism has been integral in settler Canadian state 
formation through the “liberal treatment” of colonial policy and the application of “rule of law”. 
Since the late twentieth century, lawfare strategies have shifted to a liberal legal rights regime 
and the politics of recognition and reconciliation (Comaroff 2001). It is through these logics that 
contemporary pacification strategies are organised. Through lawfare, the categorical 
subjugation of Indigenous peoples is reconciled with liberal discourse, grounded in the 
constitutionalised “exception” of Indigenous peoples (Agamben 1998; Williamson 2009). This 
“exceptional” state is the norm if we understand the lawfare of settler colonialism as continuous 
with warfare—an ongoing conflict between settler state sovereignty assertions and Indigenous 
self-determination. As Comaroff and Comaroff (2006) argue, lawfare is an arena of struggle. 
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Within this arena, and from outside and against it, dominant discourses can be unsettled and 
(re)articulated.  
In chapter 3, I argued that crises for the legitimacy of institutions and “the state” are 
managed by institutionalised reconciliation processes such as public inquiries. These are a form 
of the “judicialisation of politics” (Comaroff and Comaroff 2006:27). I discussed the Ipperwash 
Inquiry as a liberal mechanism of governance that (re)articulated a problematisation of 
Indigenous protests as an object of liberal democratic policing. In identifying the “unique” 
dimensions of indigenous protests, this problematisation validates and normalises the 
categorising of indigenous protests as inherently high(er) risk. This has been translated in police 
policy and structural reforms which continue to change, especially after being “tested” by 
successive direct actions and protests. The dimensions identified as making indigenous protests 
“unique” and “high risk”—such as the tendency to occur on or near a First Nations territory—are 
conditions that have been produced by settler colonialism over time. If policing-security 
practices draw on this specific problematisation of indigenous protests as “truth”, and these 
practices have been rationalised and normalised through policies and frameworks, there is also 
a naturalising and normalising of settler colonialism. 
Contemporary police-security practices reflect the management of settler colonial 
anxieties and the constant (re)production of sovereignty through the constitution of liberal 
“subjects of empire” (Coulthard 2007), and processes of criminalisation and exclusion. The 
logics of liberalism-security take shape in the entwined discourses of rights and prevention, 
which underlie the pacification strategies I have examined: (1) the public inquiry as governance 
mechanism; (2) liaison policing and measured response; (3) intelligence-led policing; and (4) the 
critical infrastructure nexus of national security and emergency management. Threading through 
these strategies are common legitimating devices of transparency, formalisation, rationalisation, 
neutrality, reconciliation, and rights and responsibilisation. These devices have the effect of 
masking the political nature of policing while normalising practices. 
318 
 
The most visible activation of the rights regime is by front line police in (1) building 
relationships with communities, reflecting a reconciliation discourse, and (2) in the specific 
context of protests through the deployment of rights in establishing parameters of legitimate 
protest and responsibilising protesters. The success of these strategies depends in large part on 
the police assertion of neutrality, especially on the part of liaisons. As I explore in chapter 5, one 
core dimension of constructing neutrality is by asserting a distinction from intelligence work. The 
“front door”/ “back door” metaphor used by liaisons relies on a central binary of liberal 
democratic policing that associates intelligence—or “spying”—with “high” or political policing 
versus the apolitical “peacekeeping” of “low” policing. In situating the activities of liaisons in 
relation to measured response and intelligence led policing, the governance of protests through 
rights and responsibilisation reflects a disciplinary-juridical form of power; this is amplified in the 
context of protests as Indigenous rights are subsumed by individual liberal rights defined by the 
settler state. 
Another device of establishing “neutrality” as a basis for developing “trust” and facilitating 
communication is through openness, or transparency. I have shown how transparency is 
activated by liaisons and incident command as a means of responsibilisation through 
relationship-building, maintaining the distinction between liaisons and intelligence operations 
(the “front door”/ “back door”), strategic shows of force, and educating protesters about rights 
and their limits. The transparent communication of police intentions to protesters shifts 
responsibility for the police use of force and their deployment of covert intelligence operations to 
protesters as based on their “choices” or decisions not to comply.   
Several of the police personnel that I interviewed describe their role in protests as “the 
meat in the sandwich” between protesters and government, being on the front-line of conflict but 
lacking the power to “resolve” the claims or issues at stake. This characterisation alludes to 
being an independent entity caught in the middle of two opposing parties. On one level, this 
position is an assertion of institutional authority and autonomy from the interference of other 
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institutions. However, through (un)mapping the ways in which front-line policing is entwined 
within the broader police-security apparatus of the state, their role is much more substantial and 
significant to broader power struggles. A more accurate metaphor might be the “meat of the 
sandwich”, which emphasizes the integral role of the police as a state institution in settler 
colonialism. As the front line in “managing” conflicts, police activities have deep ripple effects on 
the work of other institutions. At the same time, I have also shown how the “meat in the 
sandwich” could also describe the role of liaisons and First Nations officers vis-à-vis their own 
organisations. 
 Historically, the colonial office (in London) relied on surveillance on the ground in the 
colonies as a basis for governance. Gradually the political locus of governance shifted to 
colonial governments. Both the North West Mounted Police (NWMP) and the network of Indian 
agents were indispensable sources of information about people and land. The NWMP used 
small police patrols and Métis guides to facilitate access to Indigenous peoples and to increase 
their knowledge of the communities. While relying on “consent”-based strategies, this was 
leveraged by surveillance and the enduring potential of violence. The knowledge of conditions 
and political climate on the ground informed when and how the mechanism of colonial 
emergency was deployed by government to legitimate “exceptional” military interventions. 
Surveillance and the colonial emergency were prevention mechanisms used to circumvent 
political mobilisations against imperial power. In the contemporary emergency management 
apparatus, the protection of colonial sovereignty through “emergency” is most evident in the 
formalisation of Indian Affairs’ systematic “monitoring” of Indigenous “unrest” for the purpose of 
“situational awareness”. 
Since the mid-1990s, across the realms of emergency management, national security, 
and police practices there has been a formalisation of insecurity through the creation and 
publicising of official policies, structures, frameworks, and partnership agreements, which 
enhances discretionary power based on institutional expertise. This is a manifestation of 
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prerogative power, understood not as the prerogative of a ruler, but the prerogatives of settler 
colonial security—accumulation and order. The prerogative is delegated and diffused within the 
expertise of bureaucracies. Prerogative power is exercised through the discretionary decisions 
made in assessing when conditions meet thresholds requiring intervention. This power and the 
expanded practices of information gathering (surveillance) are depoliticised through the 
rationalisation and “scientization” (Ericson and Shearing 1986) of knowledge production through 
the intelligence-led policing paradigm.  
This diffused prerogative power is necessary in the emergency management paradigm 
because of the inherent unpredictability of “emergency”. This reflected in the lack of defined 
boundaries of the “all-hazards” approach—evident in the open-ended definitions of 
“emergencies” and “issues” as well as the criteria in official assessments of risk. This same logic 
underlies the national security impetus to not “take chances” and investigate “everything and 
anything”, and the police logics of always preparing for the “worst case scenario”. Applied to 
Indigenous communities and protests, these logics are further shaped by the anxieties of settler 
colonialism to normalise elevated prevention responses. 
While formalisation reflects a mode of transparency and pre-emptive accountability 
(often spurred by external pressures for accountability), it also works to enhance institutional 
secrecy. First, these activities reinforce the asserted expertise of institutions and the circular 
assumption that their actions are justified because they are undertaken based on this expertise. 
Second, through operational collaborations and the exchange of information and intelligence, a 
cloak of secrecy in the name of security extends from the law enforcement and intelligence 
realm to include “partner” organisations. Third, the implementation of formal lines of 
communication and institutional barriers between police and government as a means of (a) 
guarding against political interference, and (b) providing transparency and accountability, create 
conditions that encourage covert informal communications. 
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None of the governance mechanisms discussed in this dissertation—rights-based 
policing, measured response, intelligence-led policing, the national security prioritisation of 
critical infrastructure, and emergency management—are specific to Indigenous peoples and 
communities in the way that the Indian Act is. However, because of the settler colonial regime of 
which the Indian Act is a significant component, these mechanisms work in specific ways when 
deployed vis-à-vis Indigenous peoples. One way that this is most visible is the deployment of 
lawfare mechanisms of land claims negotiation and settlements by Indian Affairs to prevent or 
mitigate direct actions that disrupt (or threaten to disrupt) critical infrastructure. In the “ruptures” 
of Indigenous direct actions, we can see the convergence of the administrative-bureaucratic and 
police apparatuses of the settler colonial state.  
 
LIMITATIONS, IMPLICATIONS AND FURTHER RESEARCH  
In examining how police and government policies are being implemented in practice, my work 
moves beyond evaluating the “success” or “failure” of organisational reforms to show how they 
are rooted in, and shape, colonial relationships between the Canadian state and Indigenous 
peoples. This research contributes to understanding the unique complexities and historical 
continuities of colonial policing and well as the significance of anti-colonial resistance in 
rendering settler-colonial order insecure. This has implications in terms of thinking about 
policing practices as historical dis/continuities rooted in settler colonialism and therefore for 
understanding the enduring integral relationship of police-security institutions to settler-state 
formation. As I have discussed above, these are analytically important because they challenge 
perceptions of institutional reforms as being “new” and fundamentally different modes of 
governance, which reinforces dominant legitimating narratives that naturalise settler sovereignty 
and relegate colonialism to a distant past. Connected to this, and by centring resistance, there is 
a third set of implications for ongoing Indigenous struggles and the possibility of decolonisation, 
including the role of settlers.  
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(Un)mapping is always a partial project, intended as Dorothy Smith (2005) suggests of 
institutional ethnography, as interconnecting with other “maps” to form multilayered, 
multidimensional analyses. There are therefore always many avenues for further (un)mapping. 
The objective of this research project has been to make institutional practices visible, in part as 
a counterpoint to official representations. As I discussed in chapter 1, by choosing to “study up” 
and focus on the practices of state institutions, I have not included the experiences of those “on 
the other side” of the encounter: the Indigenous communities and individuals involved in 
protests and direct actions. These perspectives and experiences are central to fully considering 
the questions raised by this research and the bigger picture of decolonisation. 
 I have also focused on the protests and direct actions that have been categorised by 
police and government departments as “militant” and therefore of greater risk. This 
categorisation is important because it indicates the degree that these events could be “ruptures” 
to order. Of significance, many of these events take place on or near a reserve community and 
are direct conflicts with government and/or a third party. I have not addressed the specificity of 
intra-community political conflicts, which the OPP and RCMP often respond to. Internal conflicts 
within First Nations communities that have local First Nations police services raises complex 
questions about jurisdiction, conflicts-of-interest, and the perception of OPP and RCMP 
involvement as colonial interventions. Also, while I have discussed the Idle No More movement 
and protests at Parliament Hill, I have not addressed the unique dynamics of Indigenous 
protests that occur in urban centres. Consequently, I have not substantially looked at the 
practices of municipal police forces, which have different histories with First Nations 
communities and Indigenous people.  
While the institutional practices discussed in this dissertation reflect broader trends that 
transcend the nation-state, there is always a specificity in how they are implemented. One of the 
significant factors is the political-legal jurisdiction in which encounters occur. There are 
significant variations in the history of settler colonisation in the formation of the Canadian state. 
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For example, in BC, which is provincially policed by the RCMP, most First Nations have not 
signed historical treaties and much of the land remained unceded. Contemporary 
comprehensive land claims have therefore been more prevalent in BC than in other regions. In 
Quebec, which like Ontario has its own provincial police force, Indigenous self-determination 
contends with Quebec sovereignty interests and more pronounced provincial-federal tensions. 
Each of these provinces is also shaped by the events of Gustafsen Lake and Oka, respectively, 
and are the sites of frequent protest “hot spots” according to Indian Affairs and the RCMP. 
These are just some of the contingencies that shape policing practices.  
 
Implications and Further Inquiry  
Perhaps the most important and complicated question that arises from this dissertation is what 
impact do current policing practices, couched in the language of reconciliation, have for the 
potential of decolonisation? If institutions and specific organisations are shaped by quasi-
autonomous factors and local conditions and experiences, shifts in their practices can 
sometimes be in tension or conflict internally with existing practices or externally with other 
institutions. Changes in one organisation or even in one institutional cluster (e.g. policing, Indian 
Affairs, national security) can occur independently of other institutions. This is something that 
has emerged in different ways in this research. One example is the potential for Aboriginal 
policing programs and liaisons to challenge dominant constructions of risk (re)produced in 
intelligence threat assessments. The question is whether these inter- and intra-
organisational/institutional tensions—which have emerged from externally produced ruptures of 
colonial encounters—can themselves become ruptures or contribute to ruptures in unsettling 
settler colonialism.  
As the “meat of the sandwich”, front line policing maintains a tenuous and temporary 
order that may be beneficial in terms of the liberal politics of reconciliation, but not necessarily in 
terms of material restitution and respect for self-determination. Policing strategies have worked 
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to institutionalise resistance through legal and quasi-legal venues, which historically, have 
secured colonial interests, and reinforced criminalisation of “extremists” and “militants” who 
reject institutionalised processes. Coupled with the extensive surveillance apparatus, does 
contemporary policing reduce the pressures on government to address land claims and 
respects treaty and inherent rights? Despite the overall positivity expressed around changes in 
policing practices, most of the people that I interviewed were confident that Indigenous protests 
and direct actions will inevitably continue and likely intensify in the future. The most common 
explanation for ongoing conflict is the persistent failure of government to address root issues 
and to respect treaties. As one RCMP member put it, “if nothing gets done from the last [flash 
point] and we remain complacent and idle—the big ‘we’, GOC, Government of Canada—you 
know, what do you expect? There’s going to be another uprising, right; and do you think the 
issue’s going to be different? No” (Interview, RCMP3). Many interviewees identified increased 
resource extraction and energy projects as the source of future flashpoints, which will bring 
long-simmering land and rights struggles to the fore.  
 This is already evident as the arena of settler colonial lawfare has been producing 
conditions or spaces for potential rupture. On one front, the federal government have enacted a 
series of unilateral legislative changes directly impacting Indigenous peoples without engaging 
in consultation. On another front, recent court rulings have clarified legal aspects of the colonial 
relationship through their interpretations of Aboriginal title and rights; in doing so, these ruling 
have established grounds for further legal challenges by Indigenous peoples, but also have set 
parameters on which state and corporate entities can justify incursions.  
The Tsilhqot’in Nation decision,307 released in June 2014, confirmed recognition of the 
Tsilhqot’in Nation’s title over territory extending beyond its current reserve; it created the 
possibility that title could cover wide territories and not only small tracts of land where there has 
                                               
307
 Tsilhqot’in Nation v. British Columbia, 2014 SCC 144. 
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been “proof” of permanent, continuous inhabitancy. However, the Supreme Court’s ruling also 
reinforces the existing limit on Aboriginal title that allows federal and provincial governments to 
infringe title for certain purposes such as critical infrastructure development (subject to the duty 
to consult with the First Nations). Based on the Tsilhqot’in decision, the Gitxsan First Nation has 
issued eviction notices to sport fishers, forestry operators, and CN Rail.  
In another major Supreme Court decision released July 2014, the ruling went against 
Grassy Narrows First Nation, which has been engaged since 2002 in the longest running 
blockade in Canada’s history.308 The Court’s finding that Ontario has the power to take treaty 
lands has set the stage for continued resistance and confrontation with the province and logging 
companies. Meanwhile, conflict continues at Kanonhstaton (the former site of Douglas Creek 
Estates) and people from Six Nations have promised to engage in ongoing disruptions if 
Haldimand County forcibly removes a barricade on the reclaimed site.   
Conflicts over a number of pipeline projects have brought First Nations and settler 
groups together in opposition. Aamjiwnaang First Nation and non-Indigenous groups in Sarnia 
have been engaged in disruptions of Enbridge’s Line 9 project, and members of Six Nations 
recently blocked Enbridge digging operations. First Nations organisations and grassroots 
activists—as well as non-indigenous environmental and community groups—have been 
mobilising against the Northern Gateway pipeline expansion project. There have been 
demonstrations, marches, blockades and constitutional challenges launched by BC First 
Nations. 
Another implication of this research pertains to the trajectory of pacification strategies. I 
have suggested that the formation of mechanisms and techniques of governance provide the 
foundations for expansion in part through their self-justifying discourses of security. As 
Neocleous (2008) and Hussain (2007) have argued, the “exceptional” measures introduced in 
                                               
308
 Grassy Narrows First Nation v. Ontario (Natural Resources), 2014 SCC 48. 
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response to specific events tend to become incorporated and normalised as part of the security 
apparatus. Historically, policing and other social control strategies were and are deployed 
against Indigenous peoples and then applied to ‘domestic’ populations. In the time that I have 
been working on this project, we have already seen the extension of strategies to the wider 
settler population through normalised, regularised surveillance of protests in the name of 
“national security” and protecting critical infrastructure.  
Public Safety Canada’s Government Operations Centre (GOC) was one of the entities 
that I had contacted to participate in interviews. In this case, I had an opportunity to speak with a 
GOC official, who explained that they were declining to participate because the GOC did not 
have anything to do with protests, and therefore would not be of relevance to my research. In 
this conversation, I pointed to the nexus of critical infrastructure and Indigenous communities, 
but to no avail. The position of the GOC reflects the emergency management refrain that the 
object of concern is critical infrastructure. As I show in the map above (Figure 2), and in my 
discussions in chapters 3, 5 and 6, the GOC is very much a part of managing Indigenous 
resistance as a “brokerage” mechanism connecting police and political realms.  
In June 2014, an email was leaked to a journalist with the Ottawa Citizen. This was an 
email sent by the GOC to its partners asking them to assist the GOC with “compiling a 
comprehensive listing of all known demonstrations which will occur either in your geographical 
area or that may touch on your mandate.” The GOC will disseminate the compiled information to 
its partners, although sensitive information “will only be used by the GOC for our Situational 
Awareness” (Pugliese 2014).  
Most commentary in response to this leak has revolved around the questionable 
“legality” and constitutionality of monitoring peaceful protests and the inconsistency with liberal 
democratic societies—in short, describing these practices as illiberal. As I have critiqued, this is 
a problematic characterisation because it presumes a legitimate scope for monitoring— i.e. 
threats to public order, which, as I have argued, tends to legitimate the monitoring of Indigenous 
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communities. Other commentators have linked the GOC’s request to political motivations of the 
current Conservative government. Based on my findings, there are quasi-autonomous dynamics 
at work independent of the intentions of a specific government executive. First, the widening of 
monitoring objectives reflects an extension of institutional mandate, which I argue occurs in part 
to maintain its relevance (and existence) amid the plethora of intelligence producers and 
competition for funding. As I noted in chapter 6, the GOC’s relevance has been questioned 
within the law enforcement realm. Second, this is a clear example of the redundancy of 
intelligence. Considering law enforcement and CSIS concerns to maintain secrecy and security 
of their intelligence (and sources), it is likely that the main type of information that would be 
shared with the GOC would be open source. The GOC’s compiling of this information is a 
(re)packaging of information that has already been compiled elsewhere. Third, and most 
importantly, this reflects the expansion of pacification practices that have already been 
normalised in the case of Indigenous peoples.  
Throughout the dissertation and in this concluding chapter, I have discussed only some 
of the protests and direct actions that reflect the ongoing processes of settler colonialism. With 
every encounter, the settler colonial relationship is reshaped. The most recent events discussed 
in this concluding chapter reflect what Gordon (2010) argues is an intensification of (potential) 
conflicts driven by the expansionist impulses of global capitalism and accumulation. In the 
current conflicts over energy projects, there is already evidence of greater collaboration 
between corporate and state security activities. As I have discussed, the critical infrastructure 
security strategy depends on the partnership of corporate owner-operators with state 
intelligence producers. Mapping the interfacing of the “in-house” operations of critical 
infrastructure owner-operators and resource extraction companies with the various police-
security state institutions can make visible (a) the potential extension of invasive police power 
(“legitimate violence”) and (b) the expansion of the national security blanket of secrecy over the 
operations of corporate entities. In light of the conditions that seem to be setting the stage for 
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future conflicts around energy projects further work is needed that addresses the symbiosis of 
the state and the corporate sector. Although I have alluded to it, it is not something I took up 
substantially in the dissertation. This would contribute to theorising and unsettling the binary of 
public/private policing in terms of the role played by the corporate sector in pacifying threats to 
the status quo of social, political and economic relations to facilitate the accumulation of wealth 
as a central driver of settler state formations.  
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APPENDIX A 
List of Texts Obtained through Access to Information / Freedom of Information Requests 
This list only includes the texts specifically referenced in the dissertation. They are divided 
according to the department from which they were obtained and grouped by the request file 
number. The documents are listed chronologically.  
 
File Number Description of Document 
 
Royal Canadian Mounted Police 
 
A-2012-07569 RCMP. Tactical Operations Manual.  
A-2011-05620 RCMP. 2004 (September 1). “Subject: Sunpeaks” [email]. 
GA-3951-3-05023/8 RCMP. 2006. Compensation, expense and travel claims for ‘Project O Caledonia’. 
2007-02463 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2007 (January 23). Project Plan RCMP Criminal Intelligence.  
RCMP. 2007 (February 12). “Critical incident Program – Aboriginal Initiative.”  
A-2013-05807 
(informal) 
RCMP. “Tactical Troop Use of Force Guidelines” [deck].  
RCMP. 2007. “Decision Making Process: Police Crowd Management Mandates” [deck].  
RCMP. 2006-7. “Tactical Troop Crowd Psychology” [course training presentation].  
GA 3951-3-00060/11 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2007 (January 4). “Subject: Ministerial Deck for PM” [email]. 
INAC. 2007 (March 30). “Aboriginal Hot Spots and Public Safety” [deck].  
CSIS. 2007 (May 3). “Subject: Message from ITAC Director, Daniel Giasson” [email]. 
RCMP. 2007 (May 16). Briefing Note to the Commissioner (BN CCAPS-07-067).  
RCMP. 2007 (June 4). Briefing Note to Deputy Commissioner (BN CCAPS-07-069).  
RCMP. 2007 (June 12). Briefing note to the Commissioner (CCAPS-07-077).  
GA-3951-3-04344/09 RCMP. 2007. Aboriginal and Community Public Safety Situation Reports [April 11-June 30].  
A-2012-00176 RCMP. 2007. Aboriginal and Community Public Safety Situation Reports [July 1 – December 
31] 
A-2012-00178 RCMP. 2007 (September). The National Day of Action Debrief – Draft. 
A-2012-06995 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2007 (June). “Threat Assessment of Aboriginal Communities of Concern.” 
A-2012-0660 RCMP. 2008 (May). “Threat Assessment of Aboriginal Communities of Concern.” 
GA-3951-3-03434/11 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2009 (March 3). “NAPS 2009 POWPM” [deck]    
A-2011-06291 RCMP. 2009 (June). “RCMP Criminal Intelligence. Aboriginal Joint Intelligence Group. 
Aboriginal Communities, Issues, Events and Concerns 2009/10.”  
GA-3951-3-00094/12 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2009 (November 13). “Subject: Aboriginal JIG” [email].  
GA-3951-03510/11 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2011. “G8/G20 Summits Integrated Security Unit (ISU). Royal Canadian Mounted 
Police (RCMP). After Action Report (AAR).”  
Indian and Northern Affairs Canada / AANDC 
A-2013-00499 INAC. 2006 (November 28). “Rebuilding INAC’s Emergency Management Assistance 
Program (EMAP). ARDG Forum” [deck]. 
AI-2012-00081 
(informal; copy of 
2011-710) 
INAC. 2007 (February 23). “Communications/Media approach around 1st anniversary of 
Caledonia - version #928537.” 
INAC. 2007 (June 12). “Subject: Re: Six Nations / Caledonia May 30 offer – Canada’s 
response to Six Nations” [email]. 
INAC. 2007 (September 28). “Strategic Communications Plan: Negotiations with Six Nations 
and Community Relations.” 
A-2011-01156 Holman, Brad. 2007 (July 31). Final Report: Formative Evaluation – Indian and Northern 
Affairs Emergency Management Assistance Program. Ottawa: Indian and Northern Affairs 
Canada. 
2011-02004 Ministry of Aboriginal Affairs. 2007 (June 29). “FW: NDA Bulletin - NDA 29-006” [email]. 
INAC. 2007 (n.d.). Background Advice. [Ontario Region]. 
INAC. 2007. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
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A-2012-02003 INAC. 2008 (September 25) “Subject: Fwd: National Day of Political Action on September 
29, 2008” [email]. 
INAC. 2008. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
A-2010-00831  
(informal) 
INAC. 2008 (December 30). “Protest Wed Jan. 7 – 12:00 Barriere Lake Solidarity” [email – 
forwarded message from RCMP’s Aboriginal JIG]. 
INAC. 2008. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
A-2012-00033 INAC. 2009 (February). “National Emergency Management Plan – Draft” 
RCMP. 2009 (February 17). “Call for protest at Queen’s Park in Toronto…” [Aboriginal JIG 
email to EIMD]. 
INAC. 2009 (March). “Ontario Region – Incident Management Guidelines Crisis and 
Emergency Management Unit, Intergovernmental Affairs, Ontario Region, March 2009 – 
DRAFT.” 
INAC (EIMD). 2009. “Threat/Event: Notification 1 – Members of Six Nations (ON) – Protest – 
demonstration – City of Brantford – 4JUN2009 – 2268609” [EIMD notification]. 
EIMD. 2009 (October 28). “Indigenous Sovereignty Week (October 24-31, 2009)” [email to 
Aboriginal JIG]. 
INAC. 2009 (December). “Operational Plan for Managing Protests at Indian and Northern 
Affairs Canada (INAC) Offices” 
INAC. 2009 (December). Ontario Region Emergency Management Plan. 
INAC. 2009. “Brantford Incident Management System, Ontario Region.” 
INAC. 2009. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
A-2012-00257 INAC. 2010 (August). “Incident Report 2009-2010: Emergency and Issue Management at 
INAC.” 
A-2012-00256 INAC EIMD. 2010 (June 21). “Concept of Operations Template – G8/G20 Summits”. 
A-2012-1155 INAC EIMD. 2010 (April 8). After Action Report – Vancouver 2010 Olympic and Paralympic 
Winter Games 
INAC EIMD. 2010 (August 4). After Action Report – Vancouver 2010 Olympic and 
Paralympic Winter Games 
INAC EIMD. 2010 (August 26). After Action Report - G8/G20 Summits. 
A-2011-01157 INAC. 2010. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
A-2012-00032 INAC. 2011 (February 10). “Subject: Civil Unrest” [email]. 
INAC 2011 (March 1). “Capacity & Preparedness for Civil Unrest – Engaging Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence Partners (Information for Deputy Minister)” [draft briefing note]. 
INAC 2011 (March 10). “Capacity & Preparedness for Civil Unrest – Engaging Law 
Enforcement and Intelligence Partners (Information for Deputy Minister)” [briefing note]. 
INAC. 2011 (August 23). “Subject: Fwd: Incident Report status update” [email]. 
INAC (EIMD). 2011. “EIMD Logic Models for Issuing Notifications” [deck]. 
INAC. 2011. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
A-2010-02632 EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications (August 2010 to Jan 31, 
2011) 
A-2012-01674 INAC. 2012. EIMD Weekly Summaries, Weekend Summaries, Notifications [January 1 – 
December 31] 
A-2013-00501 AANDC. 2013. EIMD email distribution lists [screen shots of address groups]. 
2012-01680 AANDC. 2013. “Cheat Sheet – Supplemental Flood, Wildland Fire Season and Other Issues 
Update as of Tuesday January 29, 2013.” 
Department of National Defence 
AI 2009-00443 
(informal) 
DND. 2006 (April 24). CFNCIU Counter-Intelligence Report.  
CFNCIU. 2006 (April 24). “Threats to Security – Demonstrations – Native Protests – Further 
to CIC INTREP 012-06” (CIC 013-06). 
AI-2009-00442 
(informal) 
CFNCIU. 2006 (December 6). Counter Intelligence Information Report (2106-15-8-5). 
A-2006-00447 
(informal) 
Canada Command. 2006 (May 3). “Commander’s Planning Guidance – CF Policy in Support 
of Law Enforcement Agencies in Caledonia and Other Linked Sympathetic Demonstrations” 
[memorandum]. 
CFNCIU. 2007 (April 4). Liaison report (File No. 2106-10). 
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DND. Incident Management System of Canada Command  [entry re: probable blockade”]. 
A-2007-00590 
(informal) 
DND. 2007 (May 10). “ADM EMC Sub-Committee Meeting on Aboriginal Issues” [email]. 
DND. 2007 (May 31). “Subject: 30 May ADM EMC Sub-Committee on Aboriginal Issues” 
[email].  
DND. 2007 (June 7). “6 Jun ADM EMC on Aboriginal Issues” [email];  
DND. 2007 (June 26). “Subject: RE: ADM EMC Sub-Committee on Aboriginal affairs” 
(email).  
A-2010-00659 CFNCIU. 2010 (June 16). JTFC Counter-Intelligence Summary. 
CFNCIU. 2010 (June 22). Counter Intelligence Information Report. 
A-2012-01839 
(informal) 
CFNCIU. 2012 (December 18). CFNCIU Counter Intelligence Report.  
A-2013-00679 
(informal) 
DND. 2013 (May 7). “Issue: CFNCIU reports on road protests” [media response line]. 
Public Safety Canada 
1336-A-2007-0121 
(informal) 
RCMP. 2007 (February). “RCMP Response to Aboriginal Occupations and Protests” [deck].  
Public Safety and Emergency Preparedness Canada. 2007 (March 30). “Response to 
Aboriginal Occupations and Protests” [briefing note].  
PSC. 2007 (April 30). Minister’s Dinner with the National Chief of the Assembly of First 
Nations (AFN), Mr. Phil Fontaine, May 7, 2007” [briefing note]. 
PSC. 2007 (May 30). “ADM-EM Meeting Summary of Discussions” [email].  
1336-A-2009-0052 Public Safety Canada. 2007 (May 8). “Federal Coordination Framework for the AFN National 
Day of Action 29 June 2007.” 
ITAC. 2007 (May 25). “ITAC Threat Assessment: Aboriginal Protests – Summer 2007” 
(07/34). 
A-2009-00070 PSC. 2007 (May 16). ADM-EMC Planning and Operations Sub-Committees – Aboriginal 
Issues; Summary Record [meeting notes]. 
PSC. 2007 (June 6). DM-EMC Planning and Operations Sub-Committees – Aboriginal 
Issues; Summary Record [meeting notes]. 
A-2012-00438 GOC. 2012 (January 3). “Addendum to ST122-12G First Nations Protests” [report]. 
GOC. 2012. Situation Reports ST122-12A, ST122-12B, ST122-12C, ST122-12D. 
GOC. 2012 (December 28). “Notification – Incident NT122-12” [email]. 
PSC. 2013. “GC Contingency Planning Scenario – FN Protests & Potential Escalation” 
[deck]. 
Canadian Security Intelligence Service 
117-2008-123 CSIS. 2006 (March 30). “Native protesters in Caledonia Ontario refuse to end demonstration 
despite court order” (06/71). 
CSIS. 2006 (April 21) “Native demonstrations in Caledonia, Ontario” (06/91) [CSIS Threat 
Assessment Lasers]. 
ITAC. 2007 (May 11). “Threat Assessment: Aboriginal Protests – Summer 2007” (07/30). 
ITAC. 2007 (June 21). "lTAC Threat Assessment: Aboriginal Protests Summer 2007” (07/46). 
2012-210 ITAC. 2008 (April 16). “ITAC Situation Report: Aboriginal Protests - Summer 2008” (08/32). 
ITAC. 2008 (June 20). “ITAC Special Assessment – Aboriginal Protests - Summer 2008” 
(08/87). 
117-2012-95 
(informal) 
ITAC. 2010 (December 30). “Canada: Biannual update on the threat from terrorists and 
extremists” (10/151-E). 
117-2012-476 
(informal) 
ITAC. 2012 (April 19). “Canada: Biannual update on the threat from terrorists and extremists” 
(12/35-E). 
A-2012-384 
(informal) 
ITAC. 2013 (January 24). “Activist group plans to deliver a message to Ottawa” [Threat 
Laser]. 
Ministry of Community Safety and Correctional Services (Ontario FIPPA) 
A-2012-03063 
 
OPP. 2011. Provincial Liaison Team Review 2009-2010. [includes PLT Standard Operating 
Procedures, and Position Descriptions] 
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